Military History stories and facts Thread

Odin of Ossetia wrote:



Another interesting battle involving the Poles in Spain, but this one is somewhat incomplete as it does not mention the Spanish and German casualties that the Polish troops inflicted.


And the "100%" thing is obviously not true for every battle in the Polish history.


Rather silly video, but the only one I could find on this battle that is in English.

Most of this Youtube channel's videos are of rather low quality.






https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Tz9JMmlHrYQ

Looks like I was wrong about this being the only video on this battle in English.




Battle of Fuengirola (1810)


A Polish-French (but predominantly Polish) force defeats a much larger British-German-Spanish force in southern Spain.

Most of the "French deserters" were in reality Germans.


Part 1



https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=WUbkXf-qOho


Part 2



https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=xzpJ81oKqUw

War on Cape Sterlegov. Nazis' failed mission in Siberia

In September 1944, amphibious assault force landed from Nazi submarines to capture Cape Sterlegov's meteorological station, which sent forecasts to vessels carrying military cargo along the Northern Sea Route and thus disrupt Soviet Arctic transportation

MOSCOW, September 30. /TASS/. A mission in September 1944 in the Arctic’s Kara Sea remains among understudied events of World War II. Amphibious assault force landed from Nazi submarines to capture Cape Sterlegov's meteorological station, which sent forecasts to vessels carrying military cargo along the Northern Sea Route. The attackers hoped the radio station’s personnel would be taken aback and they would be able to disrupt Soviet Arctic transportation.

The polar station

Cape Sterlegov's station went into operation in 1934. It was named after Russia’s participant in the 18th-century Great Northern Expedition, Dmitry Sterlegov.

The station is located in the area where the Lenivaya River flows into the Kara Sea forming a cape. It makes a very convenient place for polar explorers with its rocky shores and the surrounding tundra with small hills.

The area is hard-to-reach. The station sent clear radio signals from the cape, and observers could see approaching vessels an hour before they reached the shore.

"The station transmitted meteorological data to vessels passing along the Northern Sea Route. It’s covered area was a passage between Cape Chelyuskin in the east and Dikson in the west," Pavel Kochkarev of the Russian Geographical Society’s Krasnoyarsk branch said.

During the war, the Northern Sea Route became a key route to deliver strategic military cargo from the US and the UK to the Soviet Union, Krasnoyarsk’s historian Alexei Yeliseyenko said.

Pilots dispatched to the frontline from Alaska across Siberia requested weather reports from the station, Pavel Kochkarev added. Before the war, the station issued weather reports four times a day, and during the war the forecasts would come out much more frequently.

During the war, security at all polar stations was tightened. The station had the so-called observation and communication teams. However, those, who served on Cape Sterlegov, must have believed the place was inaccessible and were rather negligent, Kochkarev said.

'Wolfpack'

It was a dramatic mistake to think the Kara Sea is the safe rear. Back in 1942, the German Navy organized the Wunderland mission, plotting to disrupt Soviet navigation along the Northern Sea Route.

Hitler’s submarines, working in groupings, dubbed "Wolfpack," attacked vessels and convoys. The U-251 submarine opened fire at the polar station on Cape Uedineniye, and the Admiral Scheer cruiser in August 1942 attacked the Dikson port (the Krasnoyarsk Region’s north).

Attacks continued in 1943. In 1944, when the Soviet Army was approaching Germany, the situation in the Kara Sea seemed to have calmed down. The illusion of being in the far rear that reigned on Cape Sterlegov turned into a disaster and almost a catastrophe in September.

At least three Nazi submarines entered the Kara Sea: Greif U-711, U-957 and U-739. On September 24 - some historians claim it was on the night to September 25 - the Nazi submarines' amphibious assault force attacked the polar station.

"Interestingly, those submarines did not succeed much in sea missions. They planted mines and destroyed two mid-size vessels. The attack on the meteorological station leaves many questions: was it a desire of the Nazi officers to have at least any success?" Yeliseyenko continued. "We cannot rule out the task was to reconnoiter and then set up a base on Taimyr, the more so since the Northern Sea Route lies close to the shore near Cape Sterlegov, making vessels vulnerable for attacks from the shore."

Radio game

In the 1990s, Doctor of Philosophy Lev Ventskovsky, who served as a radio operator at the station in 1944, wrote a letter to the station, where he described the past events.

"I turn off the radio and hear steps up the stairs outside the radio cabin <…> I was about to reach for the door, when it swung open, and people in fur coats attacked me, threw me on the floor, then put me face to the wall and began asking something. Here I realized they were Germans," he wrote in the letter.

Admiral Arseniy Golovko wrote in memoirs that those were twenty-five gunners from the German submarine, plus an assistant, a bosun, and a translator. The latter sailed on ships of the Soviet Northern Shipping Company before the war. According to German sources, the operation was organized personally by U-711 Commander Hans-Gunther Lange. The submarines took shelter at the bottom of Lozhnykh Ognei Bay.

The station’s personnel was seven people: the station’s head, radioman and mechanic Poblodzinsky; technician for the runway for hydroplanes Bukhtiyarov, radioman Ventskovsky, meteorologist Markov, and three Red Fleet officers engaged in the observation and communications.

Grigory Bukhtiyarov and Red Fleet officer Nogayev were in the tundra during the attack: they searched and defused the mines, which had got ashore. Bukhtiyarov, an experienced hunter, soon returned to the station and was taken prisoner.

The Germans made the personnel continue radio communication. The Nazis plotted a radio game to entrap Soviet vessels and find out information about convoys.

In those days, a convoy of four vessels was about to cross the Kara Sea. Admiral Yuri Panteleyev, the Commander of the White Sea Flotilla, which during the war provided security for sea communications in the Western part of the Arctic, later recalled numerous requests during one day regarding the convoy’s coordinates. This weird activity aroused suspicion among the command, and they decided to send a warship to Cape Sterlegov.

The polar station’s personnel were trying to signal the attack: they included an SOS signal "we are captured" in the messages, but inexperienced radiomen in Dikson failed to identify it. Meanwhile, events at the station made the Germans stop the radio game before they could learn information about the convoy’s sailing.

Escape

The Nazis were looting. According to Kochkarev, they were stealing anything they could grasp, including dishes and linen. They took the trophies to Lozhnykh Ognei Bay on Bukhtiyarov’s dog sleds - the only transport for miles around.

Bukhtiyarov was an experienced polar explorer. He had spent a few winters at the station and knew all the surroundings. He persuaded the Nazis that it would be much easier to take the cargo by a different road, along the Lenivaya River. The enemies did not suspect the trap.

"The very idea of an escape seemed unrealistic, as on the one side there was the river still without thick ice, and on the other side - the sea <…> Bukhtiyarov made it to a certain place, threw the cargo onto the ground and together with the dogs crossed the river. The thin ice was firm enough for the dogs, while the man had to crawl in a few places, holding onto the sled. When on the other side, he started running, holding the sled," recollected Aref Minayev, the wartime Arctic Fleet’s Chief of Sea Operations in the Northern Sea Route’s Western Sector. He had read Bukhtiyarov’s report about the escape.

The guard, who remained on the other side of the river, kept shooting, with no result though. After the escape, the Nazis took the station’s five staff members to the submarines and destroyed the station’s facilities with artillery. After that they left the Kara Sea for good. A British destroyer is believed to have sunk one of the submarines near Norway.

"A Soviet pilot found Bukhtiyarov and Nogayev in the tundra. During questioning, the polar explorer had listened attentively to what the talkative Nazis would say. They were sure an escape across the Arctic desert is impossible, as the nearest settlements were hundreds of kilometers away. According to Admiral Golovko, Bukhtiyarov managed to learn the circumstances of the Nord vessel's sinking, the location of the Nazi submarines in the Kara Sea and the route they took to get into the sea," Alexei Yeliseyenko said.

The Nazis declared the submarine’s mission a success. They lauded it as an excellent and thought-out operation, according to a German archive. Hitler’s Navy explained the failure in hunting Soviet ships by another "General Frost," meaning "freezing water temperatures, icing and magnetic disturbances," the historian said.

The polar station’s personnel were taken to a concentration camp. In 1945, the Soviet Army liberated Ventskovsky, Poblodzinsky, Utkin and Kondrashov. After the war, Ventskovsky and Bukhtiyarov participated in reconstruction of the station on Cape Sterlegov.

https://tass.com/society/1206753

This is Marcel Pliat, a Frenchman of Polynesian descent. He fought in the Russian Imperial Army as a crew member of the Ilya Muromets aircraft. He was awarded two St. George Crosses.
On April 13, 1916, Marcel Pliat, as part of the crew of the "Ilya Muromets — X" bomber, took part in an air raid on the Daudzevas station fortified with anti-aircraft guns. After causing a number of damage to the aircraft and wounding the crew commander Abner Kostenchik with shrapnel, Pliat climbed out on the wing and stayed there for a long time, repairing the damaged engines.

Everyone recovered a little, gave first aid to the commander, who was in an unconscious state. At that moment, Pliat fell from the upper hatch with a crash. Everyone was stunned. Someone broke down: "Marcel, you were supposed to fly to earth on your own!". Everyone laughed, and the tension was lifted. It turns out that the prudent Frenchman tied a belt to the wing post, and when the "Muromets" fell, he was in a state of shock dangled in the air. Marcel then admired the strength of the aircraft for a long time.

Largely thanks to the actions of a Polynesian motorist, "Ilya Muromets", despite severe damage to the surface (only about 70 holes), managed to land. For this battle, all members of the biplane crew were awarded military awards and promoted, including Marcel Pliat - the George Cross of the III degree. He was awarded the rank of senior warrant officer (feldwebel).
Info taken from the Russian-language Wikipedia. Curiously enough, neither the English nor the French wiki has this article about one of the first (if not the first) blacks to join the crew of a combat aircraft.

Mongol invasion of Russia (all parts)

Four patriotic Americans on their way to sainthood

The Catholic Church in the United States has a long list of extraordinary men and women from all walks of life who are on their way to official sainthood because they lived Christian virtues to the extreme.

On this 4th of July weekend, we share some of them who, while living those virtues, were also extraordinary examples of heroic dedication to their country.

https://angelusnews.com/faith/four-patriotic-americans-on-their-way-to-sainthood/

Why the Germans didn't bomb Moscow like Stalingrad, by Timur Sherzad for VZGLYAD. 21.07.2021.

80 years ago, on July 21, 1941, the first serious raid on Moscow took place. First, but far from the last, after that, the Soviet capital was awaited by both massive flights and harassing raids, aimed at exhausting the population and the air defense system.

Although in the interwar period, the complete destruction of cities from aerial bombardments became one of the most popular military horror stories. The reason for this was the theory of the Italian Giulio Douet - it was he who proposed to resolve the crisis of the First World War not at the expense of motorized formations, but at the expense of strategic bombing. It was proposed to act not on the troops ready for battle on the battlefield, but on the defenseless and easily panicked cities inhabited by the most ordinary inhabitants. Of course, there was no pity for them - Douai offered to work in residential areas with high-explosive, incendiary and chemical bombs.

An unenviable fate was in store for Moscow - in the diary of the chief of the German General Staff, Franz Halder, there is an entry for July 8, which mentions Hitler's firm intention to "raze the city to the ground."

Throw in hats

The Germans, despite the punctuality and thoroughness attributed to them, were no better than others in underestimating the enemy or sloppiness. In the case of Moscow, this circumstance was revealed especially clearly. The commander of the 2nd Air Fleet, Albert Kesselring, became famous for his speech addressed to the crews aimed at bombing the Soviet capital. The glory here was dubious - Kesselring promised the pilots that everything would be much easier than in raids on London - the Russians allegedly have practically no anti-aircraft guns, there are no balloons and everything is very bad with night fighter aircraft.

With the latter, it really wasn't perfect. The lion's share of air defense fighters lacked radio transmitters, and some of them lacked receivers. If in the case of front-line aviation this could still somehow be tolerated, then for the interceptors this drawback was like a knife in the throat. With radars, too, everything was worse than that of the British by 1940 - although later, in the fall, it was possible to create a continuous 300-kilometer radar field around the capital. These were the weaknesses of Moscow's air defense, but there were also strengths.

Yes, there were "bottlenecks" in the system that significantly limited its effectiveness. But all this was more than offset by the richness of means - Moscow was protected by much more fighters and anti-aircraft guns than London during the "Battle of Britain". As for the balloons, they were superior to the British - the Russians often used a "two-story" scheme, which at the first meeting plunged the Germans into shock. If in London balloons rarely rose above 2000 m, then in Moscow they could be found at an altitude of 4500 m.

Very rarely - as, for example, on the night of August 11 - it was even possible to shoot down a plane with a balloon. Then a Heinkel-111 with a wing cut off by a cable was fished out of the Moskva River. But their main task was not this, but to drive the planes higher, to where the bombs do not fly so accurately and from where it is easier to pick them out with anti-aircraft guns.

The Germans made their first major raid on July 21 - and everything was done through one place. The planes flew at low altitudes, no one tried to somehow alternate the altitude, to look for weak points in the air defense - as if it did not exist at all. The results were twofold - on the one hand, the bombers managed to cause some damage and kill 130 people. On the other hand, in comparison with what was calculated, it turned out to be zilch.

The Germans organized the second major raid smarter - the planes went much higher, maneuvered more actively, all the time they came from different directions, trying to find weak points. But nothing has changed fundamentally. Yes, the damage was sensitive, but the results were infinitely far from the apocalyptic pictures of a completely destroyed city.

The disappointment of the German command was confirmed by a change in tactics. The last major raid took place on the night of 11 August. Out of a hundred bombers, only a dozen cars broke through to the city, and only five planes flew to the center.

Realizing that the bombing could not threaten the existence of Moscow, the Germans turned their attention to the nerves of the townspeople. Now the raids were carried out much more often and with much smaller forces. The point was to wear down the population, make them run to the bomb shelter and back from constant air raids, disrupt the work of as many enterprises as possible. The psychological result was definitely - for several days in October, for example, panic swept the capital. Not only from the bombing, but also from rumors that the city was about to be taken by storm - exhausting raids created a torn psychological background. But it was possible to restore order in the city by decisive measures relatively quickly.

As unpleasant as this new tactic was, it meant abandoning attempts to completely destroy the Soviet capital from the air. This meant that the city was saved.

Here you are not here

So why did the Luftwaffe pilots easily turn not the smallest industrial city of Stalingrad into heaps of ruins, but gave up in front of Moscow? The answer to this question is complex.

First, of course, this is the merit of the capital's air defense system - for all its shortcomings, it was, it worked properly and had enough funds to disperse German attacks and shoot down bombers with a bargaining chip "one enemy aircraft in exchange for one Soviet fighter." This was a very good loss ratio by 1941 standards.

Secondly, Moscow was corny more than the same Stalingrad, and it would take longer to destroy it - in any case, it gave a gain in time.

Thirdly, the Muscovites, under the control and according to the plans of the NKVD, actively shoveled the city so that it would change when viewed from above. Camouflage nets, plywood and paints were used - parks that could become landmarks were "built up" with pseudo-houses, historical buildings like the Kremlin were repainted, and bright objects like the same Kremlin stars or gilded domes of churches were covered with covers. In addition, residents carried a night watch on the rooftops of Moscow, extinguishing incendiary bombs and preventing fires from igniting.

Finally, Moscow and Stalingrad had completely different operational situations on the ground. In the summer, when the Germans bombed Moscow massively in order to destroy it, the main battles raged very far from the city, and the air defense system could meet the blow in perfect order. When the Germans approached Moscow, they were practically exhausted, and it was unreasonable to divert aviation to massive bombing of the city. In the case of Stalingrad, it was by no means the final goal of a large offensive, and the Germans still had a lot of forces, and the Soviet troops were shocked by the summer blow of 1942 and retreated, often losing order. Therefore, the Germans, having approached Stalingrad, could afford such an undertaking as the destruction of the city from the air.

Moscow's myriad cultural and infrastructural treasures have been saved by actions both in the air and on the ground. The result fell short of Churchill's “so many owe so little,” one of the most famous phrases about the air battle of Britain. Everyone contributed, from an anti-aircraft gunner or a fighter pilot to an ordinary soldier with a rifle somewhere hundreds of kilometers from the capital.

https://m.vz.ru/opinions/2021/7/21/1108507.html