Well just because S-400 has 400 km range does not mean any aircraft cant go beyond that bubble , there are tactics ,low level flight ,DRFM jamming, stealth aircraft to get close and that just applies to any SAM out there.
S-400 and S-300 are mobile forces. You can set up one S-400 system with radars going and also set up other S-x00 systems around that with their radars on listen mode ready to receive target data and share data on emitting targets. 400km away from an emitting S-400 base you could be flying over a radar silent S-300 base.
I was also thinking in terms of jammers, which to be effective against such powerful radars would need to be based in large aircraft, which would be in serious danger at less than 400km distance from an S-400 battery.
There are also all sorts of jammers and decoys that come with S-400 batteries that can be used to emit the same signals as the main radars to attract attention so the threat launch platform is kept interested while the battery lofts a few shots at it.
No doubt they would try hard to not get beaten by HARM , its a game of tactics , innovation ,motivation and capability on both sides.
Not to mention technology. A TOR battery or Pantsir battery is not going to be co-located with an S-x00 battery for fun.
Low Side Lobes makes HARM job that much harder but not impossible , HARM like KH-31P too have wide band sensors to attack a range of target , have pre-set target data stored in them about target information obtained from even a low scan exposure , so even if the target radar shuts off due to attack , its position is already noted in HARM/RWR memory and they travel at that preset location to attack.
You are confusing two things here. The wide band seekers on ARMs let them attack a wider array of radars from artillery spotting radars to aircraft and ground based radars. The older model Kh-25 based missiles had separate homing heads for the ARM mission, with one seeker head optimised for the continuous wave radar of the Nike-Hercules and the HAWK, and another seeker option for the Patriot type radars. The seekers were interchangeable but obviously not in flight. The new broadband seekers fitted to the new Kh-25, Kh-31, and Kh-38 missiles mean that they can engage all sorts of radars on the ground and sea and air if some sources are to be believed.
Sidelobes are like with a torch where you have a bulb and around the inside of where the torch bulb is it is shiny and shaped to focus the light into a strong narrow beam. In the dark however you see two lots of light coming from the torch... a concentrated beam in the centre but around that the area is lit directly from the light coming off the bulb.
The concentrated beam is the pencil beam to track the target or scan for targets while the dimmer wide cone of weaker light is the sidelobes.
The difference is that in a radar the emitting element is covered up so it doesn't shine out like a light bulb does because that will effect the results by adding noise.
Most of the sidelobe energy in a radar goes out sideways.
Most ARMs climb after launch so they don't impact trees or buildings near the target or on the way to the target and dive at the target radar at a shallow angle of 30 degrees or so.
Such a target would be an ideal target for the SAMs co-located with the S-x00 site... it is what they are there for.
I have also read of israel HARM system that just loiters over an area for long time and in case SAM lits up it glides to the target and attack it
That would be the British ALARM... a very impressive missile that can be used in many modes including being fired into a danger area where it climbs to altitude and then deploys a parachute so it can stay in the air for a long period protecting the launch aircraft.
Obviously it has the same problem HARM has... that it can be decoyed by alternative emitters and it can of course be shot down.
Of course nothing is perfect.
It was attacked in self defence in friendly airspace and direct painting made the HARM job easier , like I said low side lobes makes the job harder for HARM , AESA has lower sidelobe then PESA.
I would say direct painting made it possible not easier.
With an array of emitters I don't see how AESA can have lower sidelobes than a PESA with one emitter.
AESA can manage their energy much better and smarter then a PESA.
I don't see how that is possible... the emitter is what is using the energy, so having 1,000,000 emitters in an AESA compared to 1 transmit receive modules in a PESA should mean the AESA uses more power... it is just basic physics.
AESAs are notorious for generating a lot of heat, now the primary function of the modules is not to generate heat... heat is just a byproduct. If it generates more heat then it must generate more powerful signals and if it does that then it must also use more power.
An AESA SAM battery with LPI will just mange its energy well and with a lowest side lobe will make a smart HARM attack that more difficult
A HARM attack is already dealt with as a threat by the colocation of TOR or PANTSIR. Both can engage HARM like targets and their missiles are very simple and very cheap. The sensors and electronics on the vehicles are expensive but the missiles are dirt cheap because they contain no sensors... which means you can use them in enormous numbers without breaking the bank.
Even a single scan is good for modern ESM to know it was scanned and know the bearing , modern ESM has 100 % probability of intercept capability , unless its an LPI , milisec scan that would be difficult but not impossible.
The first model Kh-58 (AS-11) used similar location technology to determine the location of the target site before launch so that even if it turned off it would still detonate its 150kg HE payload somewhere near the vulnerable radar antenna. Even with its 200km range from a Mig-25 launch it would still not be a huge threat to an S-x00 battery...
Like I said S-300 and 400 will be a difficult customer and its also about tactics , training , motivation and innovation by field SAM operators.
At least the ALARM is trying something sort of new... the HARM is old school for old threats.
During Kosovo NATO was given a bloody nose by Serbia SAM operators even though they operated 70's SAM but had better tactics , training , motivation and were innovative , inspite of airspace filled with modern HARM , jammers,fighters and UAV they could stay alive and fight till the end
NATO fired hundreds of HARMs to little effect. The ALARMs were more effective because they were relatively unknown by the operators. Neither would be new to an S-x00 battery.
Yeah, that's why I'm asking, ABM-135 Galoshs with Nuclear warheads aren't exactly comparable
The S-500 will have similar performance to ABM-135 but with a hit to kill warhead.
I am surprised the US was dumb enough to start a weapon race with ABM systems because the US has a huge lead in satellite resources and ABM systems would make ideal anti satellite weapons that will undermine their dominance in space.
Still I guess the ABM drive is motivated by politics rather than common sense. The irony is that MAD or mutually assured destruction actually worked whether you trusted the other guy or not. It seems they want to undermine MAD so you are going to have to learn to trust or you are going to create a situation where no one is safe... what a nightmare!
The enemy's capabilities and frequencies used for each radar or missile site were then recorded and documented revealing the enemy's battle plan.
What we do is provoke the Soviets into transmitting their air defense radars. The longer we record their transmissions, the better we understand Soviet tactics and technology.
Except that the Soviets knew you did that and operated at different frequencies and tactics during peacetime than they would use in war.
The upgrade enabled the SR-71 to ignore the rest of the spectrum. Then the information was analyzed and correlated against what the larger -135 recorded. The result was that we had the SA-5's entire radar operation, from acquisition (volume search), to individual target track, and finally to fire control.
Yet they still refused to fly into Soviet air space?
SIGINT is not confined to airborne methods...
Have no doubt we can replicate the S-300's radar signals to %99.999 fidelity and apply it against any aircraft we want...
So they know everything about the S-300 yet Israel still objects to Russia selling S-300 to Iran?
Then it claims it will develop countermeasures and spread those countermeasures around to render the S-300 ineffective... if Russia sells to Iran... or Syria.
The reality is that the measure/countermeasure game is ongoing and it really depends when they are used as to how effective they turn out to be. Everything is being updated all the time and most of the updates are intended to close gaps in the armour so to speak.
For instance an SR-71 might have captured all the radar information about the SA-5 but had it tried to penetrate an SA-5 screen in the Soviet Union it might have found the Soviet model had a back up IR guidance especially for hot high flying targets like the SR-71... or that the placement of the SA-5 batteries was especially designed to make them fly closer to Mig-31 bases that carry R-40TD... the largest AAM in the world but with a modern IR seeker and a long range at high speed that can deal with high fast targets head on.
However, because the main issue is still data processing, an ineptly designed and built AESA system, particularly its softwares, can be outclassed and defeated by a superior designed and built traditional single-beam system.
Hurray!!! the point I am making.
The Russians have lots of experience with the cheaper PESA radar technology. AESA might have a lot of promise but until the elements needed for it (the transmit/receive modules) are in mass production to make them both smaller and cheaper then it makes no sense making a half a$$ed early model AESA radar for something as important as your standard air defence SAM system that you are going to rely on for the next 20-30 years.
By 2020 it will likely have all AESA radars as will Vityaz and Morfei and all the other new front line SAM systems in Russian service.
Against US 'stealth' class bodies, the traditional single-beam mechanically motivated radar system known today will have statistically insignificant odds at effective detection, let alone track, of those 'stealth' aircrafts.
Most current Russian ground based AESA radars are long wave radars.
These are easier to make because their antenna modules are larger and easier to make than smaller higher frequency AESAs, but they also operate in frequency ranges that are more useful for detecting targets that use shaping to deflect rather than reflect radar waves. (ie stealth targets).