Russian military intervention and aid to Syria #13

Detailed report on the Russian Syrian efforts to restore civilian infrastructure and return refugees to their homes.

https://function.mil.ru/news_page/country/more.htm?id=12186855@egNews

JohninMK wrote:
Neil Hauer
‏Verified account @NeilPHauer
11h11 hours ago

Another example of how incomplete our information on Russia's full deployment of military police to Syria is: announcement today that a battalion of MPs returned to Dagestan from Syria. This battalion was not known to be in Syria until now.

Link to Russian source in Russian https://www.stav.kp.ru/online/news/3182315/

There appears to be 4 of these military police battalions and that 2 are in country while the other two are on R&R back home.

Nice although I am surprised that AT-6C wasn't provided imagine it would have been cheaper and with thermobaric warhead ideal at taking out TOW teams.

Laser guided 122mm and 120mm rounds would also be ideal at taking TOW teams and provide greater ranges from vehicle to enemy

The Kornet will be in serial production, so to supply Syria is much easier.

The cost will be covered in the budget to support Syria, and production means the price will go down for domestic orders too.

If they delivered AT-6 missiles from stocks there would be a few issues, like launcher platforms. The AT-6 is primarily designed for helicopter launch and as far as I am aware the only ground launcher would be the Shturm platform which is an MTLB with a twin launcher arm with no optics or guidance on it. (it is in the vehicle and not attached to the launcher).

The kornet has modern optics and has a 10km range with the HE model. The HEAT model has a range of 8.5km, so they would be supplied with both missiles anyway.

The launcher would be the difference... I am sure you would appreciate the difference... I believe in the British army the thermal system for the Milan anti tank missile system was popular for recon and other roles... I seem to remember it being called MIRA or something.

The Spiral stocks were originally enormous but as they are used on helicopters and rather widely used because their command guidance made them rather cheap, yet rather accurate, they would likely be used for their original purpose in exercises and conflicts.

There were even small naval vessels with Shturm added for engaging targets at sea.

The experience of a special operation of the Russian Armed Forces in Syria

The newspaper "Military Industrial Courier" published an article by the commander of the Southern Military District, Colonel-General Alexander Dvornikov "Headquarters for New Wars", dedicated to the experience of combat use of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation in the armed conflict in Syria. Colonel-General A.V. Yardmen from September 2015 to July 2016 was the commander of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation in the Syrian Arab Republic.



In a message to the Federal Assembly, Russian President Vladimir Putin paid much attention to issues of national security, strengthening the combat readiness of the Armed Forces, equipping them with modern and promising weapons. The solution of these problems is impossible without the development of military science. On the eve of the international forum "Army-2018", the "MIC" in cooperation with the Academy of Military Sciences of the Russian Federation opens a series of articles in which the questions of the development of strategy and tactics of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation are raised, the experience of local conflicts is analyzed, and scientific and technical problems are examined. To experts, the problems of some materials are known at the military scientific conference of the Russian Academy of Sciences, held in March this year.


The experience of military conflicts of recent decades shows that the rapid development of science and technology makes significant changes in the nature of armed struggle. Our Western "partners" (NATO Armed Forces) are actively promoting the methods of wars of a new type or so-called hybrid, based on non-military measures. At the same time, the boundaries between the state of war and peace are blurred.

Avoiding the classics

The analysis indicates changes in the conduct of wars of the traditional type. The last classic example was the operation of the multinational forces of NATO in Iraq in 1991, where the main task was the rout of its armed forces and the seizure of the territory. In the following quarter of a century such operations with the use of large land groupings of troops were not carried out.

Now the aggressor state reaches geopolitical goals through a set of non-military measures, which in some cases far exceed the efficiency of the military. The main task is not the physical destruction of the enemy, but the complete submission to his will.

Yugoslavia, Iraq 2003, Libya, Tunisia, Syria, Ukraine ... Everywhere we can observe almost the same scenario. But in comparison with the conflicts of the last century, where the land forces of the aggressor took a direct part in the ground operation, the emphasis was made in achieving the goals with the help of beautifully disguised integrated formations.

Such groups are created on the basis of local resources on the principle of oppositional, national and confessional separation, by organizing irregular troops and the people's militia in units capable of uniting into larger formations with the support and guidance of the MTR and PMCs of other states. And also with the involvement of the armed forces of states, foreign air forces, naval forces and other groups of troops (forces), civil and non-governmental organizations to perform tasks on strategic (operational) areas in a single information and intelligence space.

Examples are the IG and Jebhat-an-Nusra factions (banned in Russia), Kurdish self-defense units, the Iraqi people's militia, the Libyan Dawn and the Zintan Brigades, the Albanian Kosovo Liberation Army in Yugoslavia, Right-wing sector ", the Crimean-Tatar battalion" Asker ", private military companies, etc. At the same time, the conquest of air and sea commanders, the striking of cruise missiles is carried out by regular naval forces and aggressor aircraft in the created no-flight zones, usually under the guise of a peacekeeping operation and crisis management. As a result, an "obedient" government is placed in the state, the country is fragmented, chaos and lawlessness are sown, control is established over resources, military bases of the aggressor are placed on the territory.

Modern armed conflicts take on a wide variety of forms, which, depending on the region and the specific situation, are collected from individual elements into a single whole. We summarized this experience, which is extremely instructive and used by us during the operation in Syria.

Experience of special operations

The form of application of the grouping of troops in Syria was determined by a special operation, which had a complex structure. At the same time, the boundaries between the tasks of the strategic, operational and tactical levels were obliterated, and strategic (operational) goals were achieved by the work of military formations of the tactical level.

The basis for warfare in special conditions: desert terrain, mountains, the acquisition of populated areas (in some cases, with the crossing of water barriers), tunnel warfare, the use of strikes by the VKS, WTO DB in a single intelligence and strike information space. A considerable part of them was spent at night.

The experience of the special operation made it possible to determine the main most effective forms of application:

fighting to defeat the most dangerous groups of terrorist groups;

defense of important facilities, main road directions;

combat operations for the implementation of reconnaissance data by forces and means of fire destruction of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation;

covering the state border.

But when performing tasks using integrated departments there are a number of features:

integrated use of military force with the participation of military formations of interested states and groups of the people's militia;

striking to reduce the economic potential of the enemy;

active information and psychological impact on militants for undermining their moral and psychological state;

the conduct of highly maneuverable hostilities by the autonomous groupings of troops (forces) in certain areas;

the use of methods of guerrilla warfare in conjunction with the classical forms of warfare;

wide use of underground passages, tunnels and communications, construction equipment;

connection of mobile units on pickups of the "tachanka" type for raids, ambushes and counterattacks.

We had to take into account the fact that by the summer of 2015 the Armed Forces of Syria had completely exhausted themselves, the personnel was demoralized, the officer corps degraded, and the leadership of the Armed Forces showed extremely low efficiency in command and control. In this situation, we were forced to focus on the most efficient units of the militia, such as the detachments of Brig. Gen. Suhel, Desert Falcons, IRGC, Hezbollah, Fatimid, Sheikh Turki and Ibrahim, Sheikh Suleiman; further, and brigades of the 5th dhk, formed from volunteers who were part of the most combat-ready land group.

As a matter of fact it is a question of scattered irregular armed formations. But being united under the command of the commander of a group of troops from the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation and acting on a single plan, they acquired a different status. And now they can fully be called an integrated grouping.

The use of new methods of warfare allowed at the initial stage to achieve the first successes in the mountainous Latakia. During the operation of Russian military security services and the Navy, as well as units of the Special Operations Forces, critical enemy targets, infrastructure and large concentrations of terrorist units were defeated in the interests of accomplishing tasks by the land group. The main role in it was assigned not to the regular troops, but to the above-named detachments, which played a decisive role in key operations in the mountainous Latakia, Palmira, Kviris, Aleppo, the liberation of Akerbat, Khama and Deir ez-Zor.

In the mountainous region, operations were conducted along advantageous tracks with the capture and retention of prevailing heights, passes and mountain passes, the widespread use of bypassing detachments, while the knowledge of the theater played an important role. Thus, in the desert area, the results of the use of aviation and artillery on the entire depth of the enemy's defense were widely used, and offensive actions were actively conducted at night. On separate directions for the fortification equipment of lines, positions bulldozers were involved.

Tanks that were directly subordinate to the commanders of assault detachments were effectively used.

Deir ez-Zor was released by two blows of General Suchel's units and five volunteer detachments at the end of October 2017. After a massive fire attack with the use of cruise missiles Caliber from the frigate Admiral Essen with the seizure and subsequent expansion of the bridgehead on the left bank of Euphrates, Syrian troops entered the city, which for more than three years was surrounded by an encirclement. Subsequently, the grouping of terrorists was surrounded, dismembered and destroyed in parts.

The most effective resources

Another feature is the tunnel and counter-tonnel struggle. The pierced passages were used both for moving inside cities between their positions, and for secretly drawing closer to the enemy. Especially in the Syrian capital and Homs. In Aleppo and Damascus, terrorists also used tunnels to lay bombs, destroy government-controlled government facilities.

One of the key events of the Syrian war was the operation to liberate Aleppo. She wore an offensive-defensive character. With a view to constant fire influence on the enemy, the tactics of the offensive in three shifts were used day and night, without interruption. A defensive group was formed along the outer ring. Aviation struck at targets and groups of terrorist groups only on the outer ring, and missile forces and artillery, tactical firearms within the KIA - for important purposes within the city and only after confirmation from three or more sources.

In addition, the sabotage activities of the units of the SPS in relation to the objects of terrorist groups were carried out.

The humanitarian operation was conducted in parallel with the conduct of offensive operations and air strikes against point targets and subsequently became a turning point in the liberation of Syria.

It is necessary to say separately about the activities of Brigadier General Suchel, as the most capable commander in the Syrian army. He commands irregular formations. During the fighting he achieved significant successes, avoided templates, and competently used various methods of conducting a special operation.

A fundamentally new approach, implemented in practice by General Suhel, in offensive tactics was the erection of the so-called Syrian shaft to reduce losses in personnel and equipment. The fortification equipment of positions was conducted with the use of general-purpose road machinery, which, after additional armored vehicles, was also used in the conduct of offensive operations.

During the operation in Syria, we, as elsewhere before, were convinced of the practical importance of information confrontation. Information resources have in fact become one of the most effective weapons. Their wide use allows in a few days to shake the situation from within. For example, during the operation for the liberation of Aleppo, information work with the local population helped to liberate entire neighborhoods without a fight, to withdraw more than 130,000 civilians.

The effect of this kind of impact can be compared with the results of a large-scale operation involving the use of troops and forces. It should be noted that the information war was on both sides. Its results were directly reflected in the world public opinion. I will say this: without carrying out information operations, we would not have had success in Aleppo, Deir ez-Zor and Gut.

Thus, modern military science shows flexibility, the ability to adapt to a specific situation and the ability to achieve geopolitical and strategic goals without the widespread use of military force - by measures of a non-military nature, by the use of integrated groupings of troops.

Management Features

A separate issue is the organization of the management of integrated groups in the Syrian Arab Republic.

Since the beginning of the special operation, general planning for the use of troops was carried out by the General Staff of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation, and the detailed one by the commanding group. General leadership of the actions of the troops was entrusted to the commander of a group of troops (forces) directly through the General Staff of the Syrian Armed Forces.

At the same time, with the beginning of the first operations to stabilize the situation, the management organization required a serious correction. In view of the low effectiveness of the General Staff of the Syrian Armed Forces, all the work on preparing the operations fell on our officers. For the immediate management of the factions at the command post in Khmeimim, operational groups were deployed from all formations, as well as from Mukhabarat, combat units of the IRGC, Hezbollah, Al-Quds, people's defense, etc.

In order to further optimize, we decided to send operational groups of the RF Armed Forces to tactical directions in accordance with the division of the territory of Syria into zones of responsibility. At the initial stage, such groups were small and included up to five officers, but they were already effectively managed. Later on, officers, operators, scouts, artillerymen, engineers, signalers and translators were additionally included in their composition. Depending on the tasks performed and in the most active phases of the operation, the number of officers of the operational groups reached 15-20 people.

Symmetrically sharply changing situation, we also optimized the operational composition of the command post of Khmeimim. The CSO's duty shift consisted of representatives of the GSP, the Intelligence and Strike Management Group, the information and analytical center, the combined air defense command post and fighter aviation, the enemy's fire destruction planning group, the reconciliation center of the warring parties, and a group of negotiations with the coalition representatives, Israel and Turkey.

The work of the united command post of the grouping of forces (forces) built in this way made it possible to ensure continuity of management, to shorten the cycle of decision-making and to increase the speed with which the tasks were accomplished.

The composition of the combat command control group changed depending on the tasks arising. For example, before the deployment of a shipborne aircraft carrier group in the Mediterranean Sea, an operational group of the Navy consisting of 12 men from the headquarters of the Northern and Black Sea Fleets was set up to organize the use of deck aviation for ground targets of armed formations.

In February 2016, by decision of the Russian Defense Minister, a fundamentally new element of the management system was created: the Center for the Reconciliation of Warring Parties (CPVC) to monitor compliance with the ceasefire regime.

The complex of these measures allowed not only to ensure the sustainability, continuity and efficiency of management, but also linked all elements in a single reconnaissance and strike information field. In all operational groups, videoconferencing is established with the CP of the troop grouping.

One of the significant improvements was the measures to counteract the enemy's shock drone. In the complex integrated security center of the KP was introduced a group of combat with UAV, headed by the senior duty shift. Its main task is to organize the interaction of EW forces, aircraft, UAVs, fire defeats and communications (this practice is relevant for operational and combat training activities in the daily operations of troops).

The created system ensured the control of the groupings of troops on the operational-tactical directions. As well as the prospective and daily planning of military operations (long-range missile strikes on critically and economically important targets), which allowed real-time assessment of the situation, planning fire damage, and correcting the results of strikes simultaneously in all directions.

Modern military art and experience of fighting in local conflicts of the last quarter of a century show that the creation and use of integrated groups in wars of a new type is becoming increasingly important. And the problems of their deployment and management include aspects that require a thoughtful, detailed study. It is necessary to develop a common understanding of the theory of the application of such groups in the practice of combat operations of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation.


Alexander Dvornikov,

Commander of the Southern Military District, Colonel-General