State Armaments Program 2011-2020

franco wrote:Russian Defense Minister, Sergei Shoigu, announced to the lower house of parliament, on February 23 that Russia has tested a plethora of weapons in its fight against jihadist rebels in Syria.

“We tested 162 types of contemporary and modernized weapons in Syria, which showed a high level of effectiveness,” Shoigu said.

Only 10 weapons systems performed below expectations, he added, without specifying which weapons.

Oniks is probably one of the 10. It was used against land target for the first time. On the other hand, they didn't talk about the Hermes results which is weird as they said that they send some of them on Kuz and it's their futur "top missile" which need some publicity before they offer it for export, we can assume the developement is not finished yet.

Why would we assume Oniks was one of those that did not meet expectations?

I would say the Su-25 and Su-35 got removed and upgraded, and the Kuznetsov also had some faults but there were 172 new and upgraded technologies tested of which 10 did not meet expectations and 162 that did what was expected... sounds damn good to me.

When they list all the technology items they are talking about perhaps we can make some guesses, but just assumptions is not helpful here.

GarryB wrote:Why would we assume Oniks was one of those that did not meet expectations?

I would say the Su-25 and Su-35 got removed and upgraded, and the Kuznetsov also had some faults but there were 172 new and upgraded technologies tested of which 10 did not meet expectations and 162 that did what was expected... sounds damn good to me.

When they list all the technology items they are talking about perhaps we can make some guesses, but just assumptions is not helpful here.

Yes, that would means nothing, those ten could be some secondary things, total random ones or at the contrary the most important in the term of implementation of future russian military doctrine.

I dare say the special forces on the ground likely tested the bulk of the new gear including probably three dozen odd new technologies in the version of Ratnik they used to detect targets for the air power that was used... not to mention new types of ammo for a range of new weapons likely tested too.

I would guess at the very least they had trouble with batteries not performing to spec... you always get problems with new technology and batteries.

The point is that this is a real test in a realistic environment so even the systems and equipment that didn't come up to spec will now be looked at and worked on to get it up to speed... this is a good thing.

Some of those 160 weapons tested;

http://valdaiclub.com/multimedia/infographics/testing-new-types-of-weapons-in-Syria/

franco wrote:Russian Defense Minister, Sergei Shoigu, announced to the lower house of parliament, on February 23 that Russia has tested a plethora of weapons in its fight against jihadist rebels in Syria.

“We tested 162 types of contemporary and modernized weapons in Syria, which showed a high level of effectiveness,” Shoigu said.

Only 10 weapons systems performed below expectations, he added, without specifying which weapons.

According to this article the Ka-52K was one of the 10;

http://www.navyrecognition.com/index.php/news/defence-news/2017/march-2017-navy-naval-forces-defense-industry-technology-maritime-security-global-news/4985-russia-mod-problems-with-ka-52k-katran-naval-helicopter-following-mediterranean-trials.html

Before the begin of the future State Armament Program 2018-2025, there are some questions that I would expect to be solved. First, the delivery of the first unit of the S-350, T-15 IFV, Mi-38, Ka-60/62 and Yak-152 seems assured this year (if has not been done at this point). Finally, the total decommission (including of the reserve) of the Il-14, An-8, Tu-124, Be-12 and AT-T, can be finnished before 2018.

What I would expect of the State Armament Program 2018-2025:

1.- To assure common standards in procurement and decommissions for land forces, common standards for sea forces, common standards for aerospace forces, common standards for land forces deployed by air and sea means, and common standards for military intelligence:

Russian Army
Russian Strategic Missile Troops
Russian Military Police
Russian Air Defence Troops
Russian Coastal Troops

Russian Aerospace Forces
Russian Naval Aviation
Russian Army Aviation

Russian Navy

Russian Airborne Troops
Russian Naval Infantry
Russian Navy Special Forces

Main Intelligence Directorate

2.- To exclude since the begin the procurement of the relatively weakest, less standard (including launched grenades) and less modern weapons (including the last variants) and auxiliary equipment in production:

2A19/29 (M)T-12

2A65 Msta-B

GP-30

SPG-9
2B14 Podnos
GM-93/94 (LPO-97)

2S23
SA-13
MT-LB
BTR-80

3.- I would expect a militarization of some warfare that is now managed by non military security forces. It means the transference of low amounts of:

Project 11351 (3 units from R Coast Guard to R Navy)
Project 1265 (1 unit from R Coast Guard to R Navy)
Project 1330 (5 units from R Coast Guard to R Navy)
Project T-4 (3 units from R Coast Guard to R Navy)
Project 1176 (2 units from R Coast Guard to R Navy)
2S1 (12 units from Border Service of the FSB to R Army)

4.- To finnish the process of replacement of foreign components, and a plan for the scrapping, sale or demilitarization of foreign material of the Russian Armed Forces. It would include foreign designs, but not Russian or Sovietic designs produced out of Russia.

Dry cargo ships purchased for the operation in Syria

Type Dora
Type Dubna
Project REF-675
Project REF-100
Project R-5757
Project UK-3
Project V92
Project V820
L-39
L-410

An-140
Iveco LMV
IC16M Project IC16MII
An-148/158/178

5.- Total retirement from active service of the last heavy towed weapons except the biggest Surface-Air (A-135) and Surface-Surface (SS-18 and SS-19) missiles. In the case of the (M)T-12 I expect a total decommission with a retirement also of the reserve:

2A19/29 (M)T-12

2B16 Nona-K
2A36 Giatsint-B
2A18 D-30
2A65 Msta-B

6.- Upgrade on self propelled Surface-Surface, Surface-Air and Artillery warfare, with the replacement of the tractor elements with unarmoured cabin by (more standardized) tractor elements with armoured cabin, according to the modern safety standards for the rest of the land warfare, and to make full mobile the SS-29 and SS-27. The retired unarmoured tractor elements can be used for military transport in non-contested areas:

SS-29
SS-27
SS-25
SS-26
SS-21
SS-1
SS-C-7
SS-C-6
SS-C-5
SS-C-1B
BM-30
BM-27

SA-21
SA-10/12/20/23
SA-22
SA-8

A-222

BM-21

7.- Finalisation of the development of new weapons and non-combat equipment, and delivery of the first unit, to complete the new generation of equipment developed in the first quarter of the XXI century. Listed the key projects (except components, including ammunition) where the first unit is not in production in 2017. Bolded the projects where the timeline still assures not a first unit by 2025, and something elsethat I think would be interesting:

New ammunition for the SA-4 tractors (I see not news despite a lack of projects for new surface-air systems/ammunition for the 15-50Km range, approximately the original range of the SA-4)
New ammunition for the 125mm tanks of range over 17.5 Km to allow them to fight also from outside of the range of man-portable weapons of the adversary.
New ammunition for the TOS-1 of range over 17.5 Km to allow them to fight also from outside of the range of man-portable weapons of the adversary.

A-235
SS-30/RS-28

Project 23000E (multirole Aircraft Carrier)
Project 23560 (multirole Cruiser/Destroyer)
Project ????? Lavina or Project ????? Priboi (multirole Amphibious Ship)

SA-??/S-500
SA-??/Morphey
SS-31/RS-26
TOS BM2 with some ammunition of range over 17.5 Km to be able to work also from outside of the range of man-portable weapons. (Armata platform)
SS-32/RS-27?
2S?? 125mm Sprut SDM-1 with some ammunition of range over 17.5 Km to be able to work also from outside of the range of man-portable weapons.(BMD-4M platform)
2S?? 120mm Lotos (BMD-4M platform)
2S?? 240mm that combines direct and indirect (mortar) fire. Successor of the 2S4. (Armata platform)
2S?? 203mm for long range direct fire. Successor of the 2S7. (Armata platform)
2S?? 203mm that combines direct and indirect (mortar) fire. New. (Armata platform)
2S?? 152mm that combines direct and indirect (mortar) fire. New. (Armata platform)
2S?? 152mm that combines direct and indirect (mortar) fire. Successor of the 2S34. (Kurganets platform)
2S?? 152mm for agile direct fire, antitank role, with some ammunition of range over 17.5 Km to be able to work also from outside of the range of man-portable weapons. New.(Kurganets platform)
2S?? 125mm for agile direct fire, antitank role, with some ammunition of range over 17.5 Km to be able to work also from outside of the range of man-portable weapons. Successor of the BMP-3 100mm. (Kurganets platform)
2S?? 152mm that combines direct and indirect (mortar) fire. Successor of the 2S23. (Bumerang platform)
2S?? 152mm for agile direct fire, antitank role, with some ammunition of range over 17.5 Km to be able to work also from outside of the range of man-portable weapons. New. (Bumerang platform)
2S?? 125mm for agile direct fire, antitank role, with some ammunition of range over 17.5 Km to be able to work also from outside of the range of man-portable weapons. New. (Bumerang platform)
T-14 152mm with some ammunition of range over 17.5 Km to be able to work also from outside of the range of man-portable weapons. (Armata platform)
BMPT Terminator 3 with some weapon that allows to the project to work also outside of the range of the portable/man-portable weapons of the adversary. (Armata platform)
T-15 APC (Armata platform)
Kurganets-25 IFV (Kurganets platform)
Kurganets-25 APC (Kurganets platform)
Bumerang-25 IFV (Bumerang platform)
Bumerang-25 APC (Bumerang platform)
T-16 (Armata platform engineering vehicles)

MiG-35
Tu-PAK-DA
MiG-41/PAK-DP

Ka-92 or Mi-46 (in the An-24/26/30/32 size class with around 10 tons payload).
Il-214 40 or Tu-330 (transport in the Tu-204/214 size class with around 40 tons payload, with the 3 sizes philosophy).
Ka-102 (in the An-72/74 size class with around 15 tons payload).
Il-106/PTS 80 (transport in the An-22 size class with around 80 tons payload, with the 3 sizes philosophy).
Il-214 20 (transport in the An-10/12 size class with around 20 tons payload, with the 3 sizes philosophy).
PTS 160 (transport in the An-124 size class with around 160 tons payload, with the 3 sizes philosophy).
Il-214 60 (transport in the Il-76/78 Be-A50 size class with around 60 tons payload, with the 3 sizes philosophy).

Current key projects where a timeline longer than 2025 for the delivery of the first unit would not be a problem from a military point (bolded the most interesting and innovative projects for the next generation):

Yak-135 as light supersonic trainer (plus FGA to export)
Il-PAK-TA as supersonic transport
Unmanned Long Range Shipborne Maritime Patrol VTOL aircraft/helicopter
Unmanned Combat Helicopter compatible with all the branches of the Russian Armed Forces

Frigate Ecojet (airliner in the Il-62 size class for double configuration: 1 mid passenger capacity + long range, 2 high passenger capacity + mid range).
Comac C929 (airliner in the Il-86/80/96 size class for high passenger capacity + long range).
MS-21/Yak-242 (airliner in the Tu-204/214 size class for mid passenger capacity + mid range).

It is necessary to analyze if the rest of the manned projects of heavy equipment known publicly, not in production in 2017, maybe only distraction of efforts and funds.

8.- Very intense procurement in relative terms on:

Surface-Air systems (by lack os saturation of the reserve)

Infantry Vehicles (to improve the fleet toward the modern standards)

There is a potential decission to be made. It is about the adoption of standard calibers for launched grenades (30mm, 45mm and 73mm, the last likely to disappear in the future). For it the 40mm and 43mm grenades can be moved to the standard 45mm caliber. It would be an improvement in standardization and also in the power of the projectiles.

In the following years, the total decommission (including of the reserve) of the relatively weakest, less standardized and/or less modern material, is likely to come (except in the case of the foreign material included in the point 4) by natural exhaustion after its use by the Russian armed forces, because of external demand or by transference to Russian non-military security forces in the case of the exceeding less modern infantry vehicles. With the likely apparition of Rocket Assisted Projectiles for 125mm (that should have longer range than the 120mm RAP) and longer range rockets of 220mm for the TOS-1, the (M)T-12 would be the alone remaining heavy equipment that must be always inside the range of portable/man-portable weapons of the adversary to do its work, and is likely to be used and totally disappear first.

The updating of this message continues here:
https://www.russiadefence.net/t7032-state-armament-program-2018-2025

I agree with most of what you are suggesting but we still disagree fundamentally on towed weapons.

A towed weapon has features and capabilities no self propelled weapon of the same of better calibre.

It is not like a new weapon is developed and starts in a towed version which is then replaces by a superior self propelled model after which all the towed models are replaced by self propelled models.

In many situations a towed model is superior to any self propelled version.

I do agree that the removal from service of obsolete calibres will make things much easier for the Russian military where all the different and very similar calibres just complicate logistics and potentially confuse matters.

A good example is the 100mm calibre... there are smoothbore tank gun calibre rounds for the MT-12 anti tank gun, there are rounds for the rifled gun carried by the T-54 and T-55 tank, and there is the 100mm rifled gun for the stubby little medium velocity gun on the BMP-3... none of which are compatible with each other. In the similar performance range you have the 120mm rifled gun/mortar, you have the 122mm rifled artillery calibre, and you also have the 125mm smoothbore tank calibre.

In my opinion getting rid of the MT-12 rifled 100mm calibre, the 122mm artillery calibre and the 100mm rifled tank gun and BMP gun removes 4 different rounds... they can all be replaced with a 120mm gun/mortar effectively enough where the anti armour performance of the MT-12 is replaced with guided missiles and the general HE power and range exceeds that of all the rounds listed to be replaced.

That would leave the 120mm gun/mortar calibre, the 125mm calibre and the 152mm calibre for most front line units.

Obviously new vehicles will add 57mm guns and 30mm cannon too.

About reduction of calibers I do not expect explicit steps in the new Armament Program 2018-2025. There are some points where it is possible to advance in this timeline, like in the case of the (M)T-12 and its ammunition, but in overall terms I expect the decommissions coming from the exhausting of the use of the material. It would not be logical to destroy weapons in time of war.

The situation is not bad in Russia, as explained here:

https://www.russiadefence.net/t3465p150-ammo-calibres-for-russian-army-discussion#184106

There are some redundancies but in overall terms Russia has a good, well distributed and stable basis of calibers, that is very difficult to move in the future (basically because the work finding new calibers would be redundant with the work done in the past). The current calibers are the survivors of a very long list of bids. There is not doubt that a few calibers of the listed in the link will disappear but the timeline for it is clear and is not short.

In adition to the commented it is possible to work in the standardization inside some calibers, but again over the basis of the use of the oldest weapons.

Leaving out the material that should be totally out of the Russian Armed Forces in the recent past and in the short term, likely by the begin of the Armament Program 2018-2025, that we can find in the following two comments:

https://www.russiadefence.net/t1321p125-russian-arms-supplies-to-syria#186218

The equipment most likely to be totally decommissioned (including of the reserve) by exhaustion after use, under the Armament Program 2018-2025, would be:

(M)T-12

Nona-K
Giatsint-B
D-30
Msta-B

SPG-9
Podnos
GM-93/94 (LPO-97)

An-2

BTR-60
BMD-1
Il-38

PM-38

Type Woljov auxiliary ship (like all of this group)
Project 73 (433)
Project 719
Project 572 (modified to auxiliary ship)
Project 561
Project 437N
Project 572
Project 527
Project 522
Project 364
Project 596P
Project 860
Project 733
Project 577
Type RBT (05T, 378)
Project 1541 (1852)
Project 870
Project 304
Project 773 (modified to auxiliary ship)
Project 1549
Project 861
Project 160
An-10/12
Project 550
Project 737
Project 871
Project 1236
Project 376
Project 852
Project 97
Project 419
Project 1893
An-22
Mi-6/10

T-80
Project 641 conventional submarine (captured to Ukraine)
Project 1134B cruiser ASW
Project 61/01090 destroyer ASW
Project 1204 missile boat
Project 1332 minesweeper
Project 1171 amphibious ship

But nothing of this would mean the total retirement of some caliber. Even the 73mm caliber would remain still in the BMP-1, which is unlikely to be totally exhausted by 2025, because of the big reserves of this weapon. And more weakly still, the 82mm caliber would remain in some MT-LBs that can be retired or not.

Note that despite the number of projects cited, there are few ships in the last group (that includes veteran combat equipment modern in concept). The total number of ships and submarines of these 6 projects would be 12.


About the towed weapons, the alone key advantage that they provide is to allow a size that exceeds the possibilities of the mobile platforms, and it helps to take profit of the advantages of this very big size. This is the main reason of the existence of the A-135, SS-18 and SS-19, and why today there is a development of modern successors for these weapons, the A-235 and SS-30.

The rest of the possible little advantages are not enough to continue with a military concept (heavy towed weapons) that is becoming out of time, in the scale where mobile platforms are possible. Russia is being clear about it. No new heavy towed projects emerge in the size where mobile platforms are possible, while the remaining weapons are becoming aged, and are being extensively used. And just this use is what make clear that Russia wants to exhaust them instead of keeping them stored long time. Russia thinks that the timeline for the use of the heavy towed weapons with equivalent self propelled weapons is shorter than the timeline for other types of weapons.

The reason to include the remaining heavy towed weapons (except the biggest missiles) in the reserve is to allow its fast use without touch the active forces, that can continue doing its main mission.

Some of the short falls for 2016. Total of 24 aircraft not modernized or repaired in time with Tupolev the biggest offender with 11. Also short 199 aerial munitions for the Air Force.

http://in24.org/technology/26364

Look at the 2018-2025 armament purchase program;

MOSCOW, April 6 - RIA Novosti, Andrey Kots. In early July, the Russian Ministry of Defense will submit to the Supreme Commander-in-Chief and the public the final draft of the state arms program for 2018-2025 (GPV-2025). This document will determine the composition and volumes of new military equipment and technologies that will go into the troops in the next seven to eight years, and set the vector for the further development of our army, aviation and fleet in the 21st century. At the moment, the military is brought to mind the project and agree on the final details of a military-industrial complex (MIC) and the scientific community.
Details of GPV-2025 are still kept secret. However, its general outlines in February, designated Deputy Defense Minister Yuri Borisov. He said that the main task of the Russian defense industry - to bring to 2020 the level of equipment of the Armed Forces with modern equipment up to 70%. Traditionally, the priority will be given to nuclear deterrence forces and aerospace defense.

Other directions will not be left aside. A source in the military department told RIA Novosti on March 10 that the GPO-2025 will include such significant weapons for our military-industrial complex as the S-500 air defense system, the fifth generation PAK FA fighter, combat machines on the Armata platform and others. However, many military experts note that, in the face of funding cuts, a number of ambitious projects can be postponed indefinitely or their implementation will be stretched over time.

Recall, the new state program initially was to cover the period from 2016 to 2025, but it had to "move to the right." As explained in early February, Deputy Prime Minister Dmitry Rogozin, the delay is due to the difficult economic situation in the country. At the current SPO 2011-2020 the state allocated 20 trillion rubles. Rogozin stressed that part of the unspent funds will be transferred to the next program. However, it can be judged only about the full amount of its financing.

As Vedomosti newspaper reported in January referring to its own sources in the defense department, the first estimate for GPV-2025 was compiled in 2015. The military requested for the needs of rearmament first 55 trillion rubles, and later reduced the initial application to 30 trillion. The Ministry of Finance agreed to allocate for these needs no more than 12 trillion. The source of the publication believes that the final amount will be close to the figure of the Ministry of Finance. And this means that the military will have to adjust its initial plans.

"I believe that the most affected by the reduction in funding will be the Navy," Andrei Frolov, editor-in-chief of the magazine Export of Arms, told RIA Novosti. "The reason is simple: in the current SPO, he received more funds for modernization than other types of Armed Forces. Undoubtedly, the pace of construction of the Borey nuclear submarine will continue - the strategic underwater missile fleet remains one of the main guarantors of our security: it is becoming increasingly difficult with surface ships. "It is obvious that the project of nuclear aircraft carriers will be postponed to a remote box "Storm". 2025 is unlikely to come into operation destroyers promising project "leader". "

The expert stressed that, despite the reduced funding, the Russian defense industry is quite able to complete the prolonged repair of the Admiral Nakhimov heavy nuclear missile cruiser (TARKR) during this period, as well as modernize the Pyotr Veliky TARKR and the heavy aircraft-carrying cruiser (TAKR) ) "Admiral Kuznetsov". In turn, the editor-in-chief of the magazine "Military-Industrial Courier" Viktor Nikolaev noted that the program of building ships for the Arctic is unlikely to be "curtailed".

"This region is now of enormous geopolitical and economic value," Nikolayev emphasized, "The Ilya Muromets icebreaker should be commissioned in 2017 for the needs of the Navy." In addition, as early as 2016, the Ministry of Defense concluded with the Admiralty Shipyards "A contract for the construction of two universal patrol ships of the Arctic zone of Project 23550 until 2020. I think they will be completed within the framework of GPV-2025."

According to the Aerospace Forces, experts believe that the cutback in funding will not hit hard. The emphasis will be placed on deliveries of Su-30SM, Su-34, Su-35 combat aircraft, Mi-8AMTSh, Mi-28N and Ka-52 helicopters, as well as S-400 anti-aircraft missile systems, to the aircraft parts successfully tested by the Syrian war. But the debut of the promising S-500 may have to wait.The terms of the PAK DA project will shift due to the start of production of Tu-160M2
"I believe that the samples of this system will appear more or less massively in the troops closer to the end of GPV-2025 or later," Andrei Frolov believes. "I would like to conclude first its development. I think that such rates for deliveries, as with S-400, For four or five regiments per year, we will not be able to reach this period within the specified period, I believe that within the framework of the GPV-2025 our military will refuse a number of promising but expensive projects, for example, from the PAK DA - a prospective long-range aviation complex. Now we are in full swing is developing a project of modernization The development of strategic missile carriers Tu-160 to the Tu-160M2 modification, they may go on to the series until 2025. But even the very rich countries can not afford two such projects simultaneously.And the first serial fighters PAK FA T-50 within the framework of the GPV -2025 should already be put into operation ".

The leadership of the Ministry of Defense has repeatedly stated that in the coming years the troops will also receive new planes of military transport aviation. We are talking about light IL-112 (mass production start is planned for 2019) and medium Il-214 (the first flight is expected this year). In addition, the production of heavy IL-76 last modifications will continue.
The pace of rearmament of the ground forces, experts believe, should remain at a fairly high level. The share of modern tanks, for example, for 2020, will be 70% in the troops. Mainly, due to the supply of modernized T-72B3 to the troops. However, on the approach and technology of a new generation.
"With the promising T-14 tank based on the Armata platform, everything is going well," said Andrei Frolov, "Last year, the Defense Ministry concluded a contract for the supply of 100 cars, that is, we can already talk about mass production. And on this project, but there will be 20-30 new tanks a year, but in general I do not think that the Defense Ministry will completely abandon the projects ready or almost ready to go to the series.It can be pretty decent to save by simply cutting the purchased lots of equipment and Warlord zheny. This is true not only of the Land Forces, but also to the armed forces as a whole. But the samples will be tested in the army.
The expert added that if the new tanks are already produced serially, then with the project of the prospective BMP "Kurganets-25" and the BTR "Boomerang" everything is not so good. Both cars had to refine according to the wishes of the military, and, according to Andrey Frolov, the troops they will go no earlier than 2019-2020 years.

"Taking into account the current threats, I believe, in the framework of the GPV-2025, the air defense systems of the Ground Forces will significantly strengthen," military expert Viktor Murakhovsky said. "This applies primarily to the supply of Buk-M3, Tor-M2 air defense missile systems, , S-300 B. As for the ground component of our "nuclear triad", considerable efforts will be concentrated on the development of the Sarmat heavy rocket and the Barguzin combat railway complexes, as well as modernization of the systems already in service. "

At the end of March, a source in the Military Industrial Commission told reporters that the emphasis in the new LG will be made, among other things, on "intelligent weapons systems" - communications, intelligence, control, electronic warfare, precision weapons and others. In such systems, all types and branches of the Armed Forces are needed.

"The main emphasis should be made on the development of high-precision weapons," military expert and publicist Vladislav Shurygin told RIA Novosti. "Syrian experience has shown how effective it is." Secondly, we need to develop robotics-drone drones, ground complexes. Systems of control, communication and target designation, which allow you to tie all the weapons of destruction and reconnaissance on the battlefield into a single knot, and, finally, the fourth - in no case can you cut R & D financing (research and experiments but design works) Future development -. the future of the Armed Forces of Russia and pledge our continued status as one of the leading players in the global arms trade market. "

About the previous article, I do not agree in some of the ideas explained.

1.- First about the funding of the Plan. Really, it makes not sense to talk about the initial wishes of the Armed Forces. The realistic approach comes comparing the funding of the future plan with the funding of the current plan. It is necessary to take into account that the 2011-2020 plan was of 20 trillions for 10 years. It means 2 trillions per year in average. To keep the current rythm of spending the 2018-2025 plan should assure 16 trillions, of which 6 would be shared with the previous plan. The comment about 55 trillions does not justify the negative tone of the article. The amount of 55 trillions was more like wishful thinking.

The article says that the finance minister is ready to give 12 trillions. If it is 12 trillions plus part of the funding of the current plan, it would mean to increase the rythm. If it includes all, it would not reach the 16 trillions that would allow to keep the rythm. I really do not expect a reduction of the 25% of the spending in relative terms.

2.- The second point where I do not agree is in the comments about delays in some key projects underway. In overall terms today to complete the design and development of the key projects, until the production of at least the first unit, is more important for Russia than to force the rythm of procurement. The article said, citing Andrei Frolov, editor-in-chief of the magazine Export of Arms, somethings where I disagree, and even are wrong analysis in my opinion:

"It is obvious that the project of nuclear aircraft carriers will be postponed to a remote box "Storm".

This is full wrong. It breaks the recent Maritime Doctrine of the Russian federation, published in 2015, and this is something that a State Armament Program can not do, because it is a lower level document/plan. The State Armament Program is designed to assure between other things that the Maritime Doctrine of the Russian Federation is accomplished.

Also to achieve in the shor/mid term the capabilities of building every type of ship in Russia, and this is only proved when the first unit of a project is commissioned, is a goal fairly more important for Russia than to have one or two ships more or less of some projects, and more if they are very low armed ships like those of the Project 23550 of patrol ship (if there is some cut, the Project 23550 is fairly one of the most likely candidates to be affected).

Even this comment makes not sense from an economic point, because the project of Aircraft Carrier is expected to be exported. In fact when the Project 23000E was presented, it was presented the variant to export (E means variant to export), something habitual to keep some secrets of the variants for the Russian Armed Forces. No-one would cut a project that has a potential market outside.

The terms of the PAK DA project will shift due to the start of production of Tu-160M2.
...
I believe that within the framework of the GPV-2025 our military will refuse a number of promising but expensive projects, for example, from the PAK DA - a prospective long-range aviation complex.
...
But even the very rich countries can not afford two such projects simultaneously.

The return to production of the Tu-160 is perfectly compatible with the development of the Tu-PAK-DA, because in the first case, there is not a development of new technologies, there is only an update of the aircraft to the current technological level, and a rebuild of the capability of production of strategic bombers.

in the case of the Tu-PAK-DA, the nature of the project finds new technologies. To cut this project, and the projects of the MiG-41/PAK-DP and Il-PAK-TA, that seem also affected by the comment of Frolov, means to cut totally the Russian investigation on modern aerial technologies, something that will not happen. It is fairly more likely the fall of the Il-112 project if there are some cuts, as explained here:

https://www.russiadefence.net/t4312p75-russian-transport-aircraft-fleet-vta#189143
https://www.russiadefence.net/t4312p75-russian-transport-aircraft-fleet-vta#189061

With both projects, with the Tu-PAK-DA and the MiG 41-PAK-DP, Russia also finds, like for ships, the hability to build modern aircrafts of every type. And again to achieve this goal in the short/mid term, maybe before 2025, is fairly a more important goal than to have 10 aircrafts more or less of some types (MiG-35,...). It would be important for Russia to see the first unit of both finnished under the State Armament Program 2018-2025 and to reach the hability of building them completely.

The Project of the Il-PAK-TA, finds to open a new way for air military transport. It is also important, and I expect to continue, but with a longer timeline.

franco wrote:Look at the 2018-2025 armament purchase program;

MOSCOW, April 6 - RIA Novosti, Andrey Kots. In early July, the Russian Ministry of Defense will submit to the Supreme Commander-in-Chief and the public the final draft of the state arms program for 2018-2025 (GPV-2025). This document will determine the composition and volumes of new military equipment and technologies that will go into the troops in the next seven to eight years, and set the vector for the further development of our army, aviation and fleet in the 21st century. At the moment, the military is brought to mind the project and agree on the final details of a military-industrial complex (MIC) and the scientific community.
Details of GPV-2025 are still kept secret. However, its general outlines in February, designated Deputy Defense Minister Yuri Borisov. He said that the main task of the Russian defense industry - to bring to 2020 the level of equipment of the Armed Forces with modern equipment up to 70%. Traditionally, the priority will be given to nuclear deterrence forces and aerospace defense.

Other directions will not be left aside. A source in the military department told RIA Novosti on March 10 that the GPO-2025 will include such significant weapons for our military-industrial complex as the S-500 air defense system, the fifth generation PAK FA fighter, combat machines on the Armata platform and others. However, many military experts note that, in the face of funding cuts, a number of ambitious projects can be postponed indefinitely or their implementation will be stretched over time.

Recall, the new state program initially was to cover the period from 2016 to 2025, but it had to "move to the right." As explained in early February, Deputy Prime Minister Dmitry Rogozin, the delay is due to the difficult economic situation in the country. At the current SPO 2011-2020 the state allocated 20 trillion rubles. Rogozin stressed that part of the unspent funds will be transferred to the next program. However, it can be judged only about the full amount of its financing.

As Vedomosti newspaper reported in January referring to its own sources in the defense department, the first estimate for GPV-2025 was compiled in 2015. The military requested for the needs of rearmament first 55 trillion rubles, and later reduced the initial application to 30 trillion. The Ministry of Finance agreed to allocate for these needs no more than 12 trillion. The source of the publication believes that the final amount will be close to the figure of the Ministry of Finance. And this means that the military will have to adjust its initial plans.

"I believe that the most affected by the reduction in funding will be the Navy," Andrei Frolov, editor-in-chief of the magazine Export of Arms, told RIA Novosti. "The reason is simple: in the current SPO, he received more funds for modernization than other types of Armed Forces. Undoubtedly, the pace of construction of the Borey nuclear submarine will continue - the strategic underwater missile fleet remains one of the main guarantors of our security: it is becoming increasingly difficult with surface ships. "It is obvious that the project of nuclear aircraft carriers will be postponed to a remote box "Storm". 2025 is unlikely to come into operation destroyers promising project "leader". "

The expert stressed that, despite the reduced funding, the Russian defense industry is quite able to complete the prolonged repair of the Admiral Nakhimov heavy nuclear missile cruiser (TARKR) during this period, as well as modernize the Pyotr Veliky TARKR and the heavy aircraft-carrying cruiser (TAKR) ) "Admiral Kuznetsov". In turn, the editor-in-chief of the magazine "Military-Industrial Courier" Viktor Nikolaev noted that the program of building ships for the Arctic is unlikely to be "curtailed".

"This region is now of enormous geopolitical and economic value," Nikolayev emphasized, "The Ilya Muromets icebreaker should be commissioned in 2017 for the needs of the Navy." In addition, as early as 2016, the Ministry of Defense concluded with the Admiralty Shipyards "A contract for the construction of two universal patrol ships of the Arctic zone of Project 23550 until 2020. I think they will be completed within the framework of GPV-2025."

According to the Aerospace Forces, experts believe that the cutback in funding will not hit hard. The emphasis will be placed on deliveries of Su-30SM, Su-34, Su-35 combat aircraft, Mi-8AMTSh, Mi-28N and Ka-52 helicopters, as well as S-400 anti-aircraft missile systems, to the aircraft parts successfully tested by the Syrian war. But the debut of the promising S-500 may have to wait.The terms of the PAK DA project will shift due to the start of production of Tu-160M2
"I believe that the samples of this system will appear more or less massively in the troops closer to the end of GPV-2025 or later," Andrei Frolov believes. "I would like to conclude first its development. I think that such rates for deliveries, as with S-400, For four or five regiments per year, we will not be able to reach this period within the specified period, I believe that within the framework of the GPV-2025 our military will refuse a number of promising but expensive projects, for example, from the PAK DA - a prospective long-range aviation complex. Now we are in full swing is developing a project of modernization The development of strategic missile carriers Tu-160 to the Tu-160M2 modification, they may go on to the series until 2025. But even the very rich countries can not afford two such projects simultaneously.And the first serial fighters PAK FA T-50 within the framework of the GPV -2025 should already be put into operation ".

The leadership of the Ministry of Defense has repeatedly stated that in the coming years the troops will also receive new planes of military transport aviation. We are talking about light IL-112 (mass production start is planned for 2019) and medium Il-214 (the first flight is expected this year). In addition, the production of heavy IL-76 last modifications will continue.
The pace of rearmament of the ground forces, experts believe, should remain at a fairly high level. The share of modern tanks, for example, for 2020, will be 70% in the troops. Mainly, due to the supply of modernized T-72B3 to the troops. However, on the approach and technology of a new generation.
"With the promising T-14 tank based on the Armata platform, everything is going well," said Andrei Frolov, "Last year, the Defense Ministry concluded a contract for the supply of 100 cars, that is, we can already talk about mass production. And on this project, but there will be 20-30 new tanks a year, but in general I do not think that the Defense Ministry will completely abandon the projects ready or almost ready to go to the series.It can be pretty decent to save by simply cutting the purchased lots of equipment and Warlord zheny. This is true not only of the Land Forces, but also to the armed forces as a whole. But the samples will be tested in the army.
The expert added that if the new tanks are already produced serially, then with the project of the prospective BMP "Kurganets-25" and the BTR "Boomerang" everything is not so good. Both cars had to refine according to the wishes of the military, and, according to Andrey Frolov, the troops they will go no earlier than 2019-2020 years.

"Taking into account the current threats, I believe, in the framework of the GPV-2025, the air defense systems of the Ground Forces will significantly strengthen," military expert Viktor Murakhovsky said. "This applies primarily to the supply of Buk-M3, Tor-M2 air defense missile systems, , S-300 B. As for the ground component of our "nuclear triad", considerable efforts will be concentrated on the development of the Sarmat heavy rocket and the Barguzin combat railway complexes, as well as modernization of the systems already in service. "

At the end of March, a source in the Military Industrial Commission told reporters that the emphasis in the new LG will be made, among other things, on "intelligent weapons systems" - communications, intelligence, control, electronic warfare, precision weapons and others. In such systems, all types and branches of the Armed Forces are needed.

"The main emphasis should be made on the development of high-precision weapons," military expert and publicist Vladislav Shurygin told RIA Novosti. "Syrian experience has shown how effective it is." Secondly, we need to develop robotics-drone drones, ground complexes. Systems of control, communication and target designation, which allow you to tie all the weapons of destruction and reconnaissance on the battlefield into a single knot, and, finally, the fourth - in no case can you cut R & D financing (research and experiments but design works) Future development -. the future of the Armed Forces of Russia and pledge our continued status as one of the leading players in the global arms trade market. "

already spotted BS. There is already training facilities for S-500 so it won't be delayed. As well, if it is 12T rubles, that is still quite a bit for rearming. But I doubt it will be there. Possibly around 19T or 17T after what's going on with US, doubt Russia is going to sit idle.

"Last year, the Defense Ministry concluded a contract for the supply of 100 cars, that is, we can already talk about mass production. And on this project, but there will be 20-30 new tanks a year..."

20-30 a year!? Is he talking about long-term production or just about the initial order of 100?

Kimppis wrote:

"Last year, the Defense Ministry concluded a contract for the supply of 100 cars, that is, we can already talk about mass production. And on this project, but there will be 20-30 new tanks a year..."

20-30 a year!? Is he talking about long-term production or just about the initial order of 100?

its nothing short than hot air for airtime or a publication that has their names on it. In other words, gossip and made up rumors.

I assume that when the article is talking about trillions means 10¹² and not 10¹⁸ like should be. But well, note that:

20 Trillions of Rubles are = 349.389.590.181,73 USD
12 Trillions of Rubles are = 209.633.754.109,04 USD

The estimation of the cost per unit of the Project 23000 is between 1.800.000.000,00 USD and 5.630.000.000,00 USD at the currency rate of the time (May 31, 2015: 1 USD = 52,3120 RUB).

http://tass.com/russia/797980
http://www.exchangerates.org.uk/USD-RUB-exchange-rate-history-full.html

Returning the data to Rubles to compare it with the total budget of the plan, the cost per unit of the Project 23000 aircraft carrier would be between 94.161.600.000,00 RUB and 294.516.560.000,00 RUB.

This would be between a 0,78% and a 2,45% of the 12 Trillions of Rubles. Plus the costs of development of the project (far lower), and the costs of adapting the shipyard.

It is affordable for Russia by 2025, even in a situation of minimum funding for the State Armament Plan 2018-2025.

The article is written by a reporter based on interviews with various military and MIC people plus some other comments already made publicly. Certainly not written in stone, their personal view point and open to interruption.

On one side Putin is very clear that he will not bankrupt the economy to arm the military. It will be balanced out but rearming will continue.

We are already seeing that new equipment development and production has slowed down. Again a balance will be maintained and the positive is hopefully a better product with a longer development period.

franco wrote:The article is written by a reporter based on interviews with various military and MIC people plus some other comments already made publicly. Certainly not written in stone, their personal view point and open to interruption.

On one side Putin is very clear that he will not bankrupt the economy to arm the military. It will be balanced out but rearming will continue.

We are already seeing that new equipment development and production has slowed down. Again a balance will be maintained and the positive is hopefully a better product with a longer development period.

we have? Such as....?

miketheterrible wrote:

franco wrote:The article is written by a reporter based on interviews with various military and MIC people plus some other comments already made publicly. Certainly not written in stone, their personal view point and open to interruption.

On one side Putin is very clear that he will not bankrupt the economy to arm the military. It will be balanced out but rearming will continue.

We are already seeing that new equipment development and production has slowed down. Again a balance will be maintained and the positive is hopefully a better product with a longer development period.

we have? Such as....?

T-50, Armata, Kurganets, Boomerang, SA-350, SA-500, etc. etc.

franco wrote:

miketheterrible wrote:

franco wrote:The article is written by a reporter based on interviews with various military and MIC people plus some other comments already made publicly. Certainly not written in stone, their personal view point and open to interruption.

On one side Putin is very clear that he will not bankrupt the economy to arm the military. It will be balanced out but rearming will continue.

We are already seeing that new equipment development and production has slowed down. Again a balance will be maintained and the positive is hopefully a better product with a longer development period.

we have? Such as....?

T-50, Armata, Kurganets, Boomerang, SA-350, SA-500, etc. etc.

What?
 Armata has been ordered and after first batches arrive, you know just as well as I do that it will be ordered more.  S-500 is presume you mean, is already slated and as I said, there is already a training center with the first crew being set up for training on new system.  T-50? Agreement for 12 of them by 2020 was slated for various reason - engines not ready is pretty much dead giveaway.

You should know since you yourself mentioned it.  Russia orders aircrafts in 12's.  S-500 has been delayed more than once in the last 5 years (before economic restrictions).  But it is a priority for obvious reasons.  Maybe more so than PAK FA.

And anyway, what you stated makes little sense because everything as of now form start of SAP2020 till 2020 has been approved.  As mentioned earlier, the 20T will end up being met by 2019 and that was approved by everyone even economic ministry.  So money being spent now for programs to be finished and purchased (S-500, Armata) are not affected by SAP2025 because it hasn't even started yet.  You may have forgotten, but it is only 2017.

Putin even stated priorities for SAP2025 as S-500, Armata and PAK FA.  Or it was the ministry of defense.  Either way, these will end up with priority.  If any major cutbacks happen, it will be on large surface ships.  Which is understandable. But it was hinted before that PAK FA introduction is going to be spanned out longer.  MoD is expecting to purchase more Su-35's and Su-30's.  Probably because their cheap (last purchase for Su-35 came out to roughly $27M per aircraft, which is cheap).

After recent events, they may keep it high, something like 3% of GDP per year, in order to prepare themselves for potential war.

I'm not sure what we are arguing about so won't

RUSSIA’S STATE ARMAMENTS PROGRAMFOR 2018-2025

Written by J.Hawk exclusively for SouthFront

While Russia’s next State Armaments Program (GPV) will be officially revealed only in early July, its general outline is already known thanks to a number of official and unofficial announcements on the future direction of the Russian Armed Forces.  GPV’s priorities are a reflection of the perceived threat array facing the Russian Federation, and this GPV is clearly prioritizing the Ground Forces, which will sustain a rapid pace of modernization in spite of the recent economic crisis that has not yet been fully overcome. The political instability of the European Union, the rise of nationalists in Ukraine, the Baltics, and NATO’s overt hostility toward Russia, and the erratic foreign policy pursued by the Trump Administration compelled to take heed of the globalist faction of the US elite, all point to the need to bolster Russia’s ability to fight a large-scale land war in the foreseeable future. The other priority evident in the available information on the GPV is the desire to have “good enough” materiel in service now rather than “perfect” materiel later, as manifested by the deferred procurement of a number of systems currently under development.

The Ground Forces will not only expand in size but will also continue to modernize and upgrade its equipment fleet. While by 2025 the most numerous main battle tank in regular service will be the T-72B3 or its upgraded version, Russian sources believe the T-14 MBT of the Armata family will be procured at the rate of 20-30 vehicles per year, with the initial order for 100 vehicles already in.

The development of the Kurganets and Bumerang infantry fighting vehicles, on the other hand, has hit a few snags, so that they will not enter service before 2019 at the earliest. As a stop-gap measure, the Russian military will continue procuring Berezhok upgrade kits for the BMP-2 IFV, procure several hundred new BMP-3 IFVs, and overhaul the existing fleet. Land-based air and ballistic missile defense will also be a key priority, with the armed forces receiving Buk-M3, Tor-M2, and S-300V4 and S-400 missile systems. The prospective S-500, still in the development phase, will likely not be procured during the next GPV term.

The biggest predicted change in the new GPV concerning the Aerospace Forces will be the postponement of the PAK-DA strategic bomber program which is seen as redundant in the foreseeable future due to the ongoing efforts to resume the Tu-160 bomber production with the aim of procuring 50-60 of the bombers, and the modernization of the existing fleet to the Tu-160M2 standard. The PAK-FA development will continue as before, and the aircraft will enter series production in the upcoming years. However, most of the aircraft procured under the new GPV will be the already existing tried and true designs seen in the skies over Syria, namely Su-35, Su-34, and Su-30, as well as a number of MiG-35 “lightweight” fighters, and of course the Ka-52 and Mi-28N attack helicopters.

What the GPV will not skimp on is munitions procurement, and the recent statements by senior officials predicting that Russian military’s stock of precision-guided munitions will double in the upcoming years is a reflection of yet another lesson learned in Syria.

Naval Forces, by contrast, have a relatively modest role in the new GPV. Neither the Shtorm aircraft carrier nor the Lider nuclear-powered destroyer are likely to appear “in metal” within the next GPV term. Instead the existing ships, including the Admiral Kuznetsov carrier and the heavy missile cruisers, will undergo major refits to include the fitting of new missile systems, and the role of an oceanic escort will be provided by an enlarged variant of the Admiral Gorshkov-class frigate optimized to provide area air defense, a solution adopted by many European navies which found destroyers too expensive for their budgets. The construction of missile corvettes and light frigates, ships which more than proved their worth in the context of the Syria conflict, will continue unabated, as will the procurement of both conventional and nuclear submarines. There will be no change to Arctic-specific naval procurement.

The new GPV, in addition to being a response to Western actions and a reflection of lessons from recent conflicts, is also a tacit confirmation of the sad fact that Russia is perceived as a worthy partner for negotiations in the West only because it is relatively immune to political and military pressure. As before, these weapons are intended to be used only as a last resort.

Source: https://southfront.org/russias-state-armaments-program-for-2018-2025/

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20-30 Armatas per year?  

I thought that they will procure them in regiment/brigade sets, at least for the units of the 1st Guards Tank Army. For me everything is fine and nice except this.

The BMP procurement is great, it looks like that a lot of BMP-2s – if not all of them – will be equipped with Berezhok combat modules, and BMP-3s (plus maybe its modern variants, the BMP-3M "Dragun" or the upgunned "Derivatsiya", or even the unmaned "Udar") will be produced in decent numbers.

Simple explanation: no money. At least as long as the neoliberal monetarists are in charge of Russian economic policy and the sanction regime intelligently imposed by the west retards Russia's ability to access debt markets. Couple that with US fracking, LNG and alternative pipelines in to Europe, and the noose will conveniently tighten over time.

calripson wrote:Simple explanation: no money. At least as long as the neoliberal monetarists are in charge of Russian economic policy and the sanction regime intelligently imposed by the west retards Russia's ability to access debt markets. Couple that with US fracking, LNG and alternative pipelines in to Europe, and the noose will conveniently tighten over time.

most of what you said is debunked. Go to economic section of this forum for more details. Oil and gas accumulated is very small to overall Russian budget. And Russia's gas pipelines are already going fine (Nord stream 2, Power of Siberia and the Turk Stream). Russia is also poised to become the largest LNG producer as Yamal first stage will be operational this year, Shakalhin to be upgraded, and then eventually Baltic LNG.

Outlook is looking good. All that is being said right now is pure speculation as the armament program won't be shown or even signed until July this year.

Hell, Russia's GDP PPP is poised to increase 2% this year. So there is no economic mouse around Russia. Its like the so called noise around South Africa in 1976. Only it didn't do anything but bolster South Africa.

But, if you guys thought they will produce hundreds of tanks a year of Armata, think again. It is a huge system with potentially a lot of flaws. There will be years of rigorous testing and then possibly fixing. Same was with Su-35.

Biggest flaw of the article is about S-500. It was mentioned a while back that S-500 is priority for this sap program to 2025.