US Military strategy issues

A guy I worked with several years ago said the US Military could take over the world including allies and that Russian generals he met during the 90s were stupid. I think he is underestimating the Russian Military. He also said Russia uses old equipment. Would like a counter argument. Do you think he is overestimating American superiority?

US couldn't even secure Iraq and Afghanistan, how is it going to take over the world ?

Afghanisan.  Iraq.  Vietnam.  Nuclear MAD.
If they could do this, why wouldn't they?
Rather than raving about Evil Putin Invading Ukraine, why wouldn't they counter-invade and take all of Russia?
Why has freaking North Korea puttered along just fine?
Fuck.  Read about World Island Theory, Brzezinsky, etc.  If controlling the world is viable,
why do they focus on just achieving chaos to prevent others from controlling blocs to challenge the US?
What is the point in an argument though?  Let them live in their pathetic fantasy land.

andalusia wrote:A guy I worked with several years ago said the US Military could take over the world including allies and that Russian generals he met during the 90s were stupid. I think he is underestimating the Russian Military. He also said Russia uses old equipment. Would like a counter argument. Do you think he is overestimating American superiority?

Congratulations you have met a teenager in an adult body.

Every person with even a simple understanding over politics,geopolitics and military can give you dozen of examples and arguments that this is impossible, which i would point you out the very fact abou the current and the recent past of politics.

First question would be if it is true what that guy said about US military forces, if that is true why didn't US did exact this?
We clearly have seen over last 60-75 years that USA has the ambitions to control as many as possible countries and it has a constant goal to get its hands on Russias resources which includes its territory.

To underline and reinforce this exact argument of intentions and ambitions of global domination or mild said administration and leading of politics of different countries and to establishe the so called "World operative power and reflection". Which is even a part of US military doctrine to reflect at least 2 major wars anywhere on the Globus at the same time.

So we know that USA has the intentions and the ambitions.

At this point we can already see if US has the ambitions to by Monopolarity in Military,Political and Economical globaly why didn't they invade the entire planet like your little friend bregged.

Let us break it down to the very possbility of this attempt, in fully awarness and ignorance of nuclear power and the possible nuclear war that it can bring, lets pretent it doesn't exist.

Under this situation and the ignor{e]ance of nuclear repartee in a direct military conflict, we only lay our eyes on the rest of possibilities and abilities of militaries and MIC defensive and offensive nature.

The claim says it could occupy entire world during the 90s. Fortunatley for our sake of argument only, the United States has waged an invasive war against Iraq in exact this time
period, well actually a decade later Again but their potential only grew over that decade. And this very exact war is the perfect example when it comes to US logistical
capabilities and the very nature of complexity and transport of sufficient enough Ground forces and armory to hold enemies ground, because we know Air Force can not hold ground neither can the Navy with ships, so there are infantry,motorized infantry, tanks and entire branches of logistical and support units needed inside enemy territory to support and supply their speerhead of units occupying enemy territory.

You have just to look at a countries transport and logistical capabilities. 1 Abrams tank per a single C17 (while the C17 was first build in 1991 and in 1999 only 11 existed in total), coming to C-5 Galaxy which can load 2 Abrams tanks at same time like in this picture.



The US is proud of its C-5 fleet and said:

The C-5 was a major factor in the success of the initial military airlift portion of Operation Desert Shield.

So how many C-5's did the US had or does it have now?

http://www.af.mil/AboutUs/FactSheets/Display/tabid/224/Article/104492/c-5-abc-galaxy-c-5m-super-galaxy.aspx

Inventory: Total C-5 fleet changes monthly based on congressional approval of C-5A retirements; 52 C-5Ms are scheduled to be in the inventory by fiscal 2017; 16 C-5Ms have been delivered through December 2013.

So 52 C-5M of newest versions today but what was with the timespan of 1990-1999 of total C-5's fleet.

In March 1989, the last of 50 C-5Bs was added to the 76 C-5As in the Air Force's airlift force structure. The C-5B includes all C-5A improvements as well as more than 100 additional system modifications to improve reliability and maintainability.

Based on a study showing 80 percent of the C-5 airframe service life remaining, AMC began an aggressive program to modernize the C-5 in 1998. The C-5 Avionics Modernization Program included upgrading the avionics to improve communications, navigation and surveillance/air traffic management compliance. The upgrade also added new safety equipment and installed a new autopilot system.

Untill 1990 invasion the US had in this period of time at least 126 C-5's with some few growing over this few years. In 2001 this was with M models of only 168 C-5 galaxies for a single country which took over a decade of war, but this war wasn't for occupation but only occupation of government and the oil fields and establish a working puppet state in favor of US, a real occupation to enslave everything with the attempt of annexation would took even longer and that alone destroys the argument that US could invade entire planet during 90s.

2003 invasion of Iraq USA decided to use its brandnew M1 Abrams tanks rather than to use the sufficient enough M60A2/3/4 Pattons against the iraqi monkey models. It took 9 month to bring 200 Abrams tanks on iraqi boarder with help of its vassals in Middle East, by air lift and navy transport units.

Prior to exact this 200 Abrams tanks, the US Airforce had to assure that US ground forces had a secured and safe region freed from iraqi troops, only so the US can sand in a small unit of pre-operating and supportive units, such as fueltanks, pioneer vehicles to build up a temporary base that is a sufficient and established in its role as command post and a mobile refill and field repair station!

This has already taken a big time just to assure the requirements for a basis on which this military big scaled operation can have success.

I think this little example alone gives you a figure about the actual capabilities with this boys wet dreams about global domination.

I give you another example in 1999 NATO's invasion and bombing campaign of Serbia.

Preplanned invasion implemented the US of American ground forces from Germans soil out with help of NATO logistics which are far better established in Europe than US could provide. Those exact plans of sending in ground forces were scrapped immidiatley after they have recognized that this entire country would mean a vast major scenario of urban warfare for US tanks and infantry which they would lose big time. The US Air Force along with it NATO partners couldn't comprimise within its 1 week planned SEAD/DEAD missions.
After the US has lost the factor of sending in ground forces which already eliminates the possibility of annexion/occupation, they ordered US pilots to target infrastructure and civilians like simple trains, hospitals, powerplants, roads, even the sewage plant in belgrad was targeted and the news network studio in a single building on 67 floor was precisley hit by a Laser guided bomb, and only this floor of this news network working for Mesanovic.

Such a small country like Serbia used very basic and simple methods of decieving tactics use of dummies of tanks,planes and radar stations the US couldn't understand how the SAM capabilities couldn't be comprimized even tho they had constant reports of "kills" against those targets. Until 78th day of this failed "invasion" the serbian forces and SAM capabilities could not be comprimized by NATO.


There is no American superiority that is why they US terrorists for countries they are not capable on political and military ground to operate in.

Russia and China said no to Syria so US could only spew poison towards them of "human rights" BS.

Usually i don't bother even to waste time on such nonsense as your "friend" has mumbled but i'm in good mood.

Werewolf wrote:

andalusia wrote:A guy I worked with several years ago said the US Military could take over the world including allies and that Russian generals he met during the 90s were stupid. I think he is underestimating the Russian Military. He also said Russia uses old equipment. Would like a counter argument. Do you think he is overestimating American superiority?

Congratulations you have met a teenager in an adult body.

Every person with even a simple understanding over politics,geopolitics and military can give you dozen of examples and arguments that this is impossible, which i would point you out the very fact abou the current and the recent past of politics.

First question would be if it is true what that guy said about US military forces, if that is true why didn't US did exact this?
We clearly have seen over last 60-75 years that USA has the ambitions to control as many as possible countries and it has a constant goal to get its hands on Russias resources which includes its territory.

To underline and reinforce this exact argument of intentions and ambitions of global domination or mild said administration and leading of politics of different countries and to establishe the so called "World operative power and reflection". Which is even a part of US military doctrine to reflect at least 2 major wars anywhere on the Globus at the same time.

So we know that USA has the intentions and the ambitions.

At this point we can already see if US has the ambitions to by Monopolarity in Military,Political and Economical globaly why didn't they invade the entire planet like your little friend bregged.

Let us break it down to the very possbility of this attempt, in fully awarness and ignorance of nuclear power and the possible nuclear war that it can bring, lets pretent it doesn't exist.

Under this situation and the ignor{e]ance of nuclear repartee in a direct military conflict, we only lay our eyes on the rest of possibilities and abilities of militaries and MIC defensive and offensive nature.

The claim says it could occupy entire world during the 90s. Fortunatley for our sake of argument only, the United States has waged an invasive war against Iraq in exact this time
period, well actually a decade later Again but their potential only grew over that decade. And this very exact war is the perfect example when it comes to US logistical
capabilities and the very nature of complexity and transport of sufficient enough Ground forces and armory to hold enemies ground, because we know Air Force can not hold ground neither can the Navy with ships, so there are infantry,motorized infantry, tanks and entire branches of logistical and support units needed inside enemy territory to support and supply their speerhead of units occupying enemy territory.

You have just to look at a countries transport and logistical capabilities. 1 Abrams tank per a single C17 (while the C17 was first build in 1991 and in 1999 only 11 existed in total), coming to C-5 Galaxy which can load 2 Abrams tanks at same time like in this picture.



The US is proud of its C-5 fleet and said:

The C-5 was a major factor in the success of the initial military airlift portion of Operation Desert Shield.

So how many C-5's did the US had or does it have now?

http://www.af.mil/AboutUs/FactSheets/Display/tabid/224/Article/104492/c-5-abc-galaxy-c-5m-super-galaxy.aspx

Inventory: Total C-5 fleet changes monthly based on congressional approval of C-5A retirements; 52 C-5Ms are scheduled to be in the inventory by fiscal 2017; 16 C-5Ms have been delivered through December 2013.

So 52 C-5M of newest versions today but what was with the timespan of 1990-1999 of total C-5's fleet.

In March 1989, the last of 50 C-5Bs was added to the 76 C-5As in the Air Force's airlift force structure. The C-5B includes all C-5A improvements as well as more than 100 additional system modifications to improve reliability and maintainability.

Based on a study showing 80 percent of the C-5 airframe service life remaining, AMC began an aggressive program to modernize the C-5 in 1998. The C-5 Avionics Modernization Program included upgrading the avionics to improve communications, navigation and surveillance/air traffic management compliance. The upgrade also added new safety equipment and installed a new autopilot system.

Untill 1990 invasion the US had in this period of time at least 126 C-5's with some few growing over this few years. In 2001 this was with M models of only 168 C-5 galaxies for a single country which took over a decade of war, but this war wasn't for occupation but only occupation of government and the oil fields and establish a working puppet state in favor of US, a real occupation to enslave everything with the attempt of annexation would took even longer and that alone destroys the argument that US could invade entire planet during 90s.

2003 invasion of Iraq USA decided to use its brandnew M1 Abrams tanks rather than to use the sufficient enough M60A2/3/4 Pattons against the iraqi monkey models. It took 9 month to bring 200 Abrams tanks on iraqi boarder with help of its vassals in Middle East, by air lift and navy transport units.

Prior to exact this 200 Abrams tanks, the US Airforce had to assure that US ground forces had a secured and safe region freed from iraqi troops, only so the US can sand in a small unit of pre-operating and supportive units, such as fueltanks, pioneer vehicles to build up a temporary base that is a sufficient and established in its role as command post and a mobile refill and field repair station!

This has already taken a big time just to assure the requirements for a basis on which this military big scaled operation can have success.

I think this little example alone gives you a figure about the actual capabilities with this boys wet dreams about global domination.

I give you another example in 1999 NATO's invasion and bombing campaign of Serbia.

Preplanned invasion implemented the US of American ground forces from Germans soil out with help of NATO logistics which are far better established in Europe than US could provide. Those exact plans of sending in ground forces were scrapped immidiatley after they have recognized that this entire country would mean a vast major scenario of urban warfare for US tanks and infantry which they would lose big time. The US Air Force along with it NATO partners couldn't comprimise within its 1 week planned SEAD/DEAD missions.
After the US has lost the factor of sending in ground forces which already eliminates the possibility of annexion/occupation, they ordered US pilots to target infrastructure and civilians like simple trains, hospitals, powerplants, roads, even the sewage plant in belgrad was targeted and the news network studio in a single building on 67 floor was precisley hit by a Laser guided bomb, and only this floor of this news network working for Mesanovic.

Such a small country like Serbia used very basic and simple methods of decieving tactics use of dummies of tanks,planes and radar stations the US couldn't understand how the SAM capabilities couldn't be comprimized even tho they had constant reports of "kills" against those targets. Until 78th day of this failed "invasion" the serbian forces and SAM capabilities could not be comprimized by NATO.


There is no American superiority that is why they US terrorists for countries they are not capable on political and military ground to operate in.

Russia and China said no to Syria so US could only spew poison towards them of "human rights" BS.

Usually i don't bother even to waste time on such nonsense as your "friend" has mumbled but i'm in good mood.

+1 for a great post!

Setting Priorities for Nuclear Modernization

In the next decade, the United States will have to make decisions that will shape its nuclear arsenal for much of the next century. Nearly every missile, submarine, aircraft, and warhead in the U.S. arsenal is nearing the end of its service life and must be replaced.

As Congress and the Obama administration continue to wrestle with the effects of sequestration on projected levels of defense spending, the U.S. Department of Defense has begun a series of procurement programs that will nearly double the amount the country spends on its nuclear deterrent in the next decade compared to what it spent in the past decade.

Over the next 30 years, the cost of the nuclear deterrent could pass $1 trillion and crowd out defense and domestic investments needed to keep the United States strong and competitive. In addition, it could undermine U.S. credibility on the issue of nuclear proliferation—especially when it comes to dealing with regimes such as Russia, China, and North Korea.

It is no accident that so many modernization programs must begin in this decade. The United States, like Russia, modernizes its nuclear arsenal in cycles. The current U.S. nuclear arsenal entered service in the 1980s when President Ronald Reagan dramatically expanded the funding devoted to nuclear weapons. That decade saw the Department of Defense field the B-1 and B-2 bombers; the Peacekeeper Intercontinental Ballistic Missile, or ICBM; and the Ohio-class ballistic missile submarines, or SSBN.

With the benefit of hindsight, it is now known that this modernization cycle was highly inefficient: in the years that followed, political, budgetary, and strategic events would modify the U.S. arsenal from its intended shape. Initial plans to deploy 244 B-1A bombers were reduced to 100 B-1B bombers, which were removed from the nuclear mission in 1993; the expected purchase of 132 B-2 bombers was first cut to 75 and then to 21; and 24 planned Ohio-class submarines were cut to 18, four of which were subsequently converted to a conventional role.

Now, some 30 years later, these weapons systems are nearing retirement and must be replaced. This new modernization cycle represents a major challenge for the United States, as well as an opportunity to ensure that the arsenal is the right size and shape to meet national security needs in a cost-effective manner. There is little reason to hope that the current modernization cycle will be easier than the last. In Congress, budgetary politics have become even more difficult.

The Budget Control Act of 2011 has severely constrained federal spending, including projected levels of defense spending. At the same time, each of the military services is undergoing contentious and costly modernization of conventional weapons systems. Treasured priorities, including Ford-class aircraft carriers; Virginia-class attack submarines; a large and diverse surface fleet; the F-35 multirole aircraft; and Army readiness could all be affected by the current plans to modernize the nuclear arsenal.

If history is any guide, modernizing the nuclear arsenal will be a difficult endeavor. Congress is unlikely to appropriate funding for full modernization plans. Frank Kendall, the Pentagon’s acquisitions chief, admitted to reporters in early 2015 that the plans are likely “a fantasy, that what we’re going to end up with is nowhere near what we requested.” To ensure that the nuclear force can continue to serve the next president’s strategic guidance, the executive branch should review nuclear spending and put in place an affordable plan for the coming decades. If it does not, the shape of the next nuclear arsenal will likely be set by the vagaries of congressional politics as they seek to curtail whichever programs happen to face cost overruns.

This report describes four changes to U.S. nuclear modernization plans that ensure strategic stability in a cost-effective way:

-- Reducing the planned number of submarines from 12 to 10
-- Cancellation of the new cruise missile
-- Elimination of the tactical nuclear mission
-- A gradual reduction in the size of the ICBM force

Collectively, these changes could save roughly $120 billion over the next 30 years. These savings would increase the likelihood that the services will have the consistent funding necessary to efficiently modernize the nuclear force and would lower the risk they will have to quickly accommodate shocks to the nuclear force structure on short notice. This plan preserves the overall structure of the nuclear triad of bombers, land-based missiles, and sea-based missiles while remaining at the warhead ceiling allowed by the New Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty, or New START. These changes would not reduce either the number or types of targets that the United States could hold at risk nor the yield or speed with which it could strike these targets.

However, the plan does decrease the number of ways that the services could strike the same target. It may also marginally diminish the survivability of some warheads under certain contingencies. In the authors’ judgment, the benefits of maintaining this redundancy simply do not justify its costs when measured against other military and domestic priorities.

Before leaving office, the Obama administration can take three steps to ensure that his successor has the information and flexibility necessary to make these needed changes. First, the president should cancel two programs: an effort to consolidate variants of the B61 gravity bomb—a lower-yield nuclear weapon dropped from fighter aircraft—as well as a program to produce a new cruise missile launched from a bomber that is able to maneuver to its target. Second, the president should revise deterrence requirements that currently constrain modernization plans. Third, the White House should order the Pentagon to generate analysis in order to inform the next Nuclear Posture Review regarding options to limit the modernization plans.

When the new presidential administration takes office in January 2017, it should implement these changes to the nuclear force structure and seriously consider two additional steps: a further reduction of the submarine force from 10 subs to 8 subs, as well as a delay of the Long-Range Strike Bomber program.

Taking these steps will not only save at least $120 billion, which will allow the Pentagon to fund more critical priorities, but will also permit President Barack Obama’s successor to have the flexibility to make even more reductions to the U.S. nuclear arsenal without undermining nuclear deterrence.


Full Report : https://cdn.americanprogress.org/wp-content/uploads/2016/02/03053017/NuclearArsenal2.pdf

Epic Fail: Modernization of US Army Has Numerous Significant Pitfalls

The experts of the National Commission on the development of the United States Army are alarmed by the pace at which the military unit is being modernized.“The commission considers the limited investment in modernization as a source of significant long-term concern, a concern that would surface even had the less-challenging security conditions assumed in the current defense strategy held,” the eight-member panel wrote in a report published by The National Defense magazine.

Speaking about the shortcomings of the ground forces, the experts drew attention to the endurance of the military aircraft, short-range air defense systems and the state of the Biochemical Corps’ artillery.The need to modernize equipment in these categories could affect troops in the United States, Europe and the Korean Peninsula, the report said, but left the details to the classified section of the report.

The Commission also gave a long list of failed programs, which cost American taxpayers billions of dollars, including a failed attempt to modernize its fleet of manned combat vehicles and unmanned military vehicles, as well as the replacement of the multipurpose Bell OH-58 Kiowa helicopters to more modern models.

Daniel Goure, vice president of the Lexington Institute in Arlington, a Virginia-based think tank, said that the army has no major modernization programs at the moment and there is no clear, evident future of the army in modernization terms.


“The Army needs better counter-rocket, precision-guided artillery, mortar systems, active protection systems for vehicles and ways to fly through brownout conditions in helicopters,” he said. “These are incremental improvements that do cost a lot of money, but are relatively close to being fielded,” Goure said.

According to the expert, the power of the Commission in dealing with the Congress is a unique opportunity to address the fundamental problems of the troops and embark on a path of modernization, in order to achieve greater financial units. So far the army leadership hasn’t utilized their chance.“I think they missed all the marks, maybe because it had to be a consensus document. Maybe because there are politics with these things,” he added.

max steel wrote:“The Army needs better counter-rocket, precision-guided artillery, mortar systems

They seem to have followed and appreciated the conflict in Ukraine and its warfare.

KiloGolf wrote:

max steel wrote:“The Army needs better counter-rocket, precision-guided artillery, mortar systems

They seem to have followed and appreciated the conflict in Ukraine and its warfare.

Well they did lend some anti-mortar radars to Ukies which rebels grabbed during the conflict. What are counter-rocket systems? Never heard of it.

2.83 MILLION.

U.S. Not Matching Defense Spending To Threats

The central objective of U.S. Cold War security strategy was to sustain an effective nuclear deterrent against one or two peer or near-peer opponents through mutual assured destruction, escalation dominance and alliance linkage.

It is why the U.S. has almost 10,000 nuclear weapons of all sizes and effects. It is the answer to the perennial question “How much is enough?” Enough to do this. And it worked.

Today, the world of threats the West faces are substantially different from those of the Cold War, but the strategy remains the same. For example, while Western alliances have remained intact, Russia’s have not. Russia has slipped from a presumed peer to near-peer status. While China has moved forward as a near-peer competitor, it has done so without a client state or alliance buffer. The Middle East remains of strategic importance to the U.S., as it does for many other countries, but military alliances in the region are shallow and radical Islamic movements are tied to no global power.

Today the U.S. has 70,000 troops in Western Europe and more than 80,000 in South Korea and Japan. During the Cold War, we had almost three times as many. Our declaratory policy was that these forces were there to oppose and repel conventional attacks by the Soviet Union, China and North Korea. The reality was that these troops were actually “trip-wire” forces aimed at engaging the U.S. military in combat operations quickly and substantially backed up by early, limited and accurate use of tactical nuclear forces. In the 21st century, the threads of this tattered strategy are fraying.

As U.S. forces deplete and age and the size of the American military shrinks, the temptation to test the strength and resolve of a strategy of nuclear deterrence through escalation dominance and mutual assured destruction surely will increase. It already has. For many current threats—especially terrorist ones—the credibility, even the general applicability of this strategy is already gone.

So where do we go from here? First, we need to come to grips with the limitations of strategic nuclear deterrence for all threats.

We should have one strategy for dealing with large stocks of weapons of mass destruction and another for only a handful. Sometimes we deter, sometimes we defend, sometimes we preempt. We should link levels of deterrence sparingly and highly selectively.

For conventional forces without nuclear or chemical weaponry, we must deter by overwhelming superiority, active opposition, alliance resistance, strategic threats to homeland security, all delinked from nuclear guarantees. We need more forces, more agile forces and more discriminating forces.

By clinging to a Cold War strategy and force structure, we are mismatched for the actual threats we face today—primarily overmatches on our part.

One example is the B-2 bomber. This weapon is so expensive and so fragile that it cannot be used as a credible conventional threat because we cannot risk the loss of a single aircraft. We are building more and more expensive platforms that become harder and harder to use because they must service deterrence at all levels of conflict.

As a result, we are forced to place a huge requirement on proxy operations. The problems with this approach are becoming painfully obvious and the results decidedly mixed. Worst of all, we communicate a muddled foreign policy. Think of Libya, think of Benghazi, think of Crimea, think of Syria.

The time to develop a new strategy is now. Regardless of the outcome of the elections in November, U.S. forces will be in for a major rebuild and refresh. If we hew to the current strategy, we will misapply new resources. We will underinvest in fast, flexible and affordable new conventional, nonnuclear technologies and much larger force structures. And we will continue to overemphasize strategic nuclear deterrence over strategic defenses on the ground and in space.

The U.S. has enjoyed the benefits and results of exclusive, offensive nuclear deterrence for almost 60 years. It may be time again to defend ourselves and our interests the old-fashioned way—with overwhelming military superiority.

'Non-deployable' soldiers becoming problematic for US Army

Medical problems are keeping too many US Army soldiers from deployment and, as the overall force shrinks, the numbers are beginning to affect unit manning levels, a top service official said.

The US Army has about 187,700 soldiers deployed across the world (about 25,000 are National Guard and Reserve personnel). However, the service also has around 100,000 soldiers (around 10% total) considered to be 'non-deployable', about 80% of those are due to medical problems, General Daniel Allyn, army vice-chief of staff, told reporters on 21 June.

When end-strength levels were higher, the service was able to keep formations at 110-115% manning levels, meaning it could absorb 10% non-deployable soldiers and still field a fully manned unit.

Forget about two-front doctrine, U.S. military can’t fight even one war

https://cofda.wordpress.com/2016/02/26/forget-about-two-front-doctrine-u-s-military-cant-fight-even-one-war/

Hello

I want to start a thread about USA's military capability. I mean does it new military work practically? I think they got around 120000-180000 active soldiers, a litter bit less in their active troops? What is your experience around this area? Is the military budget still going on? Does it goes at 500USB? Then the military should have like eight aircraft carrier in active duty? And like 2500 aircrafts, 5000 armoured tanks and a navy, airforce and so on? Intresting to discuss? I think so, I think we can discuss it in this thread. Have the US army a solid structure in their daily permissions? I mean, how is the missions to expand their military in a decade? Will they grow their military after China have soil them? How is their military budget? Will they become the greatest military power in the world again?

Forbes named five reasons why the US will lose the war with Russia

US Army strategists believe a clash with a “practically equal” rival could happen over the next five years. By this wording they mean Russia, which is rapidly modernizing its armed forces, writes Loren Thompson, executive director of the Lexington Institute, in a column for Forbes magazine, RIA Novosti reports.

The expert suggests that a hypothetical war with Russia will be tied to the fastest possible advance of ground forces across vast spaces. A defeat in such a conflict will radically change the geopolitical balance in Europe and reduce US influence to the minimum since the beginning of World War II. And defeat is by far the most likely outcome, says Thompson.

A disappointing forecast for America is associated with several factors: these are the strategic miscalculations of previous presidents - George W. Bush and Barack Obama - and the lack of funding for the armed forces. According to the analyst, the mistake of Bush Jr. is related to the withdrawal of two American heavy brigades from Europe, and Obama’s miscalculation lies in betting on the Asia-Pacific region, the echo of which was the reduction in the US military presence in the Old World.

Lauren Thompson complains that the US Army does not receive sufficient funding, especially when comparing modernization programs with Russian ones. US forces annually receive $ 22 billion from the federal budget for new weapons, while Russia has launched a ten-year rearmament program with a budget of $ 700 billion, and most of the funds, according to Thompson, will go to the development of ground forces and aviation.

The above factors make the analyst think that the American army is likely to lose the “European war”, and Lauren Thompson formulates five arguments in favor of his thesis.
Russia has a geographical advantage, the expert notes. The battles will take place on the territories of Eastern Europe, which are further from the main landing points of the American contingent in Europe. In addition, this part of the Old World is washed by seas, which can only be entered through narrow straits, which Russia can easily control.

In addition, the US Army is depressingly unprepared for such a conflict, Thompson adds. In Europe, the United States had only two stationary brigades, a light airborne unit and a cavalry regiment armed with armored Strykers. If there is no gain, Russia will simply crush these troops, notes the Forbes columnist.

Recently, the White House decided to deploy the third rotation brigade in Europe, along with this it was decided to send a thousand soldiers to Poland and to each of the Baltic countries, but this will not save all the problems. After 15 years of fighting opponents like the Taliban (the organization is banned in Russia - ed.), The US army is still vulnerable. This applies to air defense, electronic warfare, precision weapons and inadequately protected equipment. In this, the US Army cannot compare with the Russian armed forces, Thompson concludes.

The geography of the region also suggests that most of the US naval forces and assets will be cut off from the theater of operations, the expert adds. Russia has military bases in the Kaliningrad region in the Baltic and Sevastopol in the Black Sea, which makes it dangerous for the American fleet to enter adjacent waters. The US Air Force, in turn, can be expelled from the conflict zone with the help of Russian air defense.

Another circumstance that aggravates the position of the American army in a hypothetical conflict with Russia may be the indecision of the allies in the North Atlantic Alliance, the article says. NATO forces have a numerical superiority over the Russian army, but it is far from clear whether the majority of the bloc’s members will join the conflict in the Baltic countries or Ukraine, which is also not a member of the alliance. Most opinion polls show that Europeans from the west of the continent are reluctant to protect their neighbors from eastern Europe.

The positions of the North Atlantic Alliance will also weaken if Washington chooses defensive tactics and refuses to attack military bases or units in Russia. It will be difficult to launch an offensive - the maximum stage of such a conflict could be the use of nuclear weapons by Moscow, and not one of the European capitals is ready to launch a nuclear attack, the expert concludes.

NOTE: Wow! and who is the 404 country again?

http://in24.org/

Hole wrote:Interesting. They receive 750 Bill. $ a year but only 22 Bill. $ is left over to purchase new equipment.

The murican system is so corrupt, they could spend 1,5 Trill. $ and couldn´t keep up with Russia and China. Even with India.

Even though you are right, I think the $22 billion is a typo. It does not make any sense even with corruption. Corruption comes
in the form of extortion level prices. So why would the amount the US has to spend reduced before they buy anything? The loss
comes from buying the overpriced goods and services.

$22 billion per month is $264 billion per year. This figure makes more sense since the rest is spent on civilian contractors for
military bases and general administration of the bureaucracy known as the army. I am also excluding the "special budget items"
from this amount. So about 50% of the US military budget actually goes to direct military expenditures (aircraft, tanks, missiles
and support for soldiers). Of course, what Russia can buy for the same $264 billion is about 6 times more than the USA.
Russia needs $44 billion per year to get roughly the same that the USA gets.

I do not think that US military bases and bureaucracy consumes over 95% percent of their total budget. But 50% is clearly
corrupt.