NATO ΑΒΜ Shield in Europe and Russia's response

GORKI, November 23 (Itar-Tass) — Russia will equip missiles in the Strategic Rocket Forces and the Navy with missile defence penetration systems, President Dmitry Medvedev said on Wednesday.

Due to the U.S. plans to continue the missile defence construction in Europe, strategic ballistic missiles, which become operational in the Strategic Rocket Forces and the Navy, will be equipped with missile defence penetration systems and new high-efficiency units, the Russian leader stressed.

Medvedev has called for ensuring protection of strategic nuclear forces within creating an aerospace defence system.

President Medvedev said the U.S. had launched its missile defence programme in Europe. Thus, the Russian leader gave instructions to ensure protection of the strategic nuclear forces within creating an aerospace defence system.

In his address to Russian citizens, Medvedev said he wanted to report on Russia’s return measures to creating missile defence in Europe.

President Medvedev said: “First. On my instruction the Russian Defence Ministry will immediately put into operation a radar station in the Kaliningrad region to prevent missile attacks.

“Second. Within creating Russia’s aerospace defence system we will ensure protection of strategic nuclear forces.

“Third. Russia will equip missiles in the Strategic Rocket Forces and the Navy with missile defence penetration systems. Due to the U.S. plans to continue the missile defence construction in Europe, strategic ballistic missiles, which become operational in the Strategic Rocket Forces and the Navy, will be equipped with missile defence penetration systems and new high-efficiency units.

“Fourth. The Armed Forces will be set the task to work out measures to destroy information and management missile defence systems,” Medvedev said.

“These measures are adequate, effective and need minor costs,” the president said. If other measures are insufficient, the Russian Federation will deploy contemporary strike systems [for example, the Iskander systems] in the west and south in order to prevent fire damage from U.S. missile defence deployed in Europe,” Medvedev said.

“The deployment of the Iskander missile system in the Kaliningrad region will be one of such steps in this aspect,” the Russian leader stressed.

“If it necessary we will take other measures to counter European missile defence,” Medvedev pointed out.

Austin wrote:I dont think backing out from INF is a smart idea it would just mean US would deploy non-strategic weapons IRBM/MRBM in Europe.

GarryB wrote:If the INF treaty is withdrawn from it would simply be a matter of stating publicly that any theatre or tactical weapon (ie IRBM or cruise missile) deployed in Europe by the US that can reach Russia will be considered a strategic weapon and therefore bound by the new START treaty.

GarryB wrote:Another option of course would be to block all US and NATO traffic through Russia to Afghanistan.

On Nov. 23, President Dmitry Medvedev — who, by the way, is still president — announced the measures with which Russia would respond if the United States deploys its missile defense system in Europe. Many commentators in the West and Russia agreed that there was nothing new in his threats to withdraw from the New START treaty with the United States and deploy Iskander missiles in Kaliningrad, saying his rhetoric was aimed primarily at Russian voters during a national election season.

That is largely true. Medvedev is clearly doing everything he can to avoid looking like a political lame duck or being eclipsed by Prime Minister Vladimir Putin’s vigorous election campaign. The “firm” and “patriotic” foreign policy stance is needed as a counterweight to the Kremlin’s vague economic agenda, the growing popular discontent over the ruling tandem’s return to power and the never-ending dominance of United Russia.

But that is only an initial and very superficial analysis. It would be a mistake to explain the Russian leadership’s most important strategic foreign policy and defense decisions purely on the basis of domestic policy considerations. In emphasizing those particular factors, observers tend to underestimate Russia’s real national security concerns. In fact, Russian history demonstrates that the foreign policy picture heavily influences the internal dynamics of this country. In fact, the Western forces’ cynical and colonialist foray into Libya, U.S. Secretary of State Hillary Clinton’s banal “wow” upon hearing of Libyan leader Moammar Gadhafi’s death, or the bloodthirsty comments made by U.S. Senator John McCain for the benefit of U.S. voters have done more to ensure Putin’s return to the Kremlin than could Central Elections Commission head Vladimir Churov.

It would be wrong to focus on the propagandistic aspect of Medvedev’s statements while ignoring the underlying message — namely that they denote the beginning of a crisis with the United States on nuclear arms and the overall strategic relationship between the two countries. This crisis has many dimensions, and the disagreement over missile defense is only its most striking manifestation.

The fundamental reason behind Washington’s activity in the field of missile defense is its desire to achieve complete security for the entire continental United States. That goal drives all of Washington’s national security policy and thinking.

However, today’s technology and economic situation make it impossible to create a missile defense system capable of guaranteeing protection against a massive nuclear attack. That is why the United States has chosen to work toward this goal in stages, first creating a “limited” missile defense system to stop missiles fired by “rogue states.” However, it is obvious that any “limited” missile defense system would be no more than an interim step toward building a full-scale missile defense system to provide guaranteed protection of U.S. territory against any nuclear missile attack. A lack of desire is not stopping the United States from creating and deploying a full-scale missile defense system now, but technological and economic constraints make it infeasible at present.

Thus, any “limited” versions of a U.S. missile defense system — provided it really is directed against missiles coming from Iran or North Korea — would essentially be “experimental trial runs” designed to perfect the technology needed for the later deployment of a full-scale missile defense system to protect the continental United States.

Of course, Washington’s missile defense goal is to achieve complete and unassailable national security. But as former U.S. Secretary of State Henry Kissinger aptly said, “Absolute security for one means no security for the rest.” And that is the concern underlying Russia’s position regarding any configuration of the U.S missile defense system.

At the same time, it is clear that Russia has no realistic way to stop or delay Washington’s plans to pursue its missile defense program. There is a strong consensus among U.S. lawmakers and the public on the need to achieve the greatest possible protection of the nation’s territory against any foreign missile attack, including possible strikes from Russia or China. For its part, Russia has nothing to offer in return for Washington’s belief that absolute invulnerability is attainable. Recall that when Soviet leader Mikhail Gorbachev met with U.S. President Ronald Reagan in Reykjavik in 1986, he offered complete nuclear disarmament in return for a U.S. promise to abandon its Strategic Defense Initiative. That proposal was rejected. Washington’s missile defense program is closely linked to the idea of global hegemony that underlies all U.S. foreign and defense policy.

As a result, negotiating with the United States on missile defense is entirely futile — a conviction that negotiations in recent years have only reinforced in the minds of Russian leaders. Every attempt to draw the United States into an agreement on some form of restriction has proven completely fruitless. In effect, all interactions with the United States on this question have only confirmed the nature of Washington’s “long-term” missile defense policy — one that ultimately threatens the basis of nuclear deterrence and, consequently, the very foundation of Russia’s national security.

Under such circumstances, Russian leaders are faced with a choice: either continue making futile attempts to negotiate with Washington on missile defense or resort to a contingency plan. As experienced leaders with a realistic grasp of world affairs, Medvedev and Putin should have had a “Plan B” all along — and they did. It was that plan that Medvedev disclosed on Nov. 23. Of course, domestic policy considerations played some role, but the main significance of the speech was that Russia is officially putting Plan B into action. It would be very unwise for anyone to ignore that clear signal.

Not surprisingly, Medvedev said nothing new in those statements, and the measures he announced are already being implemented. Russia’s Plan B has been under development for a long time. Development and testing have long been conducted on new nuclear warheads and upgraded missiles to carry them. These include the Lainer, Avangard and Yars missiles — with the Yars already in production. A network of new long-range early warning radar stations is under construction, one of which is the station being built in Kaliningrad. Systems are also being developed for the “destruction of the information and control apparatus of missile defense systems.” In this regard, recall that the Sokol-Echelon program for destroying U.S. early warning satellites was renewed in 2010. Also under way is the scheduled replacement of Tochka-U missiles systems with the new Iskander-M missiles in Russian army brigades. And of course, those upgrades will eventually be applied to the 152nd missile brigade in Kaliningrad as well.

And now, thanks to the increase in Russian defense spending through 2020, many of those programs can be accelerated and moved toward serial production and deployment. With that in mind, Medvedev was able to put Plan B into action. Russia continues to focus on the military and technical means required for countering the U.S. missile defense system. At the same time, the resources needed for implementing Russia’s Plan B are realistic and relatively modest. What’s more, the gradual and rather slow way that the U.S. missile defense system is being developed makes it possible for Russia to implement the program Medvedev has announced.

Ruslan Pukhov is director of the Center for Analysis of Strategies and Technologies and publisher of the journal Moscow Defense Brief.

Putting S-500s in Kaliningrad as a counter wont work if those ships equipped with SM-3 sail from the Med and the Black Sea to Greenland and off Norway directly under the flight path of Russian missiles on their way to the CONUS.

In fact with satellite early warning having US navy vessels fitted with SM-3 on either sea board of the US could be used to intercept warheads as they come in.

ABM missiles on ships are incredibly mobile and easy to deploy globally... why wouldn't the Russians want that... and they are much more likely to get it if the US has it first.

Phase Four will be complete by 2020, and will provide an early intercept capability against medium, intermediate, and Intercontinental ballistic missiles. In concert with the Ground-based Midcourse Defense (GMD) capability now deployed in Alaska and California for homeland defense, the Phase Four PAA architecture with the high-velocity, land-based SM-3 Block IIB interceptor missile and enhanced command and control and sensor network will provide an effective defensive capability for both regional and homeland defense by allowing multiple interceptors opportunities to destroy threat missiles of all ranges in the region from which they were launched.

The SM-3 Block IIB is a hit-to-kill interceptor using the force of a direct collision to destroy its target. It will be launched from the Aegis Ashore weapon system (a land-based version of the Navy’s Aegis Ballistic Missile Defense system). The ability to intercept earlier in flight -- engaging targets in their ascent phase -- enables defenders to handle larger raids (salvos) and engage target missiles before they can take evasive maneuvers or deploy countermeasures. With a higher burnout velocity, flexible launch locations, and greater interceptor divert (steering) capability, the SM-3 Block IIB can also address intercontinental ballistic missiles, supplementing the GMD capability.

GarryB wrote:But the current plans don't have missile interceptors in Poland, they have SM-3s in ships in the Med and the Black Sea.

GarryB wrote:Putting S-500s in Kaliningrad as a counter wont work if those ships equipped with SM-3 sail from the Med and the Black Sea to Greenland and off Norway directly under the flight path of Russian missiles on their way to the CONUS.

GarryB wrote:In fact with satellite early warning having US navy vessels fitted with SM-3 on either sea board of the US could be used to intercept warheads as they come in.

GarryB wrote:ABM missiles on ships are incredibly mobile and easy to deploy globally... why wouldn't the Russians want that... and they are much more likely to get it if the US has it first