Timid hope. Does the Russian naval aviation have a future?
The article offered to the reader is heavy in its texture. And it must be emphasized right away that now, after the change in the leadership of the Naval Aviation of the Navy, positive trends have emerged in the real solution of its problems.
However, the article is about problems, and its meaning is to objectively reveal them, not to let them be swept under the plinth (under the pretext of “no money,” “some have responsibility, and others have the possibilities and resources to solve them,” “these problems are now yours, so you and… sweep them up so that they are not (visible) ”). In essence and meaning - to achieve (squeeze) their resolution and elimination.
The prospects and capabilities of Naval Aviation are a topic for a separate article.
Taking into account the specifics of the topic, word-for-word citation is widely used, and, as a rule, not just "Internet resources", but publications that have all the appropriate permissions and approvals from the authorized official bodies.
Previously, the author has repeatedly touched upon the problems of Naval Aviation, since 2007 - articles “Aviation of the Navy. Was. There is? Will?" and the articles of 2018 in the "Independent Military Review" "The Fiery Sky of the Russian Navy" :
... the problems of our naval aviation are not really technical, but organizational. Let's start with the fact that the research organization of naval aviation is included not in the structure of the Navy, but in the VKS (and the relationship between "ship" and "aviation" organizations is an extremely painful issue), and ending with questions of banal funding. The obvious priority of the Navy is submarines (in relation to which there are many questions on various kinds of problems and the effectiveness of spending). A much lower priority is surface ships, and aviation is simply in the role of a stepdaughter.
However, all this in no way relieves the responsibility of the relevant officials of the Naval Aviation itself.
"Blind Killer Whale"
The Kasatka search and targeting complex is a large-scale project that involves the integration of all kinds of elements of modern equipment on board any carrier: an airplane, a helicopter, an ekranoplan, a drone. The composition of the Kasatka's equipment is impressive: radar, magnetometric, electro-optical, radio-hydroacoustic and other systems, the data from which is processed by an information and control system based on a modern computing platform, "the executive director of Radar MMS told TASS during MAKS-2021 Ivan Antsev.
“The software of the Kasatka complex is built according to the most modern principles using artificial intelligence and neuroanalytics. Thanks to the use of artificial intelligence, the Kasatka PPK has incorporated technologies that provide self-learning, ”Antsev said. According to him, "Kasatka" regularly undergoes modernization, during which the complex integrates modern technologies in the field of information processing, graphics, cartography, as well as new equipment.
Below the author will show the real cost of all this neuroanalytics, "artificial intelligence" and similar advertising dregs.
I would like to emphasize that on the basis of advertising materials from the developer itself (in principle, we will not give a number of harsh comments on the Kasatka testing network).
At MAKS-2021, at the Radar-MMS stand, an advertising video of the Kasatka complex (photo on the right side of the figure) was played with some digital parameters that fully characterize the real “value” (in quotes) and the inability of Kasatka to actually solve problems by destination.
So, the interval of setting the radio-hydroacoustic buoys RSB-16MK of the intercepting barrier is 2 s (screen from the advertising video "Radar-MMS"). With an airplane speed of about 500 km / h, these 2 s also mean a linear interval of buoy placement of about ... 270 m. That is, with an overlap of 0.75, the detection range of a single RGAB turns out to be about 200 m!
As they say - "Repin's picture sailed."
Those who wish can recalculate the theoretical reserve of the RGAB on the plane with the "Kasatka" for its search performance, but there is little practical sense in this - in view of the obvious scantiness of this figure.
After that, it is appropriate to look at the public procurement website and inquire about the volume and cost of contracts for the RSL-16MK buoys (with their shown negligible effectiveness as part of the "newest" (in quotes) search and sighting system offered by the Navy).
As a matter of fact, all this is well known to specialists and has been discussed for a long time both in the special and open press, for example, in the previously mentioned article in NVO:
The extreme obsolescence of the PPS is the main drawback of our anti-submarine aviation. At the same time, we still consider hydroacoustic buoys (RGAB) as separate (single) hydroacoustic stations. Our “field of buoys” is a set of single receivers, while in the West, already in the 1980s, the transition to joint complex processing of signals from the RGAB field as from a single antenna began, that is, RGAB became a “sensor”. This technical solution has dramatically increased the search performance of anti-submarine aircraft. With the advent of low-frequency RGAB-emitters (LFA) in the early 1990s, detection of the lowest-noise submarines was ensured.
This raises logical questions - why do we have such PPPs "wrong"? And why are Western planes and helicopters working very effectively on our submarines (including the latest projects)?
And the answer to these questions will be in the spirit of the times - the head organization on the subject in the Russian Federation was appointed (by the former leadership of Naval Aviation through the relevant structures of the Ministry of Defense of the Russian Federation) an office that had never been involved in such work (that is, simply with zero experience and the same scientific and technical backlog ).
July 6, 2015. At the naval show in St. Petersburg, the operation of the search and sighting complex "Kasatka" in real time from the Il-114 was demonstrated for the first time, "Vzglyad" reports with reference to the director of "NPP Radar MMS" Ivan Antsev. “The Killer Whale search and sighting complex was presented at the salon, which we showed for the first time fully in action. Our IL-114 laboratory aircraft during demonstration flights via a broadband channel in real time transmitted information to the ground, directly to our stand, ”said the director.
Apparently, according to Mr. Antsev, "fully in action" for the search complex - this is "the connection is transmitting something", the screens "show something": take the fleet of the complex (and most importantly - pay)!
Ability to solve problems as intended?
And what is it?
In any case, it is obvious from these statements that the head of the enterprise himself, to put it mildly, does not quite understand. Which, however, is not surprising, since the chief designer of the complex himself (who does not have any specialized education or experience in the subject) has similar problems!
During the military-technical forum "Army-2015", an extremely interesting and useful round table "Marine underwater weapons (MPS): realities and prospects" was held ( link).
List of reports (in the order of presentation):
... “Magnetometric guidance systems for naval underwater weapons in conditions of massive hydraulic resistance. Theory and Results ",
with whom the actively lobbied magnetometer and (concurrently) chief designer (as of 2015) of the Kasatka complex spoke (and was represented by persons from the Naval Aviation).
There, representatives of the Maritime Aviation "Radar-MMS" who were present (at the round table discussed, among other things, the issues of Naval Aviation, more on this below) was declared as "the lead organization on the subject."
When discussing magnetometric topics directly at the round table, there was a piquant moment when representatives of the Navy and the chief designer himself first stated that it was “impossible to counteract and imitate” magnetometric systems, and an hour later, when discussing the problem of high-speed submarine missiles, “the need to finance simulators for full-scale development of magnetometric guidance channels (MMK) ”. To the author's subsequent question about how this statement correlates with the postulate expressed an hour before these statements about the alleged "technical impossibility" of such an imitation, the answer from the persons of the Navy and the respected chief designer was silence.
Of course, imitation of a magnetic field is not only possible, but has already been implemented for a long time. In fact, we have a play on words: SGPD (means of hydroacoustic counteraction) - "hydroacoustic", and MMK - "magnetic", in which the fact that some SGPD also have means of imitation of a magnetic field is completely omitted. Moreover, such cheating (in this particular case, this word accurately characterizes what was happening) does not occur in some lobbies or smoking rooms, but takes place in the highest official documents of promising topics! Unfortunately, the situation is such that today it is not only possible to lie, but, as a rule, it is possible with impunity, including in “high documents” and the highest “decision-makers”.
Returning to the work on search and targeting systems (PPS) of anti-submarine and patrol complexes, there is an opinion that the problem of the patrol aviation of the Navy is allegedly "in the plane", but "there are a lot of those who want to develop the complex" (one of the literal statements on a specialized forum on the Internet) ... Let's call a spade a spade: in this case, we are talking about the mass of those who want to “master the money” for teaching staff, but there are big doubts about the ability of individuals and organizations that have never done this to actually perform the work.
So, in the case of Kasatka, the magnetometer became the chief designer of the search (that is, first of all, the hydroacoustic complex, and secondly - the radar). With a corresponding result. With equal "success" (in quotation marks), one could appoint a cook or a stove-maker.
In this whole situation, the funny thing is that, having already received harsh criticism of everything that was created in Kasatka, and the numbers in advertising, the corresponding "especially effective managers" of "Radar-MMS" solved the problem, so to speak, on a "high methodological level ”- removing the numbers in the new version of the advertising video (with the same plot).
A two-second dumping of buoys on it is not just a verdict on the Kasatka complex, it is just a shame and disgrace to its developers and leaders of the organization, who for all these years did not bother to figure out what a modern teaching staff is (and exposing this ignorance to the public) !
At the same time, it should be noted that, while harshly criticizing the management of Radar-MMS in this particular case, it is necessary to note and emphasize their active work in various areas of innovation.
Yes, they were not always successful. Yes, sometimes necessary and relevant topics were thrown at the moment when the "critical point" had already been passed, and it was already "starting to work out." Yes, sometimes they were engaged in frankly unfounded fantasies. However, the very fact of their active work for the future (of which there are certainly serious positive results) stands out noticeably in a positive way against the background of our defense industry (and industry), and the question of translating all this positive groundwork into a practical (and financial) plane is the need an objective and critical analysis of all the work of the company - both successes and failures, with a subsequent change in technical policy.
And where did the fleet look, the leadership of the Naval Aviation?
And the answer will be where her ex-chief came after his dismissal from the RF Armed Forces (and where he carefully prepared for himself a "soft chair" for many years) ...
A logical question arises: what about the really only organization in the Russian Federation - TsNPO "Leninets" and its complex "Novella" (export "Sea Serpent")?
Alas, a photo of the Indian Navy, because our Navy does not need aircraft with missiles. As a matter of fact, he did not even need the Novella itself (for the head and promising one was the Kasatka from Radar-MMS). From the article "Anti-submarine aviation of the Russian Navy: simulated targets and blanks instead of weapons" :
Moreover, even a relatively modern (and quite efficient) "Novella" went to the fleet "castrated" - without all the prescribed nomenclature of new RSAB.
It would be appropriate to quote the following quote here ( direct link to the pdf file on the website of the RF Ministry of Defense ):
On March 26, 2018, the Center began special flight tests of the Il-38N aircraft to remove the restrictions of the State Special Test Act.
... the generation of targeting data in the training station and the issuance of signals for the control system for the preparation and dropping of search and destruction means, according to information from the RGS. In addition, in the course of the flights, a comprehensive assessment of 1НВ1 (radar) products was carried out; 1НВ2 (RGS); НВ5 (ТТС) REC "Novella P-38", as well as ... According to preliminary estimates, all test flights are credited.
So, 2018. State tests of the Novella itself were completed back in the 2000s, the first production aircraft of the Navy completed its modernization in 2014 (Indian, with the Sea Serpent - in 2005). To put it mildly, we were not in a hurry to "lift the restriction" of the Act of State Special Tests (there is no talk about new buoys any more), which, given the passionate love for Kasatka advertising brochures, is not surprising.
Yes, in a number of aspects, Novella is outdated, but it is a really working, concretely effective (with a number of reservations) complex, which was made by experienced specialists and an organization that alone had the necessary experience and potential in the Russian Federation.
Moreover, the complex was successful in the foreign market (Il-38SD aircraft of the Indian Navy), despite the fact that, at the suggestion of some bureaucrats, it was simply delivered in a slaughtered form (from the appearance shown and announced at salons and exhibitions). Moreover, there was even a question about the modernization of Tu-142ME aircraft of the Indian Navy under the Sea Serpent, which, unfortunately, was not implemented to a large extent due to the past leadership and a number of specialists of Tupolev PJSC (not always, unfortunately, who understood that "the problems are solved not by the glider, but by the complex").
The consequence of this was that the Russian Tu-142M did not receive a full-fledged modernization (and a number of statements in the media about Hephaestus and similar advertising dregs from the point of view of the real tasks of these aviation complexes cause only a sad smile).
Long song "Apatita"
The topic of the prospective patrol complex "Apatit" has been hanging in the air for a long time . Link .
... the idea of creating a patrol complex for the Navy on the basis of the Tu-214 aircraft is far from new and goes back to the mid-1990s. Then the patrol aircraft based on the Tu-214 won the competition against the Tu-170PRLTs aircraft and the A-42 amphibious aircraft developed by the Beriev Design Bureau. Based on the results of this competition, the creation of a patrol complex based on the Tu-214 aircraft was determined by government decree No. 61-10 of February 19, 1996.
Today we have a situation of rapidly dwindling resource of the Il-38 and Tu-142M aircraft and, in fact, we are on the verge of simply losing the patrol and anti-submarine aircraft of the Navy.
Helicopter failure "Kema"
The senior instructor-navigator of the research department of the combat use of the naval aviation branches 859 of the Center for combat use, Major Stasik I.M. ( link, pdf ):
Since 2016, a massive supply of modernized Ka-27M helicopters has begun to the naval aviation of the Navy. The modernized machine is equipped with modern systems for processing and transmitting information over secure channels in real time. The updated helicopter in the field of modern radio electronics is ahead of similar helicopters of our "potential adversaries".
The basis for the armament of the Ka-27M anti-submarine helicopter is the radar command-tactical system developed by the JSC "Corporation" Fazotron-NIIR " reconnaissance and anti-submarine aircraft weapons.
Well, let's deal with the next “unparalleled wunderwaffe”, allegedly “ahead of the helicopters of“ potential adversaries ”in the field of modern electronics.
The first thing to note is that initially the Ka-27 helicopter had the "Octopus" search and sighting system developed by the Kiev Research Institute of Hydraulic Instruments (there were two centers for anti-submarine aviation work in the USSR - in Leningrad ("Leninets") and in Kiev). Yes, the system is imperfect from the height of today, so it was thrown out from the helicopter.
Is it logical?
How to say. Taking into account the fact that instead of the old PPS, a new one was never found, and instead of it two crutches were installed - RGA (radio-hydroacoustic equipment) "Kema" and KTS (command-tactical system) with a radar and a lowered GAS (OGAS).
Details on Kema and its analysis are based on the materials on it demonstrated at the Army-2020 forum at the stand of the Naval Aviation of the Navy ( here ).
What can you say to this?
There are really no analogues: in terms of rudimentarity and antiquity of this "search crutch" Ka-27M. "Kema" in essence is not even "Berkut" (PPS Il-38 developed in the 60s), but in fact a rollback to "Baku" (Be-12 developed in the late 50s)!
Only passive non-directional buoys simply exclude the possibility of using modern illumination modes, and the parameters of the positioning accuracy of the RGAB are extremely low and do not provide for the formation of an effective spatial antenna array. In fact, we have a "set of single detectors", but with digital processing and recording in separate channels. Moreover, "Kema" does not provide the development of the point of aiming of the weapon (the consequences of this - below).
It is striking that the key features of modern Western teaching staff have been openly written since the beginning of the 90s, but “foreigners are not our decree”.
From the article “Anti-submarine defense: ships against submarines. Hydroacoustics " :
And if Western helicopters are capable of providing new OGAS with multi-position joint work with BUGAS and aviation (RGAB), then even the newest ships of Project 22350 have an upgraded Ka-27M helicopter, on which essentially the same high-frequency OGAS Ros remained (only digital and on a new element base), as on the Soviet Ka-27 helicopter of the 80s, which has absolutely unsatisfactory performance characteristics and is incapable of either working together with the Minotaur or "illuminating" the RGAB field. Simply because they work in different frequency ranges.
Multi-position distributed operating modes of the modern Western OGAS HELRAS:
Timid hope. Does the Russian naval aviation have a future?
Obviously, Ros-VM is not capable of anything like that, it just catastrophically lags behind in characteristics and has a short detection range for submarines.
There is an opinion that the Ka-27M is a "temporary solution", but "very soon" we will have "grace" with the "newest helicopter" "Lamprey".
Therefore upgrading Ka-27M went on "budget to the embodiment, as the tank T-72." Yes, to a large extent this is so (for example, this is why the radar did not have a phased array, but a simple old scheme with a "mirror" antenna was used). However, the T-72B3 tank, with all its shortcomings, has real capabilities to destroy targets, but the Ka-27M has very big problems with this (more on that below).
Now for the Lamprey.
The Russian Helicopters holding has coordinated the terms of reference with suppliers for the project of the promising sea-going helicopter Minoga. Andrey Boginsky, General Director of the Russian Helicopters holding, told TASS at MAKS-2021.
“Now we are working on the development of a set of design documentation, which will be created by 2023. Last year we received advances and brought them to the suppliers. All technical specifications have also been agreed with each of the suppliers, ”he said.
Earlier, within the framework of the Army-2020 forum, the Russian Helicopters holding signed a development contract with the Ministry of Defense for the promising deck-based Minoga helicopter.
So, "terms of reference have been agreed," "advances have been issued."
Excuse me, but for what ?!
For our objectively, with a scientific and technical basis for the complex, the situation is such that even the TTZ cannot be written on it, there are too many unclear questions that need to be dealt with based on the results of serious and deep tests and special research projects!
Actually, the "assessment of the situation" from "academic and applied science":
A. E. Borodin (Far Eastern Branch of the Section of Applied Problems under the Presidium of the Russian Academy of Sciences) "Methods for monitoring the underwater situation by advanced aircraft systems (APLK) in a naval network-centric war" ( link, pdf ) :
... the solution is to introduce the "distributed detection" method into domestic CGS, which allows to fully realize the technical advantages of aviation platforms ... A necessary condition for creating a CGS based on the proposed method is the organization of complex fundamental and applied research aimed at creating the necessary scientific and practical groundwork. An obstacle to the introduction of the method of spatial detection in the nuclear submarine is the fragmented nature of the existing scientific and technical groundwork.
I emphasize once again that there is simply no groundwork for R&D on the new complex, there are separate experiments, but objectively: just in order to obtain a high-quality product (search complex) in a reasonable and fairly short time, special studies and tests are needed. And getting involved in OCD without them is another gamble, the result of which will be obviously crooked and oblique.
I repeat - "the problem is solved not by the glider (of the aircraft), but by the complex"!
"Shooting milk from wooden machine guns" - about anti-submarine weapons of the Navy
The problem of complete disregard by our Naval Aviation of the practical use of weapons has already been raised - "Anti-submarine aviation of the Russian Navy: simulated targets and blanks instead of weapons" :
In order not to "spoil the statistics", the Naval Aviation went to a complete refusal to use new practical torpedoes (with homing systems on and their real guidance at target submarines), replacing them with throwing torpedo shells.
Anti-submarine weapons of naval aviation are torpedoes, aviation submarine missiles (APR), gravitational underwater shells: corrected anti-submarine aerial bombs (GPS KAB PL) and conventional anti-submarine aerial bombs.
Taking into account the timing of weapons of the 1st and 2nd generations, only the UMGT-1 torpedo with a water-activated silver-zinc battery and a powerful low-frequency homing system (CLS) "Waterfall" (alas, having extremely low noise immunity) remained in the naval aviation. The service life of the UMGT-1 torpedoes is obviously near-limiting, and the efficiency in the conditions of using the SGPD is extremely low. The use of UMGT-1 is impossible in areas with shallow depths and in the Baltic Sea (due to insufficient salinity for the use of the battery).
That is, the basis of the ammunition is the APR-2, which, although it has an outdated SSN, but with good noise immunity. However, the APR-2 has an extremely short cruising range, and, accordingly, very high requirements for target designation accuracy. Her service life is also close to the limit.
Here it is necessary to emphasize once again that the Naval Aviation of the Navy does not have any statistics on the practical use of UMGT-1 and APR-2. All cases of their practical application are only in the form of periodic industrial tests and the only case of using UMGT-1 in the early 90s at the Pacific Fleet on the initiative of the Anti-Submarine Weapons Directorate of the Navy. In fact, the price of such “combat training” (in quotes) is similar to “voice shooting from wooden machine guns” in the infantry. Of course, replacing the actual firing from a machine gun with a tree and a "tra-ta-ta" voice - and in a nightmare not a single land commander will dream, so high-ranking of them should still ask how the fleet (with its aviation) got to "Life like this" and the complete discrediting of their combat training?
At the same time, taking into account the extremely low noise immunity of the UMGT-1 for a real war, only APRs are of value, however, the question of accurate target designation arises sharply on them. This question is quite solvable, already resolved: in the old teaching staff (the times of the USSR) and new ones - the development of experienced specialists ("Novella").
However, for the same Ka-27M, everything turns out very badly. "Kema" does not develop an aiming point, that is, an attack based on the data of passive buoys is impossible. What remains is the OGAS - with the development of firing data of the KTS based on its data. The problem here is that the work of the OGAS is not secretive, and since there are no idiots on the submarines, they perfectly understand what will happen after the close operation of the OGAS (with a short range). Accordingly - change of course and evasion ... After which the APR simply does not have enough range in order to compensate for the submarine's evasion.
There are similar problems with GPS.
In general, it was an ingenious invention of the times of the USSR, and the key factor here was the noise immunity factor: if ordinary airborne torpedoes confidently went to the SGPD, having extremely small chances of a real defeat of submarines in combat conditions, then the GPS with high-frequency and vertically oriented SSNs had almost absolute noise immunity, and accordingly - a high probability of hitting a target in real combat conditions (counteraction).
However, it is not just the 21st century, the first quarter of it is already coming to an end, and taking this into account, the GPS themselves look quite antique. The solution, which for a long time not just hung in the air, but was worked out in detail - equipping the GPS with a small-sized propulsive complex with a sharp increase in performance characteristics and efficiency, was never implemented.
Classic anti-submarine bombs, despite the extremely low probability of hitting conventional submarines in the ocean, still remain relevant for shallow depths, hitting submarines lying on the ground and targets such as subversive midget submarines and underwater means of movement of saboteurs.
So, UMGT-1 and APR-2, which were the basis of anti-submarine aircraft ammunition, are not just outdated, but simply at the limit of their service life.
The Tactical Missile Armament Corporation (KTRV) has begun mass production of the latest APR-3ME anti-submarine missiles, KTRV General Director Boris Obnosov said in an interview with TASS at the 10th International Maritime Defense Show (IMDS-2021). According to the head of KTRV, work is underway to create new models of aircraft anti-submarine torpedoes.
“In the future, to replace the APR-3ME, it is planned to develop a small-sized aircraft anti-submarine torpedo, significantly superior to the existing models in terms of cruising range,” Obnosov said.
Apparently, things are not going very well with underwater weapons with KTRV, if torture to the APR-3M series is presented in the media as an achievement.
In essence, the APR-3M is actually transferred to the modern technological base of the APR-3 developed in the 70s - 80s (with a slight increase in characteristics). In the same 90s, much more advanced APRs were developed in the "Region", however, due to a lack of funds, their development was then discontinued in favor of the openly budget APR-3M.
APR-3M (right) and dropping by a helicopter of the PLA Navy APR-3E (mid-90s)
However, the main problem of APR-3M is test statistics.
From the article “The price of torpedo crew. To ensure the combat capability of the Navy, the cost of testing and firing is important ”, the former head of the torpedo operation department of the 28th Research Institute of the Navy L. Bozin:
A serious drawback in the development of torpedoes in the USSR is the small volume of tests, as a result of which this type of weapon was produced with serious flaws. The massive use of torpedoes during combat training was essentially a continuation of state tests. In the first five to six years of the development of this weapon by the fleet , serious shortcomings are discovered and various modifications are made, including to achieve the technical characteristics declared during the development. There are a lot of examples of this.
Difficult conditions of the application environment categorically require large statistics of torpedo firing, including in situations close to real combat ...
Example: during the testing period of the StingRay mod.1 torpedo, 150 firings were carried out. However, it should be borne in mind that during the development of the first modification of the StingRay mod.0, about 500 tests were carried out. Reducing this number of firing for mod.1 allowed the system for collecting and recording data of all firing and the implementation on its basis of a "dry range" for preliminary testing of new CLO solutions based on these statistics.
Mr. Obnosov should have heard on this issue not the so-called “effective managers” of the “Region”, but the chief designer of the APR-3M. This is a very experienced specialist at a respectable age with a quiet voice, whose tough questions managers try very hard not to hear. I believe that after clarifying the situation with the chief designer himself, BV Obnosov's public statements would have been much more accurate and careful.
Here it will be appropriate to recall again the article of 2015 "Marine Underwater Weapons (MPS): Realities and Prospects" :
... a critical problem is people, at the level of Chief Designers, who are able to pull on themselves new topics and directions. In fact, the topic of new work is objectively determined by the presence of the Chief Designer or Scientific Director of the research work, who is really able to do the Case. There is an extremely limited, literally piece number of such people, often these people are of a great age, and it is critically necessary not only to "launch the topic", but to do it in such a way that talented youth can be connected to it and teach it from the "bison". If we fail to do this, we will lose the "bison", and with them, we have touched off in a number of areas.
And the result ( link ):
01/10/2020. When I wrote this in 2015, I meant absolutely specific people. One of them, Arseny Fyodorovich Myandin, passed away on January 7 ... Not just a person left, not just a “part of history", A huge scientific and technical backlog was covered (to a large extent - still of the Soviet era). For "Region" this is, to put it mildly, "knockdown" ... You can forget about the promising "superPackage" (an ultra-small product of which should have a speed of more than 65 knots and a range of about 5 km (the idea of the product and the models for using the complex is mine, but the calculations for the power module, speed and range - Arseny Fedorovich, still 2012), and about a lot of other things ... One feeling - seething rage on the faces, strangling promising topics until their meaning is lost due to the death of key developers ...
Due to the fact that the declared characteristics (for an ultra-small product) have raised doubts among a number of specialists, I will specially cite an excerpt from A.F.Myandin's rough calculations:
The last time it was reported to the decision of the management of the Corporation "TRV" and inclusion in the list of promising jobs in the fall of 2015, but was buried by "effective managers" of the "Region" (the phrase of one of them - "we have so much money now that we do not need anything" ).
Now, after the death of Myandin, we can forget about it, because “starting with what is left” is at least 10 years of hard work with a mass of failures and failures (as it was in reality in recent history on this topic), and today no one of the customers will not allow “to pass this road again”.
Commentary (ibid.) Of an official with the DOGOZ of the Ministry of Defense of the Russian Federation:
Another of the "bison" KB-1 Research Institute PGM - NPO "Region" left. Very, very sad news. The blessed memory of AF Myandin ... You know, it seems to me that for the current "Region" this is not a knockdown - as developers, they have been in a deep knockout for 10 years already. And the degradation of the "Region" as a developer is, unfortunately, a natural result of the choice made in favor of the development of the "Region" mainly as a serial enterprise ... In the abbreviation GNPP, the letter N is superfluous. Sad.
So (while maintaining the existing technical policy of the "Region" and the Concern "TRV"), all that remains is to "eat up" the old groundwork created in the time of E.S.Shakhidzhanov (for more details, "Anti-torpedoes. We are still ahead, but they are already overtaking us" ), and Accordingly, for our aviation, the only option remains - the maximum forcing of work on the "packet" torpedo (based on experience and the groundwork for the "Answer" topic). This is the only real option, everything else is manilovism.
A lively discussion on this topic developed during the round table. GB Tikhonov, a representative of KMPO Gidropribor JSC, voiced a proposal to carry out a “short R&D” project to develop an aircraft torpedo based on the MGT-1 small torpedo (product 294), a warhead of a broadband mine complex. It is categorically impossible to agree with this proposal, since the new small-sized torpedo of the "Packet" complex has significantly higher performance characteristics, and it is advisable to consider it as a single basic model of a small-sized torpedo of the Navy, with the provision of application from ships, submarines, aviation and as a PLUR warhead. At the same time, for this, it is necessary to introduce telecontrol and anti-torpedo mode on the modernized version of this torpedo (originally built into it in terms of power reserve).
Well, in fact, the Naval Aviation itself should very carefully figure out what kind of cat in a poke she received (and "is there a cat in that bag at all").
The practice of "testing weapons" (specially taken in quotation marks) today is the following link :
On the basis of the "Decision on the procedure for conducting a flight and sea experiment of qualification tests of KAB PL products" approved by the Commander-in-Chief of the Navy on September 10, 2014 and in accordance with the "Program of qualification tests of KAB PL products" at sea ranges of the Black Sea Fleet in the period of October 16–31, 2014 qualification tests of KAB PL were carried out. The program of control flight tests provided for the dropping of five corrected bombs of the KAB submarine of practical execution ... The pilot ships provided the installation of a marker buoy, a hydroacoustic receiver, direction finding and buoying of the splashdown points of products, search, sprinkling and lifting of products from the ground.
Based on the materials of video recording of the processes of dropping products from a helicopter, it was established that the products of the KAB PL on the air section of the trajectory worked normally, after splashdown they emitted probing signals and separated from the float in accordance with the specified operating mode. The terms of reference for flight and sea experiments under the Zagon-2 qualification testing program with the participation of specialists from our Center were completed in full and with high quality.
"All is well, lovely marquise"?
In the acts - yes.
But in fact, very bad questions arise: why were such tests carried out without a real target submarine?
Yes, at the time of testing there were no running boats in the Black Sea Fleet, but they were in other fleets! The above case is a clear example of outright hack, both with programs and test methods, and simply with the attitude to weapons in our anti-submarine aviation, and here the most stringent measures are needed to bring to life and realize the measure of responsibility and military duty for the task entrusted.
At a minimum, we need extensive testing of all (I emphasize, all: both old and new) weapons of the naval aviation in the conditions of their actual use (including modern SGPD, shallow depths, etc.). Today our naval aviation is practically unarmed.
Calling a spade a spade, all of the above means the actual non-combat capability of the anti-submarine aviation of the Navy.
The point of this article is a public and harsh exposing of acute problems. For their subsequent solution and raking the Augean stables. In the current military-political situation, we simply have no right to be weak.
These facts are only part of the picture of the grave state of the Russian Naval Aviation.
At the same time, I repeat, there are positive changes, and in some cases, very dramatic.
There is also an understanding that "it is impossible to continue living and serving like this." For example, Lieutenant Colonel V.P. Tyurkin, head of the research department (operation and application of hydroacoustics), PPI and PLC (MA Navy) ( link, pdf):
… There is a need to urgently create completely new aviation complexes that meet modern requirements. To do this, it is necessary ... to adopt a new aviation patrol complex for solving: search tasks, anti-submarine tasks, shock and special tasks, and air reconnaissance tasks. As a platform for the complex, provide for both aircraft and helicopter carriers. Each of them should have a modern onboard multifunctional radio-electronic complex, built on the principle of "open architecture" in a modular design. The most important property of the complex should be information and technical compatibility with ship, coastal and aviation systems of reconnaissance, detection and target designation, thus the information and control system should be integrated into a single information space of the Navy , while having modern certified software and high-speed information exchange channels; the hydroacoustic subsystem should function both on new passive and active multistatic principles of operation, which ensure prompt detection of the underwater situation in large water areas, and on simpler, but previously well-tested spectral and energy methods.
There are opportunities for solving the problems of Naval Aviation (even taking into account the difficult financial situation).
There is still time.
While there is, albeit a little.
The question is in the actions of specific officials.
The author is not familiar with them, but the fact that they decided to take responsibility for the Naval Aviation at a very difficult moment for it characterizes them positively.
We wish them success in this.