Arab states in 1973 Yom Kippur War

ahmedfire wrote:I didn’t say IDF tanks were not fighting but IAF ,ATGMs teams and artillery were there too ,

I didn't say they weren't just that the bulk of the Egyptian tanks and APCs hit were hit by IDF tanks.

you said IAF wasn’t effective

I didn't say it wasn't effective--it was clearly effective near the Mitla on the 14th--just less so than tanks.

On 11 October, the IDF had established a special course for rapidly training instructors on the use of the TOWs. 105 This gave them ample time to train units for action by 14 October.

Maybe but he didn't cite evidence for their actual use here.

the Egyptian Air missile basis were pulled backward on the 16th & 17th of Oct That means the 3rd army fought for one week till the 24th without Canal west complete SAM umbrella against IAF & IDF formations without being destroyed or impaired. It was protected by its potable anti air missiles & by the EAF.

But the IAF had to strike SAM bases south of the geneifa on the 22nd. These presumably protected the 3rd until that day or the next.

Already I shared the U.S intelligence report that Egyptian AD was effective throughout the war ,as below !!

Where it still existed maybe. But the 3rd no longer had much if anything and it showed--the Egyptians had to make a special appeal for blood for the third army's wounded.

No , as per Egyptian sources , IDF reached Cairo Suez road on the dawn of the 24th. It reached the Gulf of Suez on the night of the 24th .

Already by the 21st the 4rth armored was trying to drive Adan's units away from positions just north of the road, where their guns interdicted traffic. Adan may not have reached the road on the 20th but he was in a position to cut it.

Number were mentioned by many Egyptian books ,check the historian Gamal Hammad books .

I don't think Magen even brought that many tanks across the canal--Rabinovich says he crossed with 80.

Between 31-Oct to 18-Jan , Egyptian forces did 439 attacks on IDF forces  to prevent them for re-supplying or re-organizing, that’s why Israelis digged tunnels (width 7m and depth 5 m) to prevent the EGY forces from attacking them , they also put 750,000 anti armor mines to protect their forces .

439 attack during ceasefire caused the below IDF losses according to IDF official declarations (real losses more than those ):

Big deal. I meant how could the Egyptians launch a counterattack sufficient to reach third army or wipe out the bridgehead entirely, in late October. Kabil was very reluctant to try because he knew it was very risky if not suicidal.

Bypassing many Egyptian forces and not securing the logistics ,IDF put his forces in a danger to be destroyed.

But this wasn't possible in late October because by then the Egyptian armored forces had been mostly wrecked. The 21st and 4rth were badly depleted the 25th destroyed. If the Egyptians had a realistic chance in late October Kabil would not have been so reluctant to try...

- Failed to push the 2nd army from its new positions in the east of the canal to the west.
- Failed to push the 3rd army from its new positions in the east of the canal to the west.
- Failed to encircle the 2nd army.
- Failed to invade Suez city or Ismaeilia city.
- Failed to occupy Missory position east of the canal. This failure prevented IDF from widening the passage between the troops in the west canal bank

The bottom line is the IDF successfully trapped 3rd army, and could've finished it had the war continued another week.

They had it also in Mansourah air battle , in 53 minutes, 17 IAF aircrafts were downed and IAF tactics failed that day .

 Sorry I just don't believe that. If the EAF was really that effective, what the heck did Egypt need SAMs for? Where is the evidence for a single Phantom kill on the 14th let alone 17? Where's the wreckage or gun camera film of a Phantom being shot down on the 14th?

The main plan from General Alshazli (which Sadat rejected ) was to pullback 3 brigades from 2nd army +one from the 3rd army , after that we can add Republican Gaurds armored divisions joined the front. Since ceasefire, enormous Tanks supplies were pouring to Egypt from USSR, Jougoslavia & Algeria.

Maybe all that was ready by December not not October 24-26th….

Bypassing main Egyptian forces is not a complete succeed , IDF put his forces in a trap .

If that were true Egypt wouldn't have agreed to a cease fire but destroyed the "trapped" enemy.

To the last day IDF was losing a lot ,that’s why they put mines and dig tunnels to stop the Egyptian attacks , if Shamel plan was applied , all IDF forces would be destroyed ,that’s why U.S threatened Egypt .

Again I wasn't talking about the situation in December but two months earlier….

Don't get me wrong, I have respect for the Egyptians who fought with great courage and, occasionally, great effectiveness. But one ought to be brutally realistic and self critical, otherwise you'll never learn from experience.

I didn't say they weren't just that the bulk of the Egyptian tanks and APCs hit were hit by IDF tanks.

You gave an impression that IAF and ATGMs were not effective that day and this is wrong , I shared sources for both of them .

Maybe but he didn't cite evidence for their actual use here.

Ok you are free to believe the IDF story which no evidence over it too .At least i shared western sources .

But the IAF had to strike SAM bases south of the geneifa on the 22nd. These presumably protected the 3rd until that day or the next.
Where it still existed maybe. But the 3rd no longer had much if anything and it showed--the Egyptians had to make a special appeal for blood for the third army's wounded.

If there were no protection for the 3rd army , why IAF didn’t take it down .IAF tried hard and failed to accomplish the job and lost many aircrafts .CIA report said that and mentioned by

David Nicolle and Tom Cooper

in their book “arab mig-19 and mig-21 units in combat” , the one that you are trusting  !!



And by CIA




Neglecting the EAF role is far a way from what happened , EAF faced IAF effectively even with low aircrafts cababilities as below stories , IAF failure to destroy airports using 120 aircrafts against 62 EAF aircrafts was a clear evidence of IAF low cabability .

Below stories showing the failure of IAF VS EAF ,also showing that MANPADs were used to down some IAF aircrafts .

Already by the 21st the 4rth armored was trying to drive Adan's units away from positions just north of the road, where their guns interdicted traffic. Adan may not have reached the road on the 20th but he was in a position to cut it.

The goal of the advance after 22-Oct is to reach to that road , they did reach by 24th

The U.S plan as Kissinger said was to make an advance to push Egypt return to 5th Oct lines ,IDF failed to accomplish the plan , Egypt put her conditions .

I don't think Magen even brought that many tanks across the canal--Rabinovich says he crossed with 80.

Historian Gamal Hammad said 180 tanks with Magen and reached Suez road with 50 only .

Big deal. I meant how could the Egyptians launch a counterattack sufficient to reach third army or wipe out the bridgehead entirely, in late October. Kabil was very reluctant to try because he knew it was very risky if not suicidal.

I didn’t say the Egyptian forces on the west were enough to face the IDF there but it’s role was to make a separate attacks till the support come which consists of 5 armored brigades (600 tanks) 2nd army infantry divisions east of the Canal & pushed to the south to support Kabil division & continue surrounding IDF west of the canal. Republican Gaurds armored divisions joined the front. Since ceasefire, enormous Tanks supplies were pouring to Egypt from USSR, Jougoslavia & Algeria.
IDF continued his attacks up to 27 Oct trying to enforce the 3rd army to surrender or to occupy Suez city but they failed ,.IDF with two brigades tried to invade Suez a 24-Oct but failed  , In the north, General Sharon troops were defeated south Of Ismaelya city by the Egyptian commando brigade 150 & 182 . On the East of Canal, IDF attacked Div 16 in Missori & the nothern sector of the chineese farm & failed . IDF forces confronting the 2nd army & the 3rd army in the east of the Canal failed to push them one inch backward.

The IDF losses between 31-Oct to 18-Jan and in Suez were mentioned by Dr. George W. Gawrych as below :

But this wasn't possible in late October because by then the Egyptian armored forces had been mostly wrecked. The 21st and 4rth were badly depleted the 25th destroyed. If the Egyptians had a realistic chance in late October Kabil would not have been so reluctant to try...

Wrong. IDF failed against infantry forces to fullfill a major achievement west of the Canal. Sharon Division that was attacking to the north in the Ismaeilya direction to isolate the 2nd army was stopped by the 182nd paratroopers brigade, 129th commandos brigade & 139th commandos brigade. IDF crossing yard was being shelled on a minutely basis by the 2nd army & the 3rd army artillary & rockets. The Missory fortification east of the canal was strangling IDF logistic supplies passage to the west. Together with the chineese Farm battles, the Missory 16th armoured division troops destroyed IDF operation time schedule & wasted IDF prime goals of Canal crossing.
The Egyptian Artillary shells on IDF bridges & area of collection ( the Yard) did not stop since the 16th till the 2nd cease fire on the 24th. During this period , Rockets, Artillary shells, Katyousha, Napalm & air bombardments were dropped on IDF receiving area west of the canal. Hundreds of IDF personal were killed or injured due to this day/night continuous shelling to mark the trap which IDF put 3 of his armored divisions inside it.The failure  to conquer Missouri left their logistics supplies to their forces west of the canal subjected to artillery bombardment. In addition this site together with the other 16th Div positions offer excellent axis for cutting IDF thin access to its 3 divisions west of the canal upon hostilities works resumption. IDF faced high losses without any plan to secure his trapped forces . The high rank which IDF rate the Egyptian gunners is due to the perfect shelling of the Passage & the Yard area .

The bottom line is the IDF successfully trapped 3rd army, and could've finished it had the war continued another week.

And put IDF on the west in a danger to be destroyed .
IDF propganda which is presenting the 3Rd army seige as the only outcome of the war ,while ignoring the forced existence of more than 200,000 Egyptian troops in IDF pre-war positions, is pathetic.
The Egyptian GC was preparing to cut the passage from the reinforced 2nd army positions in the north with a simultanous local attacks on IDF divisions west of the Canal. You should not limit the new operations to the 3rd army front. By trying to demolish the 3rd army, IDF should prove that it can hold long defensive positions against a determined well organized multi node Egyptian attack on Canal west front. Only, the opposite was proved on the 6th of October.
IDF failed to maintain its Counter attack War objects till the 22nd of Oct. Egypt & Israel agreed to Ceasefire & UN decision 338 on that day. IDF violated the ceasefire & maintained a ground surround of the third army on the 24th of Oct. Yet, this try for reversing the War outcome was blocked by Egypt threat that unless IDF retreat to th 22nd lines, the Egyptian Army will resume its operations & open an access to the 3rd army. Fearing from the erupt further military actions, Israel agreed to hold military discussions with the Egyptians to discuss the issue of the 22nd lines

The Egyptian Army has fulfilled his War targets. IDF never returned to its 5th of Oct positions which were conquered by the Egyptian Army. The War started with the 50% of Canal shores under direct occupation by IDF. After 18 days of fighting, 75% of Suez Canal shores became under the Egyptian Army direct control. The trapped third army divisions are far counterbalanced by the threatened positions of IDF 3 armored divisions west of  the Canal. An attrition war was started from the 30th of Nov till the 18th of Jan 1974. IDF retreat was obligatory & took place on the 18th of Jan till the passes lines.

General Adan confessions

Sorry I just don't believe that. If the EAF was really that effective, what the heck did Egypt need SAMs for?   Where is the evidence for a single Phantom kill on the 14th let alone 17? Where's the wreckage or gun camera film of a Phantom being shot down on the 14th?

EAF is following the eastern philosophy to combine between Airforces and AD forces , also EAF had less aircrafts cababilities than IAF but EAF was effective too . Mansourah Air battle is a witness to the failure of IAF to face EAF . IAF used 120 aircraft but failed to achieve it’s goals .

So you are disucussing if EAF has downed some IAF aircrafts but you are ignoring the failure of IAF on that battle HAHAHAHAHA    

The previous battles are  an evidences that EAF was a hard opponent although the unlimited supplies by U.S to IAF .

Maybe all that was ready by December not not October 24-26th….

No this was in October and Sadat refused it .

If that were true Egypt wouldn't have agreed to a cease fire but destroyed the "trapped" enemy.

Actually if IDF achieved any goals on the west , why it accepted the ceasefire , also Egypt received warnings from U.S not to attack the IDF trapped forces .

Getting the IDF back 30 km to the east of the water line without maintaining any political price for this retreat is what Egypt needs from the begining of war. This was done as a result of 1st disengagement agreement where the egyptian side agreed on having a buffer zone between both armies.
This  clearly expresses the Egyptian army victory in fullfilling his War targets. Israel lost its 5th of October lines & Suez canal East bank forever. The failure of IDF to restore its 5th of october positions is a clear mark of its defeat.

So the ceasefire was a victory to Egypt ,so why Israel accepted it  

But one ought to be brutally realistic and self critical, otherwise you'll never learn from experience.

That’s why Agranat Commision was set up to investigate failings in the Israel Defense Forces   , the interim report, released 1 April 1974, called for the dismissal of a number of senior officers in the IDF and caused such controversy that Prime Minister Golda Meir was forced to resign .

IDF during the withdrawal was enforced to evacuate the Yamit settlement  from Israelis population , it was established during Israel's occupation of the peninsula . All the homes were evacuated and bulldozed  

IDF put some people in cages to take them out    

ahmedfire wrote:
If there were no protection for the 3rd army , why IAF didn’t take it down .

As I wrote before--source Dupuy-- they probably would've pounded it into submission if they had just one more week.

Neglecting the EAF role is far a way from what happened , EAF faced IAF effectively even with low aircrafts cababilities as below stories , IAF failure to destroy airports using 120 aircrafts against 62 EAF aircrafts was a clear evidence of IAF low cabability .

You've seen the older works but apparently not the latest on the subject--The First Nuclear War which says the IAF committed only about 27 Phantoms on the 14th, and there is no physical evidence that any were shot down by the EAF. One might have been, by Musa, but that's unproven.
I already saw all those pics you posted, at least one of them as far back as 1975 and none of them prove the EAF downed ANY jets on the 14th.

The goal of the advance after 22-Oct is to reach to that road , they did reach by 24th

But the IDF was already able to hinder if not stop traffic on the Cairo-Suez road by the 21st at the latest.

Historian Gamal Hammad said 180 tanks with Magen and reached Suez road with 50 only .

I don't think he crossed with that many, but it is true he was mauled...

I didn’t say the Egyptian forces on the west were enough to face the IDF there but it’s role was to make a separate attacks till the support come which consists of 5 armored brigades (600 tanks) 2nd army infantry divisions east of the Canal & pushed to the south to support Kabil division

They planned to send the whole 2nd army west and south to help Kabil? During the war they wouldn't even send a single brigade, the 15th, west…The 2nd's tank brigades--notably the 21st's brigades-- were badly depleted by the end of the war; I doubt 600 operational ones were still available. If the second army was really that strong it would've succeeded in overwhelming the enemy on the 17th.

Republican Gaurds armored divisions joined the front.

Not divisions to my knowledge just one or two brigades including the 27th, which had already fought before the 24rth.

Since ceasefire, enormous Tanks supplies were pouring to Egypt from USSR, Jougoslavia & Algeria.

Good for Shamel but not in time to save the third army had the war continued.

IDF continued his attacks up to 27 Oct trying to enforce the 3rd army to surrender or to occupy Suez city but they failed ,.IDF with two brigades tried to invade Suez a 24-Oct but failed  , In the north, General Sharon troops were defeated south Of Ismaelya city by the Egyptian commando brigade 150 & 182 . On the East of Canal, IDF attacked Div 16 in Missori & the nothern sector of the chineese farm & failed . IDF forces confronting the 2nd army & the 3rd army in the east of the Canal failed to push them one inch backward.

The Egyptians did retreat from the Chinese farm and the southern part of Missouri. I know Egypt had some successes in the war (!) unfortunately it failed to prevent the Israeli crossing of the canal and establishment of a big bridgehead and the trapping of 3rd army….

Wrong. IDF failed against infantry forces to fullfill a major achievement west of the Canal. Sharon Division that was attacking to the north in the Ismaeilya direction to isolate the 2nd army was stopped by the 182nd paratroopers brigade, 129th commandos brigade & 139th commandos brigade. IDF crossing yard was being shelled on a minutely basis by the 2nd army & the 3rd army artillary & rockets. The Missory fortification east of the canal was strangling IDF logistic supplies passage to the west. Together with the chineese Farm battles, the Missory 16th armoured division troops destroyed IDF operation time schedule & wasted IDF prime goals of Canal crossing.

But this didn't address my point--Egypt was powerless by the 24rth, to break through to 3rd army and save it had the war gone on…

And put IDF on the west in a danger to be destroyed .
IDF propganda which is presenting the 3Rd army seige as the only outcome of the war ,while ignoring the forced existence of more than 200,000 Egyptian troops in IDF pre-war positions, is pathetic.

I can't believe Egypt still had that many east of the canal at the end. An article I saw after the war said the third had around 18,000 men in two depleted divisions and the second not much more maybe 50,000 total.

The Egyptian GC was preparing to cut the passage from the reinforced 2nd army positions in the north with a simultanous local attacks on IDF divisions west of the Canal.

With what? The shattered 23rd mechanized? And 21st armored had already failed east of the canal.

EAF is following the eastern philosophy to combine between Airforces and AD forces ,

I note it only began to emphasize SAMs after the EAF failures of 1967-70….

Actually if IDF achieved any goals on the west , why it accepted the ceasefire

Because of superpower pressure.

This  clearly expresses the Egyptian army victory in fullfilling his War targets. Israel lost its 5th of October lines & Suez canal East bank forever. The failure of IDF to restore its 5th of october positions is a clear mark of its defeat.

Na it was due to politics. The US pressured Israel to pull back to help wean Egypt off dependency on the USSR, and turn to the US instead.

That’s why Agranat Commision was set up to investigate failings in the Israel Defense Forces   , the interim report, released 1 April 1974, called for the dismissal of a number of senior officers in the IDF and caused such controversy that Prime Minister Golda Meir was forced to resign .

I was referring to Egyptians. They had serious failings in 1973 just like in 1967. Your views, which paint a very rosy picture of Egyptian fortunes in '73, aren't conducive to improvement as they don't seem to recognize any need for it.

As I wrote before--source Dupuy-- they probably would've pounded it into submission if they had just one more week.

If IDF thought for a second they can do that , they would . Egypt forces did 439  attacks from 1-Nov to 18-Jan , why IDF didn’t reply by the same attacks or why they didn’t take that as an excuse to stop the ceasefire and start a wide operation against 3rd army ? why they took a defensive side and put hundredth of thousands of mines and digged tunnels ?

Below is a quote by Edgar O'Ballance from his book " NO VICTOR, NO VANQUISHED":

At the Israeli Symposium on the October War held in Jerusalem in October 1975 Colonel Trevor Dupuy stated that "it was clear that

Third Army were not on the verge of collapse

." Further, Drew Middleton, military editor of the New York Times, wrote, "The

Egyptian armies did not break. They were outmanoeuvred, not outfought. They were still in being

."

Quote from David Nicolle and Tom Cooper in their book “arab mig-19 and mig-21 units in combat




CIA






Egyptian leaders on the east canal were not worry about the crossed IDF on the west .

You've seen the older works but apparently not the latest on the subject--The First Nuclear War which says the IAF committed only about 27 Phantoms on the 14th, and there is no physical evidence that any were shot down by the EAF. One might have been, by Musa, but that's unproven.
I already saw all those pics you posted, at least one of them as far back as 1975 and none of them prove the EAF downed ANY jets on the 14th.

They said in their book that IAF used 120 aircrafts as below , it’s over .
And that makes sense with David nicolle describtion regarding the IAF tactics to use 3 waves on that battle ,will they send only 27 aircraft to make such huge attack using 3 waves to destroy airports that contains tens of aircrafts ?? BS



Here is  David Nicolle said that IAF failed that day  



Even wiki mentioned higher IAF aircrafts numbers (160 )
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Air_battle_of_Mansoura#cite_note-nicolle43-1

It's pathetic that Israeli fanboys trying hard to demolish facts .

By the way I didn’t say that the photos are related to Mansourah air battle !! I was proving that air-air combat wasn’t completely in favor of IAF and that EAF was a hard opponent .
IAF received tons of new aircrafts and new munitions and ECM devices during the war from U.S , but till the last day they can’t completely destroy EAF which considered as a double failure because Egypt didn't receive that huge supplies .

But the IDF was already able to hinder if not stop traffic on the Cairo-Suez road by the 21st at the latest.

No , they can only by 24th .

I don't think he crossed with that many, but it is true he was mauled...

He did had that forces but most of it was destroyed . Actually each Israeli brigades on the west faced huge losses and by the end each one contains between 17 to 50 tank .

I doubt 600 operational ones were still available.
I can't believe Egypt still had that many east of the canal at the end

No problem if you doubt , you are defending Israeli’s terrorism (The Israeli magazine Haolam Hazeh after the war published a photostat of a document that purported to show that the chief rabbi of the IDF had during the war issued a religious dispensation to Israeli soldiers to kill Arab civilians) so I understand your doubts .

Not divisions to my knowledge just one or two brigades including the 27th, which had already fought before the 24rth.

Add to them 400 tanks from Algeria,Libya and Youghoslavia which were ready by the ceasefire date , in total it's more than a division .

Good for Shamel but not in time to save the third army had the war continued.

The unsuccessfully fate of IDF attacks on DIV 16 &Suez and Ismailya, point to the expected scenario that would have resulted if IDF tried to attack the 3rd Army after the 24th of OCT.
IDF terrorists were afraid to attack the 3rd army and accepted the ceasefire and withdrawal 35km to the east after that , any other excuses are pathetic .

The Egyptians did retreat from the Chinese farm and the southern part of Missouri. I know Egypt had some successes in the war (!) unfortunately it failed to prevent the Israeli crossing of the canal and establishment of a big bridgehead and the trapping of 3rd army….
But this didn't address my point--Egypt was powerless by the 24rth, to break through to 3rd army and save it had the war gone on…
With what? The shattered 23rd mechanized? And 21st armored had already failed east of the canal.

Israeli terrorists failed to occupy Missouri . The chineses Farm  was subjected to periodic Egyptian shellfire . The Missouri Ridge, dangerously near the Israeli bridgehead, was still held by the Egyptians,and there was another strong 16th Infantry Division position about four miles to the north of Chinese Farm.

Below is the analysis of Owen, Richard L., Major, USMC of US Marine Corps Command and Staff College in his Report with the title [Operational Valiant: Turning Of The Tide In The Sinai 1973 Arab-Israeli War].

Missouri ridge remained a problem. From that position, the Egyptians could fire, and direct fire, on the Israelis in the corridor. Sharon's remaining forces on the east bank were unable to take the position, and settled in about one kilometer north of Chinese Farm

.

http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/library/report/1984/ORL.htm

The fact is that the IDF was under extrieme pressure from the Egyptian army on both Canal fronts. From the 24th of October till the 18th of January, an attrition war was imposed where more than 200 IDF troops were killed & further equipment destroyed, more that 11 aircrafts downed .
The agreement was reached on the 11/Nov reflects the real IDF critical situation on the west which forced it to withdraw without  maintaining any Political return,complete failure .

The 18th of Jan first disengagement agreement reflects the Egyptian army victory. Here IDF withdraw from his threatened positions west of Canal to 35 kms east without any political return.




To the last day , Egyptian forces attacked IDF , why IDF didn’t take this as a reason to stop the ceasefire and start the battle again if they can destroy the 3rd army ? HAHAHA because those terrorists were stuck on the west, Tha’s why U.S threatened Egypt not to attack and destroy the IDF on the west .

I note it only began to emphasize SAMs after the EAF failures of 1967-70….

It’s funny that Israeli fanboys to allege that EAF did fight in 1967 , it didn’t because the Egyptian generals were stupid enough to keep the aircrafts on the airports and gave a free sweet dish to the terrorists in Israel . Egypt didn’t fight in 1967 .

Because of superpower pressure.
Na it was due to politics. The US pressured Israel to pull back to help wean Egypt off dependency on the USSR, and turn to the US instead.

HAHAHAHAHAHAHA       this is the biggest lie by IDF fanboys to cover the IDF failure to keep Sinai but in the same time they kept Golan .

There are many facts in this life . Sun rise from the East , Israel never giveback the lands until being defeated .
Egypt already offered peace talks before the war but Israel and U.S refused it ,so why would they accept it after war ?
And why didn’t U.S pushed Israel to return the occupied Golan Heights and keep Syria away from USSR ??

Actually Sadat had already tensions with Soviets even before the war ,he wasn’t satisfy about the arms supplies by Soviets or by their interfere in the Egyptian decisions .

Soviets and U.S at 1972 agreed to calm down the ME and rejecting any wars between Arabs and Israel , and Soviets used sometimes the arms supply to play that game , Sadat visited Mosocow 4 times trying to convince them to provide more arms . Two days before the war , Brezhnev sent a clear message to Sadat not to start a war with Israel .

Algerian president that time after his visit to USSR ,said that Soviets need Sadat to be defeated . Sadat asked all soviets experts before the war to leave Egypt , so  the guy already had many tensions with USSR and there was no any condition from US to enforce Egypt to cut relations with USSR , that’s why Mubarak start to improve the relations after Sadat's death .
Why didn’t Israel took at least half of Sinai ? why they didn’t take Taba which is the last small area ( 1 km2) and Mubarak threatened to go to war if Israel didn’t withdraw from it , HAHA Israel can't face a long war with Egypt , the small Israel is not designed for such long wars and serious attacks .

I was referring to Egyptians. They had serious failings in 1973 just like in 1967. Your views, which paint a very rosy picture of Egyptian fortunes in '73, aren't conducive to improvement as they don't seem to recognize any need for it.

The Agranat Commision was set up to investigate failings in the Israel Defense Forces was enough to show the IDF failures during the war .IDF terrorists generals started accusing each others , thousands of demonstrators took to the streets  and the Prime Minister announced the resignation of her government , So Egypt no only achieved military success but also a political one and IDF terrorists lost Sinai which consider as a strategic depth, Israel would never leave that depth without a war .

Putting the Israeli terrorists inside cages is a huge insult to IDF .  

I apparently forgot this thread…Just a few points:
I'm no "Israeli fanboy." Like Cooper I'm basically sympathetic to the arabs but unlike many of them, severely objective. For the latest research on the air battle of the 14th see Cooper's latest, The First Nuclear War Crucial Air Battles of the 1973 war.
Egypt, even the EAF, DID fight in 1967. At least one Egyptian pilot shot down an IAF jet while Pollack mentioned "more than 150" sorties into the Sinai. It is true that the fighting potential of much of the Egyptian army was negated by the disorderly retreat. But the retreat was only ordered after the failure of the 4rth to stop the enemy, who had by then (the 6th) overrun the two Egyptian divisions on the frontier.
For a quite objective assessment of Egyptian performance in '73 see Pollack's Arabs at War.

starman wrote:
Egypt, even the EAF,  DID fight in 1967. At least one Egyptian pilot shot down an IAF jet while Pollack mentioned "more than 150" sorties into the Sinai. It is true that the fighting potential of much of the Egyptian army was negated by the disorderly retreat. But the retreat was only ordered after the failure of the 4rth to stop the enemy, who had by then (the 6th) overrun the two Egyptian divisions on the frontier.
For a quite objective assessment of Egyptian performance in '73 see Pollack's Arabs at War.

EAF had lost about 85% of it's airforce on the ground ,so claiming that some stories did happen doesn't prove anything .The main airforce bulk was destroyed on the ground .This was the key victory for Israel . IAF tried to do the same in YK but nearly not a single EAF aircraft get destroyed on the ground.

Actually the military top generals at 1967 were not qualified to plan for a war ,no plan ,no well training and they were corrupted .On the other side IDF did a well planned attack to destroy most of the EAF aircrafts on the ground to prevent any support to the Egyptian ground forces.

ahmedfire wrote:
EAF had lost about 85% of it's airforce on the ground ,so claiming that some stories did happen doesn't prove anything

There is a well-known photo of EAF jets attacking an Israeli column.

The main airforce bulk was destroyed on the ground .This was the key victory for Israel

Pollack wrote that its significance has been exaggerated because the IAF was not very effective in the air to ground role.

Actually the military top generals at 1967 were not qualified to plan for a war ,no plan ,no well training and they were corrupted .

Yeah, Muhsain and others were political hacks, chosen for loyalty not competence. Murtagi was different though.

There is a well-known photo of EAF jets attacking an Israeli column. Smile

So what ? I already said that .

Pollack wrote that its significance has been exaggerated because the IAF was not very effective in the air to ground role.

Belwo quote was said by Pollack in his book "Air Power in the Six-Day War" .

According to the legends that have grown up around the war, on 5 June 1967 the Israeli Air Force (IAF) obliterated the Arab air forces and thereby won the Six-Day War before it really began. That morning, the first of the war, Israeli Mirages and Myste` res swept down on the unsuspecting Egyptian Air Force at its bases and crippled it beyond repair. The IAF then visited the same destruction on the Jordanian, Syrian and finally the Iraqi air forces, gaining complete control of the skies in the first 12 hours of the conflict. Israeli fighter bombers were then free to smash the Arab armies, flying close air support (CAS) missions for Israeli ground units locked in combat with Arab forces, and battlefield air interdiction (BAI) missions to prevent Arab reinforcements from reaching the front. The pervasive Israeli air presence made it impossible for the Arab armies to move or fight in Sinai, o

ahmedfire wrote:

Belwo quote was said by Pollack in his book "Air Power in the Six-Day War" .

According to the legends that have grown up around the war, on 5 June 1967 the Israeli Air Force (IAF) obliterated the Arab air forces and thereby won the Six-Day War before it really began.

Yep, legends. In Arabs at War Pollack clearly indicated the IAF was far from a decisive factor in the ground war, in sinai.

Btw somewhat OT but see this post on the fate of an Egyptian hero of the '73 war: http://starvisions.blogspot.com/2016/11/the-martyrdom-of-defense-minister-badawi.html

The taking out of the Egyptian air force on the ground reminds me of the Nazis managing somehow to blow up many key food
depots in the USSR in 1941. They had spies that fully infiltrated the USSR. The Israelis had spies in both Egypt and more
importantly had access to US resources of all sorts.

This sort of cheat is what gives the west and its fellow travelers mythological military prowess. Without it, they would not be
doing so hot. And the Nazis for all their tricks were losing on the Eastern front from 1942 on.

kvs wrote:The taking out of the Egyptian air force on the ground reminds me of the Nazis managing somehow to blow up many key food
depots in the USSR in 1941.

It had serious consequences in Leningrad; dunno about elsewhere. Btw the destruction of the EAF in '67 was quite like the initial strike of the Luftwaffe against the Soviet Air Force.

  They had spies that fully infiltrated the USSR.

The nazis had no monopoly on spies. Soviet intelligence was quite good. The nazis were fortunate that Stalin disregarded Sorge's warning. Later of course Soviet spies found out about the US a-bomb project.

The Israelis had spies in both Egypt and more
importantly had access to US resources of all sorts.  

This sort of cheat is what gives the west and its fellow travelers mythological military prowess.  Without it, they would not be
doing so hot.   And the Nazis for all their tricks were losing on the Eastern front from 1942 on.  

I think the worst problem for both nazis and arabs was poor leadership, especially on the strategic level.

starman wrote:

ahmedfire wrote:

Belwo quote was said by Pollack in his book "Air Power in the Six-Day War" .

According to the legends that have grown up around the war, on 5 June 1967 the Israeli Air Force (IAF) obliterated the Arab air forces and thereby won the Six-Day War before it really began.

Yep, legends. In Arabs at War Pollack clearly indicated the IAF was far from a decisive factor in the ground war, in sinai.

Btw somewhat OT but see this post on the fate of an Egyptian hero of the '73 war: http://starvisions.blogspot.com/2016/11/the-martyrdom-of-defense-minister-badawi.html

IAF did the job on 1967 , destroying the EAF aircrafts on the ground means a vectory to Israel .

I know about Badawai , it's a not confirmed but could be true too ,actually Sadat put Abu ghazala in this position and he was an army strong man too .

He was involved in a missile parts (carbon phenolic cloth) illegal import scandal from the United States which were not allowed for export , by using an Egyptian scientist who was working at the US Aerojet Solid Propulsion Corporation.

U.S. Rocket Expert Pleads Guilty in Egyptian Smuggling Case

ahmedfire wrote:

starman wrote:

Btw somewhat OT but see this post on the fate of an Egyptian hero of the '73 war: http://starvisions.blogspot.com/2016/11/the-martyrdom-of-defense-minister-badawi.html

I know about Badawai , it's a not confirmed but could be true too

I doubt Badawi died in a real accident. I think he was purged, albeit in a way that made it look accidental.

Operation Dugman-5 Bet: Israeli Air Force Against Syrian Air Defense in 1973

bmpd
September 21st, 18:59
Original taken from colleague oleggranovsky  in Operation Dugman-5 Bet Operation Dugman-5 Bet (referred to simply as Dugman-5 in most sources) 10/07/73 against the Syrian air defense system in the Golan Heights during the Yom Kippur War (06- 10/24/73) - one of the most unsuccessful and tragic operations in the history of the Israeli Air Force. The operation completely failed (1 S-125 air defense system was destroyed and 1 C-75 air defense system was damaged with the loss of 6 Phantoms, 10 more aircraft were damaged, 2 pilots were killed and 9 were captured), until the end of the war, the Air Force was forced to provide direct support Landfill in the absence of freedom of action in the air, which led to additional losses.

SAM S-75 (SA-2) at the time of missile launch.



A lot has been written about the operation, there are also articles on Wikipedia (quite large in Hebrew, short in English and Russian). 09/14/21 the website of the Israeli Defense Ministry "Maarahot" published an article about the operation of Major (res.) Yitzhak Steigman. The article is titled "'Dugman 5 Beth - Operation That Changed the Face of War". Steigman 1970-1990 served as Head of the Historical Research Branch (Rosh Mador Mihkar Histori) in the Air Force Heritage Branch (Anaf le-Toldot Heil ha-Avir). Author of numerous books and articles on security issues, but primarily on the Air Force during the Yom Kippur War. Steigman is currently working on a book on the subject. Below I give a retelling of this article with some of my clarifications.

Prehistory

At the final stage of the War of Attrition, the Israeli Air Force encountered the S-125 (SA-3) air defense systems, which had recently arrived from the USSR in Egypt. There were no electronic warfare means against these air defense systems yet, the tactics of dealing with them had not been worked out. As a result, 5 Phantoms were lost in a short time, the commander of the 201st squadron Shmuel Hetz was killed.

In subsequent years, the issue of combating air defense systems was central to the Air Force. Research was carried out, funds were invested in electronic warfare, a series of experiments and exercises under the general name "Lahit" were carried out. Large-scale operations were prepared to suppress the Egyptian air defense system along the Suez Canal - "Tagar", and Syria in the Golan Heights - "Dugman". As changes in the enemy's air defense systems, on the one hand, and the strengthening of the air force on the other, the plans were clarified, their new versions and variants were released. At the start of the war, Tagar-4 and Dugman-5 Bet were relevant (ie, the Dugman plan, version 5, version 2). In general, the plans boiled down to a coordinated attack on dozens of batteries at the same time.

Understanding all the problems of the issue, the planners put forward the conditions for their implementation:
- reconnaissance data is at least 80% accurate (i.e. the coordinates of at least 80% of the enemy's air defense systems are known exactly); This was especially important for the Golan Heights, since 60% of Syrian air defense (15 batteries out of 25) consisted of mobile Kvadrat (SA-6) air defense systems; these batteries protected 3 Syrian infantry divisions on the front line and had to advance with them in the event of an attack by these divisions;
- suitable weather conditions;
- performing an operation at the beginning of the war, which was supposed to clear the way and free up funds for direct support of the ground forces in the following days.
The main force for the operations was the Phantoms, in fact, most of the fleet of these aircraft was intended to participate in the Tagar or Dugman. The plans included careful planning for the take-off of a large number of aircraft from different bases to ensure the simultaneous attack of targets, strict adherence to flight routes, widespread use of air and ground electronic warfare means, the use of long-range artillery for shelling air defense systems ( the Bendigo plan, see a separate article ), the use of UAV traps for air defense disorientation. In fact, flight commanders and individual pilots did not have the flexibility of decisions over a battlefield filled with missile launchers and massive anti-aircraft artillery (ZA) fire.

The possibility of using the Air Force for direct support of the ground forces without preliminary suppression of air defense was not predicted. This approach was brought to the attention of the NGSH and the Minister of Defense and was approved by them. However, the war began suddenly on 10/06/1973, without the Air Force being able to deliver a preemptive strike against the enemy's air defenses.

The beginning of the war and Operation Tagar-4

By the night of the first day of the war (06 / 07.10.73), the command post of the high command of the IDF ("Mutsav ha-Pikud ha-Ilion") had the following picture of the situation: the situation in the Golan Heights was tolerable, along the canal - heavy. As a result, at 21:30, the Air Force Commander presented to the NGS the Air Force attack plan for the next morning: "Tagar-4". NSH approved the plan.

The plan included 4 waves of attack: the first to clear the approaches to the air defense missile system - a strike on the outside, then three attacks on the air defense missile systems themselves along the canal. The start was scheduled for 06:45 am on 07.10.73. During the night, the technicians prepared the aircraft, the pilots studied their targets. The weather along the canal was good, the coordinates of the targets were known (most of the Egyptian air defense fleet consisted of low-mobile C-75/125 complexes), so the chances of the success of the operation were good. Optimism reigned in the air force headquarters, from the next day the air force will return to full-scale hostilities according to the IDF military doctrine.

However, at night the situation in the Golan began to change. At 03:51 am, the commander of the NWO, Major General Yitzhak Hofi, informed Lieutenant General David Elazar of the NGSH that significant Syrian forces had penetrated the southern part of the Golan Heights. Urgent air support was required. This was followed by more and more new reports about the deterioration of the situation in the Golan. Defense Minister Moshe Dayan arrived at the SVO command post on Mount Knaan near Safed. After examining the situation, he tried to contact the NGSH, and without finding him, at 06:42 he called the Air Force Commander, Major General Beni Peled. Dayan said that if the air force does not begin to strike in the Golan before noon, the Syrians will break into the Jordan Valley.

At this time, the NGSh arrived at the command post of the Air Force. After a 10-minute conversation with the Air Force commander at 07:00, a decision was made: to fold Tagar-4 and go to Dugman-5 Bet. During the conversation, Peled tried to convince the NSG that the Air Force would be able to strike in the south of the Golan in parallel with the continuation of the Tagar, but after realizing that strikes were needed throughout the entire territory of the heights, he agreed. Peled notified the base commanders of the change in plans. The NGSh, however, arrived at the operational management of the General Staff, informed about the decisions and said that in an hour and a half the Air Force would begin to strike at the Golan, and in 5 hours (ie after the completion of "Dugman") air support would become massive.

At 06:57 the squadrons received an order from the Air Force headquarters: to cancel the 2nd wave of Operation Tagar and start preparing the Dugman with the strike time at 11:30. At this point, some of the aircraft were still in the air after the 1st wave of "Tagar". An urgent preparation for the operation began. It should be noted that the last aerial survey of the Golan was carried out in the morning of 10/05/1973, i.e. more than 24 hours before the start of the war and 48 hours before the start of Operation Dugman. SAM "Kvadrat" managed to move forward together with the advancing troops, thus the available intelligence is completely outdated.

Operation Forces - All 4 Phantom Squadrons (69th, 107th, 119th and 201st) and 115 Skyhawk Squadron from Tel Nof, armed with the latest A-4N aircraft with the latest by that time by the bombing system. For each squadron, its own corridor was determined in accordance with the geographical location of the bases.

Progress of Operation Dugman-5 Bet

At 11:20 am, a wave of preparatory strikes on the ZA batteries and the work of electronic warfare began, and only 6 Yasur (CH-53D) helicopters were involved in the latter instead of 12 according to the plan. At 11:30, the main attack began with 64 aircraft (54 Phantoms and 10 Skyhawks).

- 13 aircraft of the 69th squadron flew from the Ramat David base to attack 6 air defense systems. All positions were empty. One of the crews, Ehud Khankin and Shaul Levi, who were flying in the 4th flight of the squadron, found their target right below them, out of the affected area. The crew tried to carry out a sharp maneuver and dive onto the battery at an angle of almost 90 degrees, but could not get out of such a dive, the plane crashed into the ground, both were killed.
- 15 aircraft of the 119th squadron from Tel Nof were also supposed to attack 6 air defense systems. They passed over the north of the Golan in the Quneitra area, and came under heavy fire from the FOR. The 2nd number in the 2nd flight, Avi Barvar and Zvi Afik, were shot down by the ZA on the way out of the attack. Both ejected and were captured.
- 17 aircraft of the 201st squadron from Hatzor were supposed to attack 3 Kvadrat air defense systems and 2 radar stations. Their flight route passed directly from west to east over the southern part of the Golan Heights, in the area of ​​the Rapid intersection. The squadron commander at the time of the beginning of the war was abroad (as part of the delegation on the choice of a new Air Force aircraft - F-14 or F-15) and had not yet had time to return, the squadron was commanded by 1st Deputy Commander Ron Huldai (current mayor of Tel Aviv) who took office a month before. Already during the briefing, it became clear that the flight route passes over the Syrian troops wedged into the southern part of the Golan Heights, i.e. extremely problematic. However, attempts by Huldai and base commander Colonel Amos Lapidot to change the route were rejected by the Air Force's operations department: during a massive attack, re-routing threatened to thwart attacks from other squadrons. During the attack, the aircraft went close to the ground, the climb began to the east of the Rapid intersection. In this area, the convoy of the squadron's planes came under full fire from the ZA and small arms of the Syrians. Two planes were shot down before the attack. Meir Shani and Abraham Ashkhal from one plane and Haim Ram and Itzik Yahav from another ejected and were captured by the Syrians. Two more planes were shot down during the attack itself and during the exit. Ori Shahak and Gilad Gerber ejected and were captured; Kobi Hayun and Uzi Shamir were able to reach Galilee and catapulted over their territory. Eitan Levi and Yair David landed the wrecked plane in Ramat David. Immediately after them, the downed plane of Gadi Samok landed. He was alone on the plane - navigator Avikam Leaf was thrown out of the cockpit (when the plane was hit, the automatic ejection was triggered) and was captured in Syria (the only such case in the history of the Israeli Air Force, and possibly in the world). Females saw the plane of Levi and David directly in front of him, was able to take his plane to the side and avoided a collision. Thus, 4 planes of the 201st were shot down, and 2 more sat down in Ramat David. Almost a quarter of the squadron's fleet. 1 of the 4 aircraft shelters (DATAK) of the squadron was completely empty. One of the planes that returned from the attack to their base was piloted by Dan Halutz, who later became the commander of the Air Force and the OGS of the IDF (his navigator on that flight was Eran Cohen). Females saw the plane of Levi and David directly in front of him, was able to take his plane to the side and avoided a collision. Thus, 4 planes of the 201st were shot down, and 2 more sat down in Ramat David. Almost a quarter of the squadron's fleet. 1 of the 4 aircraft shelters (DATAK) of the squadron was completely empty. One of the planes that returned from the attack to their base was piloted by Dan Halutz, who later became the commander of the Air Force and the OGS of the IDF (his navigator on that flight was Eran Cohen). Females saw the plane of Levi and David directly in front of him, was able to take his plane to the side and avoided a collision. Thus, 4 planes of the 201st were shot down, and 2 more sat down in Ramat David. Almost a quarter of the squadron's fleet. 1 of the 4 aircraft shelters (DATAK) of the squadron was completely empty. One of the planes that returned from the attack to their base was piloted by Dan Halutz, who later became the commander of the Air Force and the OGS of the IDF (his navigator on that flight was Eran Cohen).
- 9 aircraft of the 107th squadron from Hatzerim flew out in 4 flights (3 pairs and three) to attack 4 air defense systems. The flight route ran over Jordan, bypassing the Syrian army. The third link, led by Ran Goren and Kobi Shmueli, managed to destroy the S-125 air defense system. As he climbed, Goren noticed that his target positions were empty. He tried to survey the area, trying to find a new position for the air defense system - to no avail. Then he remembered that on the way he had come across a C-125 battery. He turned back and bombed the battery, dropping 11 750 lb bombs on its radar and command post. In general, the aircraft of the 107th squadron had no losses.



Downed by the Phantom of the pilot Gadi Samok in Ramat David.


Results

So, as already mentioned at the beginning of the article, out of 25 attacked batteries (including 15 "Square"), only one was destroyed (C-125) and one was damaged (C-75). And this at the cost of the loss of 6 Phantoms, 10 more were damaged. 2 pilots were killed, 9 were captured, 2 were able to return to their own. All losses were from FORA and SV fire, plus one aircraft crashed during the attack as described above. Not a single plane was shot down or knocked out by air defense missile systems.

At the same time, immediately after the attack, based on the reports of the pilots, the Air Force headquarters was full of optimism. The head of the intelligence department, Rafi Har-Lev, believed that 36% of the 25 air defense systems (i.e. 9 air defense systems) were destroyed. Air Force Commander Peled called an even bigger figure - 17 batteries were destroyed or damaged. However, as the data was analyzed, the real picture became clear.

At the headquarters of the Air Force, at the bases and squadrons, a gloomy situation reigned. It was clear to everyone that the quick transition from Tagar to Dugman was a mistake. It was necessary to conduct aerial photography, clarify the positions of the batteries, and only then proceed to the attack. The failure created a psychological barrier in the operational department of the Air Force, until 10/18/1973 there were no new large-scale attacks on the air defense missile system. The Air Force was forced to conduct direct support of the ground forces in areas covered by the air defense system. In total, during the war, 5,143 such sorties were performed (4,044 in Egypt and 1,099 in Syria) with the loss of 60 aircraft (33 in Egypt and 27 in Syria), which amounted to 58% of the total number of losses in 103 aircraft (note that the author indicates the figure 102, but 103 is true: the difference is due to a combat aircraft of an unspecified type, which received heavy damage on 10/13/1973; the issue of its restoration was studied for a long time,for more details on Air Force losses during the war, see the web archive ). Despite the losses, the support of the Air Force was important in the battles on the Syrian front at all stages of the battles, on the Egyptian, mainly in areas where there were no air defense systems or they were already suppressed in the last days of the war.

The diagram below shows all sorties of military aircraft during the war (11,045) and their division by mission:

46.5% - direct support of SV;
37.4% - air-to-air;
6.5% - strikes against airfields;
6.4% - strikes against the air defense system;
2.2% - aerial photography;
0.9% - strikes against strategic targets.



To what has been said, I will add that at the end of the war, the Air Force conducted a number of successful operations against the air defense system in Egypt. For example, during "Mefaceakh-25" on 10/22/1973, 5 air defense systems were destroyed without losses. After the war, the Air Force continued to invest strength and resources in methods of combating air defense systems, the crown of these efforts was Operation Artsav-19 in Lebanon on 09.06.82, during the First Lebanon War.

Links:

An article in the magazine "Maarakhot".
Discussion on Fresh.

https://bmpd.livejournal.com/4400220.html

George1 wrote:….
until 10/18/1973 there were no new large-scale attacks on the air defense missile system.

Yep, and Cracker 22 wasn't an overwhelming success either. Six jets lost IIRC.

I will add that at the end of the war, the Air Force conducted a number of successful operations against the air defense system in Egypt. For example, during "Mefaceakh-25" on 10/22/1973, 5 air defense systems were destroyed without losses.

Actually, loss of SAM cover may have been a bit fortuitous for Kabil.