ESTIMATION OF NEEDS OF PROCUREMENT IN RELATION WITH THE NEW 2018-2027 STATE ARMAMENT PROGRAM.
First, to note that at this point Russia keeps the best of the Sovietic arsenals improved with the time. The reductions by destruction and scrapping affected logically to the oldest, less modern and less capable material. Coming from a process of reduction, Russia had the time and the option of addapting the size of its current armed forces to the current needs, while keeping its active forces and its reserve in a level of saturation with material modern enough.
Second, to say that in overall terms I do not expect changes in the size of Russian active forces. It is the logical situation after a process of reduction of equipment since the time of the Soviet Union. In the refered to the Russian Navy, I think the trend will be to have the ships under 40 years old in active service, the ships between 40 and 50 years old in the reserve to cover non habitual operations, and decommissions of the ships older than 50 years old.
And third, to note that the production of armoured tractor elements for land warfare explained in the point 7 of the comment opening the topic would be more in the side of the production of components, not complete armament. It would not be in the subject of this comment, but it would have an impact in the procurement of land based Surface-Surface heavy weapons and of land auxiliary vehicles allowing to upgrade of the current weapons to modern standards and to a good number of replacement of auxiliary vehicles without new procurement.
Looking forward, is not easy to do a calculus, in fact, it is very difficult. Despite it, this would be my estimation of needs of armament in order to keep stable the current size of the Russian Armed Forces under the next 2018-2027 State Armament Program.
To note that needs related with lack of saturation of the planned active force and reserve would be problems more urgent than the needs related to the improvement of production capabilities, but Russia reachs saturation in all the areas as commented.
1st LEVEL NEEDS: BASIC NEEDS RELATED TO THE IMPROVEMENT OF PRODUCTION CAPABILITIES. ALLOW DECOMMISSIONS IN THE SAME MINIMAL AMOUNTS.
First unit of new heavy combat armament in production by the end of 2018 covering 1st level needs including all the branches:
Warships: First unit (Project 12300, Project 23560)
Submarines: First unit (Project 09851)
First unit of new heavy auxiliary material in production by the end of 2018 covering 1st level needs including all the branches:
Auxiliary ships: First unit (Project 15310)
Auxiliary air vehicles: First unit (Mi-38)
First unit of new heavy combat armament including all the branches:
Surface-Surface Not mobile: First unit (SS-30 RS-28)
Warships: First unit (Project 23000 multirole Aircraft Carrier)
Surface-Air: First unit (SA-?? A-235, SA-?? S-500, SA-?? S-350 Armata, SA-?? S-350 Kurganets, SA-?? S-350 Bumerang, SA-?? S-350 BMD-4(M), SA-?? Pantsir Armata, SA-?? Pantsir Kurganets, SA-?? Pantsir Bumerang, SA-?? Pantsir BMD-4(M), SA-?? 57mm BMPT Armata, SA-?? 57mm BMPT Kurganets, SA-?? 57mm BMPT Bumerang, SA-?? 57mm BMPT BMD-4(M), SA-?? Sosna Armata, SA-?? Sosna Kurganets, SA-?? Sosna Bumerang, SA-?? Sosna BMD-4(M))
Surface-Surface: First unit (SS-33 Burevestnik, TOS BM2 Armata, TOS Kurganets, TOS Bumerang, TOS BMD-4(M))
Artillery: First unit (2S?? Armata 240mm direct+indirect, 2S?? Armata 203mm long range direct, 2S?? Armata 203mm direct+indirect, 2S?? Armata 152mm direct+indirect, 2S?? Kurganets 152mm direct+indirect, 2S?? Kurganets 152mm antitank, 2S?? Kurganets 125mm antitank, 2S?? Bumerang 152mm direct+indirect, 2S?? Bumerang 152mm antitank, 2S?? Bumerang 125mm antitank)
Tanks: First unit (T-14 152mm)
Infantry: First unit (BMO-2 Armata)
Combat Engineering: First unit (Engineering Armata, Engineering Kurganets, Engineering Bumerang, Engineering BMD-4(M))
Strategic Bombers: First unit (Tu-PAK-DA)
Fighter Interceptors: First unit (Mig-41)
Fighter Ground Attack: First unit (Su-PAK-ShA 5G platform)
First unit of new heavy auxiliary material including all the branches:
Auxiliary air vehicles: First unit (Su-Superjet, Ka-60/62, Tu-330, Mi-46/AHL, Il-106/PTS Ermak 80,Il-276, Il-PTS Ermak 160,Tu-304/Frigate Freejet, New successor Il-76, CRAIC CR929, Ka-40 Minoga, New successor of the Mi-26/27, MS-21/Yak-242)
The 1st level needs are needs of strategic importance to improve and to expand the capabilities of production of the Russian Armed Forces. Some can have an exigent timeline until the end of 2025, but are affordable in overall terms, and as consequence are very unlikely to be affected by cuts or delays.
2nd LEVEL NEEDS: NEEDS OF ARMAMENT TO COVER THE REPLACEMENT OF THE LESS MODERN ARMAMENT IN ACTIVE SERVICE. ALLOW DECOMMISSIONS IN THE SAME AMOUNTS.
Heavy combat armament including all the branches:
Infantry: Intense production (BMO-2 Armata, T-15, B-10 Kurganets, B-11 Kurganets, K-16 Bumerang, K-17 Bumerang, Typhoon-U 6x6, Typhoon-K 6x6, BMO-T, BMP-3, BMD-4(M), BTR-MDM BMD-4(M))
Heavy auxiliary material including all the branches:
No 2nd level needs. Post-Sovietic reduction unfinished on air and sea heavy auxiliary material.
There are not more 2nd level needs. For the rest of the areas, there is enough material more modern in the reserve to cover the replacement of the less modern material in active service.
Additional production of modern armament and heavy auxiliary equipment is likely. In some cases there is material in production by the end of 2018 (ships) listed not until now. There are also orders signed by the end of 2018. And more orders are also possible after the end of 2018. But this production would be less necessary. As consequence, likely will not reach big amounts. The main goal of these additional productions will be to go toward the projected level for the stable productions in the long term.