Russian Navy: Status and News #6

Izvestia made a mistake in the text and thus gave false information because the flag of St. Andrew was not raised on the submarine "Emperor Aleksandar III", but the submarine was launched into the water.

Type: project 11540 "Hawk"
Board number: 777
Name: Yaroslav the Wise
Operator: Russian Navy
Location: Kronstadt - Naval Base
Date: 2022
Author: Andrey Vechernin

Is that a Korsar class?

http://roe.ru/eng/catalog/naval-systems/surface-ships-ships-and-boats/korsar/

Some of those weapon options look interesting...

How many landing craft does Russia have that can carry the Armata based vehicles?

The Armata is a urban conflict tank and would not be used by the air borne or the naval infantry... who would more likely operate Kurganets or Boomerang based vehicles or something customised to their needs.

The project Akula 1176 landing craft has a capacity of 50 tons but would be useful for troop transports and equipment and a range of other vehicles being required in any landing, but the Zubr can carry three main battle tanks at the moment so it could take at least two T-14s with troops easily, while the heavy Project 21820E Dygon landing craft could also carry armata vehicles too.

The landing ships Ivan Gren and then new Ivan Rogov classes should all be capable of landing tanks in a range of different weights and types too.

I find it a little concerning that their fleet of light landing craft will be incapable of delivering the new armored vehicles, though at the same time the west seems to be going for lighter tanks so perhaps the T-72 will remain adequate for decades to come.

The T-14 weighs not much more then the current tank generation so most landing craft will be able to carry them.

Hole wrote:The T-14 weighs not much more then the current tank generation so most landing craft will be able to carry them

The T-14 weighs over 50t, the limit of all light landing craft's carrying capacity.

48t.

T-90 is 47t.

T-14 has a bigger size. Doesn't mean it can't be 48t but very unlikely. Just look at pictures t-14 vs t-90. Pretty obvious it weights more than 50t. My bet is 55-60t.

Well you are right. Turret plays a big role in their weight.

In the above post and post 239 replace the word included with added... so for instance instead of:

Since 2013, the Russian Navy has included 21 submarines and 37 ships (with a total displacement of over 500 tons).

It should say

Since 2013, the Russian Navy has added 21 submarines and 37 ships (with a total displacement of over 500 tons).

Warships of the main classes of the Russian Navy as of 01.02.2023
* 60 submarines, of which 38 are nuclear submarines.
* 32 surface warships and 20 landing ships..




2022: Navy and SMO

   In this entry, we will not talk about the participation of the Russian Navy in the SMO on the territory of Ukraine - firstly, because the SMO has not yet ended, and secondly, due to the almost complete absence of official information on this topic (except for the most often impersonal application by frigates, RTOs and PLBs of the Black Sea Fleet of missile strikes on Ukrainian military facilities and the loss of the Moskva missile and large landing craft Saratov). Instead, we will try to assess the impact of a special military operation on the main ship structure of the Navy and the construction of warships of the main classes in the short term (until the end of the SMO) and medium term.
According to the author, despite the seemingly absence of serious problems with the financing of the Armed Forces and the defense industry, the defense budget is not rubber, and something has to be sacrificed. Since the fleet is the most expensive type of the Armed Forces in terms of unit cost of a conventional unit of military equipment (one frigate, pr. ordered to donate to them.

The annual table of the main ship composition of the 12 leading maritime powers (link 1) recently published on the blog gives a decrease in the total total displacement of 0.7% for the Russian Navy, but this figure is not indicative. Firstly, it is quite small (commensurate with the values ​​of the United States, Britain and France), and secondly, the indicated decline included ships decommissioned in previous years (submarines "Yaroslavl", "Mogocha" and destroyer "Bistiry") and decommissioned presumably (EM "Nastoychiviy"), thirdly, this also included accidental and unjustified losses during the SMO, which should not have been ("Moscow" and "Saratov"). If these losses could be removed from the calculation, our fleet would show an increase of 1.3%, and if the author is mistaken about "Natoychiviy" - 2.2%. And this despite the fact that in 2022 the actual delivery program was very meager - "Suvorov", "Belgorod" and "Ufa".

At the same time, the planned delivery program last year included (or at least was promised in various publications and therefore expected by the public): the Krasnoyarsk submarine, the Kronstadt submarine, the Admiral Golovko FR, the KRV "Mercury" and "Rezkiy", as well as undergoing repairs with the modernization of the PLAC "Tiger", "Leopard", K-331 (formerly "Magadan") and TFR "Neustrashimy", which unexpectedly, without changing in size, but still not having received a full-time "Uranus", he became a "small patrol ship" - MSC (link 2). At the same time, all of these orders, with the exception of the PLAK, but including the Irkutsk ASSR, entered sea trials.
In general, there is no good reason to believe that the delay in their transfer to the fleet is somehow connected with the SMO. Sea trials (ZKhI and "states") do not require any significant expenses, except for hypothetical cases when it becomes necessary to replace the equipment that has failed. Closer to the truth here, probably, there will be an "honest acceptance" (link 3) and the usual failure of deadlines by "Zvezdochka" and "Zvezda".

A completely different picture emerges from the annual table of ships under construction by the leading maritime powers (link 4). Here, the Russian Navy already has a 7% loss in displacement (only the Indians, who handed over the 40,000-ton Vikrant AV in 2022, are worse than us), which confirms the thesis about the fleet as a victim of the NWO, expressed in the first paragraph. The reason for the decrease in the total Dtot and the aging of orders under construction (4.9 years against 4.6 a year earlier - worse only for the French and Spaniards) is the small number and weight of bookmarks (only 2 PLB pr. 677.1 and 2 KRV pr. 20385 , total 8,600 tons).
For the first time in 4 years, SSBNs, SSN, Frigates, UDC and BDK were not laid, while in 2019-2021. paired bookmarks of ships of various projects were practiced. Meanwhile, in 2020-2022. contracts were signed or plans were announced to start construction of 2 SSBNs pr. 955A and 2 APKR pr. 885M at Sevmash, 2 FR pr. II/III on the NE and 2 on the NEA (ref. 5). At the same time, if the lack of bookmarks on the NE can be explained by overloading with orders (link 6), and at the NEA - unpreparedness of production, then at Sevmash, at first glance, there should be no other reasons except for the lack of funding - two boats were handed over, two were laid down.

I would be glad to be wrong, but mentally one must be prepared for a kind of pause in domestic shipbuilding for the period of the SMO. Being a naval-oriented individual, it is sad for me to realize this, but for the country now more important than MLRS, self-propelled guns, TOSs, tanks, UAVs. But after our victory, there is every reason to hope for a rapid growth (surge) in shipbuilding activity.
Under the new world order, Russia will need a large tanker fleet for the export of LNG, oil and oil products (not counting ships for other maritime activities), and this fleet will need to be protected from state piracy by Western countries and their satellites throughout the vast oceans. The construction of submarine forces (which, strictly speaking, have slightly different tasks) has already been put on stream. The near and far sea zones will soon be saturated with corvettes and frigates, and the surface ocean fleet will again come to the fore, the first signs of which will be 9000-10000-ton destroyers (link 7) (today's classification and index 22350M do not reflect objective reality).

The near and far sea zones will soon be saturated with corvettes and frigates, and the surface ocean fleet will again come to the fore, the first signs of which will be 9000-10000-ton destroyers (link 7) (today's classification and index 22350M do not reflect objective reality). I am sure that this fleet will be balanced and necessarily carrier-based, because, despite hypersound, aircraft carriers continue to be a symbol of the state's naval power.

https://navy-korabel.livejournal.com/284138.html


The above is a text from Navykorabel.ru, and I myself wrote about the fact that the Russian Navy is most likely "sacrificed" while the SMO lasts, that is, that is why the "Krasnoyarsk" was not handed over or the "Arkhangelsk" was not launched, etc.. It is not Sevmash's problem. the problem is that the money is diverted on armored military equipment..

It is important that shipyards have capacity and Sevmash is certainly up to any task. I'm waiting for that fucking K-564 "Arkhangelsk" to launch more than I want the Su-57 or any other weapon. I love submarines bro..

Even if we say their defence budget this year is 70 billion you have to divide that four ways... Strategic Forces is first priority and Air Force and Army are second and third, with Navy being fourth priority, so just under 18 billion a year for a very money and vehicle intensive branch.

Computer processing for hunting subs is demanding, plus hunting and engaging surface and air and space targets all require weapons and vehicles and capacities other branches don't need to worry too much about...

Hopefully they are realising the value of long range accurate gun fire capacity and are doing to the 203mm calibre what they also seem to be doing to the 152mm rounds.

203mm ramjet powered shells with a 250km range and laser/glonass guidance would be impressive and cheaper than a salvo of antiship or cruise missiles.