Russian special military operation in Ukraine #34

regular wrote:@Ark, Ukrs were never NATO standard. Not saying that NATO is the best, only saying that Ukrainians have their ways to conduct war even if they are being controlled by the US. The way they conducted defences were always the same. Starlink, logististics, visibility, command and control… it was always static defence in depth with some suicidal rushes. Offensive operations on other hand, they can pull them off quite well if there is little to no resistance

Regular, I would agree , but back in Autumn, they were hybridizing the NATO and Soviet concepts

On one hand NATO gave a shit about VSU fodder, by probing with DRGs across the front line, but to be fair with the battle management systems they had at the time and with new equipment at the time, they were able to capitalize only because the front lines were undermanned on Russian side

It is not a true NATO standard, but it was pretty damn close

The result you see now is the collapse of the battle management system employed by NATO, and VSU restive on the traditional soviet battle concept, in a situation where they have no way to replenish destroyed equipment , but keep sending flesh to the lines in absence of the alternative

Although in autumn they were able to deliver precise strikes on rear areas through HIMARS and minimal but precision shelling,

Though this mainly to deficiency on Russian lines, now solved through additional manning, reserve echelon in rear, and better BMS -

Now it will be seen, as NATO again trains a new army of fodder and re equips them, for an offensive on Crimea or from Gulyai Polye towards Melitopol and then Mariupol - if updated and mitigated Russian system can handle the NATO standard 2.0 army that comes in January/February

Either by continued defense, or by pre-emptive offensive, perhaps both in the traditional of the general staff

FlamingPython wrote:
And in that regard General Armaggedon's decision to give battle at Bakhmut rather than at Kherson proved to be a prudent decision.
Even if the former is technically an attack, and the later technically a defense; it is precisely at Bakhmut where he has been able to outmatch the Ukrainians overwhelmingly and bring multiple force multipliers to bear.
Ukrainian command acted predictably and flooded the town with reserves, a town they cannot defend. But if they had retreated, then they would have forfeited their defensive line in the Donbass. They were given 2 bad choices and no 3rd one.

Retreating back home won't save any lives; just open Russian territory and civilians for attack.
Surovikin's strategy is to advance and secure more ground, just smartly that's all.

I can agree with this, and if this is the case then the authors concerns were addressed, indeed Surovikin rectified the command and control system, plugged gaps in the defense , and has not only stabilized but began to take initiative

I wonder if ours to "micromanage" or the BMS has allowed wagner and other such forward officers to employ attacks in a decentralized manner

There's so much we do not know about how this is taking place,

We also know they're not sustaining casualties as it was in Pavlovka, so they have seriously updated their procedures and engagement rules

To me, if they can absorb Ukrainian counter offense, and then give knockout blow , it's game set and match on left bank

Because as we see it now, the Russian army has updated its chain of command and logistics

To me I see NATO having to order an all out offensive to stop the inevitable, and that is why Kadyrov is saying what he does

A decisive moment is approaching

There are unconfirmed reports that wagner has pushed into Siniat, and is right by the center

I have seen vids of MLRS fire by VSU within the city

So this could be another lisichansk developing in real time

But I want to see confirmation

Additionally Marinka supply route was cutoff, again no confirmation as of yet but seems plausible:

The AFU lost the Maryinka supply line - what does it mean
the 79th Airborne Assault Brigade of the Armed Forces of Ukraine, stationed at Maryinka, lost its ability to resupply.
On December 8, the brigade leadership reported to the command headquarters in Vostok
The road is under long-range Russian artillery fire. In addition, it is controlled by RF Air Force drones and helicopters.
It was from nearby Krasnogorovka that the brigade received ammunition and manpower reinforcements. Any attempt by the Armed Forces of Ukraine to transfer reinforcements to Marinka will now be fraught with the risk of losses.
Then they lost control of their positions in the area of ​​​​the tire repair plant and the Nikolsky lift in the southwestern part of the city.
In addition, during the offensive of the Russian forces on Maryinka, fire control was established in the area of ​​\u200b\u200bthe trucking enterprise ATP 11420 and beyond the O-0530 highway interchange

Isos wrote:

Iran, North Korea and China are way more advanced in that field, eventhough USSR was the leader of that technology. They are also way better in drone field. That's 2 field they needed for this war

To be fair, drones they scaled a lot , lancet galore videos prove that, sure Orion and other such drones did not appear as much, but we definitely saw Kub, Lancet, and Geran

As for ballistic missiles, the INF treaty limited Russia while other states did not have such obligations with US, due to Russian parity of nuclear weapons, so it was not so much inability to produce

But Russia cashing in on peace dividend by not having to duplicate a delivery system that could be nuclear tipped

At the same time, such agreements meant that probability of conventional war where conventional warheads would be necessary on industrial scale were improbable

I guess now , the opposite is true, but I would think that production of new Tornado 200km missile would cover shorter ranges

And an extended staged iskander would cover linger distance targets

Then everything else could be targeted by drones, anything that merits quick reaction strike would best be hit by a kalibr, or iskander anyway

If there are legalistic problems with Rocket ranges for Russia or Iran , the drones can replace them . A single drone with Long range can travel along a Road and hit a civilian truck engine / other vehicle or Tank , and disable and block the Road . Assembly points are the best targets , before shipping , and dispersion . The farther away they get destroyed from the frontlines , and any chance that they are used , the better .

that missile range limitation is pretty funny. I guess the Russians would have to put more fuel in them? lol.

#Chronicle of the Special Military Operation for 10-11 Dec 2022

#Crimea:

Ukrainian kamikaze drones attempted strikes against #Simferopol, but Russian air defences shot down all targets on approach.

#Starobelsk Direction (MAP):

In the #Kupyansk - #Svatovo section, units of the AFU's 14th Mechanized Brigade and the 32nd Battalion of the Terrotorial Defence attempted to storm the #Sinkovka - #Lyman 1st line, but failed.

The RF Armed Forces intercepted an Ukrainian SRG near #Dachnoye, most of the group was destroyed and the rest fled into the woods.

In the #Lyman sector, fighting is continues west of #Ploshchanka, where RF forces had previously managed to capture several enemy strongholds. The AFU is trying unsuccessfully to retake lost positions.

Fighting continues in the grey zone at the #Chervonopopovka - #Makeyevka line.

In the #Lysychansk sector, Russian troops have occupied an observation post near #Belogorovka.

#Lugansk People's Republic:

The Ukrainian militants launched rocket and barrel artillery strikes on #Svatovo and #Stakhanov, civilian infrastructure was damaged.

#Donetsk Direction (MAP):

Fighting continues in the centre of #Maryinka, where Russian troops are trying to overcome enemy defences on the central Druzhba Street.

In the #Avdeyevka sector, DPR People's Militia units are fighting in the vicinity of #Pervomayskoye and #Vodyanyoye.

In the #Ugledar sector, the RF Armed Forces have begun an offensive near Bolshaya Novoselka, trying to take advantageous positions.

The enemy militants continue intense shelling of the #Donetsk agglomeration with strikes on the centre of #Donetsk and other settlements, civilians killed.

#Zaporozhye Direction:

Ukrainian militants shelled #Melitopol with HIMARS MLRS. The shells hit the Hunters' Rest Base and killed civilians. Despite the massive strike, not a single military facility was hit. There were no casualties among the military personnel.

Artillery duels continue along the entire line of contact. The RF Armed Forces shelled targets in #Yulyevka, #Orekhov, #Gulyaypole, #Olgovskoye and #Nikopol, while enemy militants shelled #Energodar.

#Kherson Direction:

Russian forces hit AFU positions at the Kherson cotton mill in #Kherson.

In addition, targetshave been hit in #Dudchany, #Berislav, #Zimevka and #Dneprovskoye.

The RF Armed Forces destroyed an enemy SRG on Bolshoy Potemkin Island at the mouth of the #Dnipro River. At least 3 AFU fighters were killed, their bodies fell into the river.

#Odessa Region:

On the night of Friday to Saturday, Russian troops have hit the Novovodesskaya power substation with a Geran-2 kamikaze drone.

In #Odessa, the attack led to a prolonged almost complete loss of electricity supply and problems with the operation of pumping stations.


https://t.me/sitreports/1997

How many tanks did the Ukrainian Armed Forces lose in Bakhmut?

According to the Military Chronicle, from the end of August to the beginning of December, the 54th and 59th brigades of the Armed Forces of Ukraine could irretrievably lose about six to eight tank companies in Bakhmut (Artyomovsk)—from 84 to 112 vehicles. The equipment remaining in service with the Ukrainian forces in Bakhmut is on the verge of failure.

Most of the T-64, T-64BV, and Polish T-72M1 tanks were lost by the Armed Forces of Ukraine in the battles in the north of the city in the Podgorodny area and during several counterattacks in the south in the area of Kurdyumovka, Zelenopolye, and Ozaryanovka. Tanks were also lost in the battles near Opytny, where Ukrainian forces tried to stop the advance of the RF Armed Forces but retreated due to high losses. Interruptions in electricity and a lack of spare parts prevent quick repairs of equipment.

Almost all vehicles have high gun wear, and the crews of Ukrainian Armed Forces tanks regularly encounter bursts of ammunition in the gun breech, after which the vehicle is put out of action. The activity of the artillery of Wagner PMC and the RF Armed Forces also led to high losses of tanks: when a platoon (or company) of tanks is detected, heavy artillery fire of high density opens on armoured vehicles, which does not allow the equipment to manoeuvre and fire.

There are also tactical errors. Short daylight hours limit the capabilities of the Armed Forces of Ukraine in observation and reconnaissance using UAVs, and cold weather forces them to keep vehicles with running engines, which strongly unmasks them and makes them a target for sabotage groups of the RF Armed Forces with Kornet anti-tank systems and Irony surveillance devices that detect enemy equipment in the dark at a distance of 7 km.

https://t.me/Slavyangrad/24545


@Rybar: Another Consequence of Systematic Fire Attacks on Ukraine's Energy Infrastructure

Another power transformer burned down in #Kiev. Apparently, there was a switching overvoltage in the device.

It happened due to the release of overvoltage pulses into the grid from high-voltage line switching caused by the RF Armed Forces' defeat of autotransformers at city substations and thermal power plants. A breakdown occurs inside the windings, an electric arc ignites and then the oil starts to burn. The gas pressure in the tank increases sharply, leading to a depressurisation and subsequent fire.

The incident is further evidence of the cumulative effect of Russian missile strikes. Even in the absence of new raids, elements fail on their own.

🩸 Is this a Clear Sign of the Collapse of Ukraine's Power System?

No: The general control points (GCP) of most facilities are still intact, which theoretically allows, see Recent Comprehensive Assessment, replacing destroyed equipment and assembling back-up circuits.

But it is not the first time transformer fires have occurred that suggests instability and reduced sustainability of the power system. And if strikes continue, the possibility of rebuilding it in the short term will be negligible.


https://t.me/sitreports/2000

Given all the publicity regarding Merkel's recent comments, this had to be produced

Angela Merkel on the Minsk agreements:

5 March 2015: "If the Minsk Agreements are seriously violated, European leaders and the European Commission stand ready to prepare and impose new sanctions."

October 20, 2016: “We discussed a work process that has many sides and that needs to be taken into account when working on topics such as security, political process. And this should continue within the framework of the roadmap for the various steps of the Set of Measures for the Implementation of the Minsk Agreements. And that's progress."

February 18, 2017: Minsk is all we have. Unfortunately, I cannot say that all points of the Minsk agreements have been fulfilled. A long-term ceasefire is needed. My opinion is that we shouldn’t throw away the only thing we have.”

March 17, 2017: “I was very pleased to learn that the US administration and the president personally are committed to the Minsk process. We need to find a solution to this problem. A safe and secure solution must be found for Ukraine, but relations with Russia must also be improved as the situation becomes clearer. The Minsk agreements are a good basis, but, unfortunately, we have not yet reached the process we expected. However, in the coming months, we will continue to work on this issue together with our experts.”

May 20, 2017: "The issue of security, as presented in the Minsk agreements, is a prerequisite for further progress in the political process."

September 2 2017: “In the field of security policy in Europe, we must do everything to improve our contacts again. This includes the implementation of "Minsk". If this works out, then we would have a starting point for even more and more intensive dialogue.”

April 10, 2018: “We discussed the situation that is developing in connection with the implementation of the Minsk agreements. Despite the complexity of the situation, we must not relax efforts, because we are talking about people. Germany and France will continue to look for a way out of the situation together with Ukraine and the Russian Federation.”

August 18, 2018: “We must work to find a solution. This concerns, firstly, the issue of Ukraine. We've been working on this for quite some time now. The basis is and remains - it is the Minsk Agreements. Although it must be stated that we do not yet have a stable truce.”

November 1, 2018: “If there is progress, then we can ease these sanctions. Unfortunately, now the situation is such that the “Minsk agreements” are not observed. If something is done, then only a millimeter forward and immediately back. Germany will also advocate the continuation of these sanctions.”

December 10, 2019: “There is a question, is this document set in stone, or can it be changed. After all, there are certain proposals by President Zelensky to change it. <...> We hope that this document will again be flexible, and it will be revived.”

December 7, 2022: “The Minsk agreements of 2014 were an attempt to give Ukraine time. It used this time to become stronger, as you can see today. Ukraine 2014-2015 is not Ukraine today. <...> It was clear to all of us that the conflict was frozen, that the problem had not been resolved, but this gave Ukraine precious time.”

https://t.me/Slavyangrad/24617