S-300/400/500 News [Russian Strategic Air Defense] #2

miketheterrible wrote: Russia has progressed quite far and the reality was the Piss poor Russian equipment still taken down stealth during Yugoslavia conflict as well as made a mockery of your forces in Vietnam.  MiG-25 for being a piece of shit as you put it, flew faster, higher and was a problem as an interceptor to your aircrafts.

And even India has a nice showing you guys off in various exercises with Russian junk.

Other indication is that lovely NATO has access to s-300 yet manages to keep pissing itself over the deployment of these systems.

So I'm just going to go strait to the point: prove your credentials and your claims to having seen the MiG-25 interior when you placed your "engineering" cap on.

havok wrote:

Vann7 wrote:Invisible planes only exist in Holywood and western propaganda media in the west.

Likewise, I can argue that the lethality and efficacy of the Soviet/Russian weapons exists only Soviet/Russian propaganda.

When I was active duty and stationed at RAF Upper Heyford, we routinely have access to Soviet news, or what passed as news, custom edited and targeted specifically at Western sympathizers. It told of the terrible might of Soviet weaponry, of how NATO aircrafts would be swatted from the sky even before any of ours could enter Soviet airspace. All the while we, in our F-111s, rehearsed our penetration tactics, and thanks to Adolf Tolkachev, confident we will be able enter Soviet airspace all the way to Moscow if necessary. At every arms reduction negotiations, Soviet insistence that the US removed the F-111s from England were answered with: STFU.

We in the West have a saying: Perception is Reality.

If perception is reality, then Soviet/Russian arms have far to go before being perceived as on a par with their Western counterparts. In 1987, I transferred from the F-111 to the F-16, then I became a Desert Storm veteran. This is before the Internet so quite pre-historic to you kids on this forum. Desert Storm was the greatest black eye, at least at the perception front, to Soviet arms. Everyone was predicting dire consequences to allied forces, even though they admitted that the Iraqis will lose. The most confident of the lethality and efficacy of Soviet arms was, naturally, the Soviet military. Even before deployment, we read of the official Soviet government statements that even though the Iraqi troopers were not as well trained as Soviet troopers, Soviet arms will make up much, if not most, of the deficiency, therefore, just on the air warfare arena alone, there will be many American losses. Once in theater, we were too busy to pay attention to what the Soviets and the Chinese 'predicted' about the upcoming conflict. We flew and trained constantly.

Then came the order...Then came Perception is Reality.

Most countries have to import their defense and in this market, every customer is a 'captive customer'. You cannot be an ally of one side but buy your defense from the other. If perception is reality, what you bought will inevitably be tied to what will happen and at Desert Storm, perceptions and reputations are at stake. Countries were watching and even the politicians focused on what could be the definitive statement on whose guns, tanks, missiles, ships, and aircrafts were the superior. Then when Desert Storm turned out to the be the catastrophe that it was for the Iraqi military, equipped with Soviet arms and trained with Soviet tactics, the full propaganda measures of the Soviet government turned against the Iraqis.

When you are a captive customer, 'Perception if Reality' is the kind of abstract discussion you cannot afford to have. Your national security is at stake. There is no third party you can turn to.  Remember, you were assured via an official Soviet government memo that Soviet arms will compensate for much, if not most, deficiencies the Iraqi military have. Then when it turned out the Americans and allies were more threatened by fratricide than from the Iraqi military, you have no choice but to cast at least one suspicious eye at your military and wonder if it can handle the job of national defense using the equipment it has.

Perception is Reality is what sold the MIG-25. Sold physically to Soviet allies and sold virtually to the Americans. Our perception, and planned reality, of the MIG-25 was that it was superior to everything we had. I had the chance the examine the technical analysis of the MIG-25 when I was on the F-16. I put on my engineer hat and yes, the MIG-25 was a POS. Then when the Soviet Union collapsed and we went shopping because the former Soviet satellites were selling everything from tanks to jet fighters to even missile consoles, not just US but many countries found out more and more on the many technical inferiority of Soviet arms. Speaking as an Air Force guy, that is not to say I would have no worries if our pilots have to face current Russian arms, but if our experience from the Cold War to Desert Storm is any indicator, it is that Russia have not progressed that far from her old Soviet days while we have jumped from one technology to the next.

When I was active duty and stationed at RAF Upper Heyford, we routinely have access to Soviet news, or what passed as news, custom edited and targeted specifically at Western sympathizers. It told of the terrible might of Soviet weaponry, of how NATO aircrafts would be swatted from the sky even before any of ours could enter Soviet airspace. All the while we, in our F-111s, rehearsed our penetration tactics, and thanks to Adolf Tolkachev, confident we will be able enter Soviet airspace all the way to Moscow if necessary. At every arms reduction negotiations, Soviet insistence that the US removed the F-111s from England were answered with: STFU.

If perception is reality, then Soviet/Russian arms have far to go before being perceived as on a par with their Western counterparts.

If perception is reality, then Soviet/Russian arms have far to go before being perceived as on a par with their Western counterparts. In 1987, I transferred from the F-111 to the F-16, then I became a Desert Storm veteran. This is before the Internet so quite pre-historic to you kids on this forum. Desert Storm was the greatest black eye, at least at the perception front, to Soviet arms. Everyone was predicting dire consequences to allied forces, even though they admitted that the Iraqis will lose. The most confident of the lethality and efficacy of Soviet arms was, naturally, the Soviet military. Even before deployment, we read of the official Soviet government statements that even though the Iraqi troopers were not as well trained as Soviet troopers, Soviet arms will make up much, if not most, of the deficiency, therefore, just on the air warfare arena alone, there will be many American losses. Once in theater, we were too busy to pay attention to what the Soviets and the Chinese 'predicted' about the upcoming conflict. We flew and trained constantly.

Then when Desert Storm turned out to the be the catastrophe that it was for the Iraqi military, equipped with Soviet arms and trained with Soviet tactics, the full propaganda measures of the Soviet government turned against the Iraqis.

Speaking as an Air Force guy, that is not to say I would have no worries if our pilots have to face current Russian arms, but if our experience from the Cold War to Desert Storm is any indicator, it is that Russia have not progressed that far from her old Soviet days while we have jumped from one technology to the next.

But if we do not have to, then I can just admit that I broke into Kim Kardashian's apartment in Paris and porked her prior to taking her jewelry. You do believe me, right?

I have no interests in 'proving' anything of myself to you, as in the people in this forum. I come in once in a while just to entertain myself. From what I see -- nothing but kids.

Our one F-117 loss over Yugoslavia ? We have been thru this before. Did it deterred the development of low radar observable platforms in general ? No. Your Russia is struggling on that front.

You lost and F-16 as well...

[quote]The MIG-25 ? It was and still is a piece of shit. It posed no problems to US once we took it apart in Japan. You did not read my post correctly. I did not say I had access to the MIG-25. I said I had a chance to examine the technical analysis we built from Japan. Plus, you forget we pulled Iraq's MIG-25s from the sands. When you have to rebuild the engines after a high speed Mach run, it is a piece of shit. We do not do that to our SR-71s and certainly my F-111, after a Mach run over the mountains of Scotland, did not required anything more than the usual oil analysis. You obviously have no experience in aviation. If your engine is rated for a certain level of performance, it should make it without requiring extraordinary maintenance efforts like an engine rebuild. The MIG-25 is not an experimental platform. It is a line production item. The V-8 in my vehicle is rated for X amount of hp and if I chose to push it to its limits, I should not have to take it to the mechanics to rebuild the engine. Only race car engines needs that level of care. Do you understand ?

Am not here to say that the US is not concerned about Russia's weapons program, including exports. Of course we are concerned, for ourselves and our allies. But it is silly for you to think that just because we expressed our concerns, somehow that means we are 'afraid'.

The Pentagon’s soon-to-be published Electronic Warfare strategy calls for increased investment in advanced electronic warfare technology designed to defend U.S. assets and proactively use the electromagnetic spectrum to attack enemies.

DOD officials say the new strategy will be signed and distributed in the next two months, with additional annexes expected to be ready by Summer, 2017. The strategy will be an unclassified document to be shared with U.S. military developers and defense industry officials, Pentagon officials said.

Scout Warrior has learned of some key elements featured in the report, such as increasing EW attack technology, advancing new systems and training and equipping EW forces.

“In equipping our forces, we plan to develop advanced electronic attack, advanced electronic warfare support, harden our kill-chains with electronic protection, invest in electromagnetic battle management to manage the numerous assets in the battlespace,” Pentagon spokesman Maj. Roger Cabiness told Scout Warrior.

The prospect for a “first-of-its kind” DOD electronic warfare strategy gained new urgency following Russia’s successful use of advanced EW technologies in Ukraine, and the pace of global technological progress in the area of EW systems.

Electronic weapons can be used for an increasingly wide range of combat activities – from detecting and defending IED attacks to jamming enemy communications or even taking over control of enemy drones, among other things.

“Hardening the kill-chain,” for example, can involve the use of EW tactics to prevent an armed U.S. drone from being “hacked,” “jammed” or taken over by an enemy. Also, EW defenses can better secure radar signals, protect weapons guidance technologies and thwart attacks on larger platforms such as ships, fighter jets and tanks.

The report will also specify cross-geographical boundary radiated energy technologies designed to strengthen U.S. platforms and allied operations, Cabiness added.

The Pentagon strategy calls for efforts to “purposely invest in cost-imposing strategies which directly challenge potential adversaries’ EMS (electromagnetic systems),” Cabiness explained.

The concept behind this effort to advance the cost curve and, for example, use less-expensive electromagnetic weapons to destroy, intercept or jam approaching enemy missiles, drones, rockets or aircraft; this is based on the reality that using an electronic weapon is much less expensive than firing an interceptor missile, such as a ship-fired Rolling Airframe Missile or Evolved Sea Sparrow Missile, to destroy an enemy cruise missile. These interceptor missiles, and other ship-defense technologies, can cost up to hundreds of thousands each, if not more.

This tactic would both force enemies to spend money on expensive weapons while decreasing the offensive and defensive weaponry costs to the U.S., therefore advancing a “cost-imposing” strategy, as Cabiness explained.

Improving electronic warfare modeling and simulation to better prepare for emerging weapons systems is also emphasized as a key element of the strategy. This can help anticipate or train against future weapons applications which may not exist yet, but nevertheless pose an emerging threat.

Authors of the new Electronic Warfare strategy have worked closely with the Pentagon Electronic Warfare Executive Committee, stood up in August 2015.

The purpose of this committee is to translate electromagnetic experimentation into actual capabilities being deployed, as reported by Federal Computer Weekly earlier this year.

The committee is co-chaired by Frank Kendall, the Defense Department's top acquisition official, and Gen. Paul Selva, vice chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

The new strategy is designed to inform and operation alongside existing Army, Navy and Air Force efforts to engineer next-generation electronic warfare systems.

Air Force:

The Air Force is, for example, revving up electronic warfare upgrades for its F-15 fighter to better protect against enemy fire and electronic attacks, service officials said.

Boeing has secured a $478 million deal to continue work on a new technology called with a system called the Eagle Passive Active Warning Survivability System, or EPAWSS.

These updated EW capabilities replace the Tactical Electronic Warfare Suite, which has been used since the 1980s, not long after the F-15 first deployed. The service plans to operate the fleet until the mid-2040’s, so an overhaul of the Eagle’s electronic systems helps maintain U.S. air supremacy, the contract announcement said.

Various upgrades will be complete as early as 2021 for the F-15C AESA (Active Electronically Scanned Array) radar and as late as 2032 for the various EW (electronic warfare) upgrades, Air Force officials said.

The F-35 Joint Strike Fighter is also integrated with an AESA radar.

Navy:

The Navy is engineering a new, more powerful, high-tech electronic warfare jamming technology, called the Next-Generation Jammer, designed to allow strike aircraft to destroy enemy targets without being detected by modern surface-to-air missile defenses.

The Next-Generation Jammer, or NGJ, consists of two 15-foot long PODs beneath the EA-18G Growler aircraft designed to emit radar-jamming electronic signals; one jammer goes on each side of the aircraft.

The NGJ departs from existing EW systems in that it can jam multiple frequencies at one time, increasing the scope and effectiveness of attacks. This better enables U.S. aircraft to elude or “jam” more Russian-built air defenses able to detect aircraft on a wide range of frequencies, such as X-band, VHF and UHF. Russian-built S-300 and S-400 air defenses are believed to be among the best in the world.

Radar technology sends an electromagnetic ping forward, bouncing it off objects before analyzing the return signal to determine a target's location, size, shape and speed...etc. However, if the electromagnetic signal is interfered with, thwarted or "jammed" in some way, the system is then unable to detect the objects, or target, in the same way.

The emerging system uses a high-powered radar technology called Active Electronic Scanned Array, or AESA.

It will be the only AESA-based carrier offensive electronic attack jamming pod it DoD.

The NGJ, slated to be operational by 2021, is intended to replace the existing ALQ 99 electronic warfare jammer currently on Navy Growler aircraft.

The new jammer is designed to interfere with ground-and-air based threats such as enemy fighter jets trying to get a missile "lock" on a target, developers explained.

Army:

The Army is progressing with an EW modernization plan which, among other things, seeks to engineer new systems with an “open architecture” approach such that they can be efficiently upgraded with new technologies as they emerge. Existing hardware, for instance, can be updated with new software when new enemy higher-tech threats emerge.

Since the beginning of the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan and the emergence of the Improvised Explosive Device (IED) or roadside bomb as a major threat, the Army has succeeded in fielding a host of technologies able to thwart or “jam” the incoming signal from a Radio-Controlled IED (RCIED), thus delaying or preventing detonation and potential injury to Soldiers.

Some of the jammers fielded during the initial years of the war, such as the vehicle-mounted Duke V2 and Warlock jammers, informed subsequent upgrades designed to defeat a greater range of threat signals. For instance, the Duke V3 vehicle-mounted jammer, now fielded on thousands of vehicles in theater, represents a technological improvement in capability compared to prior systems.

The Thor III is a Soldier-portable counter RCIED “jamming” device designed to provide a protective envelope for dismounted units on patrol. The device is configured with transceivers mounted on a back-pack-like structure engineered with hardware and software able to identify and “jam” RF signals operating in a range of frequencies. Thousands of Thor III systems, which in effect create an electromagnetic protective “bubble” for small units on-the-move, continue to protect Soldiers in theater.

GATOR V2 is a 107-foot retrofitted surveillance tower equipped with transmit and receive antennas designed to identify, detect and disrupt electronic signals. The GATOR V2 is engineered to establish a direction or “line of bearing” on an electronic signal; it is also configured to use software, digital mapping technology and computer algorithms to “geo-locate” the origin or location of electronic signals within the battle space.

The Wolfhound is a radio frequency direction-finder engineered to locate enemy command and control nodes. The system, fielded as a QRC in 2009, is able to geo-locate RF transmitters operating in certain frequency bands, thus providing Soldiers with key battle-relevant threat information. Wolfhound can be Soldier or vehicle-mounted.

Kris Osborn became the Managing Editor of Scout Warrior in August of 2015. His role with Scout.com includes managing content on the Scout Warrior site and generating independently sourced original material. Scout Warrior is aimed at providing engaging, substantial military-specific content covering a range of key areas such as weapons, emerging or next-generation technologies and issues of relevance to the military. Just prior to coming to Scout Warrior, Osborn served as an Associate Editor at the Military.com. Osborn previously served at the Pentagon as a Highly Qualified Expert with the Office of the Assistant Secretary of the Army - Acquisition, Logistics & Technology. Osborn has also worked as an anchor and on-air military specialist at CNN and CNN Headline News. This story originally appeared in Scout Warrior.

Austin wrote:Revealed: The US Military's Electronic War Strategy to Counter Russia

The Pentagon’s soon-to-be published Electronic Warfare strategy calls for increased investment in advanced electronic warfare technology designed to defend U.S. assets and proactively use the electromagnetic spectrum to attack enemies.

DOD officials say the new strategy will be signed and distributed in the next two months, with additional annexes expected to be ready by Summer, 2017. The strategy will be an unclassified document to be shared with U.S. military developers and defense industry officials, Pentagon officials said.

Scout Warrior has learned of some key elements featured in the report, such as increasing EW attack technology, advancing new systems and training and equipping EW forces.

“In equipping our forces, we plan to develop advanced electronic attack, advanced electronic warfare support, harden our kill-chains with electronic protection, invest in electromagnetic battle management to manage the numerous assets in the battlespace,” Pentagon spokesman Maj. Roger Cabiness told Scout Warrior.

The prospect for a “first-of-its kind” DOD electronic warfare strategy gained new urgency following Russia’s successful use of advanced EW technologies in Ukraine, and the pace of global technological progress in the area of EW systems.

Electronic weapons can be used for an increasingly wide range of combat activities – from detecting and defending IED attacks to jamming enemy communications or even taking over control of enemy drones, among other things.

“Hardening the kill-chain,” for example, can involve the use of EW tactics to prevent an armed U.S. drone from being “hacked,” “jammed” or taken over by an enemy. Also, EW defenses can better secure radar signals, protect weapons guidance technologies and thwart attacks on larger platforms such as ships, fighter jets and tanks.

The report will also specify cross-geographical boundary radiated energy technologies designed to strengthen U.S. platforms and allied operations, Cabiness added.  

The Pentagon strategy calls for efforts to “purposely invest in cost-imposing strategies which directly challenge potential adversaries’ EMS (electromagnetic systems),” Cabiness explained.

The concept behind this effort to advance the cost curve and, for example, use less-expensive electromagnetic weapons to destroy, intercept or jam approaching enemy missiles, drones, rockets or aircraft; this is based on the reality that using an electronic weapon is much less expensive than firing an interceptor missile, such as a ship-fired Rolling Airframe Missile or Evolved Sea Sparrow Missile, to destroy an enemy cruise missile. These interceptor missiles, and other ship-defense technologies, can cost up to hundreds of thousands each, if not more.

This tactic would both force enemies to spend money on expensive weapons while decreasing the offensive and defensive weaponry costs to the U.S., therefore advancing a “cost-imposing” strategy, as Cabiness explained.  

Improving electronic warfare modeling and simulation to better prepare for emerging weapons systems is also emphasized as a key element of the strategy. This can help anticipate or train against future weapons applications which may not exist yet, but nevertheless pose an emerging threat.

Authors of the new Electronic Warfare strategy have worked closely with the Pentagon Electronic Warfare Executive Committee, stood up in August 2015.

The purpose of this committee is to translate electromagnetic experimentation into actual capabilities being deployed, as reported by Federal Computer Weekly earlier this year.

The committee is co-chaired by Frank Kendall, the Defense Department's top acquisition official, and Gen. Paul Selva, vice chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

The new strategy is designed to inform and operation alongside existing Army, Navy and Air Force efforts to engineer next-generation electronic warfare systems.

Air Force:

The Air Force is, for example, revving up electronic warfare upgrades for its F-15 fighter to better protect against enemy fire and electronic attacks, service officials said.

Boeing has secured a $478 million deal to continue work on a new technology called with a system called the Eagle Passive Active Warning Survivability System, or EPAWSS.

These updated EW capabilities replace the Tactical Electronic Warfare Suite, which has been used since the 1980s, not long after the F-15 first deployed. The service plans to operate the fleet until the mid-2040’s, so an overhaul of the Eagle’s electronic systems helps maintain U.S. air supremacy, the contract announcement said.

Various upgrades will be complete as early as 2021 for the F-15C AESA (Active Electronically Scanned Array) radar and as late as 2032 for the various EW (electronic warfare) upgrades, Air Force officials said.

The F-35 Joint Strike Fighter is also integrated with an AESA radar.

Navy:

The Navy is engineering a new, more powerful, high-tech electronic warfare jamming technology, called the Next-Generation Jammer, designed to allow strike aircraft to destroy enemy targets without being detected by modern surface-to-air missile defenses.

The Next-Generation Jammer, or NGJ, consists of two 15-foot long PODs beneath the EA-18G Growler aircraft designed to emit radar-jamming electronic signals; one jammer goes on each side of the aircraft.  

The NGJ departs from existing EW systems in that it can jam multiple frequencies at one time, increasing the scope and effectiveness of attacks. This better enables U.S. aircraft to elude or “jam” more Russian-built air defenses able to detect aircraft on a wide range of frequencies, such as X-band, VHF and UHF. Russian-built S-300 and S-400 air defenses are believed to be among the best in the world.

Radar technology sends an electromagnetic ping forward, bouncing it off objects before analyzing the return signal to determine a target's location, size, shape and speed...etc.  However, if the electromagnetic signal is interfered with, thwarted or "jammed" in some way, the system is then unable to detect the objects, or target, in the same way.

The emerging system uses a high-powered radar technology called Active Electronic Scanned Array, or AESA.

It will be the only AESA-based carrier offensive electronic attack jamming pod it DoD.

The NGJ, slated to be operational by 2021, is intended to replace the existing ALQ 99 electronic warfare jammer currently on Navy Growler aircraft.

The new jammer is designed to interfere with ground-and-air based threats such as enemy fighter jets trying to get a missile "lock" on a target, developers explained.

Army:

The Army is progressing with an EW modernization plan which, among other things, seeks to engineer new systems with an “open architecture” approach such that they can be efficiently upgraded with new technologies as they emerge. Existing hardware, for instance, can be updated with new software when new enemy higher-tech threats emerge.

Since the beginning of the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan and the emergence of the Improvised Explosive Device (IED) or roadside bomb as a major threat, the Army has succeeded in fielding a host of technologies able to thwart or “jam” the incoming signal from a Radio-Controlled IED (RCIED), thus delaying or preventing detonation and potential injury to Soldiers.

Some of the jammers fielded during the initial years of the war, such as the vehicle-mounted Duke V2 and Warlock jammers, informed subsequent upgrades designed to defeat a greater range of threat signals. For instance, the Duke V3 vehicle-mounted jammer, now fielded on thousands of vehicles in theater, represents a technological improvement in capability compared to prior systems.

The Thor III is a Soldier-portable counter RCIED “jamming” device designed to provide a protective envelope for dismounted units on patrol. The device is configured with transceivers mounted on a back-pack-like structure engineered with hardware and software able to identify and “jam” RF signals operating in a range of frequencies. Thousands of Thor III systems, which in effect create an electromagnetic protective “bubble” for small units on-the-move, continue to protect Soldiers in theater.

GATOR V2 is a 107-foot retrofitted surveillance tower equipped with transmit and receive antennas designed to identify, detect and disrupt electronic signals. The GATOR V2 is engineered to establish a direction or “line of bearing” on an electronic signal; it is also configured to use software, digital mapping technology and computer algorithms to “geo-locate” the origin or location of electronic signals within the battle space.

The Wolfhound is a radio frequency direction-finder engineered to locate enemy command and control nodes. The system, fielded as a QRC in 2009, is able to geo-locate RF transmitters operating in certain frequency bands, thus providing Soldiers with key battle-relevant threat information. Wolfhound can be Soldier or vehicle-mounted.

Kris Osborn became the Managing Editor of Scout Warrior in August of 2015. His role with Scout.com includes managing content on the Scout Warrior site and generating independently sourced original material. Scout Warrior is aimed at providing engaging, substantial military-specific content covering a range of key areas such as weapons, emerging or next-generation technologies and issues of relevance to the military. Just prior to coming to Scout Warrior, Osborn served as an Associate Editor at the Military.com. Osborn previously served at the Pentagon as a Highly Qualified Expert with the Office of the Assistant Secretary of the Army - Acquisition, Logistics & Technology. Osborn has also worked as an anchor and on-air military specialist at CNN and CNN Headline News. This story originally appeared in Scout Warrior.

magnumcromagnon wrote:Meanwhile Russian MOD will be accepting ROFAR, Photonic based systems by 2018....

Militarov wrote:

kvs wrote:

Militarov wrote:

magnumcromagnon wrote:Meanwhile Russian MOD will be accepting ROFAR, Photonic based systems by 2018....

Into service? Highly unlikely. They still havent dealt even with AESA issues properly as of this moment and you expect ROFAR to be operational in 2 years. Some real application by 2018, sure, that is possible, but introduction, i doubt. Maybe post 2020, maybe even later.

Claims the poser.  Put up or shut up, NATO fanboi.  

KiloGolf wrote:

Militarov wrote:

Yeah the western press is picking up on that these days. Not a pretty sight

franco wrote:S.400 put on duty outside of St Petersburg...

MOSCOW, December 8 - RIA Novosti. Solemn ritual of intercession on experimental combat duty anti-aircraft missile regiment, armed with the S-400 "Triumph" will be held on Friday in Zelenogorsk, Leningrad region, RIA Novosti reported the press service of the Western military district (ZVO).

During the objection experimental combat duty calculations of anti-aircraft missiles will test their integration into the existing system of aerospace defense ZVO in the North-western strategic direction and hold a series of special training.

"The ceremonial ritual intercession on experimental combat duty for the protection of air borders of Russia anti-aircraft missile regiment, armed with the S-400" Triumph "will be held on December 9 in Zelenogorsk, Leningrad region," - said the spokesman of the ZVO.

The interviewee said that the regiment was deployed at about 150 kilometers from the state border of the Russian Federation.