Russia's National Defense Strategy issues

Clearly the plan is to sow doubt and mistrust because if you can get one or the other to move forces and strengthen an area then the other side can jump up and down at the escalation and mirror that movement... both sides will see the increase in forces as suggesting some sinister motive... the Americans are trying to get India into their Anti China club because they need the numbers... if they can get some hostility between China and Russia... well that would be their biggest wet dream... that and Siberian separatism...

The simple facts are that there are always problems over the exact path of borders.... especially borders based on rivers because you can change the path of a river...

The Chinese have been good neighbours... excellent if you compare them with other neighbours Russia has... most of the Chinese citizens we have here are excellent citizens that do see China as the home country like white people here of British ancestry see Britain as the home country, but neither of us is going to want to become anything other than what we are... New Zealand citizens... we don't even want to be part of Australia.

Countries should not fear their Chinese citizens any more than they should fear their european ones.

The EU and HATO are proving to be much more hostile to Russia and Russian interests than China ever has... they are not really best buddies but there is mutual respect there... which there is none with the west for either country.

Does Russia need a strong fleet?

Historically, of all combat arms in VO, the fleet receives the greatest information support, thanks to the efforts of authors such as Alexander Timokhin and Maxim Klimov.

Full article: https://topwar.ru/178933-chernovik-1.html

So from what I am reading it says the Russian fleet is split into 5 pieces so any fleets they have a 1/5th of what they are funding so impossible to be effective without costing too much.

It then says essentially navies are useless and in minutes of a conflict in the Black Sea (with a Turkey where Erdogan is overthrown) everything will be destroyed in minutes and ships will be meaningless... ignoring where these missiles come from I guess...

It totally ignores the IADS of Russia and the fact that Turkey is partially inside the edge of that air defence network so no only does it not matter too much what sort of surface fleet Russia operates in the Black Sea, it goes on to suggest the ability of the US to base aircraft in Black Sea turncoat countries including the Ukraine rendering the Black Sea a pointless fleet in WWIII.

But that is a given... in any WWIII scenario it is not anyones fleet that is going to matter very much... ICBMs and unlimited range cruise missiles and underwater doomsday weapons are going to be what it is all about.

The point is that in peace time a surface fleet is going to be critical to Russian international trade and commerce capacity because the US fleet and the UK fleet and the French are certainly not going to lift a finger to help Russian vessels or vessels trading with Russia, whether they are in the right or not.

It suggests using Tu-160s against opposing navies which is stupid because flying around the 5 fleet areas looking for ship targets is a stupid waste of aircraft that should be loading up nuclear armed cruise missiles and on alert to fly to launch positions to attack HATO and the US... not piss around looking for ships to sink.

It talks about the 300km range to Turkey across the Black Sea, but does not mention the difference in air defence capacity and the fact that now the INF treaty is gone shore based Iskanders and ground launched Onyx and later Zircon missiles could obliterate all threats to Black Sea Fleet ships of the Russian Navy, which could remain in port and use their air defence systems to help protect from incoming munitions from western sources including Ukraine.

Then the article starts talking about the Northern Fleet and the danger Norway presents, saying that a Carrier base in the Northern Fleet will be vulnerable to MLRS attack from positions in Norway... which sounds to me to be the ideal excuse to locate 400-500 tactical nuclear weapons in the region to obliterate any potential launch positions that Russian intel might manage to locate...

But again... what influence can be expected in a WWIII conflict with HATO... an aircraft carrier is more for small conflicts and peace time... if you expect it to make any difference in WWIII then you are dreaming.

It also mentions the Ukraine wants the US to fund development of several naval bases in the Ukraine a similar distance from Sevastopol, which makes the Black Sea a silly place to base a carrier fleet.

The suggestion that strategic bombers converted to carry cruise missiles can some how replace carriers is the crux of the disagreement I have been having with some members on this forum.

Russian aircraft carriers are not strike tools, the strike tools are the missiles carried in much larger numbers by the ships and submarines... the aircraft carrier is there to provide air defence support for the ships and submarines to protect them from missile attack responses.

Talking about defending the Black Sea or Northern Fleet base has no meaning for the Navy... the Aerospace defence force is responsible for defending the airspace over Russia and will be knocking down incoming cruise missiles and weapons of other types, the Navy will be defending its base and likely launching strikes on all platforms engaged in attacking them and command and control centres of the opposing forces in reach.

An example from the article:

Yes, the fleet can solve certain tasks. The Northern and Pacific fleets can, in theory. In practice, we will count. But the Baltic and Black Sea, in the light of the radically changed strategy of using new types of weapons, do not pose a particular threat to the enemy.

Well none of the fleets are meant to pose threats to enemy... they are largely defensive in nature and are more about protecting Russian access to international trade than being able to obliterate this or that country.

It then says the potential of the navy is zero and it would be much more affordable to buy 50 Tu-160s and equip them with anti ship missiles... which is just a cop out because 50 aircraft would be much easier to ambush and shoot down than to destroy even 50 corvettes let alone bigger ships.

It is hard to overemphasise the stupidity of building 50 Tu-160s for WWIII instead of building ships because a navy is more than fighting WWIII... what are these 50 Blackjacks going to be doing for the next 50 years of peace time... just getting older and costing money but doing nothing at all to help with Russian sea access to the worlds commercial centres.

It is just stupid.

That story is a 5th columnist wet dream... don't build ships... navies are for idiots who want to waste money... just ignore that the US and UK and France don't want to give up their navies and their reasons for doing so are even greater if Russia has 50 Tu-160s with hypersonic long range anti ship missiles on board... yet they see a value in a surface and subsurface fleet, but it is only stupid and expensive and already obsolete for Russia... I smell bullshit.

It doesn't mention why, if Russia can't afford aircraft carriers or cruisers or destroyers, why they continue to upgrade cold war destroyers and cruisers and maintain the Kuznetsov and seem to want to keep them operational...

Maybe they don't agree.

Those 50 new Tu-160s will allow the Bears to be retired and for the Russian strategic cruise missile carrier fleet to become rather potent, but they are not going to send such expensive bombers to roam the international airspace looking for enemy ships to attack... and even if they did a US carrier group of course will not be able to shoot down those Tu-160s from 5,000km range, but they are also not going to be bothered with the 12 subsonic cruise missiles the Tu-160 can launch at their carrier group... the result is 50 Blackjacks likely split into 5 groups of ten will launch all 120 missiles from each of the 5 groups at 5 different carrier groups and I would expect most of the time those 120 missiles would be shot down... what a total waste of time and money...

Of course if they are attacking US carrier groups WTF are they doing... they should be getting their asses back to base and loading up nuclear Kh-102s and attacking the continent of the United States of America... not pissing around with their carriers... what idiot wrote that story?

What about the Kh-15S? That is supposedly a supersonic anti-shipping missile at Mach 5. I think each Tu-160 can carry like twelve Kh-15 missiles.

The AS-15 kickback is a mach 5 short range attack missile... its range is 250km which is a bit short for attacking aircraft carriers... it was intended to be used to destroy enemy air defences in real time as the Blackjack flys to its launch position. So it would have 12 Kickbacks in one weapon bay and 6 long range cruise missiles in the other and as it was flying along perhaps it detects a group of enemy fighter aircraft 400km away and closing... when it is about 200km away it launches its mach 5 missile set to detonate amongst the group of aircraft, or it detects a Patriot or THAAD battery... it would launch a missile.

The main problem with the AS-15 was that it only came in a nuclear armed version.... no terminal guidance but the accuracy of about 300m was good enough for a relatively large nuclear explosion to deal with a group of fighters or SAM site.

It was withdrawn from service in the late 1980s I seem to remember.

I find it hard to believe the Russian government would fund the construction of all those new Tu-160s without having proper supersonic or hypersonic weapons for it.
Any land attack missile can be converted into anti-shipping without much effort and vice-versa.

Its replacement is supposed to have a mach 6 flight speed and a range of 1,500km which would make it more useful, but the problem still remains that if you at the stage of sinking US shipping including carrier groups you are probably close to a full nuclear strike on the US so why are your strategic aircraft fucking around looking for US carriers to sink or harass?

The replacement is a defence penetration missile rather than an anti ship missile.

The introduction of 50 new Blackjacks likely means the retirement of most Tu-95 Bear bombers, while the introduction and production of PAK DA bombers will likely see the withdrawal of the Tu-22M3s... some of those aircraft might be adapted for maritime patrol, but I suspect an Il-96M with twin engines would be more efficient and effective in such a role.

Personally I think the Tu-160 is too large and expensive for most missions and Russia would be better served with a modern Tu-22M3 replacement. With the same number of engines you would have twice the aircraft and each would have about the same payload as a US B-1 bomber.

The obvious problem is that the Tu-22M3 does not have the range to be a strategic bomber. We saw in Syria they had to ask for basing options in Iran to allow them to bomb targets in Syria. It is a theatre bomber and really not in the same class as the Blackjack.

I doubt the Tu-160s will replace all that many Tu-95s given that the different in performance parameters is so different. I expect the Tu-95 to be replaced eventually with the PAK DA which is another subsonic long range platform. The Tu-160 will likely replace some of the Tu-22M3s.

The new Blackjacks will likely replace half the Bears, but their missile only design means they can't replace Backfires in missions like Syria dropping cheap dumb bombs.

The PAK DA will certainly replace the rest of the Bears and the Backfires and its subsonic flight speed should allow reduced operational costs.

The real point of things is that the Russian Navy has a job to do in peace time.

I appreciate the initial article talking about Russia primarily needing its Army first and foremost, but I don't agree that every part of Russia needs an army equipped to the same high level... it is simply not necessary. Over time backwater areas will be upgraded with new kit but the fact that they are backwater areas means they don't need the absolute best stuff anyway... and if they did the Army might be tempted to use them as a sort of mobile reserve in case of problems in other places leaving those areas actually empty in some situations.

The border with China does not need to be the same as the border with Finland, because China is a neutral country that Russia can actually work with that listens to common sense. HATO or pre-HATO countries are like dogs with rabies, but you have to wait till they stray onto your territory or the owner (the US) will get shitty and call the cops (start WWIII).

Investing in a Navy makes sense because it gives you a real global reach in terms of trade that the airforce and army and strategic missile forces and air defence forces cannot... well the SMFs can but it is very much glass is over flowing or glass is empty and being smashed sort of thing.

Not having a carrier is like not having an airforce... it makes everything harder.

To be clear a Russian carrier is not a US carrier, a Russian carrier will be focused on air defence... it essentially is not a case of them taking air force assets to sea, it is them taking the aerospace defence assets to sea for the purpose of adding to the ship based IADS to sea to further protect the ships.

Saying a carrier is useless and makes them weaker and vulnerable... well it is like saying adding an airfield equipped with S-350 and S-400 and S-500 and TOR and Pantsir and also A-100 and Su-57 makes Russia weaker.

About the fleet that we need today

Recently, on the electronic pages of "VO" a serious "battle" has been played out on the topic of the future of the Russian navy . The discussion came respected authors Skomorokhov R. and A. Vorontsov, on the one hand ( " Does Russia need a strong navy "), and at least respected my Timohin A. - with another " blow about reality or about the fleet of Tu-160 and the price human errors ”.

Not wanting to become a third opposing party, I will nevertheless allow myself to speak on the merits of the issue: to state my point of view, which, perhaps, will be somewhat different from the positions of the above-mentioned respected authors. So what kind of fleet do we need?

On the tasks of the Russian Navy

This is quite clearly and clearly stated in the Decree of the President of the Russian Federation of July 20, 2017 No. 327 "On the approval of the Fundamentals of the State Policy of the Russian Federation in the field of naval activities for the period up to 2030" (hereinafter referred to as the "Decree"). Clause 8 of the first section of the document defines the status of our fleet:

“The Russian Federation still retains the status of a great maritime power, the maritime potential of which ensures the realization and protection of its national interests in any area of ​​the World Ocean, is an important factor in international stability and strategic deterrence and allows an independent national maritime policy to be pursued as an equal participant in international maritime activities. ".

In other words, the country's leadership, at least at the level of setting common goals, wants to have a fleet that will retain the status of a great maritime power for the Russian Federation.

Of course, with the implementation of these good undertakings in our country, according to the immortal statement of Mr. Chernomyrdin:

"I wanted the best, but it turned out as always",

but this is not the point now.

And about the answer to a simple question:

Can the "coastal fleet", for which many authors and readers of "VO" stand up, meet the wishes of our leadership?

The answer is an unequivocal no. And that's why.

The same “Decree” clearly defines the purpose of our Navy:

"The Navy as a service of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation is intended to ensure the protection of the national interests of the Russian Federation and its allies in the World Ocean by military methods, to maintain military-political stability at the global and regional levels, and to repel aggression against the Russian Federation from ocean and sea directions." ...

According to the "Decree", the main goals of the state policy in the field of naval activities are:

a) maintaining the naval potential at a level that ensures guaranteed deterrence of aggression against the Russian Federation from ocean and sea directions and the possibility of inflicting unacceptable damage to any potential adversary;

b) maintaining strategic stability and international law and order in the World Ocean, including through the effective use of the Navy as one of the main instruments of the foreign policy of the Russian Federation;

c) ensuring favorable conditions for the development and rational use of the natural resources of the World Ocean in the interests of the country's socio-economic development.

In fact, from this point, the duality of the tasks assigned to the Russian Navy is quite obvious.

On the one hand, it is a recognition of the need to have highly effective naval strategic nuclear forces (NSNF) that will provide guaranteed nuclear retaliation to anyone who encroaches on it.

On the other hand, the leadership of the Russian Federation considers it imperative to have sufficiently powerful non-strategic general-purpose forces capable of operating in the World Ocean for a long time.

This is directly indicated by a number of strategic requirements for the Navy (listed in the section of the same name of the "Decree"), including:

1) Ability to quickly and covertly deploy forces (troops) in remote areas of the World Ocean;

2) The ability to successfully confront the enemy with high-tech naval potential (including those armed with high-precision weapons ), with the groupings of its naval forces in the near, distant sea zones and ocean areas;

3) Ability for long-term autonomous activity, including independent replenishment of supplies of material and technical means and weapons in remote areas of the World Ocean from logistics support vessels of new projects.

In general, the "Decree" quite unequivocally divides strategic deterrence into nuclear and non-nuclear. At the same time, the endowment of general-purpose naval groupings with non-nuclear deterrent functionality is one of the priorities for the development of the fleet (point "b" of Article 47 of the "Decree").

Finally, the "Decree" directly sets the task of a permanent naval presence

"In the Mediterranean Sea and other strategically important areas of the World Ocean, including in the areas where the main sea transport communications pass."

You can agree with these tasks or not. And one can argue about whether they are achievable given the plight of the domestic economy. But nevertheless, I urge you to take into account that the above tasks are not my personal fantasies, but the position of the leadership of our country. Moreover, it is stated in the document from 2017.

That is, after the crisis of 2014, when it was quite obvious that the plans of the GPV 2011–2020 failed miserably, including due to the impossibility of financing them by the budget of the Russian Federation.

Strategic nuclear deterrence

In the coming decades, it will, of course, be based on the Project 955 and 955A Strategic Missile Submarine Cruisers (SSBNs), of which there are now 10 units in the fleet and at different stages of construction (including preparation for it).

Other ships of this type are likely to be built. And also (in addition to them) also specialized carriers of "Poseidons" - "Belgorod" and Co. We will not discuss the usefulness of the latter in matters of strategic nuclear deterrence, but note that SSBNs are transferred to two fleets, the North and the Pacific.

What do we need to ensure the operation of SSBNs?

The main threats to our SSBNs are:

1) minefields deployed at the exit of our naval bases;
2) multipurpose nuclear (and non-nuclear) submarines;
3) anti-submarine aviation .

As for surface ships, they, of course, also pose a serious potential threat to SSBNs. But only in the distant sea and ocean zones.

Of course, today the capabilities of the Russian Navy are infinitely far from the desired ones. But nevertheless, an attempt to deploy a "network" of US surface ships in our near sea zone, in the immediate vicinity of land-based airfields and coastal missile systems, would be an extremely unreasonable form of mass suicide for them. And so it should remain in the future. In addition, in the north, the actions of the surface forces of our "sworn friends" are strongly hindered by nature itself.

Therefore, it is quite obvious that the combat stability of our NSNF in this case can be ensured by the formation of A2 / AD zones in the areas of the SSBN bases. That is, our Navy should be able to provide zones in which enemy submarines and ASW aircraft will be detected and destroyed with a probability that excludes the effective "hunt" of these submarines and aircraft for our SSBNs. At the same time, the size of these zones should be large enough to prevent our opponents from having a chance with acceptable admissibility to “watch for” and intercept our SSBNs outside its borders.

From the above, it does not at all follow that our SSBNs should occupy positions exclusively in areas A2 / AD. Simply with their help, the task of bringing the most modern SSBNs into the ocean, capable of operating in it, is solved. In other words, provided that the technical capabilities and skills of the crews of our ships will allow them to get lost in the ocean. Older submarines, which would be too risky to send to the ocean, can, of course, remain in relative safety of the A2 / AD. And they will be ready to strike retaliation right from there.

From my point of view, the Barents and Okhotsk Seas should become such areas for us.

In addition, it is necessary to provide a significant area A2 / AD around Petropavlovsk-Kamchatsky. But here, of course, other opinions are possible.

How to secure A2 / AD?

This requires quite a bit.

First of all, it is a system of naval reconnaissance and target designation, which makes it possible to identify enemy submarines and aircraft, and at the same time, of course, his surface ships. Accordingly, we are talking about the means of monitoring the air, surface and underwater situation.

More specifically, air control is provided by radar, radio-technical and optical-electronic reconnaissance. For what you need:

1. Orbital group (appropriate purpose).

2. Coastal radar stations (including over-the-horizon) and RTR (electronic intelligence).

3. Manned and unmanned aerial vehicles, including AWACS and RTR aircraft.

Unfortunately, many today are inclined to exaggerate the importance of satellites and ZGRLS, believing that they will be completely sufficient for detecting and classifying the enemy, as well as for developing target designation. But this, alas, is not so.

Satellites and ZGRLS are, of course, very important components of the maritime reconnaissance and target designation system. But on their own they cannot solve the entire spectrum of tasks in the field of surface and air situation control.

In reality, the capabilities of our satellite constellation are insufficient. The provision of ZGRLS is at a more or less acceptable level. But in the part of AWACS and RTR aircraft, as well as reconnaissance drones for operations over the sea, there is a large black hole.

To control the underwater situation, we need:

1. Satellites capable of searching for submarines by the heat trail (and, possibly, by other methods).

2. PLO aircraft and helicopters armed with specialized means of searching for submarines.

3. Networks of stationary hydrophones and other passive and active means of detecting the enemy. It is also possible to use mobile means, such as specialized hydroacoustic reconnaissance ships.

What do we have?

The satellite constellation, as mentioned earlier, is insufficient. The most modern "air" forces of PLO - Il-38N in their capabilities are very much inferior to modern PLO aircraft of NATO countries. And there are deliberately insufficient quantities.

The rest - IL-38, Tu-142, Ka-27, are outdated, up to a complete loss of combat effectiveness. The current Ka-27 modernization program, alas, can hardly solve this problem. The deployment of a network of active and passive hydroacoustic stations has been disrupted.

Of course, warships are also integrated into the naval reconnaissance and target designation system.

Fleet and Aviation for A2 / AD

General purpose naval forces for the formation of A2 / AD should consist of:

1. Highly effective mine-sweeping forces capable of bringing our surface and submarine ships out of the naval base "to clean water."

2. PLO corvettes for operations in the coastal and near sea zones (0-500 miles from the coastline).

3. Multipurpose submarines to counter multipurpose nuclear and non-nuclear submarines of a potential enemy.

4. Naval aviation for solving the problems of anti-aircraft defense, gaining air supremacy and destroying enemy surface forces.

On the first point, I think, the dear reader will be clear without my comments.

I will only say that mine-sweeping operations in the Russian Navy are in a terrible state, which does not allow fighting modern types of foreign mines.

The respected M. Klimov described the problem many times and in detail. And I see no reason to repeat myself. If some minesweepers are still under construction ("Alexandrite"), then they simply do not have modern and effective means of mine detection and neutralization, which is a gaping gap in our naval defense.

On the second point, it is also more or less clear.

In the near sea zone, we are threatened, first of all, by enemy aircraft and submarines. It is simply impossible to create a corvette capable of repelling an air raid by specialized naval aviation on its own. This is difficult even for ships of much larger displacement.

Likewise, there is no point in trying to stuff the corvette with anti-ship missiles up to and including the Zircon. The task of fighting the enemy's surface forces is not his target. It should be dealt with by aviation. Therefore, in the part of air defense, the emphasis should be on the destruction of guided munitions. And the main specialization of the corvette is to make anti-submarine warfare.

In other words, the corvette should be a cheap and massive ship, focused primarily on anti-submarine activities. We, alas, do everything the other way around, trying to shove the frigate's weapons into the corvette. Well, we get a corvette at the price of a frigate, of course. That reduces its basic (PLO) capabilities. And it makes impossible the massive construction of these very necessary ships of the Russian Navy.

On the third point, it is already more difficult.

As part of the creation of A2 / AD, we need, again, numerous submarines capable of fighting the latest nuclear and non-nuclear foreign ships.

What should they be?

It is impossible to answer this question in a nutshell. Of course, some of the requirements are obvious. We need specialized ships to deal with enemy submarines. What will require:

1. Such a ratio of the capabilities of the SAC and the visibility of our ship, which will allow us to detect modern and promising enemy submarines before they spot our ship. The usefulness of this is obvious - the one who detects the enemy first gets a great advantage in battle.

2. Effective complexes of torpedo and anti-torpedo weapons. It is not enough to reveal the enemy; And at the same time not to be liquidated yourself.

3. High speed low noise running. The main task of such multipurpose submarines is to search for an underwater enemy in the A2 / AD zones. And the higher the speed, the more space the submarine can “scan” in a day.

4. Reasonable price, allowing to deploy large-scale construction of such submarines.

Once again, I would like to draw the attention of the dear reader - we are not talking about submarines for escorting our SSBNs. This refers to submarines capable of searching for and destroying enemy submarines in specified areas.

Personally, I (at one time) believed that the creation of a PLAT (nuclear torpedo submarine), in its ideology close to our "Shchuke-B", would be optimal for solving such problems. Or rather, even to the British "Astute". That is, not more than 7 thousand surface and 8.5 thousand underwater displacement (maximum, but better - less).

But other options can also be considered.

For example, the French "baby" "Barracuda", with its underwater displacement of about 5300 tons.

Or the proposal of the respected M. Klimov, which boils down to creating a nuclear ship based on diesel-electric submarines of project 677. In essence, the “cost / efficiency” criterion is the determining factor here.

Does our fleet need non-nuclear submarines?

Generally speaking, yes. Needed.

Since they are quite suitable for operations in the Black and Baltic Seas. Nuclear ships are useless there.

It is also possible that a certain number of such submarines will be in demand for A2 / AD, formed by the Northern and Pacific Fleets within the near sea zone. But here, again, one should look from the “cost / efficiency” position in relation to the tasks being solved.

For example, if we want to patrol a certain coastal sea space with an area of ​​"X" and this requires either "Y" pieces of boards, or "Z" pieces of diesel-electric submarines with air-independent installations or lithium-ion batteries. And at the same time "Z" pieces of diesel-electric submarines will cost less than "Y" PLATS. Why not?

There is already a clean economy. Taking into account the number of crews, cost of life cycles, required infrastructure, etc. etc.

What do we have at the moment?

We do not build or develop PLATs at all. Instead, we create universal "mastodons" of the 885M project.

I do not at all consider Yaseni-M to be bad ships.

And they certainly have their own tactical niche. But for solving A2 / AD problems, they are completely sub-optimal. Due to the extremely high cost.

That is, we simply cannot build a sufficient number of Ash-Ms to form A2 / AD.

And if we also take into account that equipping them with a propeller instead of a water cannon does not allow relying on a high speed of low-noise travel, and also the disastrous situation in terms of anti-submarine weapons (problems with both torpedoes and anti-torpedo protection, lack of experience in ice torpedo firing, etc.) etc., again, all this is perfectly described by M. Klimov), then it becomes quite sad.

With diesel-electric submarines, the situation is very bad.

We developed and developed VNEU, but we never did. And it is unclear whether we will be able to create an air-independent installation in the foreseeable future.

A possible alternative could be the transition to high-capacity batteries (lithium-ion batteries, that is, LIAB). But - only on condition of increasing the reliability of these same LIAB, which today can explode at the most inopportune moment. Which is completely unacceptable for a warship in general and for a submarine in particular.

But even with diesel-electric submarines, not all is well.

The ship of the new generation ("Lada") did not "take off" even without any VNEU and LIAB.

As a result, obsolete Project 636.3 Varshavyankas are going to the fleet. Yes, they were once called "black holes". Yes, until about the beginning of the 90s, their "progenitor" (Project 877 "Halibut") really discovered the enemy "Elks" first. But 30 years have passed since then.

Of course, project 636.3 has been seriously improved. But, for example, such an important means of searching for the enemy as a towed GAS was not “delivered” to it. And the problems with torpedo armament and PTZ have already been mentioned above.

In other words, there is great doubt that the 636.3 is capable of effectively dealing with the latest enemy submarines right now.

But progress does not stand still ...

Aviation ...

Everything is very complicated here.

That is, everything is clear about the tasks. Apart from the PLO tasks mentioned above, in A2 / AD zones we must be able to:

1. Establish zonal air supremacy.

This is obviously necessary to ensure the actions of our own anti-aircraft defense aircraft, prevent flights of enemy aircraft of a similar purpose, cover the elements of the naval reconnaissance and target designation system, which are our own aircraft and UAVs of AWACS and RTR, as well as to protect our corvettes from attacks by enemy strike aircraft.

2. Destroy enemy surface ships and their formations, including those outside the A2 / AD zones.

The difficulties here are as follows. The fact is that the American AUG does not have to break into the same Okhotsk Sea in order to solve the problem of destroying our aviation over its waters. AUG or AUS may well maneuver even hundreds of kilometers from the Big (or Small) Kuril ridge.

The US Navy's deck-based AWACS and RTR aircraft are quite capable of being on duty even 600 km from the "home deck" and intercepting our aircraft (and the same Il-38N, for example) with the same Super Hornets. It is also necessary to take into account the capabilities of the Japanese Air Force, based in Hokkaido.

To a certain extent, the neutralization of this enemy aircraft can be solved by deploying strong Russian air formations in Kamchatka and Sakhalin. But here the well-known difficulties begin.

Stationary airfields both there and there will become, perhaps, the primary targets of the Japanese Air Force and the American Navy. And it will be so difficult to withstand the blow there.

In addition, the length of the Great Kuril Ridge is about 1200 km. And it will be extremely difficult, if not impossible, to intercept enemy multifunctional fighters over such a distance, simply because of the long flight time.

To build a "full profile" airbase for at least a regiment of fighters with AWACS and RTR aviation on the Kuril Islands?

In principle, a possible case. But it will cost a lot. And, again, the vulnerability of such a base to cruise missiles will be very high. And for such a goal, the US Navy will not be stingy.

That is why, according to the author, an aircraft carrier would be very useful to us at the Pacific Fleet.

Our "mobile airfield", maneuvering somewhere in the same Okhotsk, will not be so easy to find. And the presence of a "deck at sea" will greatly facilitate and simplify reconnaissance by RTR and AWACS aircraft. It will allow more active use of PLO helicopters. And, of course, intercepting American or Japanese air patrols from an aircraft carrier will be much faster and easier.

At the same time, it is quite possible that if we take into account all the costs of an alternative solution to the problem - that is, numerous air bases in the Kuril Islands, Kamchatka, Sakhalin with powerful air defense and missile defense, focused on the destruction of cruise missiles - the aircraft carrier will be even cheaper.

From here, the composition of the air group of a promising aircraft carrier for the Russian Navy is also visible.

These are, first of all, heavy multifunctional fighters, the most effective for gaining air superiority. In the second stage - RDLO and RTR aircraft. In the third - helicopters (or even carrier-based aircraft) PLO. That is, our aircraft carrier should be "sharpened", first of all, for solving air defense / anti-aircraft defense missions, and not for strike functions.

Of course, an aircraft carrier will need proper escort - no less than three or four destroyers.

All of the above is also true for the Northern Fleet, taking into account its geographical features, of course.

But strike aircraft ...

Here, in my opinion, one cannot do without the revival of naval missile-carrying aircraft in all its splendor.

As mentioned above, the American ADS does not have to go to the Barents or the Sea of ​​Okhotsk in order to establish air supremacy there. They can do this from the coast of Norway or beyond the Kuril ridge. And even the Su-34 will not have enough combat radius to reach them there from continental airfields.

And it will be somewhat presumptuous to pin all hopes on the airfield base of the same Kamchatka - it turns out that it should be able to repel cruise missile attacks, and provide its own air defense, and even cover large sectors of the Sea of ​​Okhotsk and the A2 / AD zone near Petropavlovsk-Kamchatsky ... and ensure the basing of a sufficient number of Su-34s? And duplicate such opportunities for Sakhalin?

At the same time, the availability of aircraft (with the capabilities of the Tu-22M3 or better) in conjunction with the aircraft carrier will allow (with very good chances of success) to carry out an operation to destroy the enemy AUS operating outside the A2 / AD zones of the Northern or Pacific Fleet. And when planning their operations, US admirals will have to take into account such a possibility, which, of course, will force them to be more careful.

By the way, if someone wants to argue about aircraft carriers - in the "Decree", which was signed by V.V. Putin in 2017 in the chapter "Strategic requirements for the Navy, tasks and priorities in the field of its construction and development" has an interesting phrase:

"It is planned to create a naval aircraft carrier complex."

It is clear that to promise does not mean to marry. But, at least, such was the intention.

Is it possible to resolve the issue of destroying the enemy AUS behind the same Kuril ridge by the forces of our missile-carrying "Ash"?

In theory, yes.

In practice, for this, it will be extremely important to provide air cover along the Great Kuril Ridge. And compulsory additional reconnaissance of AUS according to satellites and (or) ZGRLS. With which, again, carrier-based aviation will cope much better than aircraft from Kamchatka or Sakhalin airfields.

In the north of our missile-carrying aviation, it would be much more correct not to "break" to the location of the AUS through half of Norway, but, having flown straight to the north and making a corresponding "detour", from the north and attack. And here, only carrier-based aircraft can provide cover for missile carriers - aircraft from land airfields will not have enough combat radius.

But this does not mean that aircraft such as the Su-30 or Su-34 have nothing to do in naval aviation. They will be more than appropriate over the Black and Baltic Seas.

Now let's see what we need to solve the tasks of strategic non-nuclear deterrence, to ensure the presence of the Russian Navy in the distant sea and ocean zones.

General Marine Forces

Everything is very simple here.

Submarines and aircraft are very well suited for projection of force from the sea, for conducting combat operations against the fleet and the coast - especially if they act together. Accordingly, an air defense / anti-aircraft defense aircraft carrier and three or four destroyers of its direct cover. In combination with the "anti-aircraft" submarine division, which is based on the same "Yaseni-M". With the support of a couple of the above-described PAYMENTS. Together they represent a formidable naval force capable of inflicting a decisive defeat in the ocean on almost any fleet in the world except the American one.

The problem with such a connection is that the absolute maximum, which we can dream of, at least in theory, is three aircraft carrier multipurpose groups (AMG), of which one is based in the north, the second is part of the Pacific Fleet, and the third passes the current and / or capital repairs.

At the same time, there are many more places in the sea-ocean where the Russian fleet should be present.

Therefore, it makes sense to attend to the construction of frigates that have sufficient seaworthiness for walking in the ocean and universal weapons for all occasions (like the frigates of Project 22350). Which in peacetime will walk on the seas, oceans, showing the flag of the Russian Federation where it is needed. And in the case of the approach of Armageddon, they will reinforce our forces in the A2 / AD zones.

As for the destroyers to accompany the aircraft carrier, then larger ships are needed here. Something like a modernized version of the "Gorshkovs" - project 22350M.

To all of the above, of course, it is necessary to add a certain number of landing ships. And a significant auxiliary fleet capable of supporting the actions of the Russian Navy in the distant sea and ocean zones.

In the end, only two questions remain.

Can we create such a fleet technically? And is our economy able to “pull out” such expenses?

But this article has already turned out to be very long - let's talk about it next time ...

https://6b6gjclcha6ibjpa45wvvqdamu--topwar-ru.translate.goog/180900-o-flote-kotoryj-nam-nuzhen.html

Hole wrote:Is this article from the end of the 90´s?

No, today. There has been a number of articles by various Russian authors lately debating the future of the Navy... just another 2 cents worth.

miketheterrible wrote:

Hole wrote:Is this article from the end of the 90´s?

It's typical garbage and I'm unsure why Franco posts whatever piece of shit, two bit, never to have served, "expert" here.

I wonder, if I wrote an article full of shit, would it be posted here?

Franco usually has amazing stuff to share. But odd case, be posts nobodies who give poor opinions that don't even make sense to an amateur mil fan.

I will keep looking for some of your articles however in the mean time will have to post different view points to try and cover off the larger picture

Can the "coastal fleet", for which many authors and readers of "VO" stand up, meet the wishes of our leadership?

The answer is an unequivocal no. And that's why.

I agree... the coastal fleet some commentators have been suggesting is all Russia can afford simply would not be able to allow Russia to be a global trader and international power.

"The Navy as a service of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation is intended to ensure the protection of the national interests of the Russian Federation and its allies in the World Ocean by military methods, to maintain military-political stability at the global and regional levels, and to repel aggression against the Russian Federation from ocean and sea directions." ...

To meet the criteria of this decree Russia would need probably 2-3 fixed wing aircraft carriers in the 60-80K ton weight class preferably CVNs, but also the cruisers and destroyers to provide those operational capabilities with the CVNs there to protect those surface ships and undersea boats.

The respected M. Klimov described the problem many times and in detail. And I see no reason to repeat myself. If some minesweepers are still under construction ("Alexandrite"), then they simply do not have modern and effective means of mine detection and neutralization, which is a gaping gap in our naval defense.

Not true... Russia is producing more mine sweepers than the rest of the world combined and is using modern underwater unmanned drones equipped with sophisticated sonar equipment as tested in waters around Syria etc.

Money had been spent and capabilities are being achieved...

Likewise, there is no point in trying to stuff the corvette with anti-ship missiles up to and including the Zircon. The task of fighting the enemy's surface forces is not his target. It should be dealt with by aviation.

This is simply ignorance... corvettes potential and capabilities are enhanced with UKSK tube launchers... the ability to carry anti ship or land attack or anti sub weapons makes them flexible and capable... leaving anti ship issues to aircraft is a cop out because those aircraft would be better suited to dealing with enemy aircraft.

Therefore, in the part of air defense, the emphasis should be on the destruction of guided munitions. And the main specialization of the corvette is to make anti-submarine warfare.

The UKSK launch tubes that carry anti ship missiles can also carry anti sub weapons too.

In other words, the corvette should be a cheap and massive ship, focused primarily on anti-submarine activities. We, alas, do everything the other way around, trying to shove the frigate's weapons into the corvette. Well, we get a corvette at the price of a frigate, of course. That reduces its basic (PLO) capabilities. And it makes impossible the massive construction of these very necessary ships of the Russian Navy.

Frigates are better than Corvettes because their extra size means flexibility and the UKSK launchers means it can perform anti ship or land attack or anti sub missions as needed.

Making a corvette a cheap massive ship is a contradiction in terms.

As part of the creation of A2 / AD, we need, again, numerous submarines capable of fighting the latest nuclear and non-nuclear foreign ships.

Why?

Aircraft like the MiG-31K move faster and carry more effective missiles and can cover a much greater area much more efficiently.



The more interesting thing is that it considers defence but it does not take into account the fact that Russia is largely surrounded by opponents so if Russia wants to develop and expand then it needs trade relations with countries around the world... their army and Air Force are not sufficient for such a role as keeping open Russian access to the world... only the navy can do that.

In terms of defending Russia MiG-31K aircraft will keep enemy surface ships at bay and submarines can keep enemy subs and their OTH radar and amazing IADS network can defeat any weapons directed at them until they can't... by which time the weapons launched at Russian enemy will have at least assured that their enemies are gone.

Would agree with that author that the Russian Navy is not where it needs to be, but do they not understand that without the ability to just print money and the requirement that new systems actually function properly and don't end up as expensive white elephants like F-35 or Zumwalt or LCS or Ford class, then there is a lot of other work that needs to be done first like support ships and mine sweepers and new MPA aircraft and production for new destroyers as well as producing new corvettes and frigates let alone new helicopter carriers and cruisers. Upgrading older models allows new models to be delayed so they can be done better with more experience and new systems but you can't rebuild all the old stuff and keep using that forever.

New stuff will be smaller and lighter and more capable and better armed with fewer crew and more options and capabilities and will work better with other platforms to form a much better team that wont need to be as big as it used to be.

Actually there are lots of towed arrays you can use that allow you to simulate being various different ships to lure passive systems to attack the empty space behind the ship.

Returning the Mi-14 back into service would be useful to increase the numbers of helicopters that could tow such systems.

And the Soviets and Russians have a full range of similar weapons... except the west only has a fraction of the mine hunters they would need to defend themselves...

The Russians also have active anti torpedo weapons to protect themselves...though captor mines would be a problem.

The point is that the Russian Navy is not going to be fully deployed when WWIII looks likely to engage enemy countries and kill people.

In a WWIII type situation the SSBNs would be deployed to their launch positions... some SSNs will likely be sent to stop any enemy subs interfering with their mission and the rest of the Russian fleets will likely sit near ports providing extra layers of air defence for their port defences.

The main role of the Carriers will be in peace time to assure Russian access to the global markets it will need to trade and grow... a huge submarine fleet costs money and is really only actually useful during WWIII... making it an economic burden on the Russian economy and when needed it is hardly a game changer as new nuclear powered cruise missiles could be launched in enormous numbers and be far harder to stop.

Your average cruise missile flys for most of its flight path at medium altitude to maximise speed and range... it is only when it approaches its target are that it drops down and starts weaving through mountains and hills and approaching from unexpected directions...

A nuclear powered cruise missile can fly low all the way making it much much harder to detect and engage... even a subsonic model... but I suspect higher speeds are likely given time.

Ballistic weapons fly much faster but have to climb high so you can detect them from long range and their paths are predictable. A low flying cruise missile or a high flying hypersonic manouvering missile like Zircon do not have a predictable flight path like a fired bullet or thrown dart or stone... it is like an aircraft that can change path and speed as often as it likes making determining what its target is and the flight path it will take impossible.

The US can go screw itself... Russia can run any exercises inside its own territory that it likes, and when it likes... when the US starts doing what Russia tells it, the Russia might consider doing what the US tells it... until then keep barking... makes you easier to shoot in the dark.

Why it is necessary to secure Russia's eastern borders? The Kremlin is constantly trying to force it to lean against a stronger partner to the detriment of its own interests


If in pre-revolutionary Russia for decades the dispute continued between the Westernizers and the Slavophiles about the development of the country, now there is a dispute in the country between Westerners and Easterners. Or, to put it more bluntly, an argument about who we should lean against.

WESTERNS ARE IN A DEAF OPPOSITION

In the late 80s - early 90s, Westerners absolutely dominated the domestic political discourse, now they are driven into a deaf opposition. Apparently, to a very large extent they are to blame for this themselves, which, by the way, is confirmed by their current behavior.

The main theses of Russian Westernizers (opposition politicians, political scientists, journalists, publicists, bloggers, etc.) are approximately as follows: “it's very bad that we quarreled with the West”, “we need to make peace with the West as soon as possible”, “Russia is a European country, so we are only on the way with Europe "," where will you send your children to study, to Oxford or Pyongyang? " etc. All this, unfortunately, is pure demagogy, a set of ideological clichés and nothing more.

Of course, quarreling is bad, but making peace is good, and not only with the West, but with everyone in general. But it is very desirable to answer the question, and specifically and without demagoguery: on what conditions will we put up with him?

We must nevertheless find the strength to see that the West demands from us only and exclusively unconditional surrender, no other options are simply not considered. Moreover, unconditional surrender does not guarantee us anything; after it, much more will be demanded from us. For example, many of our pro-Western oppositionists are proposing to hold a new referendum "under international control" in Crimea. The point, however, is that no one in the West even hints at such an option. Only a kind of EU dissident, Czech President Milos Zeman, offers Moscow to simply pay Kiev a ransom for Crimea, but this is nothing more than Zeman's personal opinion. All other American and European politicians demand from Moscow only the unconditional return of Crimea to Ukraine (perhaps because they guess that in any referendum the result will be the same)as in March 2014, after which the wonderful concept of "annexation" and "occupation" will immediately collapse).

The West completely excludes any compromises with Moscow (this was discussed in the article "Russia and the West remain antagonists" , "NVO" of 12/15/17). And even a return to the situation before February 2014 will no longer be accepted by him, since he now wants to completely exclude the possibility of another relapse of the strengthening of Russian geopolitical positions. We will inevitably be required to radically reduce the Armed Forces (both strategic nuclear forces (SNF) and conventional forces) and an equally radical weakening of the central government in favor of the regions, that is, the de facto confederalization of Russia.

A few months ago, an alternative plan for reforming the RF Armed Forces was published in one of the opposition-oriented domestic newspapers (the author of the plan is, as it were, a Russian citizen with a very pro-Western position). According to this plan, the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation should be reduced by several times in comparison with their current state with a simultaneous transition to a completely hired principle of manning, while in each region of the Russian Federation a local National Guard should be created, formed upon the call! On the Russian Internet, this plan was assessed mainly as the delusion of a madman, which is completely wrong. The plan is very smart and correct from the point of view of Russia's opponents: its implementation will not only exclude Russia from waging any war, including a purely defensive one, but, in fact, will mean the termination of the existence of the Russian Federation as a single state.The very fact of the appearance of such a plan is extremely symptomatic and should get rid of all illusions about the possibility of "reconciliation between Russia and the West." Accordingly, Russian Westernizers should try to clearly answer the question: is such "unconditional surrender +" acceptable for us? And if not, what are the specific practical ways to avoid it?

RUSSIA IS NOT EUROPE, BUT SOMETHING MORE

There are also more conceptual questions for Westerners, irrespective of the possibility of reconciliation.

In general, Russia is not Europe, but Eurasia; representatives of non-Slavic and non-European ethnic groups have made a very noticeable contribution to its development. But even this is not the main thing. The main thing is that today's Russian Westernizers appeal exclusively to the past, diligently not noticing the present.

In particular, the point is that ideological diversity and political pluralism, traditionally considered one of the strongest and most attractive aspects of the Western system, are gradually becoming a thing of the past. Left liberalism, which implies a very peculiar interpretation of classical liberalism and democracy, becomes the "only correct doctrine", criticism of which is already considered unacceptable (criticism is immediately labeled "fascist"). Moreover, the most unobvious aspects of this ideological trend, that is, hypertrophied tolerance and political correctness, are very aggressively imposed both on the societies of the Western countries themselves and on all other countries, primarily those seeking an alliance with the West. Therefore, quite a few political scientists (both in the West and in Russia) are beginning to express a completely reasonable opinion,that if earlier the concepts of "liberalism" and "democracy" were considered complete synonyms, now they are beginning to turn almost into antonyms.

In this regard, I would like to ask our Westerners: should we “enter the West” precisely on these conditions, that is, unconditionally accept the new “only correct doctrine”, and also leftist (like the one we got rid of three decades ago)? Or is it still possible not to go as far as complete absurdity? I would like to hear a clear and concrete answer to a specific question about the current situation, and not memories of the XVIII-XIX centuries, in which none of us lived.

Finally, it would not hurt for Russian Westernizers to answer the question about the prospects of the West, especially the European Union. It is completely unclear that these prospects are rosy, the number of problems facing the EU is so great. Moreover, these problems are more likely to multiply and get worse than to be successfully resolved. In this connection, there are great doubts that we need at least in some form to join this formation, and even more so - to dissolve in it. Unfortunately, our Westerners cannot even state the problems of the current EU, let alone discuss them in relation to Russia, if it suddenly makes a "European choice." Their attitude towards the West, apparently, has not changed since the late 1980s, when the majority of the country's population perceived it as something ideal and infallible. Similar, to put it mildly,inflexibility of thinking and practically religious worship of completely earthly objects is somewhat strange for people who consider themselves the intellectual elite of the country, a “creative class” (what, by the way, is its creativity?).

FROM CONSERVATISM TO OBLIGATION - ONE STEP

And one more question for Russian Westernizers (first of all, for their political leaders), which is rather rhetorical: do they understand that by their antipatriotism they are destroying their own electoral base? For the overwhelming majority of the population, this anti-patriotism is so unacceptable that other programmatic provisions of the Westernizers, including quite reasonable ones, no longer play a role. And for those already few citizens who share this antipatriotism, Russia, by definition, does not matter, they are its citizens only by passport, but not by self-awareness. Therefore, they will not make any effort to rebuild it in accordance with their views, it is easier for them to join the West in their personal capacity, having left there for permanent residence. That is, there is simply no one to vote for the Westernizers, which was confirmed by the 2016 State Duma elections:the left-liberal Yabloko and PARNAS received a total of just over 1.4 million votes, which is 1.3% of the total number of Russian citizens who have the right to vote. This is the very real popularity of this political trend.

At the moment there is a strong impression that the goal of our Westernizers is to completely dissolve Russia in the West, rejecting not only national interests, but also territorial integrity and national identity. It seems that they are quite satisfied with not even "unconditional surrender +", but "unconditional surrender ++ ... +". Interestingly, even this option does not in the least guarantee Russia (or what will remain of it) an improvement in the economic situation and an increase in the living standards of the population. He guarantees something exactly the opposite - a significant deterioration in both, as happened in Ukraine after she "made the European choice." However, our Westerners also diligently ignore this "inspiring example", because if the theory contradicts the facts, so much the worse for the facts.it is the most important principle of modern left-wing liberalism.

As you know, the Russian government today responds to the specific features of Western left liberalism with protective conservatism, which at times and at times is very reminiscent of outright obscurantism. Nevertheless, even this version of the answer finds a very noticeable, and an increasing number of supporters in the West, so people there began to tire of the triumph of various minorities over the normal majority (and the Europeans, moreover, were already very tired of the omnipotence of an unselected supranational European bureaucracy).

Russia would follow the path of right-wing, patriotic liberalism - and it would quite realistically become not only a forceful, but also an ideological alternative pole for the West and the world as a whole. Alas, there is no reason to expect the current Russian government to turn to right-wing liberalism. But unfortunately, this is not to be expected from the pro-Western opposition either, none of its representatives even hints at such an option. Therefore, normal Russians must choose between a religious procession and a gay parade, recalling Stalin's famous statement on almost the same occasion: "Both are worse."

CHINESE DREAMS OF ORIENTS

The opposite of the Westerners is the Russian Easterners. However, this opposite is most likely apparent - they also have a completely Western-centric mentality and also experience a strong inferiority complex in relation to the West. Only if the Westerners are ready to dissolve in the West because of this, then the Easterners are ready to freeze not only their ears, but their whole head in spite of the Western "grandmother." They, like the Westernizers, do not consider the possibility of independent development of Russia, dreaming of leaning as closely as possible against China. Sometimes Easterners come up with broader geopolitical constructs that we must lean against, including more than just China. But these constructions have the same relation to reality as "reconciliation with the West."At the same time, the overwhelming majority of Easterners absolutely do not understand either the Chinese mentality or the tasks and problems facing China.

Reading and listening to Russian orientalists can be very funny. Year after year, they talk about how great the prospects for a Russian-Chinese "strategic partnership" are and how wonderful Moscow and Beijing will work together to oppose Washington's hegemony.

Meanwhile, the "strategic partnership" between Russia and China was proclaimed back in the mid-1990s. Accordingly, it has long been necessary to write and talk not about great prospects, but about wonderful achievements. But the fact is that there are none at all. The harsh military confrontation between the two countries ended during the Soviet era, in the mid-1980s. The volume of mutual trade (and just ordinary trade, nothing more) between the two countries is extremely small, given that we are talking about two great powers with huge economies, moreover, having a land border of 4.3 thousand kilometers between them. The structure of this trade is extremely humiliating for Russia - the exchange of our energy resources and timber for Chinese cars and consumer goods, and the further, the more this structure is consolidated. There is simply nothing more to say.

At the same time, Russian fans of China for some reason categorically do not want to hear the Chinese themselves. And those throughout our "strategic partnership" endlessly explain that relations between the Russian Federation and the PRC do not and will never bear the character of an alliance and are not directed against third countries. And together with Russia, China is not going to confront the United States at all, its relations with the United States are its business, which does not concern Russia at all.

The essence of the "strategic partnership" has become especially clear in the last four years. Domestic Easterners enthusiastically told themselves how China supports us in Crimea, Ukraine and Syria. In reality, on all these issues, China took a position of icy neutrality with a rather noticeable anti-Russian accent. So, in the summer of 2014 (when Crimea was already Russian, the Donetsk and Lugansk People's Republics were proclaimed), Beijing congratulated the “45 million people of Ukraine” on Independence Day (this is the population of Ukraine together with Crimea and even more so with Donbass), and representatives of Crimea urged Moscow not to include in official Russian delegations visiting China. China, like most countries in the world, has not imposed any sanctions against Russia for Crimea and Ukraine,but he made very good use of these sanctions from the West, significantly tightening his already extremely tough positions on all economic transactions with Russia. Beijing did not even verbally support Moscow's Syrian military campaign; on the contrary, it was much more inclined towards the position of Turkey and the Arabian monarchies, which were on the side of Assad's opponents. Moreover, China has repeatedly condemned any foreign military intervention in the Syrian war, without stipulating any exceptions for Russia.Moreover, China has repeatedly condemned any foreign military intervention in the Syrian war, without stipulating any exceptions for Russia.Moreover, China has repeatedly condemned any foreign military intervention in the Syrian war, without stipulating any exceptions for Russia.

BEIJING LOVES STRENGTH

However, since the end of 2016, Beijing's position has begun to change. In the Chinese media, the Crimean story began to be presented in a descriptive-objectivist style, with hints that maybe Russia was right in something. China began to vote in the UN General Assembly against anti-Russian resolutions on Crimea (before that, it abstained from such resolutions). Chinese tourists have appeared in Crimea. And Assad somehow gradually became not just the legitimate president of Syria, but even a friend of China. It is interesting that it was after this, in March 2017, that threats against China from the Islamic State (IS, a terrorist organization - banned in the Russian Federation) were first voiced, before that, not to mention the rest of the anti-Assad forces in Syria, did not considered Beijing an enemy. This "creeping reorientation" of China is extremely revealing:Beijing saw deep in its grave a "strategic partnership" with Moscow, but it appreciates and understands strength very well. Moscow showed it - Beijing reacted. But, unfortunately, so far this is only a special case, and by no means a trend.

While Russian Westerners try in every possible way to avoid discussing the prospects of the present West, Easterners behave in a similar way towards China, and here, too, not everything is so simple. Of course, China's economic successes are colossal, Europe has not dreamed of such for a very long time. But the contradictions of development did not disappear anywhere. For example, despite all the efforts of the authorities, the already catastrophic ecological situation continues to deteriorate, which is already very strongly putting pressure on the economy and social sphere. A significant increase in the well-being of the population is evident, but it is still very far from the main Western countries, even China in this sense has not yet caught up with Russia (the reports that appeared in the Russian media that the average salary in China is now higher than in Russia are the result of statistical manipulations and have no relation to reality).At the same time, Chinese products are already beginning to lose their competitiveness, since they were based, first of all, on the extremely cheap labor force. Therefore, if earlier mass production moved from the West to China, now it is moving from China to neighboring countries of Southeast Asia (Southeast Asia), where workers' salaries are indeed much lower than in China. The “one family, one child” policy created such serious demographic imbalances that it was officially canceled. But population growth will give rise to new problems, or rather, exacerbate old ones.where workers' wages are indeed much lower than in China. The “one family, one child” policy created such serious demographic imbalances that it was officially canceled. But population growth will give rise to new problems, or rather, exacerbate old ones.where workers' wages are indeed much lower than in China. The “one family, one child” policy created such serious demographic imbalances that it was officially canceled. But population growth will give rise to new problems, or rather, exacerbate old ones.

Quite interesting things are happening in China's domestic politics. The current President of the People's Republic of China, Xi Jinping, apparently took a course towards usurpation of power, abandoning the post-Mao practice, when the country's leader stays in office for only two five-year terms (between CPC congresses). In particular, the fight against corruption that unfolded under him is aimed at strengthening his own power and routing rival groups (everyone steals, but only potential opponents of Xi Jinping sit down for it). The grandiose military reform ( "The New Great Wall of China", "NVO" from 20.10.17). The massive territorial and organizational "reshuffling" of the PLA ground forces units and formations allows the dismissal of officers and generals suspected of disloyalty to Xi Jinping, and the rest - to break the established ties with the regional civilian authorities. In China, they remember very well the times of the omnipotence of the "militarists", which were less than a century ago, and they are very afraid of regional separatism, supported by the military.

"NEW SILK ROAD" AND RUSSIA

A decline in industrial production (in which China is already at least twice the size of the United States) will have very bad social consequences for the country, since it will lead to huge unemployment. Therefore, in Beijing, the idea arose of a megaproject outside China, which would support industrial production in the country and organize the export of labor. This megaproject was the "New Silk Road", then renamed "One Belt - One Road" (OBOR). Today, this project is, in fact, synonymous with Beijing's foreign and foreign economic policy in the Eastern Hemisphere. It involves the construction of transport corridors from China in the western direction, which should overgrow a variety of infrastructure and draw almost all of Eurasia and Africa into the Chinese sphere of influence (first, the economic,then political, and in many cases military). China is actively entering the countries of these two continents, buying up local assets and facilities and building its own facilities on their territories. Of course, the poorer and more corrupt a country is, the easier it is for Beijing to buy it. Therefore, he has already bought Africa almost completely, and the poorest countries of Southeast Asia (Laos, Cambodia, Myanmar, Bangladesh) were also under his control. Now China is entering Eastern Europe, which welcomes it with open arms. It is especially funny to watch the Poles and Balts, who are fighting in endless hysteria over Soviet communism (for some reason, transferring it to present-day Russia), but perhaps they are not licking the Chinese communists. But Western Europe is already very actively amenable to Chinese influence.The more powerful the economy of the PRC becomes and the more problems appear in the EU economy, the quieter the European indignation at the violation of human rights in China (especially since Beijing has completely ignored this indignation for a long time) and the wider the smiles of European leaders at the sight of expensive (in literally) Chinese guests. At the end of December 2017, the main match not only of the Spanish championship, but of all European football, El Classico Real Madrid - Barcelona was played not in the evening, as it always was, but at 13.00 Madrid time - to make it more convenient watch the Chinese! Moreover, Spanish football officials are hinting that the next El Classic could take place in China itself! This example shows well who is "the boss" now.the quieter is the European indignation at the violation of human rights in China (especially since Beijing has long ignored this indignation completely) and the wider the smiles of European leaders at the sight of dear (literally) Chinese guests become. At the end of December 2017, the main match not only of the Spanish championship, but of all European football, El Classico Real Madrid - Barcelona was played not in the evening, as it always was, but at 13.00 Madrid time - to make it more convenient watch the Chinese! Moreover, Spanish football officials are hinting that the next El Classic could take place in China itself! This example shows well who is "the boss" now.the quieter is the European indignation at the violation of human rights in China (especially since Beijing has long ignored this indignation completely) and the wider the smiles of European leaders at the sight of dear (literally) Chinese guests become. At the end of December 2017, the main match not only of the Spanish championship, but of all European football, El Classico Real Madrid - Barcelona was played not in the evening, as it always was, but at 13.00 Madrid time - to make it more convenient watch the Chinese! Moreover, Spanish football officials are hinting that the next El Classic could take place in China itself! This example shows well who is "the boss" now.

A very peculiar feature of the Chinese OBOR project from the outset was that it almost completely ignored Russia - its most important "strategic partner", which also possesses a colossal transit potential! It is difficult to think of a stronger proof of what kind of fiction the "strategic partnership" is (at least for China). Only the secondary northern route of the "New Silk Road" passed through the territory of Russia in the shortest possible version - from the border with Kazakhstan in the Orenburg region to the border with Belarus. The Transsib was completely excluded from the Chinese project. Apparently, because Russian Siberia and the Far East are not included in China's foreign projects, these are directions of direct colonization for him.

Even the most ardent domestic Easterners could not fail to notice this circumstance and began to embarrassedly say that somehow it was not in a partnership. Apparently, the Kremlin was also very offended. As a result, during Xi Jinping's visit to Moscow in May 2015, he nevertheless signed an agreement with Vladimir Putin on the integration of the Belt and Road projects and the Eurasian Economic Union. Almost three years have passed since then, but it is still unclear what this integration is (or at least should be). The Kremlin, apparently, continues to be offended, which is why it has put forward an initiative to unite not only the OBOR and the EAEU, but also the SCO and ASEAN in order to "dissolve" the Chinese project in them. This project is truly grandiose, but it is not clear how to implement it in practice. Moscow itself does not explain this, so no one reacts to its proposal in any way.

Easterners are well aware that Russia has no opportunity to become a "big brother" for China, as in the 40s - 50s of the twentieth century. Therefore, some of them offer Russia to become China's “elder sister”, which, according to Chinese tradition, the “younger brother” must respect and cherish, no matter what situation the “sister” finds herself in. It looks frankly comical, especially since there is not the slightest manifestation of such a perception of reality on the part of China. More realistic Easterners suggest that Russia, thanks to its increased military power, become the official "guard" of the OBOR outside of China. Such a role does not seem very enviable, although, of course, it is better to be a hired guard than just a slave. Only China is somehow not striving for this option, it is building its own "String of Pearls",that is, a chain of military bases and logistics centers from Hainan to the Arabian Peninsula and Africa.

UNION WITH DELHI AS A COUNTERWEIGHT OF THE EXPANSION OF THE CENTRAL

An ideal geopolitical strategy for Russia would be an alliance with India. It is a democratic country with its own specifics, but without Western left-liberal perversions. It is a country that has a deep tradition of friendship with Russia and has no overlapping interests with it. The main thing is that it would be an alliance of the third and fourth largest powers in the world, which would completely balance the first and second powers (the USA and China) separately. Moreover, in our union there would be no elders and juniors, it would be a union of equal partners, complementing each other in many respects. Then other powerful countries of lower rank (for example, Vietnam and Kazakhstan) could well join this union.

Moscow has never seemed to be against an alliance with India, but only it is constantly pushing Delhi into its chimerical geopolitical structures, within which India was supposed to be friends with China against the West. India, however, is not going to dissolve in the West, but also sees no reason to oppose it. She just needed an alliance against China. As a result, Moscow has very successfully pushed New Delhi into Washington's arms with its own hands (although no one in Moscow will ever admit that the rapprochement between India and the United States is primarily the result of our "outstanding" foreign policy). And it will be extremely difficult to play back, as Russia continues to impose friendship with China on India, which will not exist under any circumstances.

Thus, today Russia's leaning against both the West and China is impossible at best, and suicidal at worst. There seems to be no one to offer a truly independent development option. Therefore, it remains to be guided by the now banal slogan: "Russia has only two allies - the army and the navy." As part of the implementation of this slogan, it would be good, finally, to note that if the country's defense is provided very satisfactorily to the west of the Urals, then to the east of the Urals and especially to the east of Lake Baikal the situation is not at all so rosy ( “A sharp sword and a strong shield is the best guarantee of the prosperity of the state ", "NVO" from 25.08.17). And it is necessary to guarantee oneself at least against the military method of depriving Russia of its eastern half. It is necessary to insure against the peaceful method of weaning in other ways, with which, alas, we have much worse.

Alexander Khramchikhin

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