Until now, the news that try to offer a complete view of the program are so vague, not complete enough. There is better information about concrete news, but in this case allow not to have a complete view. Still is time for a preview and this would be mine, updated.
To see correctly where the Russian Armed Forces can go by 2027, before to talk about the changes, is necessary to give a reference about the current situation. To say it briefly, by the begin of 2018 or little after, the material listed in red in the following comments is likely to be totally out:
To note that material initially more oriented toward Novorussia can go later to Syria if required.
From this basis, I would expect of the State Armament Program 2018-2027 (note that the most basic details, like spending on personnel, the spending on installations, and the maintenance and upgrading of current material, with new variants, ammunition/missiles, is not included, with very few exceptions in the points 7 and 10):
1.- To assure common standards in procurement and decommissions for land forces, common standards for aerospace forces, common standards for sea forces, common standards for land forces deployed by air means, and common standards for military intelligence:
Russian Strategic Missile Troops
Russian Troops of anti-aircraft and anti-missile defense
Russian Coastal Troops
Russian Military Police
Russian Aerospace Forces
Russian Naval Aviation
Russian Airborne Troops
General Directorate of the General Staff
Russian Navy Special Forces
2.- To define more clearly the limits for the equipment exclusive of the Russian Armed Forces. I would expect the scrapping or militarization of some warfare that is now managed by non military security forces. It means the transference of low amounts of:
Project 1176 (1 unit from R Coast Guard to scrapping)
Project 1135 (2 units from R Coast Guard to R Navy)
Project 1265 (1 unit from R Coast Guard to R Navy)
Project 1330 (5 units from R Coast Guard to R Navy)
Project T-4 (2 units from R Coast Guard to R Navy)
3.- To finish the process of replacement of foreign components, and a plan for the scrapping, sale or demilitarization of foreign material of the Russian Armed Forces. It would include foreign designs, but not Russian or Sovietic designs produced out of Russia. It means total decommission, including of the reserve, of some material, bolded in fuchsia.
Dry Cargo Ships for the operation in Syria
4.- Total decommission, including of the reserve. In the following years, the total decommission, including of the reserve, of the relatively weakest, less standardized and/or less modern material, is likely to come by natural exhaustion after its use by the Russian armed forces, with decommission and scrapping, because of external demand or by transference to non-military Russian agencies of compatible material (also in the case of the point 3). With the likely appearance of Rocket Assisted Projectiles for 125mm (that should have longer range than the 120mm RAP) and longer range rockets of 220mm for the TOS-1, the (M)T-12 would be the alone remaining heavy equipment that must be always inside the range of portable/man-portable weapons of the adversary to do its work, and is likely to be used and totally disappear first. In overall terms, the following list of material bolded in fuchsia, includes the most likely total decommissions, including of the reserve, by 2025. To note that the reportes of large reserves of material like D-30 or BMP-1 do not agree with statistics of production. The large reserves exist but are of more modern material.
Project 572 (modified to auxiliary ship)
Project 773 (modified to auxiliary ship)
5.- Retirement from active service of the last heavy towed weapons except the A-135:
6.- To exclude since the begin new orders for the procurement of the foreign and relatively weakest, less standard (including launched grenades) and less modern weapons (including the last variants) and auxiliary equipment in production:
7.- Potential decision about the adoption of standard calibers for launched grenades (30mm, 45mm, 57mm, 76mm, 100mm). For it, the 40mm grenades can be moved to the standard 45mm caliber. It would be an improvement in standardization and also in the power of the projectiles. To note that the GP-25, GP-30 and GP-34 are not in the list of the point 6 because they are a component, but if this decission is made, their production would be stopped too as 40mm grenade launchers.
8.- Upgrade on self propelled Surface-Surface, Surface-Air and Artillery warfare, with the replacement of the tractor elements with unarmoured cabin by (more standardized) tractor elements with armoured cabin, according to the modern safety standards for the rest of the land warfare. Full armoured Typhoon-U 6x6 or Typhoon-K 6x6 can be used if required to replace some auxiliary vehicle of the systems. Habitually upgrades are not included in this scheme, but this exception comes because it would include a key change in the nature of the weapons, becoming armoured. The retired unarmoured tractor elements or entire vehicles can be used as military heavy auxiliary vehicles in non-contested areas (transport, engineering,...), in agreement with the status of use of every type of vehicle, and affecting to the procurement of land heavy auxiliary vehicles in the following years:
9.- Between the projects in production by the end of 2018 which introduction in the Russian Armed Forces has not been formally completed, I expect the formal delivery of the first unit (including prototypes) of the following key projects:
10.- Finalisation of the development of the key projects of new armament and heavy auxiliary mobile equipment, and delivery of the first unit, to complete the new generation of equipment developed in the first quarter of the XXI century. Listed the key projects where the first unit for the Russian Armed Forces is not in production in 2018, plus some small but key detail on new ammunition. Bolded key projects where the timeline still assures not a first unit by 2025, and something else that I think would be interesting:
Project 23000 (multirole Aircraft Carrier)
SA-?? S-350 Armata
SA-?? S-350 Kurganets
SA-?? S-350 Bumerang
SA-?? S-350 BMD-4(M)
SA-?? Pantsir Armata
SA-?? Pantsir Kurganets
SA-?? Pantsir Bumerang
SA-?? Pantsir BMD-4(M)
SA-?? BMPT 2S?? 57mm Terminator 3 (Armata platform)
SA-?? BMPT 2S?? 57mm Kurgantets
SA-?? BMPT 2S?? 57mm Bumerang
SA-?? BMPT 2S?? 57mm BMD-4(M)
SA-?? Sosna Armata
SA-?? Sosna Kurganets
SA-?? Sosna Bumerang
SA-?? Sosna BMD-4(M)
SS-35/C-16 (Intermediate Range Ballistic)
TOS BM2 compatible with the ammunition of the BM-21, BM-27 and BM-30. (Armata platform)
TOS Kurganets compatible with the ammunition of the BM-21, BM-27 and BM-30.
TOS Bumerang compatible with the ammunition of the BM-21, BM-27 and BM-30.
TOS BMD-4(M) compatible with the ammunition of the BM-21, BM-27 and BM-30.
2S?? 240mm that combines direct and indirect (mortar) fire. Successor of the 2S4 at production level. (Armata platform)
2S?? 203mm for long range direct fire. Successor of the 2S7 at production level. (Armata platform)
2S?? 203mm that combines direct and indirect (mortar) fire. New. (Armata platform)
2S?? 152mm that combines direct and indirect (mortar) fire. New. (Armata platform)
2S?? 152mm that combines direct and indirect (mortar) fire. Successor of the 2S34 at production level. (Kurganets platform)
2S?? 152mm for agile direct fire, antitank role, with some ammunition of range over 17.5 Km to be able to work also from outside of the range of man-portable weapons. New.(Kurganets platform)
2S?? 125mm for agile direct fire, antitank role, with some ammunition of range over 17.5 Km to be able to work also from outside of the range of man-portable weapons. Successor of the BMP-3 100mm at production level. (Kurganets platform)
2S?? 152mm that combines direct and indirect (mortar) fire. Successor of the 2S23 at production level. (Bumerang platform)
2S?? 152mm for agile direct fire, antitank role, with some ammunition of range over 17.5 Km to be able to work also from outside of the range of man-portable weapons. New. (Bumerang platform)
2S?? 125mm for agile direct fire, antitank role, with some ammunition of range over 17.5 Km to be able to work also from outside of the range of man-portable weapons. New. (Bumerang platform)
T-14 152mm with some ammunition of range over 17.5 Km to be able to work also from outside of the range of man-portable weapons. (Armata platform)
BMO-2 (Armata platform APC)
Engineering Armata (T-16,...)
Su-PAK-ShA evolution to FGA 5th Generation platform successor of the Su-34/32
Ka-60/62 (in the Che-22 10th size class with around 2.5 tons payload)
Tu-330 (in the Tu-204/214 5th size class with around 40 tons payload).
Mi-46/AHL (in the An-72/71/74 7th size class with around 15 tons payload).
Il-106/PTS Ermak 80 (in the An-22 3rd size class with around 80 tons payload).
Il-276 (in the An-10/12 6th size class with around 20 tons payload).
PTS Ermak 160 (in the An-124 2nd size class with around 160 tons payload).
Tu-304/Frigate Freejet (in the Il-62 4th size class for double configuration: 1 mid passenger capacity + long range, 2 high passenger capacity + mid range).
New Aircraft (in the Il-76/78 Be-A50 4th size class with around 60 tons payload).
CRAIC CR929 (in the Il-86/80/96 3rd size class for high passenger capacity + long range).
Ka-40 Minoga (in the Ka/27/28/29/31/32/35 9th size class with around 5 tons payload).
New Helicopter (in the Mi-26/27 6th size class with around 20 tons payload.
MS-21/Yak-242 (in the Tu-204/214 5th size class for mid passenger capacity + mid range).
Man-portable grenade launcher of 76mm
Man-portable grenade launcher of 45mm
New ammunition for the 125mm tanks of range over 17.5 Km to allow them to fight also from outside of the range of man-portable weapons of the adversary.
New ammunition for the TOS-1 of range over 17.5 Km to allow them to fight also from outside of the range of man-portable weapons of the adversary.
Unitl now, in the current generation of new equipment that is being developed in the first quarter of the XXI century, between the projects that have been accepted and reached the Russian Armed Forces, only a few projects can be considered redundant out of the heavy sea auxiliary vehicles. Here would be the list:
And is very likely that Russia avoids more redundant projects. There is enough work to finish the non-redundant projects in order to finish a complete new generation of equpment by 2025. In the previous list of key projects, there are not projects that create redundancies.
In overall terms, it is necessary to analyze if the redundant projects in development, and the rest of the new projects cited not until now which first unit reached not the Russian Armed forces according to the public reports or have not been officially ordered, maybe only a distraction of efforts and funds.
11.- Finally, intense procurement in relative terms, in order to raise the standards for the material in active service, on:
Infantry Combat Vehicles (to improve the fleet toward the modern standards)
For a more complete view about what can be expected on procurement see these comments, that include my Estimation of needs with different levels of priority and a preview for the procurement in the following years:
12.- For longer timeline:Current innovative key projects that can be part of the next future equipment generation, and as consequence, where a timeline longer than 2025 for the delivery of the first unit would not be a problem from a military point:
Il-PAK-TA as Supersonic Transport Aircraft
Unmanned Long Range Shipborne Maritime Patrol-Early Warning VTOL aircraft/helicopter
Unmanned High Speed Combat Helicopter compatible with all the branches of the Russian Armed Forces
Unmanned technologies and robotization can require in overall terms longer timeline that the stablished in the State Armament Program 2018-2027:
Taking into account that the system allows to include a related poll in the topic for the people can talk about it, we have one here. It is not possible to include all. One of the most interesting parts is the refered to the possible total decommissions (the points 3 and 4). There is a topic talking about the future of the foreign sea warfare including also a poll:
having 10 options, the poll of this topic can look at the land and air material cited in the points 3, 4 and 5. Total decommission includes:
- Help to allies.
- Demilitarization by transfer to other non military gouvernmental agencies (in the case of this poll would be more for the foreign material).
Last edited by eehnie on Sun Mar 24, 2019 2:27 am; edited 101 times in total