Project 12700 Minesweeper thread

The issue with the inability of the Russian navy to combat modern mines should be resolved immediately
"That's when the ships begin to undermine, then we will take measures and we will"

"Responsible officer" of the Navy on the issue of MIP. January 2015


On December 9, 2016g. The media announced the transfer of the Navy's new base minesweeper (BTSH) "Alexander Obukhov".

Undoubtedly, the fleet, whose mine forces are currently incapacitated against the current mine threat, has been waiting for a new anti-mine ship (PMK). However, it should be noted that the MTSH "Vice Admiral Zakharin", the first new-generation Mine-borne Vehicle (PMK), adopted by the Navy back in 2008, according to media reports, is still unable to use new mine-fighting systems, participating in combat training of the Navy only with obsolete with arms.


"To the war" (combat services) today go "units" having a purely decorative "combat" value. For example, naval minesweepers from the Navy in the Mediterranean go to the combat, having absolutely obsolete, "antique" radioelectronic weapons, the complete absence of modern anti-mine means (only obsolete trawls), and the "good old" rowing sails Yal-6 . Only "white sails" are missing from the navy minesweeper!

Repeatedly the issue of shameful for the Russian Navy "details" of joint exercises of mine action forces when other countries' PMCs (including the Baltic Fleet) were engaged in a real deal - the search and destruction of actual mines, and our antiquarian mine-sweepers, incapable of real combat work, The Germans put training anchor mines (that they would not "miss").


In accordance with all the "official statements" of the Navy, it is planned to solve problems with the MIP by building a series of PMK pr.12700. How much is this a solution?


Two principal reservations.


The first. Despite the objective need for a tough open discussion on the topic, there are a number of questions, "technical and tactical opportunities" for mine and mine action that are not subject to public disclosure. And this is due not only to formal "regime requirements", but also to "a significant reduction in frankness" in Western publications on the topic. Today they do not negotiate much (which unfortunately, some of our Navy experts, reminiscent of "Negroes with Beads", who have allegedly seized beautiful western avenues and very controversial ideas, do not always understand it).


The second. Mine-affected defense (MAP) and mine action (Mine Action) talks can not be without defining objective criteria of effectiveness. These are in fact:

Search performance (search for mine-like objects).
Productivity for the classification and destruction of mines.
Extremely low probability of passing and non-mitigating mines while conducting mine action.
Correspondence of the capabilities of mine protection complexes with a real mine threat (first of all, by the number of mines and the possibility of their destruction in the required time).

Project 12700.


The construction of a series of new minefields of Project 12700 among specialists caused an ambiguous reaction, which is connected with three circumstances:

a significant displacement and the cost of the newest PMK (formally, the new "base mine-sweeper" turned out to be much larger than the naval minesweepers of the Navy, and more than twice the displacement of the Soviet Naval Forces of the USSR, it is also evident a significant increase in the cost of serial БГЩ from the main (5, 5 billion rubles));
problems with the creation of a new anti-mine complex ISPUM ( "We are standing on the threshold of another Tsushima" );
a very ambiguous situation with the attempt to install on the BTSH pr.12700 French mine systems.

However, the main thing is the concept of the PMK 12700 project itself, which was questioned by a number of specialists as obsolete, which, given the high cost of the BSHP pr.12700, in their opinion, made the construction of their series inexpedient.


Their theses are the following:

We should prepare for the fight against modern ground mines surrounded by robotic autonomous combat complexes.
Existing bottom mines have fuses, which allow ignoring most of the combined non-contact trawls (magneto-acoustic drops completely), i.e. simple trawling is simply a senseless waste of time
If earlier (more than 20 years ago) a mine-sweeper was required for mine action, equipped with an anti-mine uninhabited submarine (AP) and either a downhole GAS or a mine detection apparatus that was forced to approach the minefield at a distance equal to the length of the apparatus cables and, accordingly, lowered physical fields, a system of dynamic positioning, etc. Today, these methods are outdated, and no one (primarily the fleet) did not care about the concept change.
Today, the task of an anti-mine ship should be the descent / lifting of the apparatus and the task of the program, then simply wait and process the results at a safe distance (kilometers). As a result, we have abandoned the requirements for physical fields, the refusal of the positioning system, but the installation of slips, cranes and other lifting equipment.
Since the bottom monitoring function coincides with the functions of hydrographic support, projects of overlapping appear in one ship. A ship armed with such systems does not need to approach mines (hence the reduced requirements for physical fields). Accordingly, the minesweeper is not a unique hull and equipment with minimal physical fields, but an automated mine action control system (AMM) and bezekapazhnye complexes, for which the ship is designed.
Development should be in the direction of container basing on unspecialized ships.

Logical and convincing? No! For the key problem of modern mine action is the appearance in the 90s of the last century of highly sensitive multi-channel non-contact fuses (NV) of mines with "fine processing" of target signals. The possibility of setting up such HBs for triggering from physical fields of mine-action NPA (primarily discrete components of noise) called into question the whole modern concept of mine action, - with the GAS mine detection and specialized mine action mines, additional exploration and destruction of mines, working ahead of the PMC course. At the same time, the possibility of decreasing the NLA fields (primarily the noise discrepancy) below the level of operation of the HB min is an extremely complex technical task.


For this reason, since the beginning of the 2000s, in the west, disposable mine-action NPA-destroyers have become a priority. However, the high cost of such disposable funds has made such mine action not only exceptionally expensive. The extremely high cost of such destroyers excludes the very possibility of solving the MIP problem, with any significant mine risk.

However, this problem was successfully solved in the West in the form of new integrated MIP systems: "search - non-contact trawling - destruction of mines". Today, in the west, there has been a "revival" of such an "outdated" mine-action weapon as a non-contact trawl, but with its application at a modern technical level - from bezekipazhnykh or helicopter carriers.


The essence of the matter is that the setting of the NW mines in the "mine protector" mode reduces its counter-resistance, making it possible to effectively use non-contact trawls against them. Those. mines - "mine defenders" (set up for the destruction of NPA) are destroyed by non-contact trawls, and the remaining mines (with high counter-resistance) are NPA. At the same time, taking into account the solution of the problem of "mine defenders", the requirements to the physical fields of the NPA can be reduced, up to the possibility of using civil-purpose civil defense for the purposes of the PMO tasks.

Thus, the key element of the prospective system for the destruction of mines of the Navy should be a set of jointly used and managed PMA ACS facilities:

non-contact trawl - BEC
"Heavy" (more than 500 kg) mine action SPA;
"Light" (50-100 kg) anti-mine remote-controlled NPA (possibly on the basis of civil)

To solve a number of problems (primarily for non-specialized ships of MIP), a limited use of costly disposable LPA-destroyers is possible.


In the form accepted today in the Navy, the use of non-contact trawls in the form of towing their minesweeper by trawler is outdated and is a direct prerequisite for the death of a minesweeper.


In turn, the requirement to place on board a full set of mine funds means the requirement of areas, volumes, and, respectively, displacement of the carrier. In these conditions, the possibility of upgrading the PMK of Project 12700 to new mine measures completely covers its considerable displacement.


Those. "Complete set" of MIP facilities on board, is a fully grounded factor in favor of the construction of PMK "dimension 12700".


Work in conditions of serious mine danger requires specialized ships that have not only reduced physical and modern mine complexes, but also specially trained crews. "Universal ship" can be built, but it is good to prepare a "universal crew" for all tasks - no. Specialized mine crafts will be retained in the Navy of developed countries in the future.


Nevertheless, we can not fail to note the obvious problems with the combat effectiveness of the ISPUM mine action project 12700, in the solution of combat missions:

in spite of the large displacement on board, there is only one anti-mine self-propelled underwater vehicle (for comparison, there are three anti-tank missiles of the type "Tripartite", having a displacement of half the size, there are three PMO), which will live on the minefield only until the first " mine protector ";
the domestic concept of towing non-contact trawls through the minefield today means deliberately sending a trawler to slaughter.

This raises the question of whether it can be a "salvation" for 12700 of the possibility of its equipping with French MIS systems (especially since they are partially a "Diamand" complex for the control of an unguided boat (BEC) "Inspector Mk2" and was installed at BTSC "Alexander Obukhov" ).


...

"When the ships start exploding, only then will we take the appropriate actions"
-The VMF on the problem with the obsolescence and ineffectiveness if its anti-mine weapons

Why is the building the building and testing of these minesweepers not getting any faster even if the first ship of the class is comissioned already?

hoom wrote:

Why is the building the building and testing of these minesweepers not getting any faster even if the first ship of the class is comissioned already?

There is that 'minor' issue where the 2nd boat had a big fire on it...

We are on the threshold of another" Tsushima
The Russian Navy today is not capable of a modern mine threat. This fact has long been known not only to specialists but also to all who are interested in the Navy in one way or another. Of course, it is well known to our "so-called partners".


On February 12, the media published a message, citing the statement of the Director General of the Sredne-Nevsky Shipbuilding Plant Seredocho VA, about the failure to deliver the new basic mine sweeper-searcher, Alexander Obukhov, project 12700 ("because of the refusal of the French partners to supply the necessary equipment" ).

Alas, the real situation is much worse. And here there is no fault of Vladimir Aleksandrovich, a respected and deserved shipbuilder, he himself is a hostage to the current situation (without being able to influence her permission). JSC "Sredne-Nevsky Shipbuilding Plant" is actively working and developing, and the Navy's mine issues have completely different reasons than the work of the plant.


The issue of the critical state with the mine defense system (MIP) of the Navy was repeatedly raised earlier by a number of specialists (including in the media):


2007, V.A. Katenin, Doctor of Technical Sciences, А.V. Katenin, Ph.D. (GNINGI MO RF): the Navy's naval forces are not able to effectively combat the current mine threat. ... are obsolete not only morally, but also physically and by 2016 one can expect the practical disappearance of mine-trod forces as such. The recognition by the political and military leadership of the country of the mine threat and the degradation of the national mine-troop forces should be the first step towards solving this acute problem "(Defense Order No. 15-2007).


2010, "MIC", MA Klimov: "... the general unsatisfactory state of mine-and-mud forces of the Russian Navy. Its mine action capabilities are so low that they call into question the fundamental possibility of ensuring the deployment of Russian Navy forces from its ba in the conditions of a modern mine threat. ... despite the successful passage of the MTSH "Vice Admiral Zakharin" of state tests, today he is alone in the Navy! For comparison: in the Polish Navy - 3 modernized TSCHIM project 206FM, Estonia - 5 TCHIM, Latvia - 5 TCHIM »


2014, "MIC" M.A. Klimov: "by 1991 the Soviet Navy came with numerous but morally obsolete ground forces, incapable of combating the current mine threat. ....


Due to the difficult economic situation and the presence of the ship-building vessel of the 266ME with a high degree of readiness, a decision was made to install new anti-mine systems on it. Completion of the corrected project of a single steel MTSH, obviously not having serial production, became a fatal mistake of the Navy. New mine protection systems had to be installed in the body of the massive wooden trawler (BTSC) of Project 1265, with the modernization of the BTSCH for them and the construction of a small series of new .... If we went along this path, the Navy would now have a couple of dozen modern TCHIM.


A sad monument to this amazing blindness of the Navy are the last two corps of the project 1265, from the completion of which the fleet refused. The construction factory (Petrozavodsk Avangard) was ruined, and the ships that remained without a berthing wall for a long time mooed along the lake until they died.


... the indicated rates of construction of the BSTT project 12700 in no way provide a solution in the coming years of the critical MIP problem.


Alternatives to emergency upgrading of minesweepers are not available "
From the report to the Commander-in-Chief of the Navy Admiral Chirkov V.V. of 19.11.1477 of 21.11.14:


"The present situation with the naval underwater weapons (ISS) of the Navy can be briefly described as" ships (PL) unarmed and defenseless. " We are on the threshold of another "Tsushima", which we can get not only from the US Navy, but even ......... (due to the antiquity and incapability of the Navy's mine forces against the current mine threat).


The planned measures ("Concept of the development of the Ministry of Defense of the Navy", OCD .... ..... ..... etc.) not only do not solve these acute problems, but they preserve a huge gap with Western countries (reaching 50 years!) and further.


There are four main reasons:

absence of a modern scientific and technical reserve (and complex experimental R & D for its production);
scanty and biased statistics of firing both during the Navy's Navy and the testing of new samples, and under obviously simplified conditions, - there has not yet been ANY real test ...;
The system of falsification of information in the system of the Navy and the Ministry of Defense in accordance with the situation with IGOs ​​and trials (here, deliberately and consciously "loosening up" in the Programs and test methods), disinformation of the leadership and command about the real state of affairs and the scale of the backlog from the probable enemy;
conscious actions (inaction) of persons (including the RF Ministry of Defense and the Navy) and leading organizations (and their lobbyists) to exclude the development and adoption of the modern IGO for the Navy.

...


The critical problem of the Navy is mine action defense (MIP). In March this year [2014] handed over to the Chief of the Naval Submarine Weapons Service of the Navy .... a document (in attachment) on the situation, possible consequences and necessary measures .... taking into account the current military and political situation. Necessary measures are not taken. "Hopes" on ISPUM do not have a reliable basis.


...

What of this is done?


On the modernization of minesweepers - nothing.


Modernization of the "Mayevka" - and the preparation of its mass production - both was not, and is not. In mine warfare of the Black Sea Fleet's mine-and-mine forces (with the "application" for the prize of the Commander-in-Chief), the MTSH "Vice Admiral Zakharin" participated without any new anti-mine weapons (as anyone in Sevastopol could see), which exhaustively characterizes the technical "state" a complex of the only trawler-searcher in the Navy. The question arises, what kind of "Glavkom Prize" can there be in a situation where the main weapon of a ship is not in the ranks?


BEC PMO - as there was no, and no.


The Russian Navy is incapable of combating modern ground mines ...


All this was "justified" by "hopes" ... for new ISPUM and the series of BTSCh of the project 12700, ... even though the planned dates for the receipt of these ships of the Navy "promised" until 2025. only about ten new BTSh.Dlya compare today in the "leading world fleets" trawlers-seekers: Estonia - 3, Latvia - 5, Lithuania - 3, Turkey -11, Japan - 23. That is. series BSTT project 12700, even in the medium term, does not in any way solve the problem of mine-affectedness of the Navy, even when fulfilling all the terms and requirements for the development of its anti-mine complex ISPUM.


On February 12, openly sounded what the experts had known for a long time (and they were waiting - that's it!) - the timing of the creation of ISPUM for at best will be disrupted (on the worst, I do not want to think ...).


"Everybody knows everything" (including Chirkov VV), but practically nothing is being done.


And here the question arises of the available technical reserve.


MTSH "Vice Admiral Zakharin": successfully passed the tests:

Automated mine action control system (ACS) of the mine "Dies" (OJSC "Mars");
Self-propelled remote-controlled mine-finder-destroyer (STIUM) "Maevka" (JSC "SSPP" Region ");
the subversive GAS "Livadia" (ZAO "Aquamarine").

Tests of the self-propelled vehicle (STA) with GAS Livadiya ended in failure (after 2009, STA Livadia in the promotional materials of Aquamarine CJSC was replaced by a towed side-scan sonar (SBS)). To cover this, at the level of high-ranking officials, rumors of a supposedly "failure of tests" by Mayevka (which does not correspond to the truth) were actively spreading. Unfortunately, the real characteristics of Aquamarine products do not always correspond to their advertising characteristics. Nevertheless, as the subversive GAS (PGAS) "Livadia" turned out to be quite worthy.


Thus, we have a new mine-affected complex that has been tested at the MTSH "Vice Admiral Zakharin": STIUM "Maevka" - ASU PMD "Diez" - PGAAS "Livadia", which has significant reserves for modernization and upgrading of TTX. For example, the installation at the STIUM "MAYEVKA" HBO sharply increases the search performance of the mine-sweeper, "blocking" the possibilities of the unsuccessful STA "Livadia".


In addition, as part of the R & D "Mayevka", a container modification of the complex was successfully developed and tested in 2007. at the MTSH "Valentin Pikul" of the Black Sea Fleet, but after that it was taken to "long-term storage" in Moscow.

The mine sweepers of the Navy projects 1265 and 266M have, quite good for their time, the GAS mine detection MG-89 (developed at the turn of the 60s-70s). Okeannopribor has been proposing the modernization of this SAS for many years, with a significant increase in its TTX (both in the Navy and even without docking operations), but the Navy did not interest these offers (unlike the navies of other countries that had long ago modernized (or replaced) these GAS in their own).
A set of upgraded GAS MG-89M (or GAZ "Kabarga" on projects 10750 and 12660) and a containerized STIUM "Mayvka" could quickly restore the combat capability of the existing mine action forces and give them the ability to combat modern landmines. Certainly, the capabilities of such minesweepers will be somewhat limited due to the lack of PMU ACS, but it is still better than nothing (especially since the functions of the automated control system are partially implemented in the "Mayevka" complex).
Here there is a "reef", - the requirement of dynamic positioning when working with STEUM, which our trawlers do not have. The exorbitant financial requirements of the Central Design Bureau Almaz for the cost of modernizing the mine-sweepers (I will give just one example, the claimed cost of the mechanical cable tapping device was 10-20 million rubles !!!) largely formed a negative attitude towards the issue of the mine-sweeper modernization in the Navy. However, this problem has a simple and effective solution - modernization without the "Diamond", with the installation of container systems (first of all, "Maevka", with the inclusion of UOK in its composition). According to some experienced commanders of minesweepers, the presence of adjustable pitch screws (on 1265 and 266M projects) makes it possible to dispense with working with STEUM and without the system of dynamic positioning (or anchoring), Another "counterargument to modernization" is that "trawlers will soon have to write off, but what about the new complexes?", While the real results and possibilities of ISPUM are completely incomprehensible (and here the modernized "Mayvka" would be a real and obviously working reserve) and most importantly - the BSTU of the project 12700 not only does not provide a solution to the MIP problems in the rate of construction, but also has (due to the large displacement) significant limitations when working at shallow depths.


The obvious error of the Navy is the refusal to build new 10750E project minesweepers, which the Navy categorically needs, primarily for working in shallow water. Here, of course, the question arises: what kind of anti-mine complex should be put on them? The question that has the obvious answer is the modernized Livadia - Mayevka - Diez (including the "rearrangement" of the container "Mayvka" with the minesweepers being written off).


One of the effective measures to resolve the problems of MIP and the modernization of the Navy minesweepers is equipping them with unmanned boats (BEC) MIP.


At the same time, the organization of development and delivery of the BMS PMO should optimally provide for the phasing of work, with the creation of a "basic minimal modification" in the shortest possible time, with the further building of the BEC's capabilities with separate modules, with self-passing tests and receipts of the O1 for serial production.


It is absolutely necessary to change the attitude of the interested structures of the Ministry of Defense and the Navy of the Russian Federation in relation to domestic BECs, first of all the development of the sane and real TTZ of R & D ensuring completion of work carried out by a number of organizations in the "minimal configuration" to receive the O1 letter in the shortest time and the start of serial deliveries to the fleet.


With the purpose of the speedy introduction of modern robotic complexes (BEC) in the Russian Navy and solving a number of problematic issues of the Navy, the development of the BMS PMO to lead as the creation of an integrated modular system in several stages:

Stage 1 - ROC BEC-PMO "zero version", to complete the development of the BMS PMO in the "minimum configuration" (only the search for mines) and ensure their delivery of the Navy in the shortest time.
2 stage of NIER BEC, with elaboration of the concept of application and perspective systems and tasks of BEC in full-scale conditions (including in complex with Navy ships) to obtain the necessary reliable scientific and technical R & D and development of a well-founded TTZ BER, BEC-PMO "zero version".
Stage 3 - OKR BEC of the Navy, with the introduction of mine destruction and modular target loads (reconnaissance, weapons, EW).

Founded idea of ​​the idea of ​​creation of the BKO PMO "zero version" - providing high search performance on bottom mines (including at shallow depths) due to the group application of the BMS PMO with HBO with cartography (during the initial search) or comparison (if repeated) earlier the saved sonar picture of the ground, followed by a survey of mine-like objects by divers or TNPA.


The facilities of the BMS PMO complex should provide accommodation with minimal modifications on all the Navy surface ships (including mine crafts). Due to the provision of group application of the BEC, high search performance (many times superior to BEC Inspector Mk 2) can be achieved, and a significant reduction in the requirements for search tools is possible (because at a sufficient level, further increase in their TTX is of no practical value due to geometric limitations of search conditions at shallow depths) to reduce the cost of BEC and ensure their mass serial shipments of the Navy. At the request of the developers of the control and communication system of the Orlan-10 UAV, simultaneous control from one SSU to 4 UAVs is possible, and this should be realized for the BMS PMO!


An example, - the overall dimensions of the stern of the deck of the RTG of Project 10750E provide accommodation on it to 4 boats of the type BL-540 and BEC. At the same time, 3 of them can be used in the search option (BEC with HBO), providing a high "comb" of high search performance, and from the fourth boat - to provide access for divers of minelayers for inspection of mine-like objects and their undermining.


At the same time, it is advisable to place BEC facilities on both standard BL-680 and БЛ-540 boats in the form of modernization kits (including those with an operational installation in the fleet) and the development of a specialized light small-sized BPS PMO. Taking into account the need for group basing and ensuring the launching of ships (including minesweepers of combat composition) by standard means, it is advisable to limit its mass to 600-700 kg, and constructive design, for maximum seaworthiness in the use of search tools, according to the trimaran scheme.


However, today "Mayevka" is the only real anti-mine complex, which has a significant modernization potential, which provides a sharp increase in anti-mine productivity of STIUM (both in search and in mines) in a short time, in parallel with the preparation of serial production. The subject of conversation on ISPUM will be only after the completion of its State tests (not to mention the fact that ISPUM has no container modification).


At the same time, the "Mayvok" series was deleted from the state defense order, its modernization was disrupted, exports were blocked ("unofficial refusal" in the approval of the Export Certificate in the military representation). is not exploited, "while" the complex is remarkable, personally took part in the tests "(statements of the representatives of the 1st Central Scientific Research Institute at the forum" Army-15 ").


In fact, this sabotage is on the verge of deliberately undermining the combat capability of the Navy. And here there is no fault of the "active fleet", all questions to the "capitals" (especially since VV Chirkov was aware of all this).


More examples, in 2013. a tender was announced on "Technical and service maintenance) and repair of instruments ... miners", which provided for the commissioning of "Mayevka" on "Vice Admiral Zakharina." The result of this tender is "The auction for this lot was declared invalid (no applications were filed)." The reason - allegedly "accidentally" no one in a timely manner has notified the artist about this tender.


2014, despite a sharp aggravation of the military-political situation and a "complete zero" with the Navy's PMO, none of the officials moved to put the Mayevka into operation (not to mention modernization and the series).


And here we come to the essence of what was happening.


First. The obvious negligent and unprincipled attitude of officials to ensuring the real combat capability of the Navy. For example, today the launch of the 955 "Alexander Nevsky" combat service "provides" only two sea minesweepers to the OKVS (Kamchatka), the mine weapons of which correspond to the western end of the 1960s, and unable to deal with modern bottom mines. At the same time, earlier "Mayevka" was planned primarily to Kamchatka, to provide "Borei" (from the GOZ were excluded). In fact, today, the release of the Pacific Fleet of Pacific Fleet is not assured. Everybody knows about this (including V. Chirkova). There are no measures.


The second. One of the favorite occupations in our defense industry was the "process" (and not the desire for result), on the principle of "either the donkey or the padishah." In these conditions, the very existence of a domestic, successfully tested and developed at a given time and the financing of the complex ("Maevki"), some members of the OPK caused a lot of negative feelings (and actions).


Third. "Personal aspects". For example, a person who blocked the registration of an advertising passport (and exports of Mayvok), once gave the oath, but could not put a sense of duty and business above personal petty grievances.


Fourth. "Import". "Some time ago" it was "very fashionable" to borrow new types of military equipment in the west. I should especially note that there is nothing wrong with this, for example, the purchase of a series, even obsolete western mine-sweepers, would be very useful for the fleet, This is not only a "new iron", but first of all "experience embodied in iron" - experience (modern mine action), which the Navy simply does not have. However, this should not be done at the cost of "strangling" successful domestic developments. In the situation with the new minesweepers of the situation it was simple - almost all knew the problems of ISPUM, moreover, there were those who hoped for them and hoped to replace ISPUM with the French complex.


Those. There were people to whom the possible failure of the domestic complex was very profitable. In these conditions, the presence of an effective and operating reserve in the form of "Maevka" (in the modernized version) caused this extremely negative reaction (and actions) to it.


It is this factor (the desire to "drag" import complexes at any cost) was the main reason for counteraction to the "Mayvka". It is clear that the Navy did not care about the combat readiness issues.


It should also be noted here that the Chief Designer of ISPUM Arzhanov MI probably is not fully aware of the degree of importance for the country's defense capability of the task that he is solving. At the forum "Army-15" frank perplexity among the experts present was caused by the report of M.I. Arzhanov. not about the development and possibilities of ISPUM, but about the development of a "helicopter anti-submarine station". Actually, participation in the discussion of mine action subjects by Arzhanov M.I. was reduced to negative comments on the "Mayvka". Undoubtedly, higher ISTs were laid in ISPUM than in "Mayevka", however it already exists (and with a multiple increase in capacity, in a modernized form), and ISPUM has yet to prove during the tests that it took place. The main thing is the lack of container modification,
Logical in this situation would be pre-emptive, to the construction of the main building of the project 12700, the testing of ISPUM on another carrier (minesweeper, or anyone-to the barge), as it was previously done for "Mayvka". This would allow timely opening and realizing the existing problems, work out ways to solve them, and not drag them to the ship of a new project.


Unfortunately, those who took decisions at that time, the issues of combat readiness of the Navy worried much less than their own tranquility - they knew the problems about which they wanted to delay as much as possible ("either the ass or the padishah"). They hoped (to a large extent wishing this themselves) to "French."


A drastic change in the military-political situation has become a "cold shower" for such "dreams". However, they were incapable of recognizing and recognizing the entire disastrous nature of the previous technical policy.


And here the question arises - what is it? Cowardice? Myopia and negligence? Self-interest? Or "something more"?


The problems of the Mine Action Defense (MPS) of the fleet are only a part of its acute problems (but the most "obvious" - both in terms of critical combat capability problems and reluctance to solve them).


"The history of the" Mayvka "is very similar to the story of the torpedo" Physicist "...


Rear Admiral in resignation Lutskiy AN: "Current means of anti-torpedo defense of domestic submarines are ineffective against modern foreign torpedoes ... It is proposed to equip the" Yasen "and" Borei "submarine submarines with anti-torpedo systems (PTZ), TTZ for development of which were compiled in 80 -th years of the last century, the results of research on the effectiveness of these weapons against modern torpedoes testify to the extremely low probability of non-evasion of the evading submarine "(" The Sea Collection "2010) - is still relevant.


And this list can be continued ...


"We are on the threshold of the next" Tsushima "... only after Tsushima the" decaying revolution "" flashed ". And the question is, is it really "innocent" for obvious inaction (or actions on the verge of sabotage) of officials to resolve the most acute problems of the Navy's combat readiness (including in terms of naval underwater weapons and mine defense)? - has the right to exist.


Maxim Klimov

GarryB wrote:Mine warfare is the same at sea as it is anywhere else... neglected.

Most modern western navies only have token anti mine forces and most of their equipment is so state of the art they can't afford to buy any either.

2007, V.A. Katenin, Doctor of Technical Sciences, А.V. Katenin, Ph.D. (GNINGI MO RF): the Navy's naval forces are not able to effectively combat the current mine threat. ... are obsolete not only morally, but also physically and by 2016 one can expect the practical disappearance of mine-trod forces as such. The recognition by the political and military leadership of the country of the mine threat and the degradation of the national mine-troop forces should be the first step towards solving this acute problem "(Defense Order No. 15-2007).

"The present situation with the naval underwater weapons (ISS) of the Navy can be briefly described as" ships (PL) unarmed and defenseless. " We are on the threshold of another "Tsushima", which we can get not only from the US Navy, but even ......... (due to the antiquity and incapability of the Navy's mine forces against the current mine threat).

"We are on the threshold of the next" Tsushima "... only after Tsushima the" decaying revolution "" flashed ". And the question is, is it really "innocent" for obvious inaction (or actions on the verge of sabotage) of officials to resolve the most acute problems of the Navy's combat readiness (including in terms of naval underwater weapons and mine defense)? - has the right to exist.

Minesweeper "Ivan Antonov" was commissioned by the Russian Navy