PapaDragon wrote:Revolt? By whom?
When was the last time Europeans did anything against the program?
Orders will be given (by both USA and EU) and orders will be obeyed without question same as always.
PapaDragon the situation, as already said, that would be generated would be not different (rather significantly worse in terms of negative implications for western US allies....) from the situation at the end of '80 years; now also then US and European Allies was perfectly aware that the placement of INF was practically impossible to continue in the long terms for the growing European pubblic and political pressure above all in a scenario where the CCCP was proposing a solution that avoided the placement of the deadly missiles (also in those time technically and for performances superior at times in comparison with the US -built ones) against European nations , exactly as now cleverly proposed by President В. В. Путин.
That is the content of an high amount of by now publicly released classified and reserved analytical documents .
Just to provide an example :
"European (and American) officials agree that the consequences of not-ratification would be detrimental to the continued well-being of the alliance .
This is because the leadership position of the U.S. would be questioned, while the Soviet Union would be perceived like the promoter of peace in Europe, NATO would be uncapable to continue its INF deployments and may , in facts, be forced to withdraw existing INF deployments due to strong public pressures
and, worst of all, while U.S. systems would be withdraw without an agreement, the Soviet Union would be permitted to maintain its INF systems
You can personally control almost any previously classified document of the time analysing political impact of INF deployment in Europe and its sustainability and you will read always the same elements : US and European authorities was perfectly aware that it was effectively a time gamble.
In substance European Chiefs of State would have supported the militarily and technologically very weak hand of USA, with Pershing and GLCM, in the hope that someway, with some strong aid from within the Kremlin, CCCP would accept a table of arm ban of theirs widely superior system before internal pressure would render that effectively impossible and potentially deadly for alliance's tenue. The same situation was considered for not signing of the Treaty to obtain even greater counter-gains.
Exit from INF Treaty was a largely expected and, for a side, even partially "forced" decision by part of US that begun to be explored when, more than a decade ago, first informations on technological trasformation program of strategic deterrence systems in the Federation permeated in the US.
Like in the '80 years USA will be forced, one more time, to use in this losing technological struggle the unique real weapon at theirs disposition : geopolitical influence, but that is linked to a significative amount of enormous risks of what American are perfectly aware.
The role of an oculated Federation policy will be to continue to consistently maintain the position that ,in absence of US INF systems on foreign soil, Federation will abstain to place against those nations its own INF systems (that incidentally greatly surpass US ones on all cardynal parameters); this will effectively force the US to obligate its "allies" to host its systems in order to amintain any military relevance in this way triggering a true time bomb for NATO.
Year after year, introduction of new category of strategic systems, offensive but even more defensive ones, with possibilities widely beyond the possibilities of any western counterparts, and aimed proposals to those nations to resolve the question in an European-Russian Federation bilateral format will render the growing resentment for the US's conferement of those enormous existence's risk entirely on the shoulders of its "allies" unbearable and slowly, but inexorably, decree the sunset of the sustainment element of US system: geo-political, military and economical influence on Europe.