Iran Air Defense Systems

@ PEED

I am no expert on sattelite. But have seen these modern sattelite images. It is clear to me that they can see and distinguish ground target very well. Even well camouflaged or mobile ones. Knowing what sattelite is passing or not may be useful, only the enemy knows this also, and they will attack at this time, knowing ground target are hidden or moving away. Russia or  China have information about sattelite and they can target with weapon. India may be able to do it too. But Iran has no such ability.

Agree about what you mention about costs. Different ways to hide. Dummy sites or buried sites. AAA versus missiles. But we are not counting costs in terms of lives lost or territory lost. It is not gradual calculation. It is either RADAR or no RADAR. we can not have  SOME radar. Or part of a radar. Therefore probability of being hit must be zero. Or near zero. Otherwise all the expense and effort useless. So scientist must work out exactly a way, when NO observation of RADAR site possible . Or has very low probability of observation and being hit. All you need to destroy a radar, is ONE lousy drone out of many hundreds that get through.

@Crod

Agree that underestimating opponent is not good idea. The yank imagined that Global hawk was good. Based on previous success against inferior enemy. But it was hit at 60,000 feet by Iran. So we must be ready and predict what capability they have. One of these cheap  drones has four hours flight time. So making one with six or ten hour flight time possible. At 100 km / hr, then range 1000 km.

Hitting a SAM vehicle with several ( more than number of missiles carried) drones simultaneously, will destroy it. Even if well manned and armed. No need to have vehicle. Just single buried missile tubes, dispersed.

I would say the same about radar. A vast radar but dispersed over land. Consisting of nodes. Like taking radar dish and chopping it up into hundreds of pieces. Then these nodes work together. If a node is hit, it is cheap. And radar works well still. So to disable radar becomes near impossible. Neural net or human brain model.

I'm not an expert on sattelites as well, but simple logic told me, that if a sattelite want to got such high resolution picture, that its lenses have to focus to less than 1^o, what meant it could monitor only a very small area. Specially if sattelites are geostationary at 36.000 km altitude. To have such resolution, you could only monitor few streets in Tehran, not whole Iran. If you want to monitor larger area, you have far lower resolution and in that case masking, false targets, etc still play their role. Iran also had their space program and have equipment to monitor sattelites over them and know, when they are passing over Iran and when to hide important things. Iran knows, that their enemies are US and Israel and they are not naive.

The threat of swarm saturation, but slow suicide drones like the Harpy series can be confronted economically by systems like Derivatsiya-PVO 57mm and Irans Sarir 100mm system based on KS-19.
In a saturation scenario where numbers count, you don't want to spend a mach 3 guided missile, capable to intercept >mach 2 targets on something in the kinematic class of a Harpy.
Benefit here over systems like the Pantsir 30mm gun is that you can engage at longer ranges of course. This benefits the area under protection of this economic AAA component as well as the numbers of engagements possible until the targets come too close.

Iran would use its Sarir gun system with a single round, where the target is very slow and not maneuvering or concentrate the fire of a 4 gun battery, one shot each, on a single target with all rounds arriving at around the same time.
The latter was a concept followed by Iran in the later 2000's, where thermal cameras had become affordable enough to be used to control a Sarir battery. The goal back then was simultaneous automated firing and reloading against Tomahawk class cruise missiles. A concentrated burst of the whole battery would kill the CM target at a affordable cost.

The Derivatsiya-PVO 57mm system tries to follow this concept and make up lower destructive power shells with its relative high rate of fire. The mobility requirements of Russia, simply do not allow a static Sarir-like concept. The Derivatsiya-PVO needs to make up the destructive power difference of 3kg 57mm vs. 15kg 100mm round and the non-simultaneous arrival of the shells at target via a higher rate of fire and more rounds spend.

4 simultaneously arriving Sarir 100mm shells were apparently assumed to create a large enough kill circle against a low maneuvering target in Tomahawk class to allow a high PK at >6km distance.
The 57mm systems higher ROF allows the arrival of shells at still relative short interval to allow a equivalent kill circle to the 4-shell battery Sarir at maybe 25 shells.
More importantly: While Irans Sarir system needs a static 4 gun battery to achieve that performance, the Derivatsiya-PVO 57mm can approach it with its single mobile vehicle layout. Plus the amount of ready to fire rounds is several times larger than that of a Sarir battery.

If requirements on armor and mobility are as high as with the Russian Derivatsiya-PVO, economy gets affected.
I don't know the exact assured kill sphere that the KS-19 100mm shell creates but it may be sufficient to assure a kill against a maneuvering <200km/h suicide drone with a single shot (30m?).
This would be the economic requirement to confront "expandable"suicide drones, a simple shell with an electronic time fuse.

Chinese have already developed a more mobile 76mm large caliber concept with high ROF and large magazine. But an ideal AAA concept to allow necessary economy performance would be a 3-barrel rotary canon variant of the KS-19 on a heavy off road truck chassis. The benefit would be that 4-gun Sarir battery would be shrinkend to a single mobile vehicle. Barrel cooling, recoil force and overall weight would be the obvious hurdles here.
The AHEAD concept on larger caliber rounds could also be a solution that requires lower ROF.

In general, the higher the kinematic performance the lower the effective envelope of an AAA system. So where a Pantsir 30mm gun has its lowest envelope at around 1-1,5km against a crossing, maneuvering supersonic target, very good for self defense of the system itself, the Sarir/KS-19 100mm system achieves 3-3,5km in that worst case target scenario. This allows protection of larger areas and earlier attack cycle to counter mass-saturation scenarios.
There are always key static targets that require protection, such as the Konteyner OTHR-B or airbases.

@PEED

Thanks for reply . Agree with what you say about using the right tool for the job . A high altitude and high speed target needs a high altitude and high speed bullet . A low altitude and low speed target needs a low speed bullet . The first is a matter of a necessity  . The second is a matter of economy . I guess it is very difficult to tell the difference between a high altitude high speed decoy and the real thing . So missiles have to be fired . And against low speed low altitude drone , the most economic option is AAA.

The altitude of these cheap drones , and speed may mean that lower velocity and calibre guns can be used . This means longer barrel life and more importantly faster pointing and dynamics of gun . Especially if  multiple incoming drones havd to be intercepted from different directions . Testing  reaction times and gun dynamics .

But  in reality , we can safely assume that overwhelmingly drone numbers on a particular vector will enable the peneteration of AD shield . And some AD assets , especially radar are exposed . Since these , even if a passive system , are exposed and can be spotted visually,  and take hits .

Therefore for a radar based air defence  , in order  to effectively use AD against  a numerically superior force, the radar itself  must become invulnerable or very hard and uneconomic to destroy . We must think about the design of the fabric of radar , to make them battle hardened.  

One way that I thought was to have the antennae of phased array radar , and place each one at say distance of ten meters from next antenna  . An array of say ten thousand antennae  , would stretch over kilometer . This radar can be placed against sloping side of hill . To destroy such radar , most or all elements have to be destroyed.  A very difficult job for small warhead of drone . A fragmenting  heavier warhead needs bigger craft . So easier target and more economical  to take out using missiles. But I don't know if the maths will work out . Can such radar be operational ?


https://fas.org/nuke/guide/china/facility/lpar.htm

The antennae of these large arrays, can be designed to resist attacks. They could be simplified versions, easy to replace and cheap. The antennae can be extruded out of bore holes in mountains. Designed to break if attacked. A new length then emerging. In this way, no way of taking out radar, without digging out the whole mountain.!

Iran MOD development and construction Bavar-373 loange range air defense system and Sayyad-4 missile

yavar wrote:
Iran MOD development and construction Bavar-373 loange range air defense system and Sayyad-4 missile

Did it say how long it takes to construct and commission? Hope they can get a shed lot and built real quick....they might need them!

Iran long range Mobile air defense system Bavar-373, at 39th anniversary of Iraq imposed war parade 2019

crod wrote:

yavar wrote:
Iran MOD development and construction Bavar-373 loange range air defense system and Sayyad-4 missile

Did it say how long it takes to construct and commission? Hope they can get a shed lot and built real quick....they might need them!

i is already commission by Army air defense and they building more units

US Stops U-2 Spy Planes’ Flights After Iran’s Missile Shield Starts Operation

“The US moves in the region are monitored every hour and for instance, the flights of the US U-2 planes which took off from Cyprus and flew twice over the region stopped after Iran made and operated Bavar 373 air defense system and after they found out that the system can track and destroy them (the U-2 planes),” General Taqizadeh said, addressing a ceremony in Tehran on Saturday.

https://www.fort-russ.com/2019/10/us-stops-u-2-spy-planes-flights-after-irans-missile-shield-starts-operation/

i is already commission by Army air defense and they building more units

Yes, what I meant was how long does it take to build a system, test it and supply it to front forces. I assume each system needs to undergo some sort of test audit before being released.

Iran Army air defense downs intruding foreign drone ( UAV) over southern port city of Mahshahr
https://www.presstv.com/Detail/2019/11/08/610687/drone-Iran-Army-Mahshahr

Aᴍɪʀ
@AmirIGM
·
3h
Unconfirmed report: the front flew around sophisticated defences like the S-300, but was locked onto by S-300 and other integrated radar systems. It was intercepted at an altitude of just 10 metres off the ground



Ali
@allushiii
·
2h
Update

The UAV has been shot down before reaching sensitive petrochemical facilities.

When targeted the drone was flying on altitude < 100 meters.

Iran shot it down with Mersad complex, which is domestic complex based on US Hawk.



Drone was flying extreamly low. It looks like someone try to test Iranian air defense in similar scenario as it happened in Abqaiq. But Iranian air defense detect it and shot it down. Now we could compare those two similar events, where Saudi fiasco become even more evident.

Many claim the video shows a fail.

Other say also it was an israeli drone fired from Barhein.

Mersad




IADS

I predicted this day would come. They will test defences. Reaction times. A statistical analysis to determine position of sensitive equipment. The trick is to provide them with fuzzy random data. Where intercepts take place. Not just activate near sensitive area. But activate and destroy near unimportant area.

Damascus gave Iran advanced Israeli missile captured in Syria: Russian media

The Syrian military did not give Russia the advanced Israeli surface-to-air missile that landed inside Syria in July 2018, the Russian aviation publication Avia.Pro reported on Thursday.

Instead, the Russian publication claims that Damascus transferred the Israeli missile to Iran, who, in turn, plans to reverse engineer the projectile.

“As it turned out, the missile did not go to Moscow, but to Iran, which means serious problems for Israel against the backdrop of an escalation of the situation with the Islamic Republic,” Avia.Pro reported.

“In fact, the missile did not go to Russia at all, but to Iran On this day, the Iranian cargo Il-76 was at Damascus International Airport, and could very well have delivered the Israeli missile defense system to Iran to study its capabilities,” they said, citing a military expert.

“Russia’s interest in foreign military technology is quite obvious, but for Iran, this missile allows reveals features of the Israeli missile defense system. If Tehran really took possession of such a missile, then the reliability of Israeli air defense systems is in question, even if the missile defense has been seriously damaged,” they added.

https://www.almasdarnews.com/article/damascus-gave-iran-advanced-israeli-missile-captured-in-syria-russian-media/


http://avia.pro/news/zahvachennaya-v-sirii-sekretnaya-izrailskaya-raketa-popala-ne-v-rossiyu-v-iran

Iran Army air defense "Guardians of Velayat Sky-98" exercise 2019
https://www.presstv.com/Detail/2019/11/21/611765/Iran-Air-Force-war-games-Semnan

Iran can improve heabollah and hamas rockets by knowing the caracteristics of the inboard radar (range against rocket rcs specially) so that the Pk fall at less than 10%. If they start fiting some chaffs that can be time launched or controled by a simple rwr that knows operating frequency of the missile's seaker they will go through iron dome easily.

Yes fake info can come from various sources. Trump repeated claim to hit cultural sites is more than sheer stupidity. I think the Yanks know Iran strength of AD system around sensitive site. So I think  he is trying to get Iran to move AD system. Iran should not fall into trap. But perhaps put dummy AD around religious site. If hit, the people will build them in future. And people will get even more united against yank.

the mention of KS-19 Sa-ir 100mm as an air defence system, isn't such a bad idea, Iran obviously had a load of Ks-19 in storage and with current sanctions and threats from the air from Israel and USA you cant blame them trying to turn an old system into something useful, they did the same with zu-23-2 barrels with the Mesbah-1 and the zu-57-2 with the Bahman system. the only thing i think could have improved the Sa-ir was putting onto a truck chassis with stabilising legs, this would allow a quicker set up and pack up time. with a decent range of 21km and 15km for proximity fuse, 15 rounds a minute self loading system, its not bad, for a system that otherwise would be pretty obsolete in its original format in the anti air role. Being a large calibre the blast radius should be decent, and even if the system didnt take down any aircraft it certainly would be a deterrence to aircraft when suddenly the air around starts to explode with shrapnel. improved rounds could be made including EMP rounds. I see this system could be ideal for drones including swarms of drones. Dones tend to be slower flying and weaker than aircraft, and considering the range of the gun likely destroy the drones before they get anywhere near dropping the bombs/missiles. And being an AA round it would be a much cheaper solution to drones (other than EW). I always think using a more sophisticated missile to take out a drone is a waste, especially if its homemade drone like the terrorists use in Syria. It would have been useful for Iran and Syria if Iran deployed these in idilb, Syria would gain some much needed anti drone air defence and iran could test the system in war time. The other systems mentioned above Mesbah-1 and Bahman would also be useful in syria. I am surprised Iran hasn't produced upgrades for its ZSU-23-4 and ZU-23-2 similar to other upgrades done on the systems normally an upgrades radar and the addition of MANPAD or strela-10 (sa-13).

I know Syria already stocks, Zu-23-2, ZSU-23-4, ZSU-57-2, KS-19, 52-k (85mm), 61-K (37mm) and S-60, and such systems could easily have been upgraded to more effective air defence systems. Although it very likely all were used as ground support systems. We had all seen the zu-23-2 mounted on various chassis and used as ground support. I have seen pictures of ZSU-23-4 stripped of its radar and electronics and some caged armoured attached for use as ground support, also seen, S-60 mounted on trucks and fired ground support as well. In other conflicts seen ZSu-57-2 used in ground support. And although i havent seen 61-k, 52-k, KS-19 used as such i wouldnt be surprised if they too havent been used in ground support. It was quite common during WW2 for large AA guns to be used as direct fire role. The 52-k and KS-19 being 85mm and 100mm could also be used as artillery in similar way the T-12 anti tank gun was used, firing HE-frag rounds could prove lethal to enemy soldiers and soft skinned vehicles. After the war Syria will be cash strapped and we may see older systems being converted and upgraded especially in ground attack and AA systems, while any money it does have to spent of procurement will likely be spend on the airforce and high tech air defence, thats if it has any money to spend as rebuilding the country will be key priority.

video of Sa-ir in action.