Russian Tanks ERA and APS

Guys, how widely is the Nakidka e-camouflage (I'm hoping that's the right name) used on Russian tanks? Thanks in advance.

It is a bit like ERA... if your vehicle is going to combat it will probably be the case that it should be fitted. Whether it actually gets fitted before you go is another question.

Of course it will likely need to go through all the testing and evaluation procedures that everything goes through, but I seem to remember seeing it on Artillery vehicles during an exercise... I just can't remember when.

Thanks Garry.
In the future, is it very likely that Nakidka or it's derivatives will be an integral component of any Russian tank or vehicle?

Of course it will likely need to go through all the testing and evaluation procedures that everything goes through

I thought the Nakidka was approved for used by the Russians. From everything I've heard of it, it seems like a great asset.

It is one thing to see it on display, but it is something else to see it on exercise or in a combat zone.

I would certainly expect it to be widely adopted as it seems like very useful stuff that is not too expensive.

I rather expect self propelled artillery to be a major user along with recon units, but I suspect all armour will get a suit given time.

I rather expect self propelled artillery to be a major user along with recon units

Do you mind elaborating on that? I don't get why artillery need Nakidka more than tanks.

Artillery are very vulnerable to air attack and tend to hide more often.

Tanks will often use natural cover from where they are operating... including backing into houses and using the house structure as camouflage.

I don't mean Artillery needs it and tanks don't, but Nakidka is concealment rather than protection, which can be important at certain times and for certain uses of tanks, but it is necessary most of the time for Artillery.

Is any ARENA complex up to now installed in regular army tank or they are still only in prototypes?

medo wrote:Is any ARENA complex up to now installed in regular army tank or they are still only in prototypes?

No regular units use it.

Which is part of the problem as I see it.

Arena is no super powerful invisible shield that makes a vehicle invincible, but it adds a layer of defence that adds a total of about 2-3 tons to the tank that is equivalent to several cms of armour that protects everything including weakspots from the most common threat on the battlefield today... the RPG and most ATGMs.

It might be expensive, so buy it in small batches and use it, and demand improvements and changes, get the makers used to working directly with the military to provide support so they can earn money on the system and invest some of that money on improvements in design and manufacturing.

Having it sit on the shelf because it is too expensive for full deployment is a cop out and does nothing to solve the situation.

They can either introduce it to limited small scale service and work out the bugs and solve the problems and reduce the cost of the system while improving the performance and then when the price is at an acceptable level and it does most things they want it to, put it into mass production.

The alternative is to leave it on the shelf while the company the makes it neglects it because it is not generating money and in 5 years time the Russian Army will suddenly realise that while it created the technology for active self protection systems for tanks in the 1980s in the form of the Drozd system that was operationally tested in Afghanistan, that they have lost any lead that might have given them and they will either have to buy foreign stuff and start from there or throw enormous amounts of cash at the problem to start from scratch with a whole new generation system... both of which will be expensive... and the age old question... who will sell you their latest APS system?

A labour government in the UK wont help because they don't have APS systems.

They are not aquiring APS systems simply because there isn't a need for them. A tank has to be as versatile as possible without requring a change on it's configuration. What is needed is a system which gives universal protection, against RPGs, missiles, and kinetic tank fired rounds. Having this in mind, an APS with all it's expense, added weight, etc and which only partially solves the problem (like current Arena or Drozd) what will certainly not do is see extensive adoption among the tank fleet.

They could adopt them in limited units for specific scenarios but again, it would not be very suitable to have a small number of expensive systems.

When they will bring these systems to really good versatile level, then they will have more opportunities. And such work is being carried out in Russia. Well, their APS systems are the most mature, and have the best characteristics. And will have.

But that is part of the problem... small batch use will make them stay expensive.

Personally I think the future is integration, ultimately the best APS would be an ERA brick that can be launched directly into the path of the incoming round at a range of 4-5 metres from the tank or more.

You would have a double layer of ERA, with the outer brick launched in the path of incoming threats, while the underbrick acts like built in ERA or in this case NERA.

The sensors that activate the outer layer ERA can be connected to the sensor systems of the tank to detect targets at short, medium and long ranges like a fighters radar system.

Between the layers of ERA you'd have Nakidka and the outer ERA panels will be made of nonradar low IR signature materials.

When the Russian Army had 20,000 tanks then ARENA was too expensive, but now that they are looking at a tank force of less than 8,000 then they need to start protecting their tanks with everything they have.

At the end of the day... even if ARENA only defends against RPGs it is still much better than nothing.

It is like saying we should transport troops in trucks because it does not matter what level of protection you provide the enemy will always develop a weapon to defeat it... so it is cheaper to use trucks.

The fact that ARENA does not stop Javelin is not a reason against ARENA... very few of Russians current enemies she will come to blows with have Javelin in large numbers, and while they are developing better more comprehensive systems they can get experience with ARENA, both in terms of operating it and in making it in large quantities.

I rather suspect that the companies that make Drozd and ARNEA will have been working on upgrades for the T-95 and now for Armata.

Any information on Shtora 2 or Arena 2?

Only mention of the existence of Shtora 2 and Arena 2.

I rather suspect that Shtora 2 where Shtora 1 was a combination of dazzlers and laser detectors and IR warning systems and of course special smoke grenade launchers might have progressed through to become a full DIRCM system... presumably with improved smoke options and upgraded EO sensor dazzler capability.

The airborne President-S system and the PAPV ground based systems have evolved dramatically and becomes much smaller and more compact systems (note the anti sniper thread where the previous PAPV system weighed about 50kgs and the new system is built in to a set of hand held binoculars and includes the laser and thermal sight.

Regarding ARENA 2 I could see two main areas of progression... the T-95 was supposed to have MMW radar detection and tracking and as that was part of the ARENA system too perhaps they have combined the detection into the standard avionics suite and added the two main features it needed... an ability to defend against a wider range of incoming threats (ie faster than 700m/s) and an ability to engage diving top attack weapons... though the latter could be as easily dealt with using an improved dazzler/DIRCM0.

IMPENETRABLE RUSSIAN TANK ARMOR STANDS UP TO EXAMINATION"

The T-90 has been extensively shot up in testing.

Amusingly enough, the Oplot cannot say the same, whatsoever.

Austin wrote:IMPENETRABLE RUSSIAN TANK ARMOR STANDS UP TO EXAMINATION"

The original article "Impenetrable Russian Tank Armor Stands Up To Examination" (which followed another famous article publied always on JDW an year before under the name ""Russian tanks immune to attack says German expert ") is of 1997 not 2007 and some of parts has been added.

This is likely a wrongly reported version taken from the net.

From the same article

Andrei Tarasenko own website published his article about the same all the T-90A. It has a plaque on bronezaschite. Honestly, these are too low, but I will not dwell on this fact and insist. Simply quote, conditionally agreeing with them: to determine the equivalent BPS Tarasenko protect the front part of the T-90A at 800mm. At the same site Tarasenko in his own article, "U.S. tank ammunition caliber 120mm" gives the following values ​​of American armor penetration BPS, calculated from Lanza Odermata: M-829A1-651 mm, M-829A2 - 710 mm, M-829A3 - 770 mm. In addition, for modifications A1 and A2 are also forecasted values ​​of the Russian Institute of Steel and data TASOM. A1 for 700 and 635mm, respectively, for A2 - 750 and 620mm

The T-90 has been extensively shot up in testing.

Amusingly enough, the Oplot cannot say the same, whatsoever.

Indeed, it reminds me of the Lynx vs Tigr-M competition where the Tigr was better cross country, so the main reason for buying the Lynx is because it is supposedly better protected, but because Russia has not been allowed to test their protection levels they really don't have any hard data to base that on... apart from claims about NATO experience with them.

The obvious problem there of course is that conflicts in Chechnia and Georgia that represent the sort of conflicts Russia might find itself in in the near future involve rather better quality anti vehicle weapons than those the west has come up against in Iraq and Afghanistan.


I used to think the T-80U was the best Soviet tank, till I read the results of the tests on Fofanovs page that clearly showed that the T-90 wasn't just an upgraded T-72 with T-80 electronics.

The T-90s armour was better than the T-80s and the autoloader arranged the ammo in a much safer way than the T-80 did. The result is that the T-90 is better protected and safer if penetrated... with real tests you can say such things for certain, whereas without tests you can only assume.

GarryB wrote:I used to think the T-80U was the best Soviet tank, till I read the results of the tests on Fofanovs page that clearly showed that the T-90 wasn't just an upgraded T-72 with T-80 electronics.

The T-90s armour was better than the T-80s and the autoloader arranged the ammo in a much safer way than the T-80 did. The result is that the T-90 is better protected and safer if penetrated... with real tests you can say such things for certain, whereas without tests you can only assume.

The best part about that is I'm positive given the time the tests were carried out it was the original T-90 with the cast turret shape of the T-72B, rather than the welded Vladimir turret.

Is Shtora-1 capable to jamming Kornet-ATGM Guidance ? How about system like LAHAT can Shtora-1 jam it ?

Good question.

I believe LAHAT is laser homing, so it might not be as vulnerable to IR dazzlers as some of the other weapons out there. However, the laser designator will trip the LWS and the automatic smoke screen will still render the missile useless, as Lahat wont be able to locate the designators reflection through the smoke.

I'm not sure about Kornet though. Beam riders work by sending out multiple lasers that form a vertical conical grid pattern with the center on the target. The missile knows what sector it's in based on a sensor on the rear of the missile that detects the laser, calculates were it's at on the grid, and corrects accordingly. Basically, the missile does the guiding and the laser beam itself wouldn't really be effected by the dazzlers. Note the contrast between beam riding systems and weapons like the BGM-71. With the TOW, the missile has an IR flare on it's back, facing the launcher, and the launcher sends a signal through the wires to the missile and attempts to center the flare with the target. Think of it like lining up two dots. Shtora works by making one of the dots so bright that the system cannot locate the flare on the missile, thus sending the missile out of control.

Back to Kornet, the only link in the chain I see being affected is the guy shooting the missile. I'm not sure how bright the IR dazzlers would be in his scope. Another thing is the laser beam that guides the missile to the target is rather weak and supposedly will not trip laser warning systems, thus Shtora wouldn't even engage the missile in the first place.

Is Shtora-1 capable to jamming Kornet-ATGM Guidance ? How about system like LAHAT can Shtora-1 jam it ?

I responded to this same question some time ago , i will try to resume the central points:



A "classical" laser guided ATGM detect ,with its seeker, the coded laser radiation reflected from the intended target ; in substance the designation beam must be strong enough and maintain a sufficient cohesion not only to allow an efficient irradiation of the target -up to its maximum range- but ,above all, to allow its diffracted component to be received back by the missile's seeker so to obtain its precise position .


This produce four tactically important effects:

1) LWR on board the designated target have a very easy time in detecting and triangulate exact originating position of the designation laser beam.
2) Is not possible to point the laser above the target (to prevent its crew to be alerted of the impending attack) because the missile's seeker would not receive any beam return and would go totally out of track (the maximum possible to do is to be lucky enough to have an environmental element ,with the right reflective qualities, very near to the target to use as "momentary target" for the ATGM in-flight ) .
3) Any measure present on the intended target (like ad-hoc paints and surface materials present on modern MBTs and IFVs) aimed at reduce laser reflective index reduce significantly the range and the Pk of a similarly guided ATGM.
4) Any effect capable to disperse the laser beam's cohesion or block its passage ,both toward and from the target, interrupt instantly also missile guidance putting it out track( even for very brief beam interruptions the chances, by part of the seeker, to re-acquire the right angular FOV and capture another time the beam reflection become near to zero).



Laser beam riding ATGMs, such as Kornet series, instead DON'T employ the laser beam "reflected" from the target and captured from head mounted seeker to home on it, but use the laser sensors placed of the rear part of the missile to compute the angular projection from the original irradiating point so to calculate the necessary correction to remain within it at the variation of its direction; in reality ,therefore, it DON'T HOME on any target but literally "encounter" a target placed on the same line of the laser beams within the conical projection of which it remain. (only to provide a clear example : one advanced training exercise with those kind of missiles involved the pointing of the beams just over the top of a near hill only to collimate them ,in the last seconds of missile's flight with targets placed on hill's surface simulating enemy infantry fire positions and APC or with targets randomly popping-out from the top of the same hill simulating instead the rotors of enemy helicopter's using terrain masking techniques).


The different working principles of laser beam riding missiles have as effect that :

1) The necessary magnitudo for the rider laser beam is immensely inferior in respect to that of classical laser homing missiles with the effect that possibility to alert even the most modern LWR is very low.
2) The shooters can point the beams literally anywhere (in particular them can be pointed above the intended target to don't offer to enemy any chance to become aware of the impending attack) and redirect easily the missile from a target to another.
3) Targets with low or very low laser reflective index can be attacked without any penalty.
4) An hindering element capable to block the riding laser beam must be placed between the irradiating point and the back sensors on the missile in order to successfully interrupt missile guidance !!
This is the reason because those missiles are portrayed as unjammable.




Returning to your main question : a 3D17 delivered aerosol screen at 60 m from an IFV or a MBT would interrupt instantly missile guidance of a LAHAT (the wavelengths blocked extend even to wide majority of thermal ones !!) at any point of its flight; the same 3D17 aerosol screen at 60 meters from a target attacked by a Kornet-EM would interrupt missile guidance.....just 20 hundredths of a seconds before impact with the intended target .

Is Shtora-1 capable to jamming Kornet-ATGM Guidance ? How about system like LAHAT can Shtora-1 jam it ?

Kornet uses a laser boresighted to a crosshair in a sight. All the so called guidance takes place on board the missile which looks back at the launch platform to see the laser and its position within that laser and manouvers itself into the centre of the beam.

Neither the missile nor the launch platform actually need to see the target and therefore there is not much chance of jamming it.

Besides Shtora is 1990s stuff... I rather suspect they have moved forward and have an ESM suite that allows jamming of IIR and MMW radar guided weapons as well as optically guided too using a DIRCM defence system.

Thanks Mindstorm you have my vote.

Mindstorm wrote:
Returning to your main question : a 3D17 delivered aerosol screen at 60 m from an IFV or a MBT would interrupt instantly missile guidance of a LAHAT (the wavelengths blocked extend even to wide majority of thermal ones !!) at any point of its flight; the same 3D17 aerosol screen at 60 meters from a target attacked by a Kornet-EM would interrupt missile guidance.....just 20 hundredths of a seconds before impact with the intended target .

Wouldnt the aerosol screen can also be effective against Kornet as the screen would block the view of Kornet operator for couple of minutes and that would give time for the tank to slide off in any direction to its safety.

I mean as long as the smoke screen blocks the view of the tank in IR/Laser/Thermal and Optical Spectrum it would remain effective against all type of guidance barring perhaps RF MMW seeker that is used in F&F missile

To Admins.

I wonder if we could Archive some good post on this thread and have a seperate Archive Thread so that it does not get lost and in future we can use it for FAQ , Many good posters like Mindstorm ,Garry and many others have good post that are worth archiving