Innovations of the new Naval Doctrine
navy_korabel
August 9th, 18:30
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Despite the fact that today all the thoughts of the country's military and political leadership, including the Supreme Commander-in-Chief, would seem to be occupied with a special military operation in Ukraine, the Navy did not become a stepson, pushed to the sidelines of parental attention, which, frankly, the author of the blog feared. On the contrary, taking into account the new challenges that Russia will inevitably face in the process of establishing and strengthening a new (multipolar) world order, the Navy is becoming much more important than it was before February 24.g. The new Naval doctrine of Russia, and the approval at the highest level (and not by the Commander-in-Chief of the Navy, as before) of the new version of the Ship's Charter, and the Main Naval Parade, which took place despite everything, and the fact that the GVMP, as in less tense times, speaks about a clear understanding at the top of the growing role of the years, hosted personally by the Supreme Executive Committee.
Navy Day 2022 (07) 31 St. Petersburg kremlin.ru.jpg
Boat with the Supreme Command bypasses the parade formation of ships on the Neva River, St. Petersburg, 31.07.2022 (photo from kremlin.ru)
Below are the main, in the opinion of the author and on the topic of the blog, provisions of the MD-2022 (link 1), which were not in the MD-2015, as well as expectations from the implementation of the new doctrine in practice, that is, what lies between the lines.
1. The national interests of Russia as a great maritime power extend to THE ENTIRE WORLD OCEAN [Article 8]. In other words, the Americans and everyone else, whether you want to or not, will have to move. At the same time, the extension of Russia's national interests to the entire World Ocean implies the self-evident presence in the Navy of a sufficient number of ships of the far sea and ocean zone, which in turn should inevitably affect the shipbuilding program (by adjusting the Program of Military Shipbuilding until 2050).
2. Modern Russia CANNOT EXIST without a STRONG navy* [Article 104] - a fundamental policy statement that places the creation of a strong Navy in the category of top state priorities.
* Note: Let me briefly outline my understanding of a strong navy. There is an opinion that the future of the Russian Navy lies with submarine forces (primarily nuclear ones), the marine component of long-range aviation, coastal missile forces and a large number of inexpensive, easy-to-build combat surface ships of the 3rd rank, united according to the network-centric principle, the loss of each of which is much less painful than the GRKR "Moscow", which the near-term adoption of hypersonic missile weapons by foreign fleets, i.e., the use of nuclear weapons.I can't agree with that. It makes sense to talk about the Navy of tomorrow only outside the context of the Third World War, since in the event of a nuclear apocalypse, the probability of a nuclear catastrophe is very high. In fact, we are talking about a coastal defense fleet with an advance guard of multi-purpose submarines and DA aircraft. which, according to the author, is quite small, the role of general-purpose forces will be small.
In order to understand the need for a balanced underwater-surface ocean fleet, one example is enough. Let's imagine that a request from the outside Syria (or some other geographically remote coastal state) was asked for military assistance when only one capital and not a single airfield or seaport remained under the control of government forces. There is no doubt that under such circumstances, only an operational squadron led by a full-fledged aircraft carrier of significant displacement with a full-fledged air group of up to 40 state-of-the-art fighter-bombers and the mandatory presence in the squadron of a ship landing group consisting of UDC and several BDK with a reinforced marine infantry battalion (up to 1200 people)could provide real assistance with heavy weapons-tanks, self-propelled guns, MLRS. The plan of the operation is simple: the KDG Marines, supported by the CAG air group and other DA aircraft, capture the airfield and port to further build up the expeditionary force. It is quite obvious that in such a situation, neither the submarine forces, nor the DA, nor the BNK of the 3rd rank, nor even the DBK BRAV are able to protect the interests of Russia and its allies.
3. In terms of their importance, the areas of Russia's national interests in the World Ocean are now divided into VITAL ONES (in addition to internal sea waters, the 12-mile territorial sea, the 200-mile exclusive economic zone and the continental shelf - this is the Arctic basin adjacent to the coast of Russia, incl. The Northern Sea Route, the Sea of Okhotsk and the Russian sector of the Caspian Sea), IMPORTANT (areas of the oceans and seas adjacent to the coast of Russia, incl. Sea of Azov and Black Sea, eastern part of the Mediterranean Sea The Black Sea, Baltic and Kuril Straits, areas of passage of world sea transport communications, including those running along the Asian and African coasts) and others [articles 12-16].
At the same time, in vital areas (such as the Northern Sea Route and the Sea of Okhotsk) Russia will use military-forceful methods in full, including the use of military force, in particular-to use military force when the possibilities of using non-forceful tools are exhausted [Article 103]. In other words, in these areas, you should not be too impudent, so as not to get your hands on it.
4. As the Americans and their satellites like to do, pointing to us and China, OUR MAIN ENEMY AT SEA is identified for the first time, which, of course, is the United States, which has taken a strategic course to dominate the World's oceans and to have a global influence on the development of international processes, striving together with NATO and other allies to limit Russia's access access to ocean resources and vital maritime transport communications, as well as to achieve the overwhelming superiority of their naval forces over the Russian Navy (and the PLA Navy) [art. 22]. This challenge and threat to Russia's national security and sustainable development can only be countered by preventing the US Navy from gaining a significant advantage over the Russian Fleet, as stated in art. 39 Fundamentals of the Russian state policy in the field of naval activities for the period up to 2030 (reference 2). It is clear that for this prevention, it is necessary to build ships (quickly and a lot) and continuously improve their weapons (so that one of our ships is equal in strength to two others).
In conclusion − about two particular, but very important provisions of the Naval DoctrineRussia 2022.
5. Despite the continuing, extremely annoying statements of some officials about the dubious need to create a new aircraft carrier (s) for the Russian Navy (in particular, Yu. Borisova-link 3 − the dismissal of which from the post of Deputy Prime Minister for the defense industry, of course, will benefit the fleet), the state does not intend to refuse to work on this topic. This is clearly stated in Articles 52-3 and 66-9 of the MD-2022 on the construction of large-capacity vessels (including in the Far East), including modern aircraft carriers for the Navy (there is confidence that they are not referring to the UDC). Moreover, the inclusion of aircraft carriers in addition to Osnov-2030 (Article 45) in the Russian Naval Doctrine dramatically increases the level of their significance.
6. No less dramatically increases the level of importance of creating a network of logistics points (PMTO), in other words-naval bases, in remote areas of the World Ocean. In the 2015 MD, they were not mentioned at all and, as a result, over the past seven years, nothing has been added to the only PMT in Tartus except for sluggish negotiations with the Sudan. MD-2022 declares the need to create PMTOS in the Asia-Pacific region [Articles 52-6], in the SPM (in addition to Tartus) [Articles 56-4] and in the Indian Ocean [Articles 59-4] (only the absence of Latin America and West Africa in the document raises questions − perhaps this was done to avoid premature disclosure of intentions in order to avoid pressure on partners from the United States and the European Union). ■
https://navy-korabel.livejournal.com/276033.html#cutid1
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