Older sea warfare performance and short/mid-term decommissions

There are in this forum two topics refered to the performance of the land and air heavy armament in the Russian Armed Forces and the short/mid-term decommissions:

https://www.russiadefence.net/t4072-older-warfare-performance-and-short-mid-term-decomissions
https://www.russiadefence.net/t4343-older-warfare-performance-and-short-mid-term-decommissions

This topic is created to complete the view with the sea heavy armament.

In the refered to the heavy sea armament, many times there is a lack of overall view that leads to talk about decommissions of relatively young material, and to talk about needs of production and replacement that are not realistic. At same time most of these analysis forget to talk about the low number of ships that are fairly old and less modern.

By area:

Warships:

There are 3 projects clearly older than the rest, not only by age, also as military concept. They are the Project 1204, the Project 61/01090 and the Project 1134B. This age makes the Project 1204 the alone Russian armament using 140mm MRLS rockets, makes the Project 61/01090 the alone Russian warship remaining under 5000 tons with the designation of Destroyer, and also makes the Project 1134B the alone Russian warship remaining under 10000 tons with the designation of Cruiser. Despite it, and addapted to their size, the 3 projects would not be outdated as military concept, all would allow modern armament and modern technologies. But by age, the last remaining ship of the Project 61/01090 (actively used in Syria) will have 50 years old in 2019, the youngest ship active ship of the Project 1204 will have 50 years old by 2022, and the last remaining ship of the Project 1134B (in the reserve after a fire) will have 50 years old by 2024. These are the 3 models of warship present in the Russian combat fleet closer to the mechanical exhaustion, and their total decommission by the end of 2025, including of the reserve, seems likely.

Submarines:

In this case the 2 projects most likely to disappear are the Project 613 and the Project 641. The Project 613 seems present still in the form of 2 submarines adapted to training stations, likely in the reserve. The age of both is over 60 years old and their decommission seems near. The Project 641 returned to the fleet after the capture of one unit from Ukraine in 2014. The status is not clear but seems to be part of the Russian Navy, and seems to be in the reserve. If Im not wrong the submarine captured has not been used since the time of the Soviet Union, and will have 50 years old in 2020. Also this ship seems near the decommission and scrapping.

Amphibious ships:

In this case there is not a project that can be considered a clear candidate for total decommission by the end of 2025.

Minesweepers:

At this point there are not projects of minesweepers that can be considered clear candidates for total decommission exhaustion by the end of 2025. Likely, the first in line for a total decommission would be the Project 697.

Then, a resume of the oldest Projects of combat ships would include:

Project 613
Project 1204
Project 61/01090
Project 1134B

Project 641

Project 697

Taking into account the condition of the ships of the projects mentioned, if there is some help to Syria in the form of combat ships, the most likely option would be the ship of the Project 61/01090 warship, and if there is some help to Novorussia in the form of combat ships, the most likely option would be the ships of the Project 1204 warship.

It is likely to see also the decommission by age of isolate units of other projects like the Project 1171 of Amphibious ships, the Project 266 of Minesweepers, the project 775 of Amphbious ships, and the Project 1176 of Amphibious ships.

The auxiliary fleet, including low armed patrol ships, would not be included here. It is a different case where a significant number of veteran ships still remain and the process of reduction of the fleet after the end of the Soviet Union seems far from completed.

The war in Syria will likely continue long, basically because the US  imposes war. Russia knows that when the Syrian war stops, the US aid to the rebels and Israel will move to rearm Ukraine or Georgia.

The logical decline in the numbers of the oldest weapons in Syria, Russia and Asia can lead to more intense help of Russia, Iran and other countries, with some weapons:

SEA ARMAMENT LIKELY NEEDS

Warships: Project 61/01090
by declining numbers of Project 159

For other types of weapons, the help is more difficult.

The weapons bolded in fuchsia of Russian origin, can leave the active service in Russia in 2-4 years.

In the case of Novorussia, the intensity of the conflict remains in significantly lower level than in Syria. There is not doubt that Novorussia would have all the necessary material in case of war of bigger intensity. At this point the war seems reduced to some Artillery, Surface-Surface and man-portable weapons duels. Taking it and the new local designs into account:

SEA ARMAMENT LIKELY NEEDS

Missile Boats: Project 1204
by lack of weapons

The weapons bolded in fuchsia of Russian origin, can leave the active service in Russia in 2-4 years.

Scrapping report of the 3Q of the decade for the heavy sea combat material (January 2016 - June 2018)

Isolate units and/or broken parts of heavy sea combat material to continue:

Project 1135: Sale and auction of scrap material.

Bigger amounts of heavy sea combat material to continue:

.

Bigger amounts of heavy sea combat material in process of exhaustion for the mid-term:

.

Low amounts of heavy sea combat material in process of exhaustion for the short-term and with exhaustion finished:

Project 1332: Sale and auction of scrap material and spare parts.

Liquidation of heavy sea combat material which exhaustion was likely completed by the end of 2015:

.

Looking at the reports I tend to think that:

- The scrapping activity in this time has been very low.
- The scrapping process of the Project 1332 was likely finished in 2017/2018. In 2018 would be the liquidation of the last spare parts.

It has not been scrapping activity in other cathegories for the heavy sea combat material.

For the 4Q of the decade it is possible to be some scrapping activity related to ships and submarines recently decommissioned. There are few cases in queue of ships that are not in very bad condition. The scrapping activity for heavy sea combat material can increase a little but will remain low until late 2020s.

To note that the scrapping activity on heavy sea material has been in this 3Q of the decade, and is at this point, far bigger on heavy sea auxiliary material than on heavy sea combat material. The scrapping activity on heavy sea auxiliary material is increasing, and is likely to increase significantly in the following years.

Scrapping report for the heavy sea combat material (January 2016 - December 2018)

Isolate units and/or broken parts of heavy sea combat material to continue:

Project 12411/12417/12418: Sale and auction of scrap material
Project 1265: Sale and auction of scrap material.
Project 1135: Sale and auction of scrap material.
Project T-4M: Sale and auction of scrap material.
Project 1331M: Sale and auction of scrap material.

Bigger amounts of heavy sea combat material to continue:

.

Isolate units and/or broken parts of heavy sea combat material with expected exhaustion for the mid-term:

.

Bigger amounts of heavy sea combat material with expected exhaustion for the mid-term:

.

Bigger amounts of heavy sea combat material in process of exhaustion for the short-term and with exhaustion finished:

Project 13000: Sale and auction of scrap material.

Isolate units and/or broken parts of heavy sea combat material in process of exhaustion for the short-term and with exhaustion finished:

Project 1174: Sale and auction of scrap.
Project 1332: Sale and auction of scrap material and spare parts.
Project 257: Sale and auction of scrap material.
Project 572: Sale and auction of scrap material.

Liquidation of heavy sea combat material which exhaustion was likely completed by the end of 2015:

.

Looking at the reports I tend to think that:

- The scrapping activity increased significantly in 2018 after at least 2 years of stop.
- The scrapping activity and decommissions of 2018 suggest that Russia is doing still some early decommissions related with the process of reduction of the fleet after the end of the Soviet Union. This process can be very near the end.
- At this point there are some units of projects that remain active, that have been decommissioned but still not scrapped.
- The scrapping process of the Project 1174 depends of the potential recovery of the last ship remaining (A Nikolaev).
- The scrapping process of the Project 13000 has been finished in 2018.
- The scrapping process of the Project 1332 has been finished in 2017/2018. In 2018 would be the liquidation of the last spare parts.
- The scrapping process of the Project 257 has been finished in 2018.
- The scrapping process of the Project 572 has been finished in 2018.

For the last 2 years of the decade is likely to see finished the process of reduction of the combat fleet after the end of the Soviet Union, with the decommission and scrapping of a few ships more. The number of units of heavy sea combat material scrapped will be very likely low until the late 2020s, and can include some unit captured to Ukraine. It is possible to see increasing scrapping activity in the heavy sea combat material which exhaustion can be expected for the mid-term:

Project 641
Project 1134B
Project 61/01090
Project 1204
Project 613

These projects can be finished even in the short-term.

The scrapping activity of heavy sea material restarted in 2018, and has been very high, with likely over 100 of ships scrapped, but has been focused mostly on heavy sea auxiliary material. This is likely to continue at high rythm in the short-term, because the process of reduction of the auxiliary fleet of the Russian Navy has not been done still like for the heavy sea combat material. In the following years, maybe 10-12, around 500 auxiliary ships can be decommissioned and scrapped after their total exhaustion. The production of new auxiliary ships instead will be significantly lower.

PS: IF there is some new report in the last days of 2018, will be included in this resume.

A good number of people has been raising doubt about the capacity of the Russian fleet of affording the sea transport operation in the war of Syria, without the purchase of some cargo ships. This would be a small analysis recovered and updated from other topic.



If we compare the capacity (full load) of the four purchased ships for this operation, to the overall capacity (full load) of the Russian available fleet for the purpose of transport of armament, ammunition and auxiliary equipment, we can see how the 24445 tons that the four ships sum are only a 15.15% of the 162030 tons that the overall combat+auxiliary fleet of ships over 500 tons sum in 2018.

To assure that Russia was not capable of avoiding this purchased capability of a 15.15%, increasing the optimization (that includes overhauls) in the use of the 84.85% of the fleet is very audacious. Very likely is not right, when at this point we have news only of the exhaustion and decommission of a few ships (red), with low total tonnage, between the oldest available ships at the begin of the operation, and taking into account that the available fleet increased its capacity since 2011. The lack of decommissions sugests a conservative use by the Russian Navy of the oldest ships despite new commissions, captures and purchases.


Amphibious Combat ships:

04650 tons Project 1171 Saratov http://fleetphoto.ru/ship/790/
04650 tons Project 1171 Orsk http://fleetphoto.ru/ship/17150/
04650 tons Project 1171 Nikolay Vilkov http://fleetphoto.ru/ship/17166/
04650 tons Project 1171 Nikolay Filchenkov http://fleetphoto.ru/ship/791/

04012 tons Project 775 Olenegorskiy gornyak http://fleetphoto.ru/ship/17109/
04012 tons Project 775 Kondopoga http://fleetphoto.ru/ship/17115/
04012 tons Project 775 Alexandr Otrakovskiy http://fleetphoto.ru/ship/6292/
04012 tons Project 775 Oslyabya http://fleetphoto.ru/projects/2079/
04012 tons Project 775 Admiral Nevelskoy http://fleetphoto.ru/ship/17127/
04012 tons Project 775 Minsk http://fleetphoto.ru/ship/10035/
04012 tons Project 775 Kaliningrad http://fleetphoto.ru/ship/7630/
04012 tons Project 775 Georgiy Pobedonosets http://fleetphoto.ru/ship/10965/
04012 tons Project 775 Alexandr Shabalin http://fleetphoto.ru/ship/17132/
04012 tons Project 775 Tsezar Kunikov http://fleetphoto.ru/ship/449/
04012 tons Project 775 Novocherkassk http://fleetphoto.ru/ship/839/
04012 tons Project 775 Yamal http://fleetphoto.ru/ship/840/
04012 tons Project 775 Azov http://fleetphoto.ru/ship/996/
04012 tons Project 775 Peresvet http://fleetphoto.ru/ship/17133/
04012 tons Project 775 Korolev http://fleetphoto.ru/ship/17134/
00550 tons Project 12322 Evgeniy Kocheshkov http://fleetphoto.ru/ship/19157/
00550 tons Project 12322 Mordoviya http://fleetphoto.ru/ship/19158/

04012 tons Project 775 Konstantin Olshanskiy http://fleetphoto.ru/ship/4752/ (captured to Ukraine 2014)
06000 tons Project 11711 Ivan Gren http://fleetphoto.ru/ship/25277/ (commissioned 2018)

18600 tons Total fuchsia (present since the begin and likely exhaustion before the end)
61280 tons Total black (present since the begin and after the end)
10012 tons Total green (incorporated after the begin and present after the end)

79880 tons Total 2011
89892 tons Total 2018
10012 tons Increment of the fleet


Logistic Auxiliary ships:

00686 tons Project 1823 VTR-6 http://fleetphoto.ru/ship/55823/ (decommissioned 2011)
00686 tons Project 1823 VTR-90 http://fleetphoto.ru/ship/55816/ (decommissioned 2018)
00686 tons Project 1823 VTR-82 http://fleetphoto.ru/ship/55580/ (decommissioned 2012)
00686 tons Project 1823 VTR-86 http://fleetphoto.ru/ship/41393/ (decommissioned 2018)
00714 tons Project 1823 MTR-148 http://fleetphoto.ru/ship/55644/ (decommissioned 2014)
03947 tons Project 740 Ufa http://fleetphoto.ru/ship/44706/ (decommissioned 2011)

01915 tons Project 572 Yrghiz http://fleetphoto.ru/ship/42760/
01915 tons Project 572 Bira http://fleetphoto.ru/ship/716/
00686 tons Project 1823 VTR-85 http://fleetphoto.ru/ship/41400/
07230 tons Project 596P Yamal modified to dry-cargo ship http://fleetphoto.ru/ship/17555/
00686 tons Project 1823 VTR-94 http://fleetphoto.ru/ship/28800/
01192 tons Project 773 VTR-140 modified to dry-cargo ship http://fleetphoto.ru/ship/26719/
14165 tons Project 550 Yauza http://fleetphoto.ru/ship/20520/
03947 tons Project 740 Pechora http://fleetphoto.ru/ship/14386/
01243 tons Project 1807 VTR-139 modified to armament transport ship http://fleetphoto.ru/ship/35262/
05057 tons Project 1791 Daugaba http://fleetphoto.ru/ship/33930/
00686 tons Project 1823 VTR-76 http://fleetphoto.ru/ship/34801/

07250 tons Vologda-50 http://fleetphoto.ru/ship/54485/ (purchased 2015)
09132 tons Dvinitsa-50 http://fleetphoto.ru/ship/54458/ (purchased 2015)
03554 tons Kazan-60 http://fleetphoto.ru/ship/16128/ (purchased 2015)
04509 tons Kyzyl-60 http://fleetphoto.ru/ship/55363/ (purchased 2015)

1985 tons Project 20360 VTR-79 http://fleetphoto.ru/ship/3205/

6300 tons Project 20180/20181 Akademik Kovalev http://fleetphoto.ru/ship/42639/ (commissioned 2015)

07405 tons Total red (present since the begin and decommissioned before the end)
38722 tons Total fuchsia (present since the begin and likely exhaustion before the end)
24445 tons Total greenfuchsia (incorporated after the begin and likely exhaustion before the end)
01985 tons Total black (present since the begin and after the end)
06300 tons Total green (incorporated after the begin and present after the end)

47426 tons Total 2011
72138 tons Total 2018
24712 tons Increment of the fleet


Total available ships for the operation:

07405 tons Total red (present since the begin and decommissioned before the end)
57322 tons Total fuchsia (present since the begin and likely exhaustion before the end)
24445 tons Total greenfuchsia (incorporated after the begin and likely exhaustion before the end)
63265 tons Total black (present since the begin and after the end)
16312 tons Total green (incorporated after the begin and present after the end)

127992 tons Total 2011
161344 tons Total 2018
033352 tons Increment of the fleet


Future ships under construction:

Amphibious Combat ships
6000 tons Project 11711 Pyotr Morgunov http://fleetphoto.ru/ship/59957/

Logistic Auxiliary ships
6300 tons Project 20180/20181/20183 Akademik Makeev http://fleetphoto.ru/ship/59962/
3627 tons Project 20360 Gennadiy Dmitriev http://russianships.info/eng/support/project_20360m.htm
3627 tons Project 20360 Vladimir Pyalov http://russianships.info/eng/support/project_20360m.htm

06000 tons Total light green Amphibious (under construction)
13554 tons Total light green Logistic (under construction)
19554 tons Total light green (under construction)


Russia likely has been following a conservative strategy with its sea cargo transport fleet. It is understandable and more with the Mistral factor also in the mix, but it means not lack of overall capacity to afford the operation with the own capacity. Also, there is a point where a conservative use of the oldest ships stops making sense, because it is also necessary to optimize the remaining fleet after the operation. It means to apply a more conservative standard still to the ships to remain, while to apply a standard of exhaustion to the old ships to decommission.

In the following years we can see to increase the total capacity of the Amphibious fleet of ships over 500 tons, to compensate a reduction of the total capacity of the Logistic Auxiliary fleet for cargo transport. It can be more evident when the project of Amphibious ship over 500 tons for the next generation emerge. Likely will be bigger than the current ships and more conventional container friendly, but I do not expect something very big.

MODERNIZATIONS:


Combat ships:

Maintenance and modernization of the combat ships is assured, specially in the case of the biggest ships. Conceptually, a degree of maintenance and modernization is necessary in order to assure the explotation of the entire cycle of life of the combat ships. Some people is talking about lack of funds for it, but this is not a problem for Russia, because Russia has other options where to do cuts.

Russia only will avoid maintenance and modernization of the combat ships which early decommission is planned as part of the process of reduction of the fleet after the end of the Soviet Union. The rest will see completed the necessary maintenance and modernization in order to complete their cycle of life.

To note that Russia even is affording important repairs and reforms in ships that are to be retired and to go a museum just at the end of the repair works.

All this means that Russia has resources to afford all the necessary modernizations of combat ships, and only a few ships which decommission was planned years ago will be retired and scrapped.


Auxiliary ships:

Conceptually, the cycle of life of the auxiliary ships must be significantly shorter, by intensive use in all its life of service, until an exhaustion that must come faster. Conceptually, modernization of auxiliary ships makes not sense, because must be totally exhausted before a modernization becomes necessary.

After the end of the Soviet Union, Russia inherited a large fleet of auxiliary ships, which number was addapted to a much bigger combat fleet. In the case of the auxiliary fleet Russia applied not the same scrapping policy to the auxiliary fleet because they are ships that worked not enough for the total exhaustion, despite to have in many cases advanced age, and thanks to the lack of work conserved in many cases a mechanical reserve for works that are necessary to do also today.

This is the reason of the large auxiliary fleet that Russia keeps still. With the time, many ships have been totally exhausted, and in 2018 restarted the process of scrapping of auxiliary ships at strong rythm. A strong process of reduction of the auxiliary fleet of the Russian Navy begins, and the scrapping process will continue some years at the current rythm. The total exhaustion of some ships makes to increase the work schedule for the remaining ships, and it combined with a policy of strong concentration of the work in the oldest remaining ships plus a policy of conservation of the newest ships, will lead to accelerate the process of reduction of the auxiliary fleet of the Russian Navy. In the following years, maybe during the current State Armament Program, around 500-600 veteran auxiliary ships, some of them decommissioned recently, can be scrapped.

At same time, very likely, modernization of auxiliary ships will disappear totally, and maintenance of auxiliary ships over 25 years old will decline, becoming minimal.

This process of reduction of the auxiliary fleet of the Russian Navy, will allow liberate sailors to compensate the light growth in the crews of the combat ships caused by the introduction of bigger combat ships than the replaced, and also will allow to liberate funds to help in the maintenance and modernization of the Russian fleet of combat ships.

For the long-term, the Russian Navy is likely to go to a fleet of auxiliary ships of around 200-250 ships, with intense use, faster rotation (cycle of life reduced to approximately 25 years) and without need of modernization.