Russian special military operation in Ukraine #30

BetAB-500SHP

Oh yeah, baby

ucmvulcan wrote:

limb wrote:Whats the reason the dpr advance in pervomaiskoe is measured in meters? unlike in bakhmut and soledar which have large quarries and industrial zones on their east sides, pervomaiskoe is just a one street tiny village with destroyed houses on each side of the street.

You people make fun of terrobobs, but if they make the russian not advance almost at all in the last 4 months, then they have much better defensive effectiveness that most here admit.

Is the town the objective or is wiping out the Ukrainian army the objective. You go in, take part of the town dig in, know the Ukes will advance, you retreat and you shell, swedish traffic cam, washing machine, and strafe them all to Unka Adolf and Grandpa Stepan, wash, rinse, repeat.  You are assuming that taking the town is the objective, not the means to the obective.

Liberating the DPR, I mean russian oblast of donetsk and moving the frontline away from donetsk out of range of child murdering bombardments is the objective. Ukrainians are still murdering children by shooting  from avdeevka, Toretsk, novgorodskoe, kransogorovka and marinka without a worry in their minds for 8 months now because theres been almost no progress in the DPR.

Hole wrote:

Read on Twitter that an Su-57 shot down an Ukro Su-27 with an R-37M. Waiting for conformation.

I doubt they used byelka radar there. Nato is listening to every signal comming from Russia. Would give away to much.

It was probably a su-35 or mig 31.

Isos wrote:

Hole wrote:

Read on Twitter that an Su-57 shot down an Ukro Su-27 with an R-37M. Waiting for conformation.

I doubt they used byelka radar there. Nato is listening to every signal comming from Russia. Would give away to much.

It was probably a su-35 or mig 31.

and what if Su-57 didn use own radar but a datalink and just fired the missile ?

All the overdue reports from last week, there are so many that I have divided it into several entries each dedicated to a topic

Chronicle and summaries of each day, and other reports, including losses

https://guerraenucrania.wordpress.com/2022/10/21/noticias-de-la-guerra-informes-del-16-al-21-de-octubre-informe-especial/


Strategy and tactics: a new type of war

https://guerraenucrania.wordpress.com/2022/10/21/estrategia-y-tacticas-un-nuevo-tipo-de-guerra/

The Battle of Kherson

https://guerraenucrania.wordpress.com/2022/10/21/sobre-la-batalla-de-kherson-situacion-y-perspectivas/


The offensive of the flying bombs

https://guerraenucrania.wordpress.com/2022/10/21/las-bombas-volantes/

PapaDragon wrote:
Just take out the source plant that pumps ammonia  through this pipeline, problem solved

In Togliatti?

Hey it's an ugly city, but surely it doesn't deserve that. Blowing up its ammonia plant would pollute the Volga as well and everything downstream.

Better to just shut the pipeline off from the Russian end

flamming_python wrote:

PapaDragon wrote:Just take out the source plant that pumps ammonia  through this pipeline, problem solved

In Togliatti?
Hey it's an ugly city, but surely it doesn't deserve that. Blowing up its ammonia plant would pollute the Volga as well and everything downstream.
Better to just shut the pipeline off from the Russian end

Ah, yeah

Do that then

(not as fun, though)

Ispan wrote:All the overdue reports from last week, there are so many that I have divided it into several entries each dedicated to a topic

The offensive of the flying bombs

https://guerraenucrania.wordpress.com/2022/10/21/las-bombas-volantes/

The flying bombs
Miniaturday 21 October, 2022 Zhukov

About "suicide" drone strikes that it would be more appropriate to call them "flying bombs" like the V-1s of World War II.

The More The Merrier

Well into the morning (18 October), new attacks on Ukrainian energy
infrastructure works were carried out. There are four arrivals in Kiev. In the Sumy region, a substation was hit, as well as in Dnipro. There was a
arrival in Odessa. Earlier in the evening, there was an attack on military installations in Nikolayev. An oil depot and many
the warehouses were hit.

And all this is done by a primitive UAV called Geranium 2, based on the Shahed-136. Let me clarify right away that this is a Russian-made UAV. What is known about the Iranian Shahids? It is a rather primitive device with a payload of 50 kg, a speed of 180 km /h and a flight altitude from 60 to 4000 meters. Launched from a mobile platform like a truck/train/boat. Autonomy is up to 2000 km. Guidance system-autonomous.

Again, this device is primitive but has a cheap price. Also the impact it produces is not small due to the fact that its payload is equivalent to a 155 mm caliber projectile. And, surprisingly, Russia did not invest in its mass production before the SMO. There is nothing complicated in them. It is a kamikaze drone (or flying bomb). They are orders of magnitude cheaper than the Kalibr or the X-101, but they have a relatively small explosive charge, which is compensated by their quantity. And there is another effect that they produce…

Air defense systems, when faced with a new and different threat, were defenseless. Firstly, the number of drones was massive, and secondly, they had low speeds and small target dimensions.

As a result, regime soldiers have come up with an "interesting" tactic of mobile groups armed with rifles and machine guns deployed inside cities to shoot down drones. The effect is amazing. First of all, at least two civilians were injured in Odessa when soldiers fired like crazy in all directions. Secondly, the drones shot down over urban areas when falling crash into civilian buildings, and explode just as they did today in Kiev. And the difficult question is: what is more dangerous for civilians, this kind of "anti-aircraft fighters" or Geranium itself, which just flew over industrial sites where there are no civilians in the morning hours.

I don't think they are the next superweapon. Instead, I guess the Geranium
it should be worn on the front. Inside the cities something more powerful is needed, on the front there are also Russian-made "Lancets", flying at 70 km / h, and Caliber missiles, which are expensive. So, suddenly, the Russian Armed Forces found out that a weapon does not have to be sophisticated and expensive.

Enough with the large number and reliability. The Soviet Union has already gone through this during the Great Patriotic War. At that time extremely simple and extremely mass-produced armaments were designed, which were able to equip the Red Army with weaponry and stop the Germans, and helped us get to Berlin. Today we repeat the same story…

https://t.me/donrf22

How mass missile attacks will change the status quo in Ukraine

For the first time since the beginning of the war, missile strikes are being carried out in parallel with the mass use of drones.

Geran-2 drones have helped to improve the effectiveness of cruise missiles. With its help, not only the operation of the Ukrainian energy system was disrupted, but also military logistics, fuel supply to the Armed Forces of Ukraine, and the repair of armored vehicles damaged in battles at military factories.

According to the Military Chronicle, the attacks on the Ukrainian electricity system led to continuous blackouts and disruption of power supply to Ukrainian railways. Because of this, trains with military cargo are delayed at the crossing stations for several days.

The safety of such transport has deteriorated significantly: even the presence of an air defense system at the station does not guarantee the safety of passengers. If there is no electricity in the area where a military train is parked, and the trains are waiting for it to turn on or for a diesel locomotive to arrive, cruise missiles are increasingly being used against such targets.

However, part of the military cargo is still sent via railway bridges across the Dnieper River to the territories controlled by Kiev, for example, to the fortified areas in Kramatorsk and Slavyansk. Other weapons and equipment are delivered to the Armed Forces of Ukraine by road bridges.

So far, the Russian Armed Forces have prevented mass attacks on the bridges crossing the Dnieper, but after the Ukrainian electrical system is disabled, it will also be possible to use weapons against them. In addition to the Geran-2 drones, 9M723-1 missiles of the Iskander-M complex, as well as Kh-47M2 Kinzhal medium-range missiles can be used for this purpose.

Low-visibility drones can be used as the first wave to disable air defenses, and hypersonic weapons can hit particularly important targets, such as the Beskydy tunnel or railway logistics terminals for receiving Western weapons in western Ukraine. In addition, Onyx cruise missiles can be used for the attack. Since the beginning of the SVO, these weapons have been successfully used against AFU targets in Nikolaev, Odessa and Ochakov.

The combined use of attack drones, cruise missiles and hypersonic weapons will allow the Russian Armed Forces not only to suppress the air defense system of the Armed Forces of Ukraine at critical installations (for example, bridges over the Dnieper), but also to simultaneously begin their destruction. The absence of Buk, Osa-AKM and S-300 air defense systems will allow Russian aviation to use high-power bombs - ODAB-9000 or KAB-1500.

The use of operational tactical aircraft and bombers is currently limited: aircraft fly only in those areas where the air defense of the Armed Forces of Ukraine is completely suppressed or shows minimal activity.

A massive and centralized missile strike on the power grid, air defense of Ukraine and transport channels across the Dnieper will cut off the supply to the enemy grouping in Kramatorsk and Slavyansk, and deprive the Ukrainian forces of supplies in the Krivot Rog and Nikolayev directions.

If they succeed, the Donbads, Mykolaiv, Zaporizhia and Odessa will become isolated theaters of military operations. A massive strike will allow the Russian Armed Forces to properly plan an assault operation without fear of large reinforcements, and will deprive the Ukrainian troops of the last hope of a major military success.

@milchronicles


Drones are useless against effective air defense

The conflict in Nagorno-Karabakh in 2021 demonstrated the high combat effectiveness and invulnerability of Turkish drones such as the Bayraktar TB-2 against the Armenian armed forces and their Soviet-era air defense systems.

However, an air defense operation launched by the Russian army in February debunked this myth.

During the initial period of the operation, Russian air defenses shot down about 90% of all unmanned aerial vehicles produced by Baykar Makina, which undoubtedly left a negative mark on the manufacturer's image. Previously signed contracts by some Asian countries for production UAVs have been terminated.

On the current battlefield, we often hear about the invulnerability of the American HIMARS rocket launcher system. But I would like to counter this with proven facts as well. Over the past week, the Ukrainian army fired more than 80 such missiles in the direction of Kherson. The Russian Pantsir-S1 SAM system also copes with this task effectively.

About 70 missiles were shot down by this complex, that is, the efficiency of air defense is about 90%. Which says a lot about the ineffectiveness of American weapons against the Russian army.

Archangel Spetsnaz

Ispan wrote:All the overdue reports from last week, there are so many that I have divided it into several entries each dedicated to a topic

The Battle of Kherson

https://guerraenucrania.wordpress.com/2022/10/21/sobre-la-batalla-de-kherson-situacion-y-perspectivas/

About the Battle of Kherson: situation and prospects
Miniaturday 21 October, 2022 Zhukov

About the Battle of Kherson - situation report October 18

Two Older @Dva_Majors

The civilians have to go. This is not an assumption. Regardless of what happens. Because the bombings have already been coming to the region for months. And the enemy will not rest.

The situation - is characterized by the appearance of muddy weather, difficulty in the passage of equipment and the cold season, which complicates the actions of both parties.

River crossings destroy each other. Until winter, both sides will try to occupy the most advantageous lines or impose the initiative on the enemy and put him in an awkward position. There is less and less time for decisive action.

The enemy - has a better positioning of troops, especially in the Nikolaev direction (logistics is not disrupted), personnel turnover and equipment supply are possible.

It has Western mobilization resources and weapons, especially artillery (including rocket launcher artillery), which are superior to ours in range and accuracy in some areas. He has the ability to attack in our rear and crossing points. The media and the communication system are also more Moderna. It employs aviation and air defense systems.

Our forces: they are being reinforced by mobilized men (they fill the units that have been in the field for several months).

On the right bank, our forces are important for defense, but not for offense. The supply across the Dnieper River is difficult, as is the accumulation of forces to break through the entrenched enemy defenses.

The Theater of War is a Theater After All

https://t.me/zastavnyii/1918

My words are addressed exclusively to those people who apparently have neither logic nor common sense. I will try to explain why the anticipated "leap" of the Ukrainian army towards Kherson (only as an intention, they are unlikely to take the city because we will not retreat from there) is purely a media operation.

What would a proper military command do if the enemy is expected to bring new reserves to the front in a fortnight? Let me remind you that Russia has just mobilized 300 thousand new soldiers — the number that Ukraine took six months to assemble.

For Zelensky, mobilizing more people would be very difficult (besides, the Russians can easily call more, because the mobilization resources are much larger). At first glance, it seems that it is absolutely necessary for Ukraine to move forward as quickly as possible, conquering as much territory as possible. In this case, it seems logical to set as a goal to reach the Dnieper River, if possible, even capture Kherson itself. Everything seems reasonable on paper.

But let's take a closer look at this decision, putting it in the real context: the Ukrainian army will have to overcome significant distances from the line of contact to Kherson, about 20, 40 and 100 km respectively from each of Pravdino, Snigiryovka and Dudchany.

Suppose it would take Ukrainians a week or two to make such a growth spurt. But under what conditions will they get to the city? I assure you that the Russians will not give up the territory as they did in the Kharkov region: both the grouping in the south is different, and reinforcements are brought in every day, and artillery and aviation act impeccably. The other day, the Ukrainian army already tried to make such a leap from Dudchany and Novaya Kamenka, and the Russian Army rejected them and made them pay the price of no less than a full regiment.

Therefore, the Ukrainian leap to Kherson, if it materializes seriously, has every chance to be remembered as a "bloody hell" for the Ukrainian Army itself. Having lost several regiments and even a division in the watermelon fields under artillery and aviation fire, the battered Ukrainian army would emerge from the shelling to be met by a new Russian defensive grouping, reinforced by several waves of reservists, in the urban area of Kherson. The question "What will happen next?"it's quite unnecessary.

Therefore, the decision to go to Kherson on the eve of the dramatic strengthening of the Russian grouping in the south, in the current conditions (coordinated artillery/aircraft work), seems to be an exceptionally disastrous choice for the Ukrainian army. From a military point of view, it makes no practical sense.

But such a decision can be made, and it would be political. Another "victory" of the Ukrainian army in the form of reconquering a significant territory would show the American electorate that Joe Biden was not mistaken and that his military assistance helped, and therefore would also help in the future. Meanwhile, the appearance of a direct threat to Kherson and the raid on its suburbs would begin to affect the approval of Vladimir Putin very strongly. What happens next, within the current election cycle, no one cares. That will be a story for another time.

In my opinion, this is a purely political performance, as well as designed to impress the media. And as for the brainwashed Ukrainians and their support group, let them revel in another media success. In the end, it won't matter what they decide to do.

Progress report 21 October

Russia has significantly strengthened the grouping of its troops in the Kherson region, so the Armed Forces of Ukraine are unable to conduct a successful offensive. This was stated on Channel 5 by the former spokesman of the General Staff of the Armed Forces of Ukraine Vladislav Seleznev, PolitNavigator reports.

"We know that fierce local battles are now being fought on the right bank of the Dnieper in its lower reaches, there are no advances of the Ukrainian defense forces as part of the counteroffensive, since the Russians have dragged additional reserves to the right bank …

The comabtes there are actually extremely durps. In addition, the Russians have recently begun to receive in sufficient quantities all the logistical components, because more or less pontoon bridge crossings across the Dnieper are operating for the supply of goods, ammunition and weapons, a bridge is operating near the dam on Novaya Kakhovka, they are trying to actively use pontoon bridge crossings and other infrastructure facilities to deliver weapons, ammunition and other components to the …

That is, the situation of the Ukrainian defense forces, taking into account the fact that the Russians have a considerable number of troops there, according to some estimates, it is believed that there are up to 30 thousand of them, besides they have more or less stable logistics. That is, the situation for the Ukrainian defense forces is not easy," Seleznyov said.

- Readovka

Ispan wrote:All the overdue reports from last week, there are so many that I have divided it into several entries each dedicated to a topic

Strategy and tactics: a new type of war

https://guerraenucrania.wordpress.com/2022/10/21/estrategia-y-tacticas-un-nuevo-tipo-de-guerra/

Strategy and tactics: a new kind of war
21 October, 2022 Zhukov



Strategy: the intentions of the American enemy

Russian commentary on the RAND corporation analysis

https://k-politika.ru/vojna-protiv-rossii-ssha-uzhe-proigrali-no-zelenskomu-poka-ne-govoryat

A new kind of war

https://zavtra.ru/blogs/vojna_novogo_tipa_o_material_no-tehnicheskom_obespechenii_svo

Extensive interview with a Donetsk militia commander who explains the technical means and the necessary personal equipment, for its length I only copy the most interesting part related to tactics

Moderna of warfare are significantly different from those of previous "wars. This is directly related to a huge leap in the development of communications and intelligence satellites. In the Moderna, both long-range unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) (attack or reconnaissance type) and conventional short-range quadcopters have become essential and vital.

Our great-grandfathers in the Great Patriotic War. they did not even dream of such things as an anti-tank guided missile (ATGM), an anti-tank grenade launcher on a tripod (SPG), which requires only a couple of people to employ, or an incendiary rocket launcher "Shmel"

Artillery has become much more accurate and long-range. And the rocket artillery "Grad" and "Uragan" is much superior to the first "Katyusha", from which the enemy was already terrified. And all this is usually guided by satellites and GPS, or corrected the shooting with the help of unmanned aerial vehicles.

As a rule, in our Armed Forces, a company of unmanned aerial vehicles with a small number of remote-controlled aircraft, which often do not even have a thermal imager and are not intended for operation in the dark, is assigned to a military unit of about two thousand people. The lack of mass-produced manual thermal imagers in the troops significantly complicates the fight against enemy sabotage and reconnaissance groups (DRG) (I translate it as "patrols"). Today, the enemy's armed formations are close to NATO standards and receive such equipment regularly, up to the platoon level. Elon Musk's satellites work for the Ukrainian army.

Our army is more adapted to positional warfare or carrying out attacks by large units, one company and above. In the presence of the listed means of reconnaissance and destruction, this is effective, but also extremely dangerous. A large gathering of troops is very difficult to disguise, but it is easy to detect, easier to hit from a great distance.»



Considerations on the decisions and effects of investing heavily in strategic versus tactical weaponry,

(Lu-Lu "out of chewing gum" via Slavyangrad)



Part I

These days, everyone marvels at the effectiveness and tactical advantage that is obtained by using cheap and abundant kamikaze drones with small payloads, equivalent to an artillery shell, such as the Shaheed-136/Geran-2 drone, versus the cost of using medium and high-precision payload missiles, such as Kalibr, Iskander or even the more expensive and exotic ordnance.

The dichotomy is not new and the origins of the matter go back to the time of Putin's speech at the Munich security meeting in 2007, probably even a little earlier.

The geopolitical environment in which Russia found itself in those days was that of a continuous expansion of NATO, which had become quite energetic and could no longer be ignored. Putin saw the situation in Russia as something that was becoming direct and limited in a familiar way, like what the United States is used to doing with its geostrategic opponents, not with a potential ally (or what today we would call a vassal state).

It is logical to assume that the decision to develop a number of strategic weapons to deter aggression and ensure retaliatory capability, or even first strike capability if such a situation were necessary. Weapons such as Poseidon, Sarmat 2, Kinzal, Avangard, Burevestnik and hypersonic missiles were imagined. It could be seen that the always cautious Putin saw such weapons also as a diplomatic tool of great power, due to the fear that it would implant in Russia's opponents. He counted on wielding a very large stick, to balance himself with the sweet carrots of Russian exports.

At that time, the United States and the United Kingdom were beginning to understand the value of unmanned aerial vehicles, with which the Coalition that invaded Iraq had gained a lot of experience, opening their eyes to the potential of unmanned aerial vehicles.

But a lot of time passed between 2008 and 2022, and many conflicts were also fought, and unmanned aerial vehicles became a formidable weapon. Was Russia not aware of this? He doubled down on the decision to invest heavily in the strategic weapons mentioned above, in addition to the PAK FA and the Kh-52, the Armata-14 and other expensive programs of impressive characteristics, among the best in their line, if not a generation beyond, but aimed at a traditional theater of war where unmanned aerial vehicles were a sideshow.

Why didn't Russia learn from the tactics of its now clear opponent? Why didn't he do it exactly like Iran? Observe, adapt and improve! Russia definitely had the capability. One answer would be that large parts of the military development budget were devoted to the above-mentioned programs, with their huge costs, delays and excesses. Possibly also the decisions were made at the top and no one dared to raise objections. Military hierarchies are like this: if you want to rise to the top, do not oppose orders.

And what I say here about the situation regarding unmanned aerial vehicles can also be applied to the tactical division of troops and requests for support from the chain of command, as well as the flow of information and the level at which tactical decisions are made. Russia has lost a step of modernization, anchored in the traditional way it used to wage wars. But in Syria and Ukraine, we have seen that, even so, Russia is no longer waging war the old-fashioned way. In fact, he has been using newer and more agile tactics with smaller teams, which take full advantage of the reception and knowledge of the battlefield on the fly.

It is easy to pronounce these observations at the moment, hindsight is always clear. And the development of strategic weaponry has not been in vain. These are formidable weapons, but we should all hope that they will never be used, since most of them are doomsday weapons.

It so happens that the uncompromising position of the United States towards Iran in the JCPOA is a stroke of luck for Russia. This means that Iran can export its advanced drones without restrictions. This will allow the Russian military complex to gain time to expand its fleet of unmanned aerial vehicles, taking into account the particular needs of the Russian forces. Integration with China's drones is much more difficult as the Chinese have very precisely designed their UAV fleet to suit their own operations. Time will tell whether these much more developed drones will find use in the Russian context.

In conclusion, I would like to urge Russia to remain vigilant and observe the novelties that the United States and NATO are introducing on the battlefield. It is clear that Russia will not be able to match the obscene amount of money that these states are throwing into the fire pits of war, but cunning decisions can still be made after observing the innovations of their opponents. Let's take as an example the effectiveness of Starlink and the possibilities it opens up. Russia will not be able to launch constellations as Musk is doing, not in the near future. But jamming them will be an obvious necessity. The F-35 has mostly been a flop, but the novel friend-or-foe rating systems it houses are a potent tool for any armed force.

Simply put, Russia has to learn to be agile in its technological and tactical responses required by the hot geopolitical theater in which we find ourselves now.

JohninMK wrote:

Ispan wrote:All the overdue reports from last week, there are so many that I have divided it into several entries each dedicated to a topic

Strategy and tactics: a new type of war

https://guerraenucrania.wordpress.com/2022/10/21/estrategia-y-tacticas-un-nuevo-tipo-de-guerra/

Strategy and tactics: a new kind of war
21 October, 2022 Zhukov



Strategy: the intentions of the American enemy

Russian commentary on the RAND corporation analysis

https://k-politika.ru/vojna-protiv-rossii-ssha-uzhe-proigrali-no-zelenskomu-poka-ne-govoryat

A new kind of war

https://zavtra.ru/blogs/vojna_novogo_tipa_o_material_no-tehnicheskom_obespechenii_svo

Extensive interview with a Donetsk militia commander who explains the technical means and the necessary personal equipment, for its length I only copy the most interesting part related to tactics

Moderna of warfare are significantly different from those of previous "wars. This is directly related to a huge leap in the development of communications and intelligence satellites. In the Moderna, both long-range unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) (attack or reconnaissance type) and conventional short-range quadcopters have become essential and vital.

Our great-grandfathers in the Great Patriotic War. they did not even dream of such things as an anti-tank guided missile (ATGM), an anti-tank grenade launcher on a tripod (SPG), which requires only a couple of people to employ, or an incendiary rocket launcher "Shmel"

Artillery has become much more accurate and long-range. And the rocket artillery "Grad" and "Uragan" is much superior to the first "Katyusha", from which the enemy was already terrified. And all this is usually guided by satellites and GPS, or corrected the shooting with the help of unmanned aerial vehicles.

As a rule, in our Armed Forces, a company of unmanned aerial vehicles with a small number of remote-controlled aircraft, which often do not even have a thermal imager and are not intended for operation in the dark, is assigned to a military unit of about two thousand people. The lack of mass-produced manual thermal imagers in the troops significantly complicates the fight against enemy sabotage and reconnaissance groups (DRG) (I translate it as "patrols"). Today, the enemy's armed formations are close to NATO standards and receive such equipment regularly, up to the platoon level. Elon Musk's satellites work for the Ukrainian army.

Our army is more adapted to positional warfare or carrying out attacks by large units, one company and above. In the presence of the listed means of reconnaissance and destruction, this is effective, but also extremely dangerous. A large gathering of troops is very difficult to disguise, but it is easy to detect, easier to hit from a great distance.»



Considerations on the decisions and effects of investing heavily in strategic versus tactical weaponry,

(Lu-Lu "out of chewing gum" via Slavyangrad)



Part I

These days, everyone marvels at the effectiveness and tactical advantage that is obtained by using cheap and abundant kamikaze drones with small payloads, equivalent to an artillery shell, such as the Shaheed-136/Geran-2 drone, versus the cost of using medium and high-precision payload missiles, such as Kalibr, Iskander or even the more expensive and exotic ordnance.

The dichotomy is not new and the origins of the matter go back to the time of Putin's speech at the Munich security meeting in 2007, probably even a little earlier.

The geopolitical environment in which Russia found itself in those days was that of a continuous expansion of NATO, which had become quite energetic and could no longer be ignored. Putin saw the situation in Russia as something that was becoming direct and limited in a familiar way, like what the United States is used to doing with its geostrategic opponents, not with a potential ally (or what today we would call a vassal state).

It is logical to assume that the decision to develop a number of strategic weapons to deter aggression and ensure retaliatory capability, or even first strike capability if such a situation were necessary. Weapons such as Poseidon, Sarmat 2, Kinzal, Avangard, Burevestnik and hypersonic missiles were imagined. It could be seen that the always cautious Putin saw such weapons also as a diplomatic tool of great power, due to the fear that it would implant in Russia's opponents. He counted on wielding a very large stick, to balance himself with the sweet carrots of Russian exports.

At that time, the United States and the United Kingdom were beginning to understand the value of unmanned aerial vehicles, with which the Coalition that invaded Iraq had gained a lot of experience, opening their eyes to the potential of unmanned aerial vehicles.

But a lot of time passed between 2008 and 2022, and many conflicts were also fought, and unmanned aerial vehicles became a formidable weapon. Was Russia not aware of this? He doubled down on the decision to invest heavily in the strategic weapons mentioned above, in addition to the PAK FA and the Kh-52, the Armata-14 and other expensive programs of impressive characteristics, among the best in their line, if not a generation beyond, but aimed at a traditional theater of war where unmanned aerial vehicles were a sideshow.

Why didn't Russia learn from the tactics of its now clear opponent? Why didn't he do it exactly like Iran? Observe, adapt and improve! Russia definitely had the capability. One answer would be that large parts of the military development budget were devoted to the above-mentioned programs, with their huge costs, delays and excesses. Possibly also the decisions were made at the top and no one dared to raise objections. Military hierarchies are like this: if you want to rise to the top, do not oppose orders.

And what I say here about the situation regarding unmanned aerial vehicles can also be applied to the tactical division of troops and requests for support from the chain of command, as well as the flow of information and the level at which tactical decisions are made. Russia has lost a step of modernization, anchored in the traditional way it used to wage wars. But in Syria and Ukraine, we have seen that, even so, Russia is no longer waging war the old-fashioned way. In fact, he has been using newer and more agile tactics with smaller teams, which take full advantage of the reception and knowledge of the battlefield on the fly.

It is easy to pronounce these observations at the moment, hindsight is always clear. And the development of strategic weaponry has not been in vain. These are formidable weapons, but we should all hope that they will never be used, since most of them are doomsday weapons.

It so happens that the uncompromising position of the United States towards Iran in the JCPOA is a stroke of luck for Russia. This means that Iran can export its advanced drones without restrictions. This will allow the Russian military complex to gain time to expand its fleet of unmanned aerial vehicles, taking into account the particular needs of the Russian forces. Integration with China's drones is much more difficult as the Chinese have very precisely designed their UAV fleet to suit their own operations. Time will tell whether these much more developed drones will find use in the Russian context.

In conclusion, I would like to urge Russia to remain vigilant and observe the novelties that the United States and NATO are introducing on the battlefield. It is clear that Russia will not be able to match the obscene amount of money that these states are throwing into the fire pits of war, but cunning decisions can still be made after observing the innovations of their opponents. Let's take as an example the effectiveness of Starlink and the possibilities it opens up. Russia will not be able to launch constellations as Musk is doing, not in the near future. But jamming them will be an obvious necessity. The F-35 has mostly been a flop, but the novel friend-or-foe rating systems it houses are a potent tool for any armed force.

Simply put, Russia has to learn to be agile in its technological and tactical responses required by the hot geopolitical theater in which we find ourselves now.

So this last article confirms my suspicions that the russian military spent too much money on james bond villain weapons instead of practical equipment that wins wars and saves lives.  

Russia should've done what china did. Invest very little in strategic nuclear weaponry, only as much as to gaurantee MAD, and go all in on precision guided munitions, drones, replaced all the 1960s trash cans like grad and gvozdika with tornado and koialitsiya. This saves russian soldiers rather than trying to be all scary to NATO  with muh superduper godzilla tsunami torpedo 9000.

limb wrote:

So this last article confirms my suspicions that the russian military spent too much money on james bond villain weapons instead of practical equipment that wins wars and saves lives.  

Russia should've done what china did. Invest very little in strategic nuclear weaponry, only as much as to gaurantee MAD,  and go all in on precision guided munitions, drones, replaced all the 1960s trash cans like grad and gvozdika with tornado and koialitsiya. This saves russian soldiers rather than trying to be all scary to NATO  with muh superduper godzilla tsunami torpedo 9000.

What a pile of nonsense.
Money doesn't equip a military, a good industry does. You need manufacturing, not worthless dollars conjured out of thin air.

Russia's industry is way more efficient than NATO because it doesn't suffer from the corporate greed like the MIC in the US does.
Produce as little as possible for the maximum profit is the US corporate philosophy, in fact they barely even commit human resources to fighting wars, they have to use proxies like Azov, ISIS, etc.

I would estimate that Russia is an order of magnitude more efficient, at getting results for the money spent on military equipment, than NATO.

Also, NATO has poor output from it's MIC, for proof just look at the low volumes of gear they have been sending Ukraine. Members wait years to receive what they order.

What NATO likes to do is brag about how much money they budget, not how much equipment you actually get for that money.

PapaDragon wrote:
Just take out the source plant that pumps ammonia  through this pipeline, problem solved

No need, just shut off the natural gas supply

limb wrote:
So this last article confirms my suspicions that the russian military spent too much money on james bond villain weapons instead of practical equipment that wins wars and saves lives.  

Russia should've done what china did. Invest very little in strategic nuclear weaponry, only as much as to gaurantee MAD,  and go all in on precision guided munitions, drones, replaced all the 1960s trash cans like grad and gvozdika with tornado and koialitsiya. This saves russian soldiers rather than trying to be all scary to NATO  with muh superduper godzilla tsunami torpedo 9000.

If we're not in nuclear war yet between NATO and Russia, then the James Bond villain weapons are doing their job

Now as for the rest. Russia did invest in plenty of practical equipment that wins wars. Indeed including a replacement for both the Grad - the Tornado-G, and the Gvozdika in the face of the 2S34 Khosta modernization. Both of these add GLONASS support and modern fire control systems at the minimum. With the Tornado-G also offering up a newer truck chassis, and the Khosta packing a new gun and guided round capability.

It's a different matter that Russia clearly doesn't have enough of either in service in comparison with the earlier Soviet models still vastly outnumbering them in service, also the fact that these are fairly straightforward and inexpensive modernizations raises some questions.

But you can make a criticism of NATO too - in that they've invested too much money into fighting colonial-type campaigns like in Iraq or Afghanistan, with the sort of equipment and capabilities too match. But not enough focus on mass conventional conflicts.

Mostly Russia does use upgraded or new gear where it counts (tanks, air power, infantry equipment, etc..), and the Soviet-era stuff is typically sufficient in the roles where its still extensively employed in (artillery, ATGMs, etc..)

We can notice a deficiency in C4I compared to NATO - but that has been that way for a long time.
On the other hand Russia possess very strong EW capabilities but it is conservative about using them, over fears of revealing too much.
Small unit tactics and command, together with organic UAVs and recon means Russia seems to be behind in - but again that's old news.
On the other hand Russia has the Tos-1s and Shmels, which go a long way towards making a bad day for any commando group with satellite support that is encountered.

Point is you're always going to have strengths and weaknesses in any comparison.
Russia's artillery may be mostly old but there hasn't been any report of it breaking down under stress, as we've heard about the much heralded PzH 2000

Lots of noisy things in the skies this morning. It's 04:45. Our little blue girl tells us what they are, hardly have to lift a head off the pillow. Kristl'Yannah does NOT like the Migs but she is enamored of the Dries and tries to jump high enough to get one to play with. FFC, but she tries.

interception of HIMARS GMLRS

Taken down by Pantsir SM

The Wagner line in donbass

Arkanghelsk wrote:


interception of HIMARS GMLRS

Taken down by Pantsir SM

any link?

Seems there is a large number of RU forces now west of the Dnieper. UKR forces are getting clapped every time they try to advance. Videos today show ~12 armoured losses.

flamming_python wrote: I BTW haven't heard of Pakistan shipping weapons to the Ukraine either way.

And I haven't heard anything about India shipping weapons to the Ukraine via Armenia either. Or any weapons going from Armenia to the Ukraine.

There are several reports that provides details about Pakistan's arms supply to Ukraine. Here is one such link
https://greekcitytimes.com/2022/10/07/pakistan-supplies-arms-ukraine/#amp_tf=From%20%251%24s&aoh=16664177418567&referrer=https%3A%2F%2Fwww.google.com

GarryB had recently mentioned in one of the threads how those Indian bustards have entered into a deal with Nancy Pelosi to arm Ukraine via Armenia.

Tolstoy wrote:

flamming_python wrote: I BTW haven't heard of Pakistan shipping weapons to the Ukraine either way.

And I haven't heard anything about India shipping weapons to the Ukraine via Armenia either. Or any weapons going from Armenia to the Ukraine.

There are several reports that provides details about Pakistan's arms supply to Ukraine. Here is one such link
https://greekcitytimes.com/2022/10/07/pakistan-supplies-arms-ukraine/#amp_tf=From%20%251%24s&aoh=16664177418567&referrer=https%3A%2F%2Fwww.google.com

GarryB had recently mentioned in one of the threads how those Indian bustards have entered into a deal with Nancy Pelosi to arm Ukraine via Armenia.

Never heard about any Indian deal, but the Pakistan one doesn't much surprise me. The Pakistani Army Chief and his top brass are part of the same clique who deposed Khan.