February 5th, 21:30About the new boathouse at Severnaya Verf
The degree of readiness of the new SV boathouse on a satellite image from Google Earth from 08/23/2022
Until the recent announcement of the planned conclusion of a state contract for the construction of six frigates pr. 22350 and 22350M, in which the Amur shipyard appears, all hopes regarding the start of the renewal of the ocean multipurpose surface forces of the Russian Navy were associated with the new boathouse under construction at Severnaya Verf (St. Petersburg) , where immediately after the completion of the work they were supposed to lay the lead FR pr. 22350M (the incorrect classification and index of the project was mentioned in one of the previous entries.
However, there is still no complete clarity as to exactly how many units of 22350M the contract will be signed, and whether the Amur Plant will start building ocean-going ships immediately or whether it will first need to master the construction of DMZ (22350) frigates, which is more logical. But one way or another, the situation cannot be called satisfactory when the most important shipbuilding facility for the naval and economic power of the country is being built in such a strange and absurd way.
It is difficult to say what is more here - the incompetence of officials, the corruption component, or banal bad luck, which are expressed in the termination of two state contracts with the general contractors who built the boathouse, and the conclusion of a third, which raises questions.
You can write a novel about the ups and downs of the construction of an object of interest to us or make a movie in the genre of adventurous drama. The first contract was concluded by the General Director of SV I. Ponomarev with the St. Petersburg Metrostroy five years ago (December 29, 2017) and assumed the completion of work in the 1st quarter. 2019 , that is, a huge two-span boathouse with dimensions of 250x140x75 m (apparently external) with all the necessary crane and transmission equipment, as well as with production sites for slipway, outfitting and mechanical assembly production, it was planned to build in just one year and three months, a timeframe as optimistic as it is unrealistic.
It is curious that the tender with the participation of 4 companies took place only on the third attempt - the first failed due to lack of funds (!), the second was canceled by the Federal Antimonopoly Service due to the wrong approach to choosing a contractor. In March 2019, the contract was terminated due to missed deadlines (only 27% of the estimate was used - 2 billion rubles out of 7.4 and financial problems of Metrostroy. The situation was aggravated by technical and economic mistakes made by the non-core design bureau ViPS, which was entrusted against any rules with the development of the boathouse project (*).
(*) KB ViPS (Design Bureau of High-rise and Underground Structures), which had no experience in designing shipyards, according to the terms of reference, was to develop (and probably developed) working documentation in some two months, and TSTSS (Center for Shipbuilding and Ship Repair Technology) , who designed most of the existing shipbuilding facilities, was left out of work. In modern domestic shipbuilding, there is a bad tendency to replace professionals with amateurs.
The USC is headed by a former financier-auditor, an official from the automotive industry and farming, the Nevskoye Design Bureau is an engineer-economist and a recent chief accountant, the UDC is designing a low-tonnage and not at all aircraft carrier Zelenodolsk Design Bureau, which was crushed under his Ak Bars by an energetic, but infinitely far from the fleet merchant Mistakhov (the analogy of the boathouse SV and UDC pr. 23900 as one of the future symbols of the Russian Navy is especially alarming).
In September 2020 (a year and a half was being redesigned with sluggish work in certain areas), instead of the unjustified trust of Metrostroy, the new general director SV I. Orlov signed a contract with the company Domestic Systems and Technologies (OST), which, like its predecessor, never built shipbuilding slipways. According to Orlov, more than 10 enterprises participated in the tender, the OST says that only they submitted an application in the course of further tender procedures. Completion was planned for the end of 2021 with a possible shift to 2022, however, this contract was also terminated in January 2022 . There is information that this time the estimate is 7.8 billion rubles. was disbursed for 1 billion (13%). The third act of this bad spectacle began on December 21, 2022, when, as a result of a competition with one participant, Severnaya Verf signed an agreement with the RusGard Production Company (Rostov-on-Don) with a completion date of March 2024.
PC "RusGard" has a quite decent website, but two points cause concern: firstly, the last message in the "News" section is dated 01/14/2019; 2); secondly (and most importantly), the menu includes the supply, installation and maintenance of gas turbine units; production of industrial filters; production, installation and maintenance of equipment for electric power facilities, but there is not a word about building competencies .
Let's digress a little from the difficult relations of the SV (and USC) with contractors in order to assess the importance of the new boathouse for the country's defense capability and economy. A satellite image from Google Earth dated 08/23/2022 confirms the external length and width of the object, which were announced in the press (250x140 m) and gives the clear width of two uneven spans of approximately 69 and 55 m (according to available data, spans of overhead cranes should be 68/70 .5 and 54/56.5 m. It is well known that initially it was planned to build destroyer (cruiser) pr. 23560 in the boathouse with Dtotal, according to various sources, 14000-19000 tons. Most likely, the width of the larger span was chosen for the consideration of the simultaneous construction of two ships of this project in it (according to the author's estimates, for Dtotal 16500-19000 tons, Lnb and Bnb will be about 210-220 and 26.0-27.0 m).
Of course, in a 69-meter span, two frigates (destroyer) pr. 22350M ). At the same time, a narrow span is ideal for an Aframax type tanker with average Lnb and Vnb values of 243 and 42 m (for Aframax 114K project, being built in Zvezda SSC, 250 and 44 m . Since tankers and BNK of the ocean zone will be vital for Russia in the new world order after the completion of the SMO, the new boathouse of the Severnaya Werf is an object of particular importance.
In a 30% finished slipway (building slab and part of the columns), it is necessary to: 1) complete the erection of the columns; 2) install ceilings; 3) complete the cladding of the building; 4) build an administrative building; 5) purchase the machine, crane [and transmission] equipment provided for in the contract . Will PC "RusGuard" cope with this? As far as can be judged from the materials of the official website, the company is now in serious trouble.
As far as can be judged from the materials of the official website, the company is now in serious trouble. It purchased and installed Western equipment (Siemens, General Electric, etc.) and produced filters using Western technologies. All this is now impossible or severely limited. Thus, the contract with SV for RusGuard is something like a lifeline. This is evidenced by the absence of other applicants in the competition. Most likely, this is due to the not very attractive terms of the contract, but they did not bother the drowning man.
According to the author, there may be two scenarios. In the first case, the management of the general contractor will treat the matter of national importance responsibly, hire an equally responsible subcontractor or subcontractors with rich experience in construction work and agree with the proposed price, be able to find a supplier and purchase the necessary equipment, without which the boathouse turns into an "expensive barn" , and hand over the object at the appointed time.
In the second, the story with Metrostroy and OST will be repeated, after which, with a high probability, Rakhmanov will lose his position (the third puncture on this topic), he will get hit in the neck, but Orlov will remain (despite the second puncture plus the fire on Provorny, plus not a single order delivered in 2022, he will have the delivered "Golovko", "Mercury" and a couple of fishing vessels in his assets), the President will take personal control of the case with the involvement of all available resources, and with a delay of another year and a half (in 2025) two 22350M and one Aframax will be laid in the new SV boathouse.
A year and a half in naval construction does not mean much, but, of course, I would like to see three FR (EM) pr. 22350M) - two at Severnaya Verf and one (plus one 22350) at Amur Shipyard.