US Navy ships and weapon systems

The puzzle in this picture is where are the other ships? I thought a Carrier Task Force was larger than a carrier and 4 others (plus submarines).

A photo the USN probably wishes was never taken, double ignomy. By an ally as well.

Statistics: the US Navy's naval staff as of 01/01/2018

The presented statistical study takes into account warships of the main classes (nuclear and non-nuclear submarines, aircraft carriers, cruisers, destroyers, frigates, corvettes, littoral warships, seagoing landing ships) with a total displacement of 2000 tons (above 1000 tons). that component of the Navy, which is capable of projecting force to remote regions of the world. The ships transferred to the fleet (decommissioned), starting from 01/01/2018, are included in the initial data for reference - they are not included in the total number of ships or in the total displacement. The names of the ships are given in Russian transcription, tested for compliance with either established (traditional) writing, or dictionary phonetic transcription.





https://navy-korabel.livejournal.com/188870.html

U.S. Navy is Recreating the Second Fleet


https://www.msn.com/en-ca/news/world/us-navy-re-establishes-second-fleet-amid-russia-tensions/ar-AAwLz9g?li=AAggFp5&ocid=SKY2DHP



It aims to challenge Russia in the northern part of the Atlantic. Back to the Cold War.

The NSM anti-ship missile was chosen for arming the American LCS ships

On May 31, 2018, the Naval Sea Systems Command of the United States Navy gave the American corporation Raytheon a contract worth $ 14.856016 million for the delivery of the first batch (officially undisclosed - but apparently, eight) of NSM anti-ship missiles under the Over- the-Horizon Weapon Systems for equipping the "Littoral" LCS combat ships of the American fleet. The contract includes the delivery of one set of fire control systems, from which it can be concluded that the contract covers so far equipping the NSM PCS with only one LCS ship - apparently, for testing the integration of the complex into ships. Previously, in the budget request for Work should be completed by May 2020. However, the contract includes an option, the implementation of which will bring the total cost to 847.6 million dollars - that is, with the equipping of the NSM of all LCS ships.

Thus, the NSM (Naval Strike Missile) anti-ship missile developed by the Norwegian Kongsberg group and offered by the Raytheon and Kongsberg consortium was selected for the "Over-the-Horizon Weapon Systems (OTH WS)" competition for equipping the "literal" LCS warships and actually adopted by the Navy USA. This is a great success for Kongsberg. In addition to LCS ships, the missile chosen for the OTH WS program should also be used to equip the prospective American frigates FFG (X), and, possibly, other US Navy surface ships.

https://bmpd.livejournal.com/3223314.html

Not really news but an article an opinion of a senior navy officer. Wants to bring back tomcat F-14


https://m.warhistoryonline.com/war-articles/comeback-for-the-f14-tomcat.html

And you guys think that you have shipyard problems. Just be thankful you don't have to scrap the 8 reactors in the USS Enterprise. Conventional power for future US carriers perhaps? Read the sorry and expensive tale at

http://www.thedrive.com/the-war-zone/22607/the-navy-could-need-more-than-15-years-and-over-1-5b-to-scrap-uss-enterprise

JohninMK wrote:And you guys think that you have shipyard problems. Just be thankful you don't have to scrap the 8 reactors in the USS Enterprise. Conventional power for future US carriers perhaps? Read the sorry and expensive tale at

http://www.thedrive.com/the-war-zone/22607/the-navy-could-need-more-than-15-years-and-over-1-5b-to-scrap-uss-enterprise

The article refers to the Los Angeles class SSN Boise thats been sitting at the quay for 30 MONTHS awaiting repairs and the repairs will cost $400M, equal to the repair and upgrade pf the Kuznetsov. Funny how our forum clowns endlessly troll the K and Russian yards in general, and ignore the fact that the US has its own share of problems

JohninMK wrote:And you guys think that you have shipyard problems. Just be thankful you don't have to scrap the 8 reactors in the USS Enterprise. Conventional power for future US carriers perhaps? Read the sorry and expensive tale at

http://www.thedrive.com/the-war-zone/22607/the-navy-could-need-more-than-15-years-and-over-1-5b-to-scrap-uss-enterprise

This different, the Enterprise is being decommissioned therefore yes the reactors must be properly destroyed. That is the protocol, just like when the russians decommission nuclear subs they send them to a specific area to safely and properly dispose of the nuclear reactors.

For the Boise it's more of a problem the shipyards are overstuffed we have a much larger fleet then Russia, and the navy is in no hurry as we have all the submarines we need right now.

Does the Us have some issues with shipbuilding sure, but they are few and far between, to try and compare that to Russia just doesn't work.

When it comes down to it we can easily out produce in the naval area it's not even a contest.

And you guys think that you have shipyard problems. Just be thankful you don't have to scrap the 8 reactors in the USS Enterprise. Conventional power for future US carriers perhaps? Read the sorry and expensive tale at

One of the things that always struck me as outrageously negligent about nuclear power is how much of the disposal plans (still!) consist of 'leave it for a few decades & hope someone else comes up with the necessary tech, $$$ & somewhere to put it'

Russia has no shortage of ongoing nuke disposal issues also, though fortunately a bunch of it has been helped along by Western funding & technical aid (even if for not entirely altruistic reasons).

hoom wrote:

And you guys think that you have shipyard problems. Just be thankful you don't have to scrap the 8 reactors in the USS Enterprise. Conventional power for future US carriers perhaps? Read the sorry and expensive tale at

One of the things that always struck me as outrageously negligent about nuclear power is how much of the disposal plans (still!) consist of 'leave it for a few decades & hope someone else comes up with the necessary tech, $$$ & somewhere to put it'

Russia has no shortage of ongoing nuke disposal issues also, though fortunately a bunch of it has been helped along by Western funding & technical aid (even if for not entirely altruistic reasons).

Radioactivity decaying by logarithmic .
Means if they wait 100 years then the gamma radiation decrease by one magnitude.

In 300 years the fuels can be disposed/reprocessed by hand.

Reads quite well. Only first two parts out sofar.

By Dmitry Filipoff

Series Introduction

“Fleet level processes and procedures designed for safe and effective operations were increasingly relaxed due to time and fiscal constraints, and the ‘normalization-of-deviation’ began to take root in the culture of the fleet. Leaders and organizations began to lose sight of what ‘right’ looked like, and to accept these altered conditions and reduced readiness standards as the new normal.” –2017 Strategic Readiness Review commissioned in the aftermath of the collisions involving USS Fitzgerald (DDG-62) and USS John S. McCain (DDG-56)

The U.S. Navy is suffering from self-inflicted strategic dysfunction across the breadth of its enterprise. This series seeks to explore the theme of the normalization of deviation in some of the most critical operations, activities, and attributes that prepare the U.S. Navy for war. Because the U.S. Navy is the senior partner in its alliance activities many of these problems probably hold true for allied navies as well.

Part One below looks at U.S. Navy combat training and draws a comparison with Chinese Navy training.

Part Two will examine firepower relating to offense, defense, and across force structure.

Part Three will look at tactics and doctrine with an emphasis on network- and carrier-centric fleet combat.

Part Four will discuss technical standards.

Part Five will look at the relationship between the Navy’s availability and material condition.

Part Six will examine the application of strategy to operations.

Part Seven will look at strategy and force development, including force structure assessment.

Part Eight will conclude with recommendations for a force development strategy to refocus the U.S. Navy on the high-end fight and sea control.


http://cimsec.org/how-the-fleet-forgot-to-fight-pt-1-combat-training/37873

“This ship is built to fight; you’d better know how.” –Former Chief of Naval Operations Admiral Arleigh Burke (ret.) at the commissioning ceremony of the destroyer USS Arleigh Burke (DDG-51)

The training strategy of a military service is one of its most fundamental responsibilities. Training is central to piercing the fog of war as much as possible before combat exacts its price. Training is what forges people into warfighters.

Soon after the Cold War ended the Navy announced a “change in focus and, therefore, in priorities for the Naval Service away from operations on the sea toward power projection.”1 A new operating focus on low-end missions such as partner development missions, striking land targets, and deterring rogue regimes came to dominate its focus. Different training followed. This training and operating paradigm replaced the high-end threat focus the Navy was originally made for in an era of great power competition against the Soviet Union. But the shift was wholesale, and did not attempt to preserve a responsible minimum of important skills that still held relevance. Perhaps worst of all, somehow this shift allowed U.S. Navy training to fall to incredible lows and remain there for most of a generation.

So much valuable corporate memory has evaporated. Extremely unrealistic training exercises starved Sailors of opportunities to learn important skills and prove themselves. And while the U.S. Navy slipped for years its latest rival, the Chinese Navy, made strong gains in the very same skills the U.S. Navy was losing.


http://cimsec.org/how-the-fleet-forgot-to-fight-pt-firepower/37357

The Navy’s tactical ignorance is built into its arsenal. Currently some of the Navy’s most important weapons development programs are not just evolutionary, but revolutionary in the possibilities they open up. This is not due to innovation, but instead many of these noteworthy and foundational capabilities are finally arriving decades after the technologies were first proven, many close to half a century ago. Many of these most crucial weapons are already in the hands of great power competitors such as Russia and China who have had decades of opportunity to train and refine tactics with them.

Good links!

The American Web Resource “The Drive” in the Tyler Rogoway "Navy To Supersize Ultrasound SM-6" reports that the US Navy has requested funds in the draft US defense budget for fiscal year 2020 $ 7 million to develop a new long-range version of the Raytheon Standard SM-6 multipurpose ship-borne missile, designated the SM-6 Block IB.



https://bmpd.livejournal.com/3580198.html

New American Destroyer Zumwalt in Alaska





https://bmpd.livejournal.com/3582725.html

It looks like it is made of brick... I would have thought a stealthy design would try to have as few joins as possible and therefore have fewer but larger surface panels on its exterior.

Of course it wont be very stealthy with those two tug boats attached to it all the time... the propulsion still giving problems?

GarryB wrote:It looks like it is made of brick... I would have thought a stealthy design would try to have as few joins as possible and therefore have fewer but larger surface panels on its exterior.

Of course it wont be very stealthy with those two tug boats attached to it all the time... the propulsion still giving problems?

Looks like floating Alcatraz!

The side cross section of this POS is enormous. And that slant is not going to stop an incoming radar beam from scattering back to the
source even we ignore quantum mechanics. Those tiles are their attempt at RAM coating where they guess what part of the EM spectrum
that their designated enemy will use to scan this tub.

American "wunderwaffe" is all about style over substance and prices beyond insanity. But chutzpah does not win wars.

The new missile will replace the USA and the "Tomahawk" and "Harpoon"

The new missile will replace the USA and the
In the command of the naval systems of the U.S. Navy (NAVAIR) has published a request for obtaining information from potential contractors for the OASuW program.

The service is responsible for material support of air components of the fleet, asks stakeholders to present their achievements and to indicate the approximate cost of creating a new universal missile by 2030. It is reported by the French edition of Air&Cosmos.

As indicated in the aforementioned request, the new product must be capable of hitting both ground and naval targets. It is assumed that the quality of the media will be platforms such as the F-35 (the rocket will be located inside the aircraft and outside the car), F/A-18, P-8 and, in addition, a promising fighter of the next generation.

NAVAIR intends to perform the power plant of the new weapons, different systems, in particular, to navigation, information and military. Also there will be studying its ability to interact with other missiles. So the new product must be able to connect in your face like properties of anti-ship missiles "Harpoon" and winged "Tomahawk".
On the approximate cost of the program is not reported.

https://weaponews.com/news/65349748-the-new-missile-will-replace-the-usa-and-the-tomahawk-and-harpoon.html

So this is how it goes, time after time:

1) Call Russia a broken state at the brink of disintegration and with backwards, rusting military absolutely incapable of facing US military might
2) Order countless programs to update US junk to astronomic prices so they will hopefully manage to do in a decade what Russian armament is doing now
3) Repeat ad nauseam

Statistics: the main ship of the US Navy as of 07/01/2019

A continuation of a series of statistical publications (link) devoted to the navy of the leading maritime powers as of mid-2019 compared with the beginning of 2017, which, among other things, should reflect the dynamics of their growth or decline over the past 2.5 years. The final table (rating scale, top 10-12) is likely to see the light closer to the Day of the Russian Navy, which this year falls on July 28. To speed up the process, source data by country will be published without comment, with explanations in the lower parts of the tables.





https://navy-korabel.livejournal.com/211726.html

Training records hardly count for much...

they say: "u fight as u train!"