Source Military Parade, No. 1, 2011, page(s): 12-15
EUROPEAN MISSILE DEFENCE DEVELOPMENT PROBLEMS AND OPTIONS
Author: Andrei Mikhailov
Andrei Mikhailov, special correspondent of the Military Parade magazine
Addressing the entire international community, Russian President Dmitry Medvedev made a crucial statement during his visit to India in late 2010: "Any curtain, any wall, whether ideological or technological, is dangerous." The ideological wall collapsed just over two decades ago, simultaneously with the symbolic fall of the Berlin Wall in 1989. However, the technological barrier, which prevents partnership integration of the countries to strengthen security, remains intact.
Mikhail Gorbachev was the first to use the term 'partnership' with regard to defence during Soviet-American negotiations. At first, the attitude to this word was extremely wary. Two years before the fall of the Berlin Wall the-then US President Ronald Reagan, making a speech at the Brandenburg Gate in West Berlin, had urged Mikhail Gorbachev: "General Secretary Gorbachev, if you seek peace... tear down this wall!" Nowadays, the appeal to 'tear down the wall' is made in reverse - addressing the NATO-Russia Summit in Lisbon in November 2010, Russian President Dmitry Medvedev called on NATO Secretary General Anders Fogh Rasmussen and 28 NATO heads of state to get over the mistrust and become equal partners: "If Russia takes a corresponding part in the NATO missile defence programme, participates in the dialogue, plays a certain role in developing a joint missile defence system..., it will be acceptable for us."
This appeal was primarily addressed to the US, since Europe is as concerned as Russia about the terms and conditions of deploying the global missile defence shield. At the 11th Missile Defence Conference, hosted by the Royal United Services Institute for Defence and Security Studies (RUSI) in 2010, head of the US Cevasco International, a company specialising in defence cooperation and aerospace defence, Frank Cevasco pointed out that, according to experts, outsourcing of the global missile defence deployment, with European states playing a secondary role of hosting US missile defence system elements on their territories, would make Europe subordinate to the US, deprive it of its voting right, and fail to solve the entire range of European security problems. Europe has its own missile defence potential and invests in new projects, though they are less ambitious than those of the US.
However, while the US and Europe have managed to overcome the legacy of previous wars and become allies, the Russian brass have yet to erase the German Fulda Gap, a section of territory between the former East German border and Western Europe, from their maps. History proves that it was fear, rather than goodwill, that launched the process of nuclear arms control and partnership. The Cuban Missile Crisis of 1962 became the critical moment. The-then US President John F. Kennedy ordered the US Armed Forces to be put on Level 2 combat readiness (DEFCON 1 (defence readiness condition), i.e. preparations for nuclear missile launches).
Addressing a round table meeting on the US-Russian nuclear arms control at the Brookings Institution, Washington DC, in 2009, chair of the meeting, former Deputy Secretary of State (1994-2001) Strobe Talbott called on nuclear powers to take on greater responsibility, team up their efforts, and establish defence cooperation. To make a pun on the acronym of the new Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START III), signed this year, let's say the process got off to a good start. It is the beginning of a new stage, the motto of which should be 'trust' between Russia and the USA, and Russia and NATO, because otherwise missile defence integration will be next to impossible.
Three Points of European Missile Defence Development
How to start deploying a joint missile defence system, given the ever increasing threat of surprise ground-, sea-, air-, and even space-based ballistic missile strikes, involving nuclear, chemical, or biological WMDs? Will this process be based on the principle of complementarity, or will the parties remain counter-partners?
At the present time it is dramatically important not only to define the missile defence deterrence strategy, but to choose the best option after examining
all aspects, all possible threats and challenges. This is exactly what NATO's Deputy Assistant Secretary General for Political Affairs and Security Policy James Appathurai talked about at a news conference in Moscow in February 2011. He outlined three points of development in the ongoing international discussion of the specific European missile defence structure.
The first 'point of development' is the most complicated issue of reaching a consensus on the best technical and organisational algorithms of taking a decision on engaging a target within the framework of the joint information component of the NATO and the Russian missile defence systems, including their transparency.
James Appathurai underlined that there would be completely independent, though mutually coordinated, NATO and Russian missile defence systems. He added that the best solution should be arrived at, and that NATO would be defending its territory, and Russia its own territory. "It is only NATO's responsibility to defend its territories and we cannot pass this responsibility to anyone else. It is clear that Russia is going to protect its territory itself and will not give up this duty. It would also seem strange if Russia asked the other part for permission to defend its territory," he pointed out, stating that the best missile defence system structure should not undermine the defence potential and the sovereignty of any country, involved in the joint missile defence.
The logic of averting a missile threat consists in detecting and knocking down an incoming missile as soon as possible. However, experts started disagreeing on whether NATO or Russia should, for instance, knock down ballistic missiles, posing a threat to Europe, over the territory of a non-member state, for example, Russia, Ukraine, or Georgia?
NATO has already embarked on developing sophisticated automatic command and control (C2) systems, based on top-notch technologies, for the joint Active Layered Theatre Ballistic Missile Defence (ALTBMD) system. It tests interoperability of different national air command and control systems so that they could function as a single C2 centre, given a decisionmaking time limit of less than one minute. NATO expands the number of allies, integrated into the revamped missile defence system, adds mobile components, based wherever possible, and exchanges tactical and intelligence data. As a result, every national C2 body will get access to a more complete and updated digital map, facilitating defence against a wide scope of missile threats.
The new NATO joint missile defence command structure, the Combined Air Operations Centre (CAOC), incorporating C2 systems of five allies, including Germany, Italy, the Netherlands, the US, and France, was opened in Germany earlier this year, with the ceremony attended by NATO Deputy Secretary General, Ambassador Claudio Bisogniero. In December 2010 NATO tested its new ALTBMD C2 system. The tests were aimed at checking command and control over the multinational coalition's weapon systems and sensors during a missile interception operation. Claudio Bisogniero officially confirmed that NATO had begun shifting to a new TMD configuration, since the CAOC became operational. Under the decisions, adopted at the Lisbon Summit, the new theatre missile defence system will constitute the backbone of the future strategic European missile defence. The US-French Thales Raytheon Systems was appointed principal technology integrator in the international missile defence market.
Within the framework of the NATO Air Command and Control First Level of Operational Capability (ACCS LOC1) programme Thales Raytheon Systems is to replace NATO's existing air command and control systems in Europe; set new standards of interoperability for air operations by providing a single, integrated approach, including sensor and weapon system configuration, detection, identification, early warning, monitoring, coverage, air and missile track processing, display, management, and engagement. Interoperability of revamped national C2 systems will lead to an Initial Operational Capability (IOC). The next stage of the theatre missile defence extension, headed by the ALTBMD Programme Office, is slated for 2013. The ultimate configuration of the upgraded and integrated TMD system is to cover the entire territory of NATO member-states (Final Operational Capability).
Balanced Defence
The second 'point of development' in the international discussion of the European missile defence is the partnership network of its participants. What should the logic of partnership be? What should the format of cooperation within the framework of the joint missile defence system be? NATO's Deputy Assistant Secretary General for Political Affairs and Security Policy James Appathurai emphasised that in order to establish NATO-Russia partnership within the framework of the joint missile defence it was necessary to clearly realise the goal of and the reason for the project. He said that the main political message of joint missile defence efforts was that NATO did not expect Russia to deliver a nuclear strike, and neither did NATO have such plans. James Appathurai stressed that the European missile defence system was not designed to undermine
Russia's deterrent potential, and that NATO and Russia should jointly counter increasing missile threats. He also called on the Russian side not to resort to resounding statements on counter-measures during negotiations and not to attempt to define the last steps when the joint work had only started.
Only two countries possessed nuclear missiles in the early 1970s. At the present time in excess of 30 states either have or seek to develop missile technologies, while 44 countries enjoy a nuclear-power engineering capability. Nuclear-capable China and India combined are thrice as large as NATO in terms of population. At the same time India is neither a signatory to the Nuclear Non- Proliferation Treaty (NPT), nor a permanent member of the UN Security Council, where only five nuclear powers - the US, Russia, the UK, France, and China - seat on a permanent basis. Therefore, India is maximally distanced from the partnership negotiations. Pakistan and North Korea have not signed the NPT Treaty either. For instance, according to some sources, North Korea possesses more than 1,000 ballistic missiles. Generally, according to data presented at the 11th RUSI Missile Defence Conference, nuclear powers that are not included in the 'Nuclear Five' have a combined total of about 6,000 sub-strategic (non-strategic or theatre) ballistic missiles, capable of delivering a nuclear warhead to the target specified in four (maximum 40) minutes.
The European missile defence sys tem is considered to be a defensive potential against the threat of nuclear proliferation outside NATO member-states and partner states, involved in the project. In other words integration of missile defence potentials of these countries means that they do not expect missiles strikes against each other and believe that this threat is only posed by those outside of their partnership. It is a fundamental shift in thinking, which on the one hand will lead to a gradual involvement of all nuclear powers in the partnership (otherwise they will be on the list of threats to NATO's security), and on the other hand it will boost development of missile defence technologies in partner states that have yet to acquire such technologies.
The problem of global defence against a surprise nuclear ballistic missile attack from an unpredictable corner of the compass already prompts the military lobby to develop the best defence option - a stratosphere- or a space-based missile defence system, radar-carrying warships, and modular interoperable missile defence facilities (the so-called 'building blocks' principle) (the latter envisions global integration of the military cooperation market). For instance, the UK has designed the Zephyr High-Altitude Long-Endurance (HALE) Unmanned Aerial Vehicle (UAV), powered by solar batteries, featuring a flight altitude of over 20,000 m, and designed to be used as part of a missile defence system.
Experts also discuss a possibility of deploying nuclear weapons into orbit - a nuclear warhead may be built into an ordinary satellite (in this case the early warning time will decrease dramatically). Therefore, special attention will be paid to countries capable of launching spacecraft.
In light of missile defence technologies, development of laser weapons capable of destroying orbital satellites (anti-satellite weapons, ASAT) has seen a significant boost. Ground-, air-, and sea-based laser systems have been tested since the late 1990s. Such projects are pursued by Russia, NATO, and China.
The third 'point of development' in the international discussion of the European missile defence consists in striking a balance and preventing an arms race, refining international laws on non-proliferation, and preventing escalation of technological rivalry in the defence cooperation market, which may result in negative political consequences. It will be impossible to adequately develop the European missile defence without progressing to the so-called McNamara's figure (US Secretary of Defence Robert Strange McNamara, the Pentagon's famous reformer during the administrations of John F. Kennedy and Lyndon Baines Johnson in 1961-1968), i.e. reducing the number of nuclear warheads possessed by each side down to 1,000. The world no longer has economic resources for an unrestrained arms race. As far as the global missile defence is concerned, the US does not have enough resources to cover the whole of Europe; Europe does not have enough resources to build a European missile defence system on its own; Russia does not have enough resources to cover its entire territory; and CIS member-states rely on partnership assistance even more than NATO member-states.
Robert McNamara once calculated that it would take mere 400 nuclear warheads to completely destroy the US or Russia. Strategic nuclear weapons are just the tip of the iceberg, sub-strategic weapons pose an event greater problem. Theatre nuclear weapons (TNW) have been reduced to a certain extent since the Cold War: NATO has cut its TNWs by 85% (about 240 nuclear warheads are left Belgium, Germany, Italy, the Netherlands, Norway, and Turkey), Russia by 55% (the number of warheads exceeds 12,000), the US operates over 9,000 TNWs, the UK - 250 pieces, France - up to 400 pieces, China - about 500, India - around 100, and Pakistan - approximately 100.
James Appathurai pointed out that nuclear arms reductions would only be effective if agreement was reached on missile defence. He said that when talking about nuclear arms reductions it was worth mentioning that there were more nuclear weapons in the world than necessary. However, both NATO and Russia would maintain their nuclear deterrence capabilities so long as nuclear weapons existed, he emphasised. The international community should seek a nuclear-free world and create every necessary condition to this end, he added. Prudent and controlled nuclear arsenals reduction would be the most sensible way to go, he stressed.
Such a comprehensive approach to the nuclear threat problem is nowadays called "balanced defence". In addition to the balance between offensive and defensive missile technologies, the balanced defence also includes cyber security (cyber attacks can disable missile defence systems, nuclear power plants, etc.), as well as the fight against international terrorism in general (including denial of access to TNW storage facilities).
The sum vector that will shape the ultimate configuration of the future global missile defence of the XXI century will comprise a great many viewpoints of experts, representing various schools of thought on missile defence and tactical decisions on deploying missile defence system elements, national defence and economic interests of the Allies and the partner countries, and fundamental political views on the progress in WMD non-proliferation and missile threats.