Older warfare performance and short/mid-term decommissions

Some aircrafts which decommission must be confirmed, in some cases, to remain as monuments:

Looking monuments:
Be-12: http://russianplanes.net/reginfo/31995
Yak-38: http://russianplanes.net/reginfo/34650
Tu-16: http://russianplanes.net/reginfo/69173
Tu-16: http://russianplanes.net/reginfo/69164
Tu-16: http://russianplanes.net/reginfo/69176
Tu-16: http://russianplanes.net/reginfo/82229
Be-6: http://russianplanes.net/reginfo/80108
MiG-9: http://russianplanes.net/reginfo/23004

Remains captured in Crimea:
Yak-38: http://russianplanes.net/reginfo/35769
Yak-38: http://russianplanes.net/reginfo/49190
Yak-38: http://russianplanes.net/reginfo/35823

Remains in Ukraine:
Yak-38: http://russianplanes.net/reginfo/34974

The number of active units of the Be-12 reduced to 5 (all in Sebastopol):

http://russianplanes.net/planelist/Beriev/Be-12

http://russianplanes.net/reginfo/33411
http://russianplanes.net/reginfo/33282
http://russianplanes.net/reginfo/33405
http://russianplanes.net/reginfo/33345
http://russianplanes.net/reginfo/32997

Also, there are today 34 units in the reserve.

These are the 2 units that go to the reserve in 2016.

http://russianplanes.net/reginfo/33396
http://russianplanes.net/reginfo/32991

The aircraft seems almost exhausted. A total retirement of the aircraft seems to be near.

In the refered to the air material, the analysis of the results of the scrapping process in the first half of 2017, detailed in the references 17.0001 to 17.0049 plus 17.0071 to 17.0072, gives the following results:

- In the refered to the combat aircrafts and helicopers, in this quarter it has not been material from the scrapping process of no-one type of combat aircraft or helicopter in the cited references. The scrapping activity seems stopped. There is some report of complete engines of the following types of combat aircraft and helicopter offered to auction:

Yak-28: 13 engines (It seems a total liquidation of the components stored of this aircraft).

Mi-8/9/13/14/17/18/19/24/25/35/171/172/177: 75 engines (Mi-8=46, Mi-24=29)
MiG-23: 15 engines

Like in the case of the land warfare, the evolution of the air warfare in the War in Donbass always has been take into account in this topic.

The recent publication of The Military Balance 2017 allows to make an homogeneous comparation with the data published by the same source in The Military Balance 2014.

These would be the differences in the refered to the air warfare:

- 080.00% Be-12

- 047,93% Mi-8/9/13/14/17/18/19/24/25/35/171/172/177
- 013.88% Su-25/28/39

- 080.00% First group
- 043.08% Second group
- 044.49% Total subsonic air warfare

- 061.02% Su-24
- 058.89% MiG-29/35
- 005.56% Su-27/30/33/35

- 049.19% Total supersonic air warfare

- 046.43% Total air warfare

Note that like in the case of the land warfare, this would not be a recount of war loses. It would be the variation between the begin of 2014 and the begin of 2017 for every model of combat aircraft and helicopter, according to the source that publish The Militrary Balance (which is clearly pro-Western). Then it would include the variation caused by loses in the war, the variation caused by own decommissions and the variation caused by incorporation of new units of these models.

If we compare these data with the most reliable source about air loses of Ukraine during the war

https://aviation-safety.net/wikibase/dblist.php?Country=UR

we can see how the data offered by The Military Balance are not compatible with the certified loses in one case, except if it has been an incorporation of new foreign units during this time. The case is bolded and signaled in red in the previous list. The transfer to Ukraine of material of Su-25/28/39 would not be limited only to spare parts, also would include material for aditional units.

In this case is easy to identify the countries that helped to Ukraine to improve their number of units of Su-25/28/39. Clearly would be Bulgaria.

My point about the reserve is a little different. The reserve is not, or should not be simply a storing of the oldest material. The material in the reserve should be to be used first, without touch the capabilities of the active forces. The material in the reserve should be combat ready, especially the oldest part of the reserve that would be to be used first.

Then it is important to reach a saturation of the reserve, and to create a continuous rythm of production that allows to a continuous renovation of the material. Habitually the level for a saturation of the reserve depends mostly of the size of the active force, that is not a totally fixed amount.

Also it is important to take into account the different roles, but with an open vision. It is possible to find different ways to do the same, technological innovations allow to it.

Fighter Interceptors:
- Valoration of the role: To remain.
- Outdated models as military concept: -
- Oldest model that remains actual as military concept: MiG-25/31.
- Saturation of the reserve: In saturation. My stimation is that Russia would need 7 or less aircrafts to reach a saturation of the reserve.
- Production of new aircrafts for the role: -
- New projects in development: MiG-41-PAK-DP
In my view the role continues being very actual and useful and is to remain, mantaining their main feature and advantage, that is to have significantly bigger speed than aircrafts of other roles. Then, as long as the development of the MiG-41 is not finnished and its production is not started, I do not expect a retirement of MiG-25/31 aircrafts, because it would mean a reduction of the fleet of fighter interceptors that I do not expect. Also the aircraft still remains actual as military concept. In my view these are the main reasons why aircrafts of this role (MiG-25/31) are not being transfered to Syria.

Fighters:  Including Air Superiority and Multirole
- Valoration of the role: To remain.
- Outdated models as military concept: -
- Oldest model that remains actual as military concept: MiG-23.
- Saturation of the reserve: Not satured. My stimation is that Russia would need 120 aircrafts to reach a saturation of the reserve.
- Production of new aircrafts for the role: Su-PAK-FA, Su-27/30/33/35, MiG-29/35
- New projects in development:
In this case, the main problem that I see for the retirement of the MiG-23 is that after the retirement of aircrafts in the previous two decades, today the reserves of aircrafts of this role are not reaching the saturation. Also the aircraft still remains actual as military concept. In my view these are the main reasons why aircrafts of this role (MiG-23) are not being retired or supplied to Syria.

Strategic Bombers: Including long range Maritime Bombers
- Valoration of the role: To remain.
- Outdated models as military concept: Il-38, Tu-95/142
- Oldest model that remains actual as military concept: Tu-22.
- Saturation of the reserve: Not satured. My stimation is that Russia would need 91 aircrafts to reach a saturation of the reserve. But the number would be reduced if the joint active fleet decreases.
- Production of new aircrafts for the role: Tu-160
- New projects in development: Tu-PAK-DA
The role has been under question but is proving to be useful, not only for the use of nuclear weapons but also in its orignial activity of longe range bombing. It requires a configuration and a size of aircrafts that is clearly different to other roles. In the last decades, with the adition of maritime reconnaissance, surveillance and patrol, the long range maritime bombing hability has been considered a different role, but today, the trend is to see unmanned smaller aircrafts assuming reconnaissance, surveillance and patrol roles, and it helps to unify the entire long range bombing hability in a single role. The difference between ground and sea targets and types of weapons is not big enough to keep the difference of roles, and very likely future strategic bombers will be able to afford land and sea, including submarine targets.
Looking at the form that is taking this role for the future, the speed is becoming a feature more important still than it was in the past. With independent reconnaissance, surveillance and patrol (on sea and on land), sometimes done by unmanned aircrafts and spacecrafts, plus detection installations (radars,...), there is a factor of fast answer of increasing importance for the strategic bombing, in adition to the important value of the speed in the safety of the strategic bombers facing the weapons of the adversary in contested areas.
While the development of unmanned shipborne longe range aircrafts for reconnaissance, surveillance and patrol, is less advanced than the development of man-portable air defense (in the case of the FGA), at this point, subsonic aircrafts for long range bombing (today Il-38 and Tu-95-142) are becoming also outdated. The Be-12 has not enough range to be considered a long range bomber, and as consequence is not in this cathegory.
But looking at the state of the reserve of long range bombers, it should not be decommissions still until to reach a saturation of the reserve. In fact, the lack of saturation of the reserve is a sign of lower strenght of the fleet of Strategic Bombers compared to the fleets for other roles, and this would be in my view, the main reason for the restart of the production of the Tu-160, with an important order of 50 aircrafts.

Fighters Ground Attack: Including Close Air Support aircrafts and short range Maritime Bombers
- Valoration of the role: To remain.
- Outdated models as military concept: Be-12, Su-25/28/39
- Oldest model that remains actual as military concept: MiG-27, Su-17/20/22.
- Saturation of the reserve: In saturation. Without include the Be-12, my stimation is that Russia would need 2 aircrafts to reach the exact point of saturation (at the begin of 2017). The Be-12 fleet would be a surplus.
- Production of new aircrafts for the role: Su-34/32
- New projects in development: -
With the development of the man-portable air defenses, the military concept, the fighting style, of Close Air Support is declining. The CAS is becoming an obsolety fighting strategy only usable where the adversary has not man-portable air defense. Today there is not an aircraft that can resist the impact of a man-portable air defense system, and it will not be in the future. As consequence the aircrafts that based its fighting strategy in armour to resist projectiles coming from the land adversary, in order to remain attacking them close to the land lost their strategic advantage, and as consequence become fairly outdated. These aircrafts today, in order to fight vs adversaries with man-portable air defense must adopt an strategy of ground attack from higher distance, like the rest of the FGA, with the disadvantage of being not prepared for it like the rest.
Obviously there are also longer range air defense systems that can defeat other types of FGA, but are far less common, and only the biggest powers control more to who supply them.
Under these conditions, despite to be a decade older, I think the MiG-27 and the Su-17/20/22 have advantage over the Su-25/28/39 in order to remain in the Russian Armed Forces. It means not that the Su-25/28/39 is not useful still. In cases like Syria, under Syrian flag the aircraft would be able to fight still in Close Air Support style (taking some risks that under Russian flag would not).
But the less modern of the aircrafts of this role in terms of performance would be the Be-12, which place is fairly uncertain out of the previous role of maritime bomber, and wich total retirement would not affect to the Russian military capabilities on this role. Looking that the alternatives in production, and at the state of the reserve, there is not problem to begin decommissions in this group. First in line would be the Be-12 (5 active and 34 in the reserve today).

Helicopters of Combat:
- Valoration of the role: To remain with unmanned vehicles.
- Outdated models as military concept: Mi-8/9/13/14/17/18/19/24/25/35/171/172/177, Mi-28, Ka-52/50
- Oldest model that remains actual as military concept: -
- Saturation of the reserve: Not satured.
- Production of new aircrafts for the role: Mi-8/9/13/14/17/18/19/24/25/35/171/172/177, Mi-28, Ka-52/50
- New projects in development: Not public.
In this case the entire concept of combat helicopter is under revision. Helicopters for combat roles are vulnerable, and new technologies are showing the way to avoid the casualties, going to unmanned helicopters.
Today, the unmanned combat aircrafts/helicopters, are still less developed than unmanned aircrafts/helicopters for reconnaissance, surveillance or patrol roles, but we begin to see something. Maybe still early to have real alternatives to the current helicopters in the battlefield, even maybe be too early to cut the production and procurement of new units of the current combat helicopter models, but in other stages, as example looking at the development of new models to replace the current fleet of combat helicopters, surely we are in the right time to rule out the development of more manned combat helicopters. Another example is that it would not make sense to reach the level of saturation of the reserves with warfare of a military concept that begins to decline.
While there is not an advanced unmanned alternative in production, I expect the current fleet to remain stable.
Note that the difference between combat helicopters and auxiliary helicopters (transport, training, utility,...) is in the hability to carry and use armament. The Ka-27/28/29/31/32 seems closer to what would be an auxiliary helicopter (also some non-military ships of the coast guard are able to carry some torpedo).

-----------

As resume:
1.- In the short term I only expect the total decommission of the Be-12, including of the reserve. To Syria?, like France used the Breguet Atlantique 2? Maybe.
2.- Next in line for a total decommission? Uncertain.

3.- Three models of combat helicopter in production maybe redundant. In the short term it is possible the stop of the production of the Mi-8/9/13/14/17/18/19/24/25/35/171/172/177 (also from an air transport point with the new Mi-38).
4.- I do not expect the development of new models of only subsonic Strategic Bombers.
5.- I do not expect the development of new models of only subsonic Fighter Ground Attack aircrafts. I do not expect the old order of Be-200 to be completed (to work as short range maritime bomber).
6.- I do not expect the development of new models of manned Combat Helicopters.

This would be compatible with my point about the reserve. I see it compatible.

Also the material stored, in the reserve, or even decommissioned, is logically the material for helping to allies.

eehnie wrote:There is an interesting sequence of news that is interesting to read together. I readed time ago the first, and I was finding the second but unsuccessfully until now, despite it is from a little before to begin this topic. Reading all them together it is easier to have a better understanding of what is being done for the replacement of the Be-12, the Il-38/20/22 and (maybe) the Tu-142.

The first new, the declaration of June 2015 about a decission to be made in the short term (then) about a platform to be elected to replace the current fleet of Anti-Submarine Aircrafts:

https://translate.google.com/translate?hl=en&sl=ru&tl=en&u=http%3A%2F%2Fria.ru%2Fdefense_safety%2F20150630%2F1103958839.html

aircraft IL-38 and IL-20 will be put up to 2020

11:06 30/06/2015 (updated 11:08 30.06.2015)

Противолодочный самолет Ил-38. Архивное фото
© RIA Novosti. Vitaly Ankov Go to the photo bank
Unified platform, created to replace the IL-38, as well as other anti-aircraft type will be completely new and will replace all existing naval aviation park patrol cars, said the head of the Naval Aviation Russian Major-General Igor Kozhin.
Zhukovsky (Moscow region)., June 30 - RIA Novosti The new unified platform to replace the aircraft IL-38 and IL-20 in the interest of the Russian Navy Naval Aviation will be introduced until 2020, told reporters on Tuesday the head of the Naval Aviation Russian Major-General Igor. Kozhin.

"The platform is now selected by 2020 it will be introduced, will be the general structure." - Kozhin said, answering journalists' questions about the timing of input of the new platform.

According to the chief of naval aviation, unified platform, created to replace the IL-38, as well as other anti-aircraft type will be completely new and will replace all existing naval aviation park patrol cars.

"This is a new, modern car that many issues will surpass foreign analogues Now we evaluate the possibility of building on it." - Kozhin said, answering journalists' questions about the main characteristics of the new platform, which should enter into operation in 2020.

The second new, the new of July 2015 announcing which platform has been selected:

https://translate.google.com/translate?hl=en&sl=auto&tl=en&u=http%3A%2F%2Fria.ru%2Fdefense_safety%2F20150717%2F1134034092.html&sandbox=1

Source: Russian Navy intends to 2020 to buy the planes on the basis of the Be-200

14:47 17/07/2015 (updated 14:49 07.17.2015)

Самолет Бе-200. Архивное фото
© RIA Novosti. Sergey Levanenkov
Fleet Command made a decision to purchase up to 2020 on the basis of hydroplanes Be-200 to search, detect and destroy submarines, said a senior official of the Russian Navy.

MOSCOW, July 17 -. RIA Novosti Command of the Navy until 2020, it intends to order the game industry such as hydroplanes Be-200 to detect and destroy submarines, told RIA Novosti on Friday, a senior official of the Russian Navy.

In Russia on July 17 is the day of naval aviation of the Navy.

"Command of the Navy decided to purchase necessary to 2020 on the basis of hydroplanes Be-200 to search, detect and destroy submarines," - a spokesman said.

He recalled that at the present time as part of the Navy Naval Aviation are hydroplanes Be-12, which service life is coming to an end. The new aircraft Be-12 is no longer produced.

The structure of Naval Aviation of the Russian Navy includes deck, anti-submarine, military transport and assault aircraft.

Day Sea Russian Navy aviation's celebrated on the day when the Russian pilots were victorious in a dogfight over the Baltic Sea during the First World War - 17 July 1916 four hydroplane M-9 aircraft carrier vessel "eagle" of the Baltic fleet rose into the air and clashed with four German planes.

And finally, a related new of March 2016 showing what is after the word platform in the news about the replacement of the current fleet of maritime patrol aircrafts:

https://translate.google.com/translate?depth=3&hl=en&rurl=translate.google.com&sl=auto&tl=en&u=http://ria.ru/defense_safety/20160303/1383612879.html

ASW seaplanes A-40 will replace the Russian Black Sea Fleet on the legacy BE-12

12:29 03/03/2016 (updated: 03.03.2016 12:39)

Самолет-амфибия А-40 (Альбатрос). Архивное фото
© RIA Novosti. Roman Denisov Go to the photo bank
Full update Naval Aviation Russian Black Sea Fleet of the park will be completed by 2020, said BSF MA Colonel Gennady Zagonov.
SEVASTOPOL, March 3 -. RIA News New anti seaplanes A-40 "Albatros" will replace the amphibious aircraft Be-12 in the framework of the Black Sea Fleet of complete renewal of the Naval Aviation (MA BSF) Russia in 2020, told reporters on Thursday the chief MA BSF Colonel Gennady Zagonov.

"Amphibious aircraft Be-12 will be replaced by modern anti-aircraft A-40 by 2020", - he said.

Multipurpose amphibian A-40 "Albatross" (Be-42, a product "B", according to NATO codification: Mermaid) - Soviet multipurpose amphibious aircraft was planned to replace the Be-12. The project was halted after the Soviet Union collapsed, then repeatedly declared to resume production.

Taking into account that the Be-200 (of 37900Kg of Takeoff Weight and 2100Km of range), is based on the Be A-40 (of 86000Kg of Takeoff Weight and 4100Km of Range), we begin to see the true sense of the word platform here.

Also taking into account that 6 Be-200 were ordered in 2013 and seems to be for combat roles, this is what I can understand from all this:

1.- The family formed by the Be A-40 and the Be-200 has been selected to replace the Be-12 and the Il-38/20/22. The Tu-204/214 and the Il-114 will not be used for the maritime patrol role. Both seems rejected.

2.- While is not well reflected in the news, the Be-200 has the size of the Be-12 and the Be A-40 is a little bigger than the Il-38/20/22. These would be the logical replacements if there are new orders for both.

3.- The work on this is far more advanced than expected. The replacement of both aircrafts will begin before the end of the decade, and the replacement of the Be-12 can be finished by the end of the decade.

4.- The effort on design will be low. The Be-200 is an aircraft in production and the Be A-40 would be in production before 2020.

5.- With the unmanned technologies coming, there is some risk for these aircrafts to become obsolete early in their life cycle. To take a traditional manned aircraft as solution for the future maritime patrol requires to have the new aircrafts as fast as possible, and to keep low the costs of design and development. This solution seems to do it.

6.- Thinking about it, a seaplane can have advange on range over other types of aircrafts if it is possible to refuel them from ships. It can make another way of "shipborne" maritime patrol, where the range begins to count from the ship.

In overall terms this solution seems to maximize the features for manned aircrafts done according to the old mold,

Since 2013 it was a contract signed for the procurement of Be-200, that now seems to be stopped.

https://www.russiadefence.net/t4640-be-200-multirole-amphipian#203418

franco wrote:The contract for the delivery of Be-200 aircraft to the Ministry of Defense of Russia is terminated

As RBC's agency reported on August 30, 2017, the Moscow Arbitration Court granted the claim of the Defense Ministry of Russia about the recovery from the PJSC "Taganrog aviation scientific and technical complex named after G.M. Beriev" as an unscheduled advance of more than 6.726 billion rubles.

   The specified amount was paid to the Ministry of Defense as an advance on the contract concluded in 2013 on the supply of five [actually six] Amphibian Be-200BC aircraft, but none of the aircraft was ultimately delivered to the agency.

   Based on the results of the case, the Moscow Arbitration Court decided to terminate the contract concluded between the Ministry of Defense and TANTK, to collect from the aircraft factory an unearned advance and 200 thousand rubles. duties in favor of the state.

On the bmpd side, we recall that the PJSC "Taganrog Aviation Scientific and Technical Complex named after G.M. Beriev" (TANTK) concluded on May 23, 2013 with the Ministry of Defense of Russia a state contract for the supply of Russian Navy aviation to two Be-200BC aircraft and four modified aircrafts Be-200PS (without extinguishing function) with a total cost of 8.4 billion rubles. The delivery was to be made under the terms of the contract in 2014-2016, but the construction of these aircraft (serial numbers 03-09, 03-10 and 03-51 to 03-54), according to known data, did not advance further than the initial stage. It was reported that as early as in 2016 the Ministry of Defense of Russia suspended the implementation of this contract.

In my view, the main reason for the cancellation of this order is not in mistakes or incompetence. Russia does what Russia wants to do. And Russia wanted to do Be-200 for the Ministery of Emergencies, and wanted not to do Be-200 for the Ministery of Defense.

The Be-200 is a civil aircraft. As aircraft for Maritime Patrol is a good option to solve the role by the old way, but with the development of unmanned aircrafts, this role will be strongly affected and will change a lot. Today simply is not in the interest of Russia to buy new aircrafts of the old mold that can remain 50 years in the Russian Armed Forces. A new way to solve the role is coming fast and the transition will be easier for Russia without the Be-200.

As you can see in the following link, in one of the last paragraphs, the cancellation of this contract without being made and completed was predictable, and has nothing to do with incompetence. The Be-200 can have a future but as civil aircraft.

https://www.russiadefence.net/t4312p75-russian-transport-aircraft-fleet-vta#189143
https://www.russiadefence.net/t4957p225-russian-military-reforms-command-structure-strength#164291

After this cancellation, I think the whole plan for the replacement of the Be-12 and the Il-38 with Be-200 and Be-A-40, exposed in the first quote of this comment, seems to fall to the new ways of solving the role. Also likely the Be-12 will be totally decommissioned fast, including of the reserve.

Be-12 is already too old design.

Any guess what will be the solution you mentioned?

T-47 wrote:Be-12 is already too old design.

Any guess what will be the solution you mentioned?

It would be out of this topic, but here is a reference to previous comments that I find not and that explained it fairly well. This reference cites almost all the most important features that the new model of maritime patrol can have.

https://www.russiadefence.net/t2897p400-russian-naval-aviation-news#203753

Interesting. Both counts seem to be very coincident.

https://russianplanes.net/planelist/Beriev/Be-12

Listed as active:

http://russianplanes.net/reginfo/33411  <-->  29-04  1973  RF-12009  Nº20
http://russianplanes.net/reginfo/33282  <-->  21-02  1970  RF-12010  Nº29
http://russianplanes.net/reginfo/33405  <-->  29-02  1973  RF-12007  Nº12
http://russianplanes.net/reginfo/33345  <-->  26-02  1972  XXxxxxxx  Nº01
http://russianplanes.net/reginfo/32997  <-->  29-01  1973  RF-12006  Nº10

To the reserve in 2016.

http://russianplanes.net/reginfo/32991  <-->  28-02  1973  RF-12012  Nº28
http://russianplanes.net/reginfo/33396  <-->  28-03  1973  XXxxxxxx  Nº 76  RESERVE/REPAIRS

The difference seems to be that very recently the Nº28 rejoined the base of Sebastopol after some paint and repair. If you see the link now there are very recent photos of the aircraft painted that were not at the time of my previous comment. Surely the web will be updated to include the return of the aircraft to active service, but until now they updated the new pictures with the aircraft painted.

The last of the links is just about the Nº76 about which you commented that have not be seen in fly for several years and is probably in repair plant. Just the link also says the aircraft is in Yevpatoria (Crimea), in the repair plant, but really I do not know if it is for repairing or to become spare parts.

In fact if you check every link for the Russian Be-12 listed by russianplanes.net as in the reserve, there is a reference of where the aircraft is or was sometime ago.

The last aircraft that gives me some doubt about if can be recovered or not is this one, in the reserve since 2008. Maybe you know something about it:

https://russianplanes.net/reginfo/33009  <-->  Nº15

About the overall replacement of the Be-12, my guess is that in the short term maybe done with some of the upgraded Il-38. If I'm not wrong, the contracted number of Il-38 to upgrade is a little bigger than the current number of Il-38 in active service. The surpluss maybe to take also the position of the Be-12 in Sebastopol. The last Be-12, I think they can go to Syria, maybe to work under Russian flag in the Russian base there, or maybe to work under Syrian flag. It would work a little more, but the aircraft seems almost exhausted.

Finally this was the solution proposed for a replacement of the Su-25 at a production level, and maybe to send them to the reserve:

https://sputniknews.com/military/201609151045349379-armored-su34-analysis/

Armored Su-34 Will Become a 'Revolutionary' Ground Support Aircraft

20:03 15.09.2016(updated 20:05 15.09.2016) Get short URL610790593

Over the past year, Russia's Sukhoi Su-34 fighter-bomber has been demonstrating its deadly potential against terrorists in Syria. According to independent military analyst Valentin Vasilescu, the next logical step for the plane's designers is to equip it with armor. This, the analyst emphasizes, will "revolutionize" its impact on the battlefield.
In his analysis, published in the independent news and geopolitical analysis website Voltairenet.org, Vasilescu emphasized that the Sukhoi Su-34 has already proven itself as a capable strike fighter.

The 45 ton, Mach 1.8-capable airplane, designed to carry up to 8 tons of weaponry, has a tactical radius of 4,000 km, and a flight ceiling of 18,000 meters. The plane can also be equipped with up to three additional fuel tanks, allowing to fly 8 hours without refueling.

Having been tested in real-world fighting conditions against Daesh and other militants in Syria in the course of the past year, Vasilescu explained that "one of the conclusions drawn by Russian military experts has been to expand the capabilities of this aircraft for ground attack missions," and "to replace the armored Sukhoi Su-25 [close air support aircraft], whose operational resource is running out."

If the Su-34 is to turn into a genuine close air support aircraft, it will have to be able to confidently enter into the range of portable surface-to-air missiles, anti-aircraft guns and enemy small arms fire, the analyst noted. "For this reason, the Su-34 will need armor plates to protect the flight deck, engines, fuel tanks and flight control systems. The dome cabin and its front window must also be armored."

The plates of this armor, according to Vasilescu, will require the use of 15-30 mm titanium, nylon-coated to stop explosive fragmentation. The aircraft will need to be capable of withstanding armor-piercing projectiles and explosives between 23 and 57 mm.
Meanwhile, the analyst noted, the Su-34 already has advanced electronic countermeasures against MANPADS and short-range radar-guided missiles. This system consists of the L-150 Pastel radar warning system, APP-50 decoy flare launchers and the KNIRTI SPS-171/L005S electronic countermeasure system, the latter mounted on the plane's topside.

In addition, the aircraft has a multi-target, passive electronically scanned array forward radar, enabling it to 'hunt' for enemy aircraft and equipment at a range of between 200-250 km. The plane is also equipped with rearward-facing radar, and can be equipped with the M402 Pika side-looking radar. In addition, its L175V/KS418, Digital RF Memory-equipped jamming system allows it to be used as a battlefield jammer.

Vasilescu emphasized that when it comes to aircraft armor design and testing, "that's not so difficult for the Russians, given the successful experience with the Su-25's armor. The Su-25 has a length of 15.5 m, a 14.3 m wingspan and a height of 4.8 m, while the Su-34 is 23.3 m long, 14.7 m wide and has a height of 6.1 m."

Accordingly, the "Su-34's armor will weigh between 800 and 1,000 kg, as opposed to that of the Su-25, which weighs 500 kg. The process will be completed in 2018, when the first group of 12 Su-34s will become operational for ground attack missions."
As a fighter-bomber with attack aircraft capability, it's only logical that the Su-34 can be equipped with long-range and short-range air-to-air missiles, including the R-77, the R-27 and the R-73. The Su-34s operating in Syria quickly received such missiles soon after a Turkish F-16 shot down a Russian Su-24M over northern Syria in November 2015.

Among the other benefits of an armored Su-34 is its capability to climb and cruise at heights between 8,000 and 12,000 m, allowing the pilot to familiarize himself with the tactical situation on the ground with the help of onboard sensors before swooping down for attack.

"The selection and continuous monitoring of selected targets is done using airborne radar and the Platan electro-optical targeting system, mounted on the fuselage. It is equipped with a laser target market which measures the distance to the target using laser telemetry."

The armored Su-34 is expected to carry out attacks on ground targets from heights between 1,000 to 3,000 meters, using small 50kg bombs, air-ground anti-tank missiles, S-5 rockets, as well as rounds from the onboard GSH-30-1 30 mm cannon.
Ultimately, Vasilescu noted, Su-34s equipped for close air support will "ensure extremely precise support for land forces fighting terrorist groups without causing collateral damage and the risk of being downed."

"Such ground support aircraft are becoming a necessity, although only the US and Russia have such planes. Lacking a new aircraft for this role, the Americans gave up on plans to retire 240 [70s and 80s vintage] A-10 Thunderbolt IIs from duty, extending their resource until 2028."

As for Russia, the country has the Su-25 Grach, also introduced in the 70s and undergoing several stages of modernization into the 2010s. But soon, armored Su-34s will begin to complement, and then replace these aircraft, thus vastly improving the ground attack capabilities of the Russian Aerospace Defense Force.

Previously, in the first page of this topic it was a discussion about the future of the CAS role and about the replacement of the Su-25/39.

https://www.russiadefence.net/t4343-older-warfare-performance-and-short-mid-term-decommissions#113438

eehnie wrote:About the Su-25 being better armoured than the Su-24. Again, armour without weight? Armour means weight, and the Su-25 has a 43% of the weight of the Su-24 (both empty). This is what has not been explained still and need to be explained in order to prove that the Su-25 is better armoured than the Su-24.

GarryB wrote:You want the Su-24 to replace the Su-25.

This was my opinion about a potential replacement of the Su-25:

Su-25/39: I think this aircraft is one of the easiest to be replaced. I think the Su-34 seems a perfect replacement for the Su-25 and is in production, while the Su-24 remains more actual in my view and should have longer life. In this case a sale of used aircrafts to third countries would be likely in my opinion.

Also I doubt that the combat style of the Su-25 can remain longer than the combat style of the Su-24. It seems less adapted to modern battlefields with modern man-portable air defense. The Su-25 can become obsolete before.

Very different of what you said.

https://www.russiadefence.net/t4343-older-warfare-performance-and-short-mid-term-decommissions#114203

eehnie wrote:
GarryB, who is unrespecful to others is who take not well differing opinions. You are not taking very well my opinions. And in many cases not because of what I write, it is because of what you think I'm suggesting...

GarryB wrote:Saying I don't know what I am talking about after suggesting a medium strike aircraft can perform the role of a CAS aircraft is amusing...

Do you see? I never suggested this. I said the Su-34 seems the perfect replacement for the Su-25, but I never said the Su-34 or the Su-24 need to perform this role. I said that the combat style of the Su-25 can become obsolete before than the combat style of the Su-24. How can you think that I want the Su-24 or the Su-34 to work like the Su-25, when I said that this combat style can become obsolete in some years? The Su-24 and Su-34 can go after the targets of the Su-25 but keeping their own combat style. With the increasing use of drones in the frontline for locating the enemy and their positions, is perfectly doable.

That article is from more than an year ago.....a lots of things changed.

Personally I don't really think Su-34 can replace Su-25. 34 was designed for a different role in mind while 25 was dedicated for CAS.

On a note: Su-34 already has some armor around its cockpit. 17mm if I remember correctly.

GarryB wrote:Why waste time with the puny Su-34... why not just replace the Su-25 with an armoured Tu-160.... even heavier and faster.

The value of the S>u-25 is that it is cheap.

With added armour the Su-34 is anything but cheap.

Idiots also suggested a ground attack version of the F-16 could replace the A-10.

It could not and did not.

For all the same reasons.

Su-25 doesn't really needs replacement. Just to upgrade it can be used safly for another 10 or 15 years. Some say it could be replace by Something more stealthy but it can't really because it is supposed to carry tons of rockets and cheap missile so it will still have huge rcs because of weapons.

You can't armour an Su-34 so it can operate near the battlefield so close that it can take some shot of 30 mm bullets. It is a modern fighter that has to stay away from ground artillery. Moreover like Garry said its not cheap, Su25 is 12 millions while Su-34 armoured will be much ore like 50 millions.

The tructure of the Su-34 wasn't made to be able to take critical damage and land safe. While Su-25 has separate engine, big and enormous wings, reduced IR because of non-afterburner, very good low altitude flight ...

But now they have Mi-28 and Ka-52 that can do the same work if not better ... while they don't need airport to land. I would replace them by those and buy Ansat-2RC in big numbers while keeping modernized Su-25.

GarryB wrote:
Idiots also suggested a ground attack version of the F-16 could replace the A-10.

Then they amazingly proposed "stealth" F-35 for CAS xD xD

My thought is Su-25 upgrades are enough for now and at least 10+ years. Even if its in dire need of replacement I think even restarting the production again will also be a good idea. Like Tu-160, the same airframe but totally new inside.

GarryB wrote:The Su-34 is a good aircraft, but put heavy armour on it and its flight performance becomes mediocre.

The main effect of 1000 Kg of armour well balanced and distributed should be only a reduction, around a 10-12%, of the payload of the aircraft for armament. The flying performance should not be seriously affected. In fact the current option of external fuel tanks would have fairly bigger effect, but not until the point of damaging the flying performance of the aircraft.

Very very likely your comment is wrong.

GarryB wrote:Most of the BIG GUYS in most air forces love fast jets and don't like cheap simple aircraft like the A-10 or Su-25.

This is because they are aware of the costs of the loses in combat. And they dislike combat loses because they are expensive, not cheap, specially human loses. The word cheap is not compatible with combat loses, unless you are talking about projectiles (ammunition).

Surely the people that like the Close Air Support in its old way need still to pass their mourning to assume it, but the main problem of the CAS fighting style is to be very vulnerable to the current manpads. In this equation, the manpads are in the cheap side, and the shut-down CAS aircrafts and helicopters in the expensive side. This is a reality that has not return. Ukraine learned it too late and by the wrong way.

Obviously Russia is moving forward at the design, development and production stages, while is using smartly their current arsenals of CAS aircrafts and helicopters in order to minimize the loses, which still happen even vs adversaries with very low number of man-portable air defenses, like in Syria.

GarryB wrote:

The main effect of 1000 Kg of armour well balanced and distributed should be only a reduction, around a 10-12%, of the payload of the aircraft for armament. The flying performance should not be seriously affected. In fact the current option of external fuel tanks would have fairly bigger effect, but not until the point of damaging the flying performance of the aircraft.

One ton of armour for the Su-34 would not even equate to the armour plate between its engines... The Su-34 is enormous and is a much larger aircraft compared with the Su-25.

Not only that but the engines of the Su-34 are much bigger too... the Su-25 not only has armour around its engines but also a sheet of armour between its engines to prevent damage to one engine effecting both engines. It also has the famous armour bathtub around the cockpit.

To do the same on the Su-34 would require 5-6 tons of extra weight that it could never drop.

The Su-25 replaced the Su-17/22 Fitter family that was previously given the light strike role.

The Su-25 was not better because it had better avionics... the Su-25 was fitted with the same avionics as the Fitter.

The Su-25 was better than the much faster Fitter because it was slower... the pilot had more time to see the target and the manoeuvrability to line up the target and take a shot. It had the armour to withstand light fire from ground forces, which made it much more effective in real combat (ie Afghanistan in the 1980s).

Replacing it now with an Su-34 would be like replacing it then with an Su-24... horrendously expensive.... and not effective because if you fly either of those two fast strike aircraft low and slow over the battlefield they are both going to get shot down.

Very very likely your comment is wrong.

The Su-24 and Su-34 already have some armour but it is oriented for high speed low altitude strike missions, not CAS missions.

The Su-34 will be a 60 million dollar aircraft... an Su-25 is a 20 million dollar aircraft in the SM3 upgraded model... more importantly the Su-25 gets in close and uses cheap unguided rockets and light dumb bombs. The Su-34 has shown it can be economical with dumb bombs from medium height, but much of the time it uses expensive guided weapons too.

This is because they are aware of the costs of the loses in combat. And they dislike combat loses because they are expensive, not cheap, specially human loses. The word cheap is not compatible with combat loses, unless you are talking about projectiles (ammunition).

I appreciate what you are saying but it is a false economy.

Taking experience in Afghanistan in the 1980s as an example again... troops on the ground call for air support... Fitter blow in but at the speed they are operating at they don't see the enemy... the enemy might even shoot one down if they are lucky. The Grach comes in, finds the target and hits it hard with 80mm rockets and 250kg bombs.

The cheaper option is to send no air support but that is not cheaper for the ground forces at all.

Surely the people that like the Close Air Support in its old way need still to make its duel to assume it, but the main problem of the CAS fighting style is to be very vulnerable to the current manpads. In this equation, the manpads are in the cheap side, and the shut-down CAS aircrafts and helicopters in the expensive side. This is a reality that has not return. Ukraine learned it too late and by the wrong way.

MANPADS are not all powerful weapons. Currently their use and distribution is restricted, though obviously the US violates that and other players like Iran and China and North Korea that make their own are free to sell them to anyone too, but new DIRCMs fitted to new Su-25s and the new Russian attack helos should defeat the threat of MANPADS.

Besides if MANPADS makes flying slow and low enough to find targets then it is over for the Su-34 as well in such roles.

The weight relation barely bigger, but the dimmensional difference on surface between the protected areas of the Su-34 and the Su-25 is unlikely to reach a 2:1 relation like the difference of armour installed 1000:500. It means that with 1000Kg of armour the Su-34 will not have smaller thickness than the Su-25 with 500 Kg of armour. Your comment about 5-6 tons is way off. Very likely the Su-34 will be as well armoured than the Su-25, but it means not the Su-34 assuming the old fighting way of the Su-25, which is suicidal vs every adversary that can have US support. Today the situation is more with the Su-25 assuming the fighting way of the Su-34, Su-24 and the Su-17/20/22.

About the rest, well you obviously has to do your mourning, but the reality is the reality. After the success of Afghanistan in the 1980s did not you learn anything about the performance of Su-25 and combat helicopters in modern battlefields with a right density and a proper use of the manpads? You should. Russia was knowing it even before, do not pretend now a return back to the mistake. You can not continue talking like if the debacle of the Su-25 in Ukraine happened not. The Ukranians tried to use the Su-25 like it was used in Afghanistan.