Khepesh wrote:
Edit: Enot Corps left Donbass last year saying that essentially due to the political situation there was no reason to remain, and that maybe return in five years when the situation requires it. Seems five years was a very long overestimate and they advise those who want to go to Donbass to fight should slowly collect pack packs and that it will not be a waste of time. This should be seen as a serious indication that war could occur in the not distant future.
What does all this mean?
Please explain what is Enot Corps, and why they advise people not to hurry to go fighting to Donbass? Or are you being ironic?
I think what remains is just the endgame. Ukraine can no longer expect military aid from US and NATO, so it's all over. The Ukranian army is a spent force without any serious offensive capability. These are the death throes, but I do not expect them to commit to a final offensive.
For various reasons and simple logic, I know Basurin is deliberately minimizing the extent of the fighting, he is not giving accurate numbers of enemy shells fired because that is simply impossible.
I rechecked my posts. I had set a minimum threshold of a hundred daily casualties as the average for a low intensity war. That has been confirmed throughout 2014 and 2015 (in fact actual casualties were even bigger), but I rechecked, since I thought big battles were driving up the average and in 2016 there haven't been any of those.
Just going by the confirmed reports of wounded arriving to Ukranian hospitals, I am certain that Ukranian casualties average 50 daily, wich would fit with the overall picture. The catch is that the fighting has been nonstop for the entire year and at a higher level of intensity than most of 2015, Debaltsevo pocket excluded.
I took the seven month period of March-October, and in those 200 days the ukrainians will have suffered 10,000 casualties, one third dead, and that is a low end estimate. By years end it will be much closer to my previous 20,000 casualties projection. And that is based on known losses from mostly two hospitals.
Being pessimistic Novorussian casualties are a third of that. I feel though that the exchanges are more likely 1/4 or 1/5. I hope to be wrong.
Not decisive losses in themselves, but by various reasons the junta can't replace it's losses, as it has to discharge conscripts after one year of service and there are not enough volunteers. I expect they will have to draft again those previously mobilized, or order a 7th levy.