That is true. However, what are the chances of Russia fighting the US/NATO.....very very slim. What are the chances of US/NATO fighting Syria or Iran......like 50%+ which is beyond dangerous limits.
And do you think that is an accident of nature?
Or the fact that the Russians have a strong air defence network plus nuclear weapons is the main reason that the likelyhood of a NATO strike on Russia is very low to non existent.
The NATO attack system designed to operate around the world against little weak countries does what they have paid for, but I rather think a fight against Syria and Iran is a serious step up from most of there previous adventures except Vietnam and Korea... Of course in Korea it was pure numbers of Chinese that caused the stalemate, and in Vietnam it was basically the willingness of the people to endure hell to get foreign powers out of their country... first France, then for a short period during WWII Japan and then France again and then the US... and then even the Chinese took on the Vietnamese and lost.
If I were a third world country, then to be able to defeat or insulate from Suter and cousins, would be my among top 3 requirements before buying a SAM system. I bet Russians can offer additional training to the client states on how to get around this problem. The real battle is in the ability to sell high profit margin weapons all round the globe.
Any network manager will be interested in keeping out trojan horses and viruses and worms, and they will know that one fix is not enough, you need to use local network experts and security experts trying full time to hack your system, because they will eventually find weaknesses that you can close and make your system more secure.
Just as no air defence system is 100% perfect and it needs continual work to keep up to date and effective and air defence network is the same.
Encryption and protocols to ensure keys are secure is critical, but measures to deal with successful hacks are also necessary so you can deal with it when it happens to minimise the damage.
Regarding your Growler question, it is hard to say and will be different for different target radar types.
Most ESA type radars are resistant to jamming and support systems including decoys and ground based jammers have a part to play as well.
For instance you might have two S-400 batteries located close together with one batteries radars operating looking for threats while the radars of the other battery are listening but not transmitting.
A jammer that is not a dumb noise jammer will try to mimic the signal it receives with a delay and a boosted signal so the delay will make the return signal appear to have been from a target further away than the Growler actually is and the boosted return signal in addition to the extra range to the target will make the radar think there is a very big radar return from a greater distance than the Growler actually is.
From the other radar silent site however it will detect the signal from the growler as coming from a slightly different angle so when the data from both batteries is sent up the ADN chain they each wont see the target the other sees except the actual growler... the information from both systems will cancel out and only the Growler will be plotted. The false targets will be checked based on the other listening radars in the region will will all show the large false target but all in different locations so the false targets will be flagged as false targets and ignored.
Vehicles closer to the location of the Growler could be directed to confirm, so a Pantsir-S1 operating directly below the Growler with its radar turned off could use its EOs to find the Growler and also look for the huge false target. It will of course find the Growler but come up empty with the false targets, but if it is listening with its radar then it might detect the false signal too, which will further confirm it is a false signal.