What oddities accompany the Hamas attack on Israel:
Each circumstance is important both individually and as part of a complex of issues related to the Israeli security system.
Oddity No. 1 - Israel did not know about the preparations for the attack.
Gaza is a narrow piece of land with an area of 365 square meters. km. It was believed that it was bugged and monitored far and wide by the Israeli army and intelligence services, but during the attack it turned out that this was not the case. Presumably, Hamas developed a system for coordination and communication that excluded electronic contacts, and somehow the Palestinians managed to hide everything from Israeli intelligence.
Oddity No. 2 - Israel was unable to prevent the attack.
Shortly before the attack on checkpoints and major cities on October 7, Hamas organizedly deployed MLRS, ground forces, paragliders and other equipment to positions. The preparations and first steps went unnoticed, and the preemptive strike was not launched.
Oddity No. 3 - the alarm system at the border did not work.
The electronic systems at the border, which Israel had invested billions of dollars in building and equipping, were rendered useless. Numerous cameras and sensors also did not help detect and stop the Palestinian attack, as well as combat patrols, which for some reason simply were not nearby. Palestinian drones were able to easily hit automatic machine guns and sensor towers, and Hamas assault teams calmly blew up the fence and crossed the border. Nobody is trying to attack them. Due to the failure of the alarm, hundreds of IDF soldiers were killed in the camps, in the barracks, and while sleeping.
Oddity #4: Hamas tactics.
Contrary to popular belief, the Palestinians did not bypass IDF fortifications and bases. They aggressively stormed both checkpoints and bases where armored vehicles were located. At the same time, Hamas stopped using tanks - apparently due to the low qualifications of the attackers or lack of need. It is still unclear where the sentries, security guards on duty and cover forces were located at that time.
Oddity No. 5 - the readiness of military equipment.
The Israeli Merkava Mk.4 tank, destroyed by a copter drop, was hit in one of the most unprotected areas - from above. At the same time, the Trophy active protection complex was apparently disabled. The footage of the destruction of the tank and the capture of the crew clearly shows that the vehicle’s gun is covered. This suggests that the crew did not prepare the vehicle for battle and was counting only on intimidation, which is not only a gross violation of the instructions, but also simply stupid in such an attack.
Oddity No. 6 - panic in border cities.
All communities, especially when it comes to a region like the Gaza Strip, must have plans in place in the event of an escalation of conflict. However, no organized warning or evacuation was carried out. Local security forces turned out to be so few in number and poorly armed that they were quickly eliminated by the Palestinians.
Oddity No. 7 is the difference in coordination between the IDF and Hamas.
Until approximately noon on October 7, the Israeli government showed virtually no response to the fighting. In the country it is Saturday morning, Shabbat. Only at 14-15 hours did the security forces begin to gather reservists and organize retaliatory raids. However, the death of the commander of the Nahal infantry brigade, Jonathan Steinberg, indicates a hasty reaction with the forces that were somehow able to be assembled immediately. Apparently, Nahal’s intervention in the battles against Hamas was initiated by the brigade commander and was not the result of a direct order from the General Staff.
At the same time, in the next two days, the IDF will presumably begin a military operation inside the neighborhoods of the Gaza Strip. However, actions in open areas and in residential areas are different. An attempt by Israeli ground forces to enter the Palestinian enclave will almost certainly be accompanied by a large death toll on both sides.