Russia's naval doctrine and strategy

The shorter the SLOCs, the easier they r to defend. With the help of future S. Arabia-Egypt &/ Yemen-Djibouti bridges, trade with Africa & L. America can be done overland via N. Africa & across the S. Atlantic where it's the narrowest. Saudi–Egypt Causeway Bridge of the Horns

https://www.ynetnews.com/articles/0,7340,L-5034345,00.html

https://cairoscene.com/Buzz/new-details-of-egypt-saudi-bridge

Russia can use bases in Angola, W/C/S Africa & Venezuela to patrol that portion of the ocean. 
https://rg.ru/2020/09/03/kitajskoe-izdanie-nazvalo-bombardirovshchik-tu-160-hudshim-koshmarom-nato.html

China is now investing in African & S. American road networks anyway, & every involved nation there will benefit: 
https://www.silkroadbriefing.com/news/2019/05/29/chinas-belt-road-initiative-south-america/

https://www.oecd-ilibrary.org/sites/9789264304505-5-en/index.html?itemId=/content/component/9789264304505-5-en

Russia could invest there too, to start benefiting from it sooner & save $Bs on CBGs that won't be needed.
In the meantime, the Pacific Fleet could see hard times ahead &  much closer to home:
https://vz.ru/world/2020/8/9/1053454.html

If you would have to entrust the AD of naval assets to someone, would you not choose Russians?

Yes, but if you have to rely on air defence from surface located platforms or a mix of air power and surface ships I would want both... it costs more, but is also more effective.

They have already said that by the time US gets their act together and fields their newer missiles, they will already have the necessary defences in place... which in plain text means they have already tested them. S-500 is intended against ICBM-class targets, and even Pantsir has already hypersonic interceptors...

But they will be better with aircraft like a naval Su-57 and an AWACS platform to improve performance and make them more survivable.

What is actually a no-go is trying to defend the ship if your radar horizon is limited to that of a surface vessel. As discussed above, there are circumstances where modern high supersonic missiles can cross that distance before the ship's defences can even react, much less intercept quite difficult targets with effectiveness. With hypersonic weapons this will be even more difficult, granted I don't know if the sea skimming approach is feasible even for a few km at those speeds or on the contrary they will just be used with high level cruising + terminal dive. In any case a surface vessel left to their own devices in terms of radar detection is on a very precarious situation and it is making that even worse due to its need to radiate continuously.

Surface ships alone can be protected by all sorts of radar and missiles and guns, but adding aircraft makes them only slightly more expensive but much much safer in terms of the distances they can see and they can run airborne radar 24/7 because anything they can detect they can direct other platforms to engage well before they get anywhere near them to attack... the mutual defence capacity means the aircraft make the ships safer and the ships make the aircraft safer...

And as I keep saying Russia does not need Nimitz or Ford class carriers, they don't need to be that big or that expensive, and having naval Su-57s will mean the US will have to come up with a new naval fighter to replace their F-35s... which will likely mean the US spending even more billions that they don't have on new fighters they wouldn't otherwise really need, yet they would be useful for Russia in relatively small numbers... it would be modifying a current type which is less expensive than developing something new from scratch.

The Su-57 will have low drag and high thrust to weight ratio so can probably operate from the K with full internal weapons and fuel loads from the short takeoff run positions and have excellent range and performance from carriers.

The shorter the SLOCs,

That is true but only relevant during war time... Russia produces its own food and energy so even if the west managed to cut all their SLOC it wont be a problem for Russia. Of course Russia will want to trade with the rest of the world because Russia has products the rest of the world can use that are better than western overhyped rubbish.

Russia could invest there too, to start benefiting from it sooner & save $Bs on CBGs that won't be needed.
In the meantime, the Pacific Fleet could see hard times ahead &  much closer to home:

The cost of 2 CVNs would be less than the bridge to the Crimea and would be much more useful because they would make Russian surface ships and subs safer in international waters.

If Russia wants to trade internationally without getting put in her place by the west because the west has carriers and Russia does not then it needs carriers... not urgently... 10-15 years time for the first CVN... especially if the rumours are true and they have cats for the kuznetsov...

Russia produces its own food and energy so even if the west managed to cut all their SLOC it wont be a problem for Russia.

RF SLOCs will be mostly the same as PRC SLOCs as far as their trade with Africa & L. America is concerned. Since China already has carrier fleet & her trade with them won't be less than with Russia, the VMF can capitalize on it should it become threatened.

The cost of 2 CVNs would be less than the bridge to the Crimea and would be much more useful because they would make Russian surface ships and subs safer in international waters.

That bridge will last 100+ years, while each CVN lasts only 40-50 years at best. Like it, the other future bridges will pay for themselves & bring in/direct profits just like the existing canals, bridges, roads, tunnels & icebreakers that made our World smaller. That's why Russia & China r investing in them wherever it's feasible.
In fact, as history showed, a strong navy may encourage conflicts when there r no alternative overland trade routes. The Ottoman Turkey blocked European trade with the Orient which produced incentive to seek maritime trade routes & ushered the Age of Exploration, genocide, slavery & colonization. That later created centuries long rivalry between Spanish, Portuguese, French, Dutch, & English on the high seas.
I'm not saying Russia shouldn't have a strong navy; only that she shouldn't be betting her wellbeing on it as much as the US their allies do.

If Russia wants to trade internationally without getting put in her place by the west because the west has carriers and Russia does not then it needs carriers... not urgently... 10-15 years time for the first CVN... especially if the rumours are true and they have cats for the kuznetsov...

who knows what the the geopolitical/economic/demographic situation in Russia & the World will be even in 5 years? Moscow may lose her FE & access to the Pacific with it. A large meteor may explode over C. Russia or the Urals wiping out industry, population & infrastructure there, effecting many other regions. There is a reason why the USSR started building TAKRs only 3 decades after WWII ended: the economy took long to recover.
As before, these shipbuilding plans may be delayed/cancelled.
Even the USN couldn't afford more than 1 Enterprise class CVN & 3 Seawolf SSNs. With so many CVNs, 1 of them forward deployed in Japan, there were lately still large gaps in deployments due to their maintenance/refit & training cycles being prolonged. 
The alleged Adm K. catapult, if installed, is going to be experimental; I doubt there's enough room for 4 AWACS planes on it. With only 2-3, it'll be a sitting duck. 
IMO, in ideal circumstances, for better combat sustainability, they better deploy at least 2 CVNs & their escorts overseas. To do that, they'll need to have 5-6 total in the N. & Pac. fleets. If the VMF is going to patrol SLOCs off S. America/Africa, it better have 1-2 forward deployed there. How much is CVN's supporting infrastructure will cost to maintain & operate?
It'll be more beneficial to build a railroad to Chukotka & Kamchatka with NPPs to make it another Kola with its many naval bases connected to the mainland all year round. 
OTH, overseas air/missile bases r going to be less costly.

This morning i have finally a bit of time, therefore i can return on the questions about maritime strike, sea control and cost and performance effciency of resources expended in aircraft carrier and its air winf against other most up-do-date Navy force composition.


First i want to adress the question of the sortie rate and the distance from the carrier:

LMFS wrote:I think this is a misinterpretation of the text:

Page 4

...Almost all the targets were within 200 nm of the USS Nimitz. These distances are not indicative of the maximum striking range of the aircraft, but rather were driven by the proximity of the carrier operating are to the target ranges. We show the maximum operational strike range that the strike / fighters could have reached, based on typical operational employment and time airborne.

Page 31

...These distances are not indicative of the maximum striking range of the CVW-9 aircraft. Rather the distances were driven by the proximity of the carrier operating area relative to the Southern California target ranges. During the Surge, aircraft were frequently held overhead USS Nimitz awaiting recovery, time that in real operation would have been spent transiting to and from more distant targets. Figure 10 shows the maximum operational strike range that could have been reached on each strike sortie. (3)

(3) We based this computation on the aircraft flight times and on the requirement for aircraft to be in the Marshall pattern at the beginning of the recovery. We also accounted for the time required to engage, receive fuel, and disengage from tanker when refuelling was necessary. We estimated the time for strike aircraft to locate the target as ten minutes. We included a requirement to return to force on a 75 nautical mile dogleg (such a requirement was imposed during Operation Desert Storm)

The resulting table is not very precise but it would indicate roughly the following maximum ranges per sortie:

> ca. 20 sorties below 100 nm
> ca. 60 sorties between 100 and 200 nm
> ca. 440 sorties between 200 and 300 nm
> ca. 270 sorties between 300 and 400 nm
> ca. 40 sorties between 400 and 500 nm
> ca. 80 sorties more than 500 nm

...................What you refer is the distance to the target, not the distance effectively covered by the carrier's airwing during the exercise, as the flight time and specific statements in the report show.................
...................I can't agree, see the argumentation above: they calculated maximum range based in actual flight time. In fact those times are also specified and roughly correspond with the mission times you calculated in your scenario and the ones I used, roughly 2 hours. The average flight time of the F/A-18C in the surge was 1.8 hours.

There is not any interpretation here LMFS, i've read that document almost ten years ago and since then i have not even given a glimpse of attention to the CLAIMS by parts of the US Navy officials responsible for this "surge parade" about the SUPPOSED range that theirs air wing could have reach and average time of flight but only to the hard, parametrical, measurable data of the range of each target hit and the initial position of the aircraft carrier; those are the unique comparable and measurable data involved, the rest are pure claims by parts of organizers of the surge event with clear self-evident vested interests in presenting a picture of the potential of theirs air wing totally unsupported by involved data.

Even more those pure claims appear absolutely ungrounded and irrational : in facts the Air Wing 9 was not based on a ground airfield placed too near to the exercise's targets but on a Nimitz-class nuclear carrier purposely prepared to support the sortie surge that could easily place itself at much greater distance from target's positions where theirs air wing could use at full theirs on-board fuel and the technical preparation before take-off so to PROVE in a measurable, comparable, parametrical way the capability of those aircraft to be prepared before and after each mission and to strike enemy targets at medium and long range maintaining the declared sortie rate.

Doing as done in the exercise instead would be totally unexplicable and irrational........unless, of course, that was done forcibly and on-purpose because the fuel and technical and maintenance preparations to strike targets at 60-70 nautical miles from the carrier, with few unsophisticated weapons, would require only a small fraction of the resources and efforts required to do effectively the same at 250 or 300 NMi of distance , and only that has allowed to present a similar level of sortie rate.

This obviously is not mine opinion but that shared by majority of the US Navy analysts taking into account the "arranged" result of Surge '97

https://blog.usni.org/posts/2009/08/27/the-monster-myths-of-the-cvl-concept

LMFS wrote:The approach vector of the frigates depends on the starting conditions. I consider it reasonable to assume that the carrier group would not start completely surrounded and without room for movement. It has the full advantage in open seas, so why not use it? In fact, the question is how long a fleet composed by small displacement ships can pursuit a CVN than can sustain 30+ kt indefinitely. The USN RFI for the FFGX asked for 3,000 NM range @16 kts. The Italian version of the FREMM, which is the base for the FFGX, has a range of 6,800 nmi @15 kts with CODLAG propulsion, that means range at 30 kts would be a fraction of that.

I think that to continue to apply simplicistic models ,incredibly optimistic assumptions and totally irreal, unrealizable tactics for sea control only for the sake of debate and to attempt to “aid” the side with the single aircraft carrier is not longer useful.
In the reality any aircraft carrier on this planet will not escape anywhere against a so high number of low-tonnage low signature enemy naval units for the simple reason that, for the wide majority of them, it will not even know of theirs presence and position before IR surveillance satellites would detect salvo launch of theirs anti ship missiles.

In facts today (leaving outside possible breaching of the enemy code of command and communications transmissions ,as happened in the WWII) the unique assets allowing each side to effectively detect the other at very long range and conduct and guide missile strikes at hundreds of km of distance on enemy naval units are :

1) Constellation of space-based radar and wide FOV electronic/infrared emission satellites, representing by far the most important ISR elements, for which a single, enormous, flat top ship as an aircraft carrier with theirs highly concentration of continous traffic of several dozen of aircraft taking-off at full afterburner and with radar with emission like E2-D is immensely easier to detect ,track and continously maintain under observation in comparison with 22 different low tonnage ships each of which with hundreds of times lower radar, infrared and electrocmagnetic signature.
That mean also that often active radar or passive EM surveillance satellites on different orbit could easily assure weapon grade continous track of any aircraft carrier but could easily lose track of a previously discovered corvette or frigate because the following satellite would be incapable to detect them within its area of coverage.

2) Sea bottom and suspended sonar and magnetic variation sensors networks. Also in this instance the difference in signature and area coverage would be simply immense.

3) Finally there are Long endurance UAVs . The discovery by part of those kind of assets of low signature ships in plain sea (in the littoral them would be easily downed by enemy air defense and ground based aviation) would happen mostly by chance. Anyhow this would represent the unique instance where an aircraft carrier could interrupt more easily the surveillance contact ,thanks to its air wing.

E-2D ,not differently than E-3 (and this is just the reason for which US's Air Force employ E-8 JSTARS to detect and maintain track of ground targets and now E-3 AWACS), is designed for maintain air coverage and has relatively poor look-down target detection of surface units in sea clutter.

Moreover in the reality of maritime conflicts possiblity to egress from a sea sector is almost always not even an option; it mean very often surrender critical strategic positions and assets to the enemy ; in the example i had described a carrier even only abandoning the Alaskan maritime sector would allow surrender and expose the entire US Nothern Command , and Missile Defence Forces to destruction or, worse taking control , doing the same on Western CONUS Pacific Sector would mean likely the destruction of the 65-70% basis and construction/maintenance potential of the US Navy.

Last note: aircraft carrier in order to employ theirs air wing must choose its direction of motion to follow wind's direction (even more at speed greater than 13-14 knots).

LMFS wrote:The convergence of frigates can indeed be a way of increasing the size of the salvo needed, but then one of the main advantages of the distributed fleet would disappear, since if would turn into an increasingly centralized fleet and not a distributed one, reducing the opposing side's ISR effort.

As to the AD capability of the FFGX itself, after reading more about their radars and interceptors I have to consider them not in the same category as an AEGIS DDG. I am not sure the frigate could allow itself to employ just the half of its interceptors, due to the reduced engagement time, I recalculated the radar horizon and considered some other limitations:

The radar is the AN/SPY-6(V)3: A 3-sided phased array fixed version of the EASR.
- It lacks the X band segment normally used for low target search, since it offers superior resolution and clutter rejection
- It uses only 9 RMA against 37 RMA in the case of an Arleigh Burke Flight III, for a fraction of the antenna gain and power performance
- Its altitude over the sea surface is roughly 18 m, which would result in a radar horizon of ca. 14 km against a target flying 5 m over the waves. Against a  0.9 M target that is ca. 45 seconds time, - against a 3 M target that is roughly 14 seconds or quite close to the reaction time of the ship's AD, estimated in ca. 10 seconds for an AEGIS fire control from detection to launch of the first interceptor in optimum conditions. Evaopration conditions can reduce that radar horizon to well below 10 km, which means that the system would not even have the chance to engage the incoming missile (that makes very clear IMHO why “Threat D” was assessed as critical by USN) Wink
- Considering the beam deflection limitations of AESA technology and the lack of overlaping between the three arrays of the FFGX radar, it is questionable if the directions right at the deflection limits of the arrays are not especially vulnerable.
- A small tonnage vessel is specially subject to state of sea and therefore its radar horizon can be additionally affected due to the ship raising and sinking with the waves
- Atmospheric conditions affect through ducting the effective radar horizon, both increasing or reducing it. A serious attacker will consider this and organize their attacks when the fleet's radar field is compromised

 

I believe that you have misunderstood the content of what you have read:

- At low altitude (up to 900m -1 km) the index of radar wave atmospheric refraction is almost constant ,it is called in facts standard refraction and just the stability of this factor allow to compute the radar horizon for low altitude ,low incidence of illumination angle (just the instance of ship borne radar against inbound AShM) with the so called "4/3 Earth model" -an approximation assuming the Earth's radius at 4/3 of its real value - to compute the standard increased radar horizon caused by the downward bending of the radar waves.

https://core.ac.uk/download/pdf/193254619.pdf
https://www.researchgate.net/publication/283349893_How_far_is_the_radar_horizon

To the contrary of what you think for long range airborne radars ,also those equiped with look-down SAR optimized for ground/sea level detection surveillance, is much more difficult to capitalize this effect and that for the simple reason that the geometrical horizon of theirs radars lie at enormous range where the powqer density is already incompatible with the extraction of the position of a target from the surface clutter, leaving aside extract the position of one from behind the geometrical horizon where radar dispersion surge enormously.

For a ship-borne very high power ,high aperture radar with detection range of 200-250 km against a 3 square meters target detect and track a target 12-14 km over its geometrical horizon at 25-30 km is a standard task , do the same at a geometrical horizon placed at 300 km of distance is almost impossible.

Separated mention deserve instead the problem of radar ducting (anyhow happening generally at far higher altitude than those of inblound antiship missiles) that can well create situations of detection at enormous distances or zone of radar shadow where the same target would appear intermittently on the screem.

Usually anyhow is very difficult for a stand-off attacker to capitalise the erratic manifestations of this phenomenon unless it manage to probe the atmospherical conditions in relatively close range of the ship (with something such as UAV/UCAVS) without that they will be downed; for ships monitoring of those amospheric parameters are used the on-board helicopters.

@Mindstorm: I was also busy these days to touch this issue, since it demands a significant research and documentation effort from me in order to try being minimally serious, but I will post the last part of my answer to your previous posts before addressing the new ones, even when I am not linking all the sources right now due to lack of time. Now, allow me to say the following: I am probably one of your fondest followers here and happy to admit you are much more knowledgeable than myself in all sorts of military issues, but sincerely, making the case for the use of air power in the naval domain is simply too easy (literally there are layers upon layers of conclusive arguments in their favour) for me to admit that in the future surface-only fleets have the upper hand against the ones that count on airborne assets. This is not going to happen, on the contrary, lighter and more abundant aircraft of all kinds will be used, both as defensive and offensive means, actually I prove below that smaller surface units like FFGX also plan using them.

Mindstorm wrote:
Without Space and Submarine based third party surveillance the discovery of enemy ship units would happen by pure chance ,likely by very long endurance UAVs and also in this instance the chance of discovery of the Nimitz calss carrier and of 22 dispersed frigates would be worlds a part in terms of probability of happening.

This touches one of the most crucial differences between a fleet with or without availability of air power in the naval warfare, which is the difference in radar horizon and range of available ISR and even the possibility of keeping RF emissions silent. I am going along with not restricting space based assets, which may or may not be the case in a concrete scenario, but it is obvious that without them and in an oceanic deployment the fleet without air ISR assets would be rendered essentially blind and defenceless, an eventuality a military planer will certainly not want to be unprepared for. In fact this is such an obvious shortcoming that the FFGX expects to carry a UH-60 + the MQ-8C helicopter type UAV. No question the range and capabilities of such assets are a far cry of those available to a carrier, and their vulnerability against the carrier's airwing, complete.

The very document you refer and that I was also checking while writing this reply explains in detail plans and proposals to integrate more capable ISR assets in the carrier's airwing. They mention some undefined U(C)AV to take care of such missions, but being more concrete, the RQ-9 was proposed in a naval ISR version for the BAMS program called Mariner, with almost 50 h persistence and for which carrier-compatible versions (w/ folding wings) were proposed. Therefore the technological availability of long range, long persistence ISR assets is given and it will very probably be the answer to distributed threats like the ones you propose, in the case that they actually have the offensive potential to threaten a CSG. That means a very different breed of AShM to those available to the USN now and used in our scenario.

BTW, do you have some reliable source about the actual integration of the LRASM in the Mk 41 VLS? I know Lockheed has done the necessary technical work, but until now the only officially approved integration I have seen is for bombers, fighters and patrol aircraft of the USN. Plus the FFGX is using the NSM, so it is not clear to me if the LRASM is finally going to be adopted for sea launch from the VLS. Not that I think it would be very crucial for our analysis, but for the sake of correctness.

Following with the ISR means: in the latest days we have seen an interesting Russian example of UAV that could be ideal for long range naval surveillance, namely the Helios from Kronshtadt. A catapult equipped carrier can use and importantly defend such assets, obviously a frigate can not. With the range announced, it may stay on station for practically one day at 400-500 nmi of the carrier... not counting on eventual tanker support, which could make it an asset capable of being almost permanently on station for the confrontation applicable period of time! So this is a race (distributed vs. centralized fleet composition) the on-board air power is in condition to win even before it starts.

The range i have proposed in mine scenario take into account space based and sea bed based sensor network providing to the carrier the capability to attack enemy frigates at safe distance (and obviously discover and follow a single flat top behemoth such as a Nimitz is for radar satellites orders of magnitude easier than discover and maintain contact with 22 reduced signature low tonnage ships).

This relates also to part of your last post, regarding the difficulty of E-2D to detect low speed targets against ground sea clutter. This capacity is explicitly mentioned by US military sources but actual technical parameters of the radar are kept under seven locks, so proving or refuting this may be difficult. As you may imagine I would need figures or sources to accept that an E-2D cannot detect a frigate in the open sea, not even considering that the frigate or frigate group cannot keep their radars off in order to have a minimum defensive capability.

So, on the one hand, the frigates need to keep their radars on not to be simply defenceless to any sort of attack; on the other, and accepting that some of the ships may be silent and use the radar information of other ships or could emit just intermittently as part of some tactics, it would be relevant to know what is the actual RCS of a modern frigate in the frequencies of interest. Being a 150 m metal structure and their hull having angles optimized against level radars but not airborne ones, I struggle to think they have actually low RCS in absolute terms for a naval ISR airborne radar, but I might be wrong, I have not researched this in depth yet. In principle it would seem their best defence is their low speed that complicates Doppler detection, but this being a very sensitive technique and given the stochastic parameters that can be used to characterize the sea clutter it is not obvious that a big vessel could escape detection even in the highly unlikely event of keeping its radars silent.

Why so long stand-off range ? Because allowing some groups of enemy ships to come closer ( let put at 800-900 km) to the carrier would expose it to the deadly risk that one or more groups not previosuly discovered would come near delivery range and the carrier at this point would confront several groups contemporaneously.

Even when I have built my case with that very big distance in mind, we would need to accept that a frigates can:

1) Outrun the carrier, which is not realistic on pure speed and range metrics.
2) Close 400 km gap with the carrier in a short enough time to avoid detection. For that to happen in 24 h, the frigate would need to be almost 10 kts faster than the carrier over that period of time. The carrier would need to stay practically static over that period, which would not be an acceptable wartime behavior at all.
3) Threaten the carrier's AD, even if no fighters are considered. Ignoring the 3 x Phalanx CIWS, a Nimitz can carry currently above 50 interceptors. So, not even considering CIWS or EW effects, the Mk 41 loadout of 5 frigates would be needed to overcome the amount of interceptors available to the carrier. In the simply never intended and therefore mostly absurd case of using the carrier without the support of several AEGIS DDGs or CGs (!)

In fact we should include them in the analysis, compensating their cost with an increased number of frigates, to avoid this exercise being simply unrealistic.

Arleigh Burkes cost ca. $1.8B per vessel (not to confuse with the shipyard cost, which is half of that but does not consider weapons and systems. The same applies to FFGX, BTW. With current figures, the AB cost between 50 and 100% more than the FFGX (no complete FFGX yet so no way of knowing for sure where the usual US cost overruns wil take the program). So let us add the DDGs to the carrier (3x) and add 6 frigates to the distributed fleet. Chances to threaten the carrier evaporate (if we are to consider a FFGX can deflect 35 AShMs, what can a massively more capable AB do, with early radar detection of the inbound missiles hundreds of km away and 96 VLS cells that translate into almost 400 x ESSM per ship? No surprise this is the way carriers are used in reality.

LMFS you are too intelligent and long time versed in military related matters to ignore that aircraft and theirs A-A missiles (unless purposely conceived and built for the mission) are almost useless in missile defense roles, the chances even only few interceptions are so incredibly low that US Navy ,in theirs models of carrier’s defense from anti ship missiles, discard it entirely and compute instead only the performances of the complex AEGIS AD systems on board the numerous ships parts of the carrier battle group that are present with almost the only role to provide cover to the otherwise totally defensless aircraft carrier.

Therfore i will consider all that that story on the 14 AAM missiles on the F/-18  and the 220 LRASM as a funny boutade…..    

I thank you, but if what I said is wrong, then I am guilty of being wrong with a conviction. AMRAAM was designed with look-down, shoot-down capabilities explicitly, its ability to down CMs and the role of fighters to do this as a fundamental part of the US territory defence strategy is well known. Also the role of fighters in thinning CM salvos with their AAMs is amply discussed in naval domain... I would appreciate evidence from your side. Of course the carrier, having an escort so capable as AEGIS vessels, rely mainly on them for anti-missile defence, since using fighters against very fast AShMs is not really viable and modern SAMs are cheap, readily usable and capable enough to be the weapon of choice.

In any case, both SM and ESSM-ER actually use the AMRAAM seeker and yet it is assumed they will be more than enough to down the AShMs, even in their most challenging terminal approach, with strongly reduced altitude and high-g manoeuvring. A CM in mid-course does not manoeuvrer vigorously and flies higher, and should be no big challenge to today's Doppler radars, AAM seekers and actuators. Where is the catch?

I will answer your replies of today later, and also touch the ARM use in naval domain, since I found interesting evidence in the meantime. If I find the time I would like to create a scenario with Russian assets too, since  the situation changes significantly due to the completely different missile technology available both to the frigates and to the strike fighters. In fact things could go more in favour of the frigate fleet, which considering weapons like Tsirkon becomes a real danger, unlike the poorly armed FFGX.

That bridge will last 100+ years, while each CVN lasts only 40-50 years at best.

The Bridge was built to make accessing a region of Russia easier and cheaper... it will pay for itself 100 times over.

A CVN will help keep ships and submarines safer from enemy attention... it will improve the situational awareness of any Russian surface group so they can make better decisions and make it much less likely Russian ships will be surprised.

That's why Russia & China r investing in them wherever it's feasible.

No one will lend Russia a CVN, and for less than the price of a new bridge spread over a decade or two it is easily affordable and be able to offer more capabilities than any number of smaller ships made in its place.

They are laying down two helicopter carrier landing ships which will require fixed wing air cover to have any chance of ever actually being useful... that alone requires aircraft carriers.

In fact, as history showed, a strong navy may encourage conflicts when there r no alternative overland trade routes.

Russia has no alternative overland trade routes that don't go through hostile countries...

I'm not saying Russia shouldn't have a strong navy; only that she shouldn't be betting her wellbeing on it as much as the US their allies do.

If she can't sail where she wants when she wants then she might as well isolate herself and accept a servants wage if the west is feeling generous enough to not just use her as a slave.

Moscow may lose her FE & access to the Pacific with it. A large meteor may explode over C. Russia or the Urals wiping out industry, population & infrastructure there, effecting many other regions.

And this can of tuna I have had in my fridge for two years might contain the right biological threat that could wipe out all man kind but it is no reason not to pay the mortgage...

Russia has to look at what is has now and what it can improve and develop and make better in every way, and expanding its blue water navy will instil confidence in potential trade partners around the world and that is what is going to help Russia and the rest of the world grow and develop... free trade that does not go through some middle man in the EU who takes a cut in both directions and lives off the labour or Russia and her trade partners.

Even the USN couldn't afford more than 1 Enterprise class CVN & 3 Seawolf SSNs. With so many CVNs, 1 of them forward deployed in Japan, there were lately still large gaps in deployments due to their maintenance/refit & training cycles being prolonged.

Couldn't care less about the USN and their problems.... they want to bully everyone everywhere all the time so they need 10 carrier groups and they can't afford them and it is destroying their economy which is a good thing.

Russia doesn't need to dominate the worlds oceans... but she does need to access them sometimes and she also needs to show potential trade partners that she can be reliable and offer everything they will lose when they cut the umbilical cord from the west and the west as usual goes apeshit and tries to regime change that country so they can continue to milk it of Lithium or oil or whatever else takes their interest...

The alleged Adm K. catapult, if installed, is going to be experimental;

Of course it is... just like the Ford class CVN and the Zumwalt destroyer class and their little LCAs or whatever they call them... the point is that the Adm K has fighters and an AEW helicopter that don't need cats to operate so even if the new experimental cats are totally useless it will still be an upgraded and improved CV... which is more than one can say for the Ford helicopter barge.

I doubt there's enough room for 4 AWACS planes on it. With only 2-3, it'll be a sitting duck.

It is experimental... even if it only had one AWACS plane and one Inflight refuelling plane that would be fine for testing.... AEW can continue to be done by Ka-31.

Sitting duck my ass... what sitting duck carries 12 supersonic 7.5 ton anti ship missiles and well over 200 SAMs to defend itself... including about 12 30mm 6 barrel gatling guns?

And that ignores the Fighter aircraft it carries...

IMO, in ideal circumstances, for better combat sustainability, they better deploy at least 2 CVNs & their escorts overseas.

Which is what I have been suggesting,,, but getting 2 CVNs built and the destroyers and cruisers they will need to operate with them to make them useful will take 20 years... and that is fine too.... they would not have anywhere to keep them if they had them right now.

For now experiment with new stuff on the Kuz.... new radars and new missiles and new cats and new electrical systems... this upgrade is going to be valuable... they will likely learn quite a bit, much of which might go into making their destroyers and cruisers more "electric".

To do that, they'll need to have 5-6 total in the N. & Pac. fleets.

Rubbish... they are not the worlds police force... they don't need to babysit anyone... at best they might need to send a carrier with ships and subs to a hot spot... having two CVNs and the Admiral K being a CV would be plenty. Upgrades and overhauls are planned and organised.... it is not the measles or pregnancy.... they can make sure no two vessels are out of the water at the same time except for emergencies and even then they will still have one more ship they can use... but the vast majority of time they will have two and sometimes three.

If the VMF is going to patrol SLOCs off S. America/Africa, it better have 1-2 forward deployed there.

They don't need any carriers forward deployed anywhere... from the Pacific and the Northern fleet bases and being able to cross the arctic ocean with icebreakers they should be able to get carriers where they need them quickly enough... they are not the worlds police and often a small group of "polite" specialists delivered by nuclear submarine running at 30knts 24/7 can get most places quickly enough... the surface ships they will need for three surface groups at best, but in normal practise they could probably mix and match... not every group of Russian ships would need air cover all the time...

It'll be more beneficial to build a railroad to Chukotka & Kamchatka with NPPs to make it another Kola with its many naval bases connected to the mainland all year round.
OTH, overseas air/missile bases r going to be less costly.

It is always better to develop Russian infrastructure and transport options...

LMFS you are too intelligent and long time versed in military related matters to ignore that aircraft and theirs A-A missiles (unless purposely conceived and built for the mission) are almost useless in missile defense roles,

I would think an Su-57 armed with R-37M and the newer bigger longer ranged missiles will have all sorts of ABM capacities and uses going forward... obviously not as potent as missiles mounted on a MiG-31 or MiG-41, but still useful...

Mindstorm wrote:I mean an insulated FFGx against an attack by LRASM delivered by carrier aircraft ? Probably between soft and hard suppression defensive systems no less than 35 incoming missiles within a very low time window, with a very high percentage of no "leakers" in the salvo.

An adapted 155mm M109 Paladin howitzer, under the control of the Advanced Battle Management System (ABMS), shot down a cruise missile during exercise.

Once the land version goes into production we can develop a similar naval gun as well. This is a very cost effective way to shoot down several cruise missiles.

RTN wrote:

Mindstorm wrote:I mean an insulated FFGx against an attack by LRASM delivered by carrier aircraft ? Probably between soft and hard suppression defensive systems no less than 35 incoming missiles within a very low time window, with a very high percentage of no "leakers" in the salvo.

An adapted 155mm M109 Paladin howitzer, under the control of the Advanced Battle Management System (ABMS), shot down a cruise missile during exercise.

Once the land version goes into production we can develop a similar naval gun as well. This is a very cost effective way to shoot down several cruise missiles.

In all fairness the BQM-167 Skeeter which was the simulated target goes at most 0.93 Mach, A Kaliber does between 2.5 or 2.9

That's a massive difference and you forgot the mention the Paladin missed a shit ton before it finally got a lucky hit and that was the only hit in the entire exercise via the Paladin.

In an attack with multiple missiles and much faster missiles that idea would be dead weight.

This was just a research concept nothing more and it will not see the light of day.

An adapted 155mm M109 Paladin howitzer, under the control of the Advanced Battle Management System (ABMS), shot down a cruise missile during exercise.

Once the land version goes into production we can develop a similar naval gun as well. This is a very cost effective way to shoot down several cruise missiles.

I would agree, and it is a useful technology to be moving forwards with, but in 1982 when the British sent a force to retake the Falkland islands they had a variety of ships with a variety of weapons... from the archaic Sea Slug and Sea Cat, to the modern and impressive Sea Wolf and equally impressive (on paper) Sea Dart.

The Sea Wolf was shown in tests to be able to hit a 114mm artillery shell in mid flight... so in theory any group of ships where one ship was armed with Sea Wolf should have been safe from an attack by Exocet missiles.

Didn't work out that way.

But the Russians are working on guided shells and airburst rounds for intercepting flying objects with large calibre rounds... when they are flying level and straight they are relatively easy targets so firing shells at them makes a lot of sense.... even at distances like 50km away a 152mm air burst shell could shatter a low flying subsonic cruise missile if it is flying straight and level and not changing speed... a four round burst that brackets the area the missile is going to be in when the rounds arrive would be very efficient and cheap... and forcing enemy missiles to start manouvering at greater distances will reduce their effective range and energy...

But it is always easier to attack.

In all fairness the BQM-167 Skeeter which was the simulated target goes at most 0.93 Mach, A Kaliber does between 2.5 or 2.9

Also very true... but not all targets are as capable as the Kalibr... having gun shells you can fire at the easy targets frees up more missiles and more missile guidance channels to engage the harder ones.

It would be interesting though... because airburst rounds that spew 10kgs or more of ball bearings in the air in front of an incoming threat could be useful if you can get some material in the path of the weapon... in that case its own speed would count against it...

As they might say.. not hugely likely to work but ...worth a shot...

That's a massive difference and you forgot the mention the Paladin missed a shit ton before it finally got a lucky hit and that was the only hit in the entire exercise via the Paladin.

So a bit of work to do...

The irony is that with EM technology guns are going to become much more interesting soon...

And they are always versatile.

You can fire warning shots at Pirates... or you can just sink them....

In an attack with multiple missiles and much faster missiles that idea would be dead weight.

I think there are a lot of other situations that ship, or Russian ships could be involved in that don't involve enormous numbers of hypersonic weapons attacking them... in which case a gun can be more than just dead weight... it can be useful.

Hell... the Bulgarians and Russians had a joint venture in the 1980s to create a jamming round for the 152mm calibre guns... you fire it like a normal round... they reach about 22km but will jam SW and VSW radio communications to disrupt enemy command and control within a 700m radius of where the shell lands for 1 hour.

They created a 122mm calibre model too.

How hard would it be to put a jammer or decoy emitter into a shell that can be fired away from the ship to distract incoming missiles... you could give it wings and basic propulsion and make it a UAV that flys around for an hour or two emitting a jamming signal.... the incoming missiles might home on jam but the likelyhood of them actually hitting such a small target would be very low so it could keep operating for long periods and distract several enemy missiles... if it is a 152mm calibre you could fire the round 70km away from the ship... and soon 170km away from the ship...

This was just a research concept nothing more and it will not see the light of day.

That is a shame for the US because the potential is enormous even if the actual results to date are not impressive...

They are laying down two helicopter carrier landing ships which will require fixed wing air cover to have any chance of ever actually being useful... that alone requires aircraft carriers.- they won't operate out of range of land based aviation, either deployed or at home bases. wrote:

Russia has no alternative overland trade routes that don't go through hostile countries...- China, Mongolia, Kazakhstan, Belarus, NK, & later Japan & SK that will stop being hostile after railroads/bridge/tunnels r built & opened.

It is experimental... even if it only had one AWACS plane and one Inflight refuelling plane that would be fine for testing.... AEW can continue to be done by Ka-31.- I'm surprised they didn't start working on the Yak-44 or its follow on again.

Sitting duck my ass... what sitting duck carries 12 supersonic 7.5 ton anti ship missiles and well over 200 SAMs to defend itself... including about 12 30mm 6 barrel gatling guns? And that ignores the Fighter aircraft it carries...- the USS Vincennes that shot down the Iranian A-300 wasn't a sitting duck either, but u keep saying an AWACS is needed to avoid that. W/o it, it may become an ugly duck after its group shoots down a civilian plane by mistake.

F-18E/Fs, B-52s, P-8s & U-2s can also detect surface ships from high altitudes. https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Boeing_F/A-18E/F_Super_Hornet#Specifications_(F/A-18E/F)
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Boeing_B-52_Stratofortress#Specifications_(B-52H)
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Boeing_P-8_Poseidon#Specifications_(P-8A)
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Lockheed_U-2#Specifications_(U-2S)

Some B-1Bs or B-2s could be given more powerful surface search radars as well:
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Rockwell_B-1_Lancer#Specifications_(B-1B)
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Northrop_Grumman_B-2_Spirit#Specifications_(B-2A_Block_30)

So, you are talking about guided naval gun rounds and limit yourself to american failures without EVER mentioning VULCANO and DART that are actually operative and work flawlessly at a fraction of cost?
Have we Italians in the forum to be offended or what?

GarryB wrote:But the Russians are working on guided shells and airburst rounds for intercepting flying objects with large calibre rounds...

152mm guided shells - Impressive! Which ones are these? Are these guided shells only for the Army or also the Navy?

GarryB wrote:even at distances like 50km away a 152mm air burst shell could shatter a low flying subsonic cruise missile if it is flying straight and level and not changing speed... a four round burst that brackets the area the missile is going to be in when the rounds arrive would be very efficient and cheap... and forcing enemy missiles to start manouvering at greater distances will reduce their effective range and energy...

If those incoming missiles are capable of High G manouvering then probably they can't be hit. Hypersonic cruise missiles will probably have High G manouvering capabilities.

A piece by Alexander Shishkin, shipbuilding engineer and author of navy-korabel.livejournal.com, related to our previous discussions in this thread and with solid information about OTH targeting, naval strike and employment of naval aviation in VMF vs. USN scenarios:

Are Russian missiles capable of hitting an American aircraft carrier?

18 November 2019, 18:10

The tactical anti-ship cruise missiles (OTN anti-ship missiles) 3M55, 3M45 and 3M70 of the Onyx, Granit and Vulkan missile systems are rightfully considered the pride of the Russian Navy. However, there is an opinion that their outstanding flight range (500-700 km) is not provided with reliable target designation, and therefore is useless in practice.

In other words, it is generally accepted that the means of destruction available to Russia (which the media call nothing other than "aircraft carrier killers") are almost meaningless in modern conditions. And all due to the fact that the Navy does not have the tools necessary to guide long-range missiles. They say that the Tu-95RTs reconnaissance and target designation aircraft and the space group, which in Soviet times solved this problem, no longer exist, and the new system has not been created. This means that in a real confrontation with the US Navy, Russian sailors will fire missiles at aircraft carriers "with their eyes closed" (without seeing the target). Needless to say, in such circumstances, there can be no question of any successful attacks and targeted hits.

Is it really? Let's try to figure it out. Let's leave behind the scenes the A-50 / A-100 radar patrol and guidance aircraft (RLDN) and the Sunflower over-the-horizon radar station tied to the shore. Let us consider only those means that make it possible to counter the most dangerous surface enemy of the Russian Navy - the American aircraft carrier strike groups (AUG) in the open ocean.

In space

At present, a grouping of spacecraft (SC) of the newest system of maritime space reconnaissance and target designation (MCRTs) "Liana" is being formed in near-earth orbit. Its predecessor ("Legend"), despite the chronic  understaffing,  for 33 years  regularly provided  intelligence to the main headquarters of the Navy, the headquarters of the fleets and directly ships - carriers of anti-ship missiles.

According to open information, the Liana should include two Pion-NKS radar reconnaissance spacecraft (RLR) and two Lotos-S radio-technical reconnaissance (RTR) spacecraft. Two regular "Lotos" are already in their orbits (launched in 2017–2018). The launch of the Peonies is expected in 2019–2020. Satellites of two different types are needed to make the intelligence more reliable.

A constellation of four spacecraft operating in sun-synchronous orbits with an altitude of 900 km is capable of providing a daily (once every 24 hours) survey of any point on the planet, if the swath of each spacecraft is equal to the turn-to-turn interval at the equator with a small (10%) overlap , i.e. about 800 km.

This value and even its doubling (up to 1600 km) can be considered easily achievable taking into account the fact that: 1) the small Russian RLR satellite  "Condor" with a  mass of 1150 kg has a swath of 1000 km (500 km each to the left and to the right of the flight path); 2) the swath of the radar of the outdated American Lacrosse spacecraft is estimated at 2 × 1000 = 2000 km; 3) the reconnaissance band of the US Air Force RTR satellites "Ferret" was already in the 1980s about 6000 km. Moreover, taking into account the approximately threefold superiority of passive (radio-technical) spacecraft over active (radar) spacecraft in width of view, it can be assumed that four Liana satellites will be able to cover a strip with a total width of 12800 km (2 × 1600 RLR and 2 × 4800 RTR).

This means that the number of flights of the spacecraft of the new ICRC system over the same point of the World Ocean in one day can reach four, and the time interval between flights can reach six hours. During this time, the US Navy AUG can travel only 120 miles (220 km) on an economic run. Theoretically - in any direction, but in wartime - without changing the combat course (for example, for rapprochement with the enemy's naval strike group, the coordinates of which were obtained from their space forces). Thus, the six-hour data obsolescence should not critically affect the results of missile firing of the naval strike group (KUG) of the Russian Navy.

In addition, if necessary, the position of the spacecraft orbital plane can be corrected using low-thrust engines, namely, it can be shifted in the direction of the Earth's rotation (from west to east). Then at each new loop the satellite will catch up with the AUG leaving from under it and, in fact, "hang" over the enemy ships (pass over them once every 103 minutes).

It is clear that in the event of a major war, the orbital groupings of the belligerent parties will be quickly destroyed, and the data received from them will be hopelessly outdated within a day.

To restore the efficiency of space reconnaissance and target designation, it will be necessary to launch backup spacecraft. You can forget about cosmodromes (priority targets for a nuclear missile strike). The best approach would be intercontinental ballistic missiles capable of launching a payload of the order of 3300/3800 kg (the mass of the US-P / US-A spacecraft of the Legend system).

Unfortunately, the least vulnerable (mobile) missile systems (ICBMs) Topol-M, Yars and Bulava have a throw-weight of less than 1200-1400 kg (for Sineva 2000/2800 kg). The heavy "Voevoda" and "Sarmat" with 10 warheads are the "sacred cows" of the Strategic Missile Forces, the main weapon of retaliation, and are unlikely to be used for other purposes. The most suitable candidates for the role of a hot reserve, perhaps, can be considered the silo launch rockets  Strela (based on the UR-100N UTTKh ICBM) and  Dnepr  (based on Voevoda), but with light RLR spacecraft of the Kondor type ...

Above the water

It is generally accepted that even in the absence of space target designation, the US Navy's AUG has phenomenal combat capabilities - sometimes  we are talking  about a depth of defense of 1500 km (this is the opinion of the former commander of the Russian Black Sea Fleet, Admiral Komoedov). In fact, the carrier-based aircraft RLDN (AWACS) E-2C / D "Hawkeye", loitering at a "typical" distance from the aircraft carrier of 320 km (200 statute miles) at an altitude of 9400-11 300 m, is capable of confidently (when the onboard radar is active mode) to detect targets of the "missile cruiser pr. 1164" type at the range of the radio horizon. In other words, 410-450 km from the patrol line or 730-770 km from the center of the order of the aircraft carrier group.

In the passive mode (radio direction-finding), the detection range is approximately doubled, but the information received loses in reliability. This unreliability can be exacerbated by enemy countermeasures, including limiting the operation of radio-electronic equipment for radiation and distorting radio-technical portraits of ships.

Theoretically, "Hawkeye" can detect the operating RES at a distance of 1200 km from the AUG. In this case, after additional reconnaissance of targets by the Growlers (EA-18G), the strikes by the Harpoons from the Super Hornets (F / A-18E / F) will follow - wave after wave, which will not be so easy to reflect. At the same time, the aircraft carrier strike group, maneuvering accordingly, may simply not allow the Russian KUG, which is moving under continuous attacks from carrier-based aircraft, to reduce the distance and approach the rocket firing range.

However, being an excellent means of long-range reconnaissance, the Hawkeye also acts as an unmasking feature of the AUG. Radiation from the powerful E-2 airborne radar will be immediately detected by the radio-technical means of the KUG of the Russian Navy. After the discovery of a carrier-based RLDN aircraft, patrolling tacks 160 km (100 st. Miles) perpendicular to the course of the aircraft carrier group, it will be possible to determine the bearing on the AUG and the distance to it. Further advancement of the anti-aircraft KUG in the radar silence mode (using from time to time only short intra-squadron communication) will give it a chance to covertly approach the anti-ship missile launch line.

   Additional opportunities to counter the AUG of the Russian Navy will receive after the adoption of the anti-ship missile system 3M55M ( Onyx-M ) with a range of 800 km and the completion of the repair of the Admiral Kuznetsov.

The Su-33s based on Kuznetsov are, among other things, capable of: 1) performing the functions of a combat air patrol (BVP), patrolling for two hours at a distance of 250 km from the shipborne aircraft carrier group; 2) using the N001 airborne radar (SUV " Sword "), to detect aircraft carriers at a distance of 350 km, fighters - at a distance of 150 km; 3) attack air targets with R-27P missiles   from a distance of 110 km.

The practical application of the Su-33 in the initial phase of an aircraft carrier battle can be represented as follows. Having received a warning about radiation from the "Hawkeye" from the L-150  "Pastel" station , the patrol fighter calls a pair on duty for additional reconnaissance and destruction of the RLDN aircraft and "Hornets" BVP, followed by the identification of the location and course of the AUG, after which the first of the two rises from the aircraft carrier shock squadrons MiG-29K (accompanied by the Su-33) for a missile attack.

As for reconnaissance ships, due to their low combat stability, they are not very suitable for operational target designation in wartime, but they are indispensable for compiling a database of radio technical portraits of potential enemy ships. Without such portraits, the work of passive intelligence means is impossible.

Under water

The main advantage of the submarine forces is stealth, which makes the submarine a priority means of dealing with the AUG. In the event of the outbreak of global hostilities, the task of updating the space target designation data received by the atomic submarine cruisers (APCR) pr. 949A and 885 deployed in the ocean during the threatened period will require the use of an onboard sonar system.

The detection range of surface ships by modern high-power SACs in the noise direction finding mode is kept in strict confidence. It can only be argued that it is not lower than that of MGK-540 Skat-3, which is twice as  powerful  as its predecessor in terms of energy potential (MGK-500 Skat, 230 km).

It turns out that even the APCR pr. 949A with the "Granit" SCRC can independently detect the enemy's AUG at a distance commensurate with the firing range of their anti-ship missiles (460 and 500 km, respectively). At the same time, submarine cruisers patrolling at low noise speeds (5-10 knots) on the target movement route identified by the ICRC will remain outside the detection and destruction zone of multipurpose nuclear submarines that provide anti-submarine defense of the AUG, being ahead of the order at a distance of about 100 nautical miles (185 km) ...

The fact that the submarine, forced to move at the same (much noisier) speed as the aircraft carrier formation it covers (20 knots), will inevitably be detected first, and the range of its weapons (MK 48 torpedoes) does not exceed 50 km.

Besides...

A new big war at sea, for which one must prepare in order to avoid it (si vis pacem, para bellum), of course, will not be reduced only to battles between aircraft carrier and anti-aircraft forces. In all naval theaters of operations, clashes will occur between naval formations that do not have RLDN aircraft. Their duties will have to be taken over by deck helicopters.

   Using shipborne helicopters for additional reconnaissance of the AUG is not only useless, but also harmful.

Even the modernized Ka-27M can detect enemy surface ships at a distance of no more than 250 km, and fighter-type air targets - 70 km (Ka-27M) and 100-150 km (Ka-31), being at an altitude of 3500 m. 200 km from their carriers. This is much worse than the capabilities of the Hawkeye. In other words, a patrol helicopter loitering at the front line in front of the KUG will only contribute to its earlier detection by the enemy.

It's another matter if the KUG is opposing a similar naval grouping of the navies of the NATO countries, consisting of destroyers and frigates. In this case, the Ka-27M will be able to provide target designation for firing anti-ship missiles of the Onyx (albeit not at full range), Caliber (3M54 anti-ship missiles), Uranus and Moskit complexes. Instead of deck helicopters or together with them (for a preliminary control center), radar systems of the Monument type can be used with a passive channel with a surface target detection range of at least  450 - 500 km.

Even diesel-electric submarines of the previous generation (project 636.3) with MGK-400M "Rubicon-M" are capable of attacking enemy ships at over-the-horizon ranges from under the water  . The export version of this complex in the noise direction finding mode can detect NK at a distance of 100 km. Taking into account that this parameter should be noticeably higher for its own fleet (125-150 km), the detection range of the newest SJSC Lira (NNS project 677) with large-area noise direction-finding antennas may well reach 250-300 km.

Conclusion

It would be strange if the ammunition (in our case, the rocket) was developed by itself, and not in conjunction with the weapon control system, which ensures its use for a given range. This article certainly contains some inaccuracies and even errors caused by a lack of reliable source information. However, the picture as a whole is as follows - accurate target designation for firing operational-tactical anti-ship missiles of the Russian Navy at the maximum (over-the-horizon) range is possible and is ensured in practice.

https://vz.ru/opinions/2019/11/18/1004334.html

Arrow wrote:There are OTH radars that can detect ships at distances of thousands of kilometers.

The author was focusing on an open ocean confrontation, so OTH and such land based assets were removed from the equation. Navy is a power projection tool, so that is the proper approach IMHO.

The question is when will Russia become a navy power?

This guy's blog is named "Open ocean fleet: third attempt", so he is precisely following the development of the VMF into a force of global reach. It may sound pretentious now to aim to that and in fact that would be one of the biggest success of the USN, deterring other navies from even trying to confront them, but all indicates VMF command has a clear idea that the navy needs to be capable of operating autonomously far from Russian shores and what needs to be done to develop it in that direction. New carriers will take 15 years to be available. No substantial amount of modern ocean-going vessels / attack subs / modern aviation will be available before 2030, most probably. In the meantime Russia cannot push a confrontation with US in the open oceans beyond the point of showing a certain deterring capability (that means, the USN would have the upper hand but they would most likely pay a high price in case of an actual armed exchange with the VMF). Thankfully Russia does have a sizeable missile advantage that will help them bridge the period of time until the shipbuilding industry is brought up to speed. As far as I see it, what they need the most in terms of fleet vs fleet, open ocean confrontation is a RLDN / AEW aircraft of much better characteristics of what they have and strike capabilities / high-end air launched AShMs adapted to their Su-33/MiG-29K.

The USA borders only on 3 countries, 2 of them on land while the RF borders on the USA in the Bering Strait & 13 on land + Japan near the Kurils.
At best, she's ~75-80% continental & 20-25% naval power now. Even if she never gets above 50% in naval power, it'll be enough.

Russia has always considered its navy as the least important compared to air force and land force.

Now their priority for the navy is nuclear deterrence and kalibr numbers.

And having enough ships/subs  to defend the NSR, SSBN bastions, & LHDs to defend her coasts & interests elsewhere.

To the naysayers: read the Russian naval strategic development documents, I cannot provide better proof than that about the views and plans of the people calling the shots. 22350, 22350M, modernised 1155 and 1144, the 1164, the Kuznetsov are all ocean going ships. VMF spends a significant amount of time very far from the Russian shores, read their fleet commanders' interviews in Krasnaya Zvezda. They are highlighting the role of SSNs and Tsirkon in sub-strategic deterrence too, that means they plan to park their subs in front of US if the need comes and that requires a significant amount of them and all their supporting assets. Examples signalling their intent are quite abundant.

Of course it will take time, the industry must rebuild completely. Of course the first priority is always survival (or militarily speaking, strategic deterrence), but once that is ensured, the development of the navy as the way to enable Russia to establish relationships with other countries and its strategic relevance in the long run is clear for Russian leadership and perfectly enshrined in those documents. Russia is no conversely "exceptional" country that does not need to trade and to make allies as much as possible. Strategically it cannot voluntarily create a void for US, China or other powers to fill it and use the money and influence resulting from it to harm them. The competition between the big world powers will take place in Eurasia and abroad, this is a unavoidable principle of geostrategy. Russian leadership are only being humble and unbiased enough to admit they will need to take part in that struggle too, if they are to preserve Russia's development and hence security in the long run.

The fact that Russia has failed several times in the attempt of creating a blue water navy in the last century only proves that they are frequently their worst enemy, not that it is technically / economically beyond their capabilities or some kind of dirty neo-colonial luxury. This approach shows a lack of perspective and an ideological blinding of the pragmatic, state-oriented kind of thinking that must be employed to guide the country and its military.

Arrow wrote:22350M does not exist. The 22350 frigate is far too little. Even that's 10 target pieces. The other ships are Soviet antiquities. Russia need more oceanic ship i think. New ship no old soviet destroyer. Are they still having trouble building the 22350 since they're upgrading the old destroyers?

Soviet antiques? You mean similar to the Nimitz class where all but 3 were laid down in Soviet times?...

The efficacy of a warship is dependent on its condition, its maintenance and how hard it has been worked, not on how old it is. Russia isn't about to throw away perfectly useable frigates like the 1155s just because they have a touch of grey around the temples...  I do too, and I've got loads of potential left

BTW the 22350s are being built at Severnaya Verf in St Petes so modernisations of 1144/1155 don't affect their program or schedule.

That is what is done in the past too. So yeah, not like Russia is short during wartime.

BTW, arrow and the Chinese guy in China ship thread are saying almost exact same stuff. I presume same user.