Of course - but the fact remains- Russian industry has had no problem making innovative and excellent weapons and munitions, that have barely seen actually unit delivery- or have been delivered in anemic numbers. See tank ammunition, precision munitions in AF units, precision artillery rounds, AAMs etc etc.
I can't help but to remain unconvinced 200km munitions are in any widespread service.
Exist only two main factors contributing to the....at least apparent....scarce ,widespread presence of up-to-date ammunitions among Russian Army and Air Force units in PEACETIME stance
1) A truly IMMNESE amount of ammunitions
(literally of any type and for any branch of the Armed Forces) inherited from URSS
, majority of which with a significative residual operative live and the number and characteristics of which represent still today even an huge overkill against virtually all likely conventional enemy.
2) The strongly rooted habit
(also that inherited from cardinal principles of Soviet Military Doctrine) at information's corruption and denial
, through or the controled "leaks" to opposing sides of staged technical documentation or downgraded specimens (in URSS times the so called monkey models) or the direct subtraction ,until possible, from enemy Intel's echelons even of the same physical specimens of the most critical systems (and therefore theirs CONOPS and strong/weak points).On the 2008 conflict
, for example, has been wrote tons of articles and books but ,up to this time, complementary interests from both parts
- Western analysts and Institutions , frustrated by the clamorous Intel's debacle
interested ,at least ,in capitalize the instance for attack and attempt to tarnish, as usual, Russian Military's name
,while on the Russian side not only negate to NATO's observers ANY type of information on ANY type of up-to date weaponry or strategic and tactical concept of operations but also promote toward internal public opinion the roundness of the ongoing ,military reform and future substantial increase of military spending
- has prevented an honest ,realistic analysis to be conducted
. This conflict
,that we must never forget, was won in only 5 days and at very TRIVIAL costs
(you can only image the length and the stellar costs involved if the same conflict would have been conducted by NATO ; only the Air Campaign would have encompassed more than a month and half of operations
) ; was a clear example of operation attentively prepared and executed mantaining as central requirement systematic information denial toward NATO's observers and ELINT units preset in the theatre
, employing not only almost exclusively the most outdated weaponry available to the divisons in the area but limiting or even avoiding completely any "sensible" EM emission (among the crew of the US Navy "aid ship" purposely prepared and sent to the Black Sea ,likely would be manifested ,in those days, a very high amount of cases of mental disorders and manic depressive syndromes
In the meantime T-72B..... T-62 and even ....some T-55...was engaging Georgian ground forces, Russian Navy was destroying Georgian unities only with....P-120 Malakhit...and Russian aircraft avoided like hell the use even only of the most outdated versions of Kh-59 miissiles or KAB-L precision bomb series of which exist a stock pile more than sufficient to desroy several times all main military targets in both Europe and USA