PREVIEW ABOUT PROCUREMENT OF COMBAT AIRCRAFTS
Fighters (FAS and FMR) (total per year)
Average 2010-2018: 28.00
It has been reported that Russia plans to have around 700 Fighters, including FAS, FMR and Fighter Interceptors. Taking into account that a new Fighter Interceptor is being developed, and taking into account that today would be 149 MiG-25/31 in active service, the figure of 700 means around 550 Fighters (FAS and FMR).
Russia is finding a long-term stable production that leads to this figure of 550 Fighters. And this is what we begin to see. A production of 22 Fighters/Year, sustained 25 year means just 550 new Fighters, for a renovation of the entire Fighter fleet every 25 years. Under this rythm of production the aircrafts wold have a life of 25 years in active service plus 25 years in the reserve. And just it allows to the development of a new generation of Fighter every 25 years.
To note that the current public reports are talking about a fleet of around 566 aircrafts, very near the goal of 550.
All this means that unless war or very high tension with adversaries, this stable rythm of production of around 22 Fighters/Year on average will not be modified in years.
And a consequence of it is that the current level of procurement of the Su-30 and Su-35 will be modified, will be reduced in the refered to the procurement of the Russian Armed Forces, to attend external demand and for for the introduction of the Su-57. Taking into account that the Su-57 will be very likely the alone fighter design of this armament generation, it is likely that the production line of the Su-57 be designed for a stable production of around 22 Su-57/year, affording first production for the Russian Armed Forces, and later production to export.
The alone thing that would make change that is if Russia goes forward with some weaker project of fighter like the MiG LMFS and/or a Yak VTOL. In this case the figure of 22 Fighters/Year would be the sum of the production of the 3 (or 2).
Fighters Ground Attack: (total per year)
Average 2010-2018: 12.44
In this case public reports talk about an active fleet of 466 Fighter Ground Attack aircrafts. Again Russia is finding a sustained and stable production for peace time. And a production of 19 FGA/Year, sustained 25 years means just 475 FGA, for a complete rotation of the fleet in 25 years. Again the life of the aircrafts would be of 25 years in active service plus 25 years in the reserve. And just it allows to the development of a new generation of FGA every 25 years.
As consequence, the production of Su-34 will remain stable around this number, until a new FGA appears. It seems likely that the Su-PAK-ShA project can evolve toward a 5th Generation aircraft to succeed the Su-34/32. The first prototype of a new FGA aircraft based on the 5th Generation platform of the Su-57 can be ready by 2025. Likely after 2030, while the production of Su-34 for the Russian Armed Forces declines, it will be replaced by production to export and by the production of the new aircraft for the Russian Armed Forces.
With the expected decision of replacing the Su-25 with a variant reinforced of the Su-34, it is obvious that Russia only will have one FGA model per armament generation.
Fighter Interceptors: (total per year)
Average 2010-2018: 00.00
The decission to go forward with the MiG-41 fighter interceptor seems solid. Technologically there is an important difference with Fighters (FAS and FMR) and only when the technologies for Interception get underdevelopped both types of aircrafts become closer.
The current fleet of active MiG-25/31 would be of 149 aircrafts. It should be big amounts of spare parts. The projection of the fleet of Fighter Interceptors seems to be of around 150 aircrafts.
With the scheme of renovation obtained for both Fighters and Fighter Ground Attack, of a total renovation of the active fleet every 25 years, we would reach to a stable production of 6 FighterInterceptors/Year.
Strategic Bombers: (total per year)
Average 2010-2018: 00.11
The decission to go forward with the return to production of the Tu-160 is only a sign of that this type of aircrafts have a future. Taking into account that all the Maritime Patrol role is being solved by Strategic Bombers (as military concept) except the Be-12 that has not the range, the fleet of active Strategic Bombers would be around 183 aircrafts (Tu-160, Tu-22, Tu-95/142 and Il-38). From the public news about future productions we can see how the projection for the future fleet of strategic bombers seems to be of around 175 aircrafts.
Taking this reference of 175, and with the scheme of renovation obtained for both Fighters and Fighter Ground Attack, of a total renovation of the active fleet every 25 years, we would reach to a stable production of 7 StrategicBombers/Year. A production of 7 StrategicBombers/Year sustained 25 years would mean 175 Strategic Bombers.
Recent news say that the new production line for the Tu-160 is planned for a rythm of 3 StrategicBombers/Year. It seems that at same time there is a planned production of Tu-PAK-DA. My impression is that a total production of 7 StrategicBombers/Year can be likely.
And again I expect only one design of Strategic Bomber per armament generation, taking into account that the Tu-160 is a design of the previous generation, and that an advanced Tu-PAK-DA with main features surpasing the Tu-160 (otherwise the Tu-160 would win the orders, and even a return to production of the Tu-22 would be possible) would be the design of the current generation.
Combat Helicopters (total per year)
Average 2010-2017: 58.625
This data would include the Ka-50/52, the Mi-28 and the entire family of Mi-8/9/13/14/17/18/19/24/25/35/171/172/177. In the last case some helicopters with auxiliary roles are included, but it is very difficult to separate the production of combat and auxiliary variants of the Mi-8/9/13/14/17/18/19/24/25/35/171/172/177 family, then better to include all.
Again in this case Russia seems to find a stabilization of the production. According with the public data, now Russia would have 1442 helicopters of the three models in active service. It means it would be necessary a production of 58 CombatHelicopters/Year (including auxiliary helicopters of the Mi-8/9/13/14/17/18/19/24/25/35/171/172/177 family). This number is very near of the average production obtained. We can conclude Russia has been producting these years to keep the current fleet.
Technologically the trend for the Combat Helicopters as warfare type is to become unmanned. The risks for them are high, and the pressure in relation with human loses increases. Likely the next generation of combat helicopters will be unmanned, being able to assume higher risks that manned helicopters can not assume, and there a high probability of seeing also a process of robotization of the current fleet. The transition is unclear still.
To note that this production would cover the most urgent needs of combat
aircrafts identified in the comment of the page 2 of this topic. The rythm of production can reach the stable long term level for a total renovation of the fleet for all types of combat aircrafts, except for Fighter Interceptors (MiG-41) and Strategic Bombers (Tu-PAK-DA).https://www.russiadefence.net/t7032p25-state-armament-program-2018-2027#208063