Attack Helicopters combat survivability

max steel wrote:can we target Ka-52 and Mi-28 with American stinger manpads ?

Same goes for Apache 64D and Chinooks can they defend themselves against Verba , Igla manpads ?

If you mean getting a lockon with targeting, then yes. Most off the time it will come down to Intel off own troops rather than actual training of individual soldier. The Stinger can lockon, but do not ask me at what ranges, because that can vary and boils down to different circumstances and environmental influences. Verba and Igla can do it aswell, the bigger the engines, the hotter they get so you can see a Chinook far better than an Apache with MANPADS, but the temperaturs overall are relative close to each other while Mi-28 actually has very low temperaturs due the massive IR suppressors and several cooling section within its design.

max steel wrote:can we target Ka-52 and Mi-28 with American stinger manpads ?

Same goes for Apache 64D and Chinooks can they defend themselves against Verba , Igla manpads ?

Any MANPAD could target any plane or helicopter, if operator have visual contact with it. Other question is, if the missile will hit it.
Basic weapon against MANPADs are flares, but there is a question, how effective are US flares against Igla and Verba missiles and how effective are Russian flares against Stinger and Mistral missiles. Of all helicopters for sure Ka-52 is the most protected as its protecting suite have RWR, LWR and MAWS sensors to detect treats and flares and chaffs dinspensers, radar jammer and DIRCM complex to jam incoming missiles. Also there is a question of quality of laser in DIRCM complex, if it is effective to blind all types of IR, IIR, UV and optical homing heads in MANPADs and AAMs. If yes, than Ka-52 is safe against them and if radar jammer is fully effective against AMRAAMs, than Ka-52 is really hard nut for enemy air defense and enemy fighters.

max steel wrote:can we target Ka-52 and Mi-28 with American stinger manpads ?

Same goes for Apache 64D and Chinooks can they defend themselves against Verba , Igla manpads ?

The latest MI-28NM i think is the name.. have the best capabilities of any attack helicopter
to face Stinger or Igla-S manpads.. Stinger are guided by radio command and heat in the last
part... Radio communications can be jammed easily ,just like drones ,stealing away the control
of the missile from the operator.. that is to block any update.. and can deploy decoys that simulate the helicopter infra red signal.. I also have heard of EMP reactive defenses.. that
damage the small sensors and electronics of any missile ,so it doesn't explode near the helicopter.

Against laser guided missiles ,there is also something RUssia have developed and have seen
some videos.. it looks like a decoy that simulate the same lazer used to guide the missile..
the decoy is fired in another direction of the helicopter and the missile follows it.

And there is of course tactics ,things that never fail.. If you will be sending an Mi-28 to any warzone you better be sure it fly low as much as possible to avoid being on light of sight of any one with a manpad.. then you send high flying drones to give you an early look at the zone you need to attack.. this will distract the people with the manpads.. then later you send high flying planes to try get more attention of the manpad users.. then you will have the army using artillery on enemy positions so that they needs to go inside buildings for cover ,limiting the use of manpads through windows.. then after you have so many distractions ,you send attack helicopters to fire through windows .

If you combine army with snipers or artillery+ support planes + drones + attack hellicopters ,it will be very difficult,if not impossible to hit anything with a manpad.. because you need to
stay standing still for some times ,exposing yourself either to drones attacks ,to snipers or to Attack hellicopters or combat planes.

Just think about that.. the Syrian Army rarely lose a combat plane to manpads.. they combine
army with tanks with combat planes flying high.with drones and attack hellicopters too. and they do not have any advance hardware at all.. their airforce is soviet hardware. Most Syrian
Airforce casualties have been to Turkey and Israel airforces and anti air defenses deployed near Syrian Borders.

the Americans have made a helo-based obscurant launcher, kinda looks like the one on the Armatas. when a rocket launch is detected they will pop ir-blocking smoke grenades between the helo and the launcher, leaving the helo free to reorient itself to(from) the threat to engage(or run).
more like a hardkill interceptor meant to destroy teh rocket itself...

collegeboy16 wrote:the Americans have made a helo-based obscurant launcher, kinda looks like the one on the Armatas. when a rocket launch is detected they will pop ir-blocking smoke grenades between the helo and the launcher, leaving the helo free to reorient itself to(from) the threat to engage(or run).

That would not work for helicopters in 99% of the time.

Vann7 wrote:

max steel wrote:can we target Ka-52 and Mi-28 with American stinger manpads ?

Same goes for Apache 64D and Chinooks can they defend themselves against Verba , Igla manpads ?

The latest MI-28NM  i think is the name.. have the best capabilities of any attack helicopter
to face Stinger or Igla-S manpads..  Stinger are guided by radio command and heat in the last
part... Radio communications can be jammed easily ,just like drones ,stealing away the control
of the missile from the operator.. that is to block any update.. and can deploy decoys that simulate the helicopter infra red signal..  I also have heard of EMP reactive defenses.. that
damage the small sensors and electronics of any missile ,so it doesn't explode near the helicopter.

No. There is no "radio command guidance" for the Stinger. It uses proportional navigation in the first phase. Not jammable.

Vann7 wrote:Just think about that.. the Syrian Army rarely lose a combat plane to manpads.. they combine
army with tanks with combat planes flying high.with drones and attack hellicopters too. and they do not have any advance hardware at all.. their airforce is soviet hardware. Most Syrian
Airforce casualties have been to Turkey and Israel airforces and anti air defenses deployed near Syrian Borders.

"Syrian Army"? The Syrian Air Force has lost three aircraft to Turkish and Israeli air defences: One MiG-23, one Mi-17 and one Su-24. They have lost many more to various rebel air defences, AAA, MANPADS, SAMs.

And when I said "not jammable", of course the Stinger can be decoyed by flares. But you can't "jam" it.

The Longbow radar.

http://www.file-upload.net/download-11318323/LongbowProgrammAH64AtoD.pdf.html

B. IMPACT OF CLUTTER ON SENSOR PRFORMANCE IN LAND COMBAT
The Longbow program was further along than any others; the Longbow approach
used information provided by its high range resolution radar return from the stationary
target as opposed to a Doppler-shifted return from a moving target.
As a follow-on to the work modeling radar clutter for engagement of air targets,
STD got a study from the Army’s Model Improvement and Simulation Management
Agency to look at how clutter affected engagement of stationary ground targets. The
Longbow program was at that time further along than any other at trying to exploit highrange-
resolution radar signals to do detection and identification of stationary targets. It
was selected as the technology development on which to focus.
Tactical radars have low resolution in azimuth and elevation, limited by antenna
size. The resolution in range is limited by bandwidth and can be much higher. “High
5
range resolution” means that the radar “pixel” size (in the downrange direction) is small
compared with targets of interest. For a Longbow-sized antenna operating in K-Band,
with a 1 GHz bandwidth, the radar could distinguish “spots” on the ground about 100 m
wide and 15 cm deep. Typically, one would group these range cells, looking for “hot
spots,” then process the individual cells. A ground patch of about 30 range resolution
cells (even numbered cells in blue, odd numbered clear) with a tank in the middle might
map like:


The task for the clutter-suppression algorithm is to use the 30 or so returns, called
a “range profile,” from the wide, thin ground patches to determine whether a target of
interest is present. This is very challenging for a number of reasons:
• Each range cell has much more nontarget area than target area. Therefore, the
return may not be dominated by the target.
• The target may overlap adjacent patches, either in range or in cross range.
• The target orientation is unknown.
• For a turreted vehicle, the turret chassis angle will be unknown.
• The returns will vary rapidly with viewing angle. For example, there is no
reason to believe there will be any similarities in target returns between the
situation below and the one above.

Note that in the application of the high-range resolution technique to the air-to-air
environment, all these challenges are substantially mitigated or nonexistent.

IV. SUMMARY
Experienced analysts with a strong technical background were able to intuit, on
first hearing a description of the Longbow program, that performance against stationary
targets would be its Achilles heel (1987). This was identified as a research area that STD
successfully pursued as part of its sensors and target acquisition focus. The research on
the Longbow algorithms revealed the approach to be incapable of delivering needed
operational performance (1992). This was stated publicly as part of the Bottom-up
Review (1993), as was the fact that a forward-looking infrared could provide adequate
target location for the RF missile, thus providing stationary target capability through a
different approach. In 1995 the IOT&E revealed the difficulties with detection and
classification in a formal test with publicized results. As late as the summer of 2000 we
were still discovering the shortcomings of those tests.
In 2003 as part of Iraqi freedom, Apache operators found:
• The system was effective against moving targets and in bad weather.
• False alarms were excessive, especially for stationary targets.
• Most operators lacked confidence in the fire control radar for target location
accuracy
• The forward-looking infrared was the primary target acquisition sensor for
the RF Hellfire
• There were too many false SA-8 declarations.
To close:
How do we avoid spending money and delaying programs by pursuing features
that will not be achieved with the current approach, but are achievable in other ways?
How can we ensure that future operators are not surprised during an operation by
what had been intuited 16 years earlier, known with certainty 10 years earlier, and
revealed in tests 8 years earlier?

The Longbow Ka-band (MMW) for ground targets covers 90° in azimuth and quite narrow angle in elevation. The coverage of tank sized and combat relevant RCS signatures on battlefield does not exceed 8km under optimal conditions. Thus we calculate the field of coverage of ground targets by determining the area of sector it covers. 90° / 360 * pi*radius 8² = 50.27km², not counting in blind spot of 500-1000m right infront of the helicopter, depending on its altitude the blindspot is eleminated or extended.

The Longbow does feature air-to-air mode which was unsatisfactory (AH-64D Block2) not known in Block3, but the E suffix was given after the Longbow problems have been reduced/eleminated or at least decreased to some closer satisfactory level to come closer to specifications of the Longbow programm that were pursued.

Arbalet K,Ka-band (MMW broad) covers under optimal conditions 8 up 12km, while it is usually always closer to 8km rather then 12km. The azimuth is slightly higher with 120° and elevation is also higher since the Arbalet antenna can move in 2D inside the nose dome.
The Arbalet covers between 67km²(8km range) to 150km². The problems of this come similiar to that of Longbow in clutter distorting the recieved data to process a clear picture of the situation especially for stationary targets without distingtive RCS not to mention what mess it would be on a battlefield were tons of ammunition is fired into the field and remains of ammunition is increasing steadily the clutter the radars recieve.

Most of the time FLIR and intel from observering/commanding helicopters is more useful than using MMW radar.

Werewolf wrote:The Longbow radar.

http://www.file-upload.net/download-11318323/LongbowProgrammAH64AtoD.pdf.html

B. IMPACT OF CLUTTER ON SENSOR PRFORMANCE IN LAND COMBAT
The Longbow program was further along than any others; the Longbow approach
used information provided by its high range resolution radar return from the stationary
target as opposed to a Doppler-shifted return from a moving target.
As a follow-on to the work modeling radar clutter for engagement of air targets,
STD got a study from the Army’s Model Improvement and Simulation Management
Agency to look at how clutter affected engagement of stationary ground targets. The
Longbow program was at that time further along than any other at trying to exploit highrange-
resolution radar signals to do detection and identification of stationary targets. It
was selected as the technology development on which to focus.
Tactical radars have low resolution in azimuth and elevation, limited by antenna
size. The resolution in range is limited by bandwidth and can be much higher. “High
5
range resolution” means that the radar “pixel” size (in the downrange direction) is small
compared with targets of interest. For a Longbow-sized antenna operating in K-Band,
with a 1 GHz bandwidth, the radar could distinguish “spots” on the ground about 100 m
wide and 15 cm deep. Typically, one would group these range cells, looking for “hot
spots,” then process the individual cells. A ground patch of about 30 range resolution
cells (even numbered cells in blue, odd numbered clear) with a tank in the middle might
map like:


The task for the clutter-suppression algorithm is to use the 30 or so returns, called
a “range profile,” from the wide, thin ground patches to determine whether a target of
interest is present. This is very challenging for a number of reasons:
• Each range cell has much more nontarget area than target area. Therefore, the
return may not be dominated by the target.
• The target may overlap adjacent patches, either in range or in cross range.
• The target orientation is unknown.
• For a turreted vehicle, the turret chassis angle will be unknown.
• The returns will vary rapidly with viewing angle. For example, there is no
reason to believe there will be any similarities in target returns between the
situation below and the one above.

Note that in the application of the high-range resolution technique to the air-to-air
environment, all these challenges are substantially mitigated or nonexistent.

IV. SUMMARY
Experienced analysts with a strong technical background were able to intuit, on
first hearing a description of the Longbow program, that performance against stationary
targets would be its Achilles heel (1987). This was identified as a research area that STD
successfully pursued as part of its sensors and target acquisition focus. The research on
the Longbow algorithms revealed the approach to be incapable of delivering needed
operational performance (1992). This was stated publicly as part of the Bottom-up
Review (1993), as was the fact that a forward-looking infrared could provide adequate
target location for the RF missile, thus providing stationary target capability through a
different approach. In 1995 the IOT&E revealed the difficulties with detection and
classification in a formal test with publicized results. As late as the summer of 2000 we
were still discovering the shortcomings of those tests.
In 2003 as part of Iraqi freedom, Apache operators found:
• The system was effective against moving targets and in bad weather.
• False alarms were excessive, especially for stationary targets.
• Most operators lacked confidence in the fire control radar for target location
accuracy
• The forward-looking infrared was the primary target acquisition sensor for
the RF Hellfire
• There were too many false SA-8 declarations.
To close:
How do we avoid spending money and delaying programs by pursuing features
that will not be achieved with the current approach, but are achievable in other ways?
How can we ensure that future operators are not surprised during an operation by
what had been intuited 16 years earlier, known with certainty 10 years earlier, and
revealed in tests 8 years earlier?

The Longbow Ka-band (MMW) for ground targets covers 90° in azimuth and quite narrow angle in elevation. The coverage of tank sized and combat relevant RCS signatures on battlefield does not exceed 8km under optimal conditions. Thus we calculate the field of coverage of ground targets by determining the area of sector it covers. 90° / 360 * pi*radius 8² = 50.27km², not counting in blind spot of 500-1000m right infront of the helicopter, depending on its altitude the blindspot is eleminated or extended.

The Longbow does feature air-to-air mode which was unsatisfactory (AH-64D Block2) not known in Block3, but the E suffix was given after the Longbow problems have been reduced/eleminated or at least decreased to some closer satisfactory level to come closer to specifications of the Longbow programm that were pursued.

Arbalet K,Ka-band (MMW broad) covers under optimal conditions 8 up 12km, while it is usually always closer to 8km rather then 12km. The azimuth is slightly higher with 120° and elevation is also higher since the Arbalet antenna can move in 2D inside the nose dome.
The Arbalet covers between 67km²(8km range) to 150km². The problems of this come similiar to that of Longbow in clutter distorting the recieved data to process a clear picture of the situation especially for stationary targets without distingtive RCS not to mention what mess it would be on a battlefield were tons of ammunition is fired into the field and remains of ammunition is increasing steadily the clutter the radars recieve.

Most of the time FLIR and intel from observering/commanding helicopters is more useful than using MMW radar.

Wow, this is all very revealing information. The Eurocopter Tiger does not use a radar because the designers argue that electro-optical systems are superior.

Cyrus the great wrote:
Wow, this is all very revealing information. The Eurocopter Tiger does not use a radar because the designers argue that electro-optical systems are superior.

For most situations and work and requirements of battlefield today they are superior and almost exclusivley the only tool to observe and target objects on the battlefield, however the necessity for attack helicopters to have a big picture of the battlefield ahead of them is key to maximizing effeciency and minimizing risk weights almost only on intel and means of data they can recieve.

TBH, sooner or later i expect one seat helicopters with direct aided link of weapon and navigation/communication system via datalink controlled by 1-2 persons that are on the ground, remotley controling weapons and targeting systems aswell aiding information to the pilot.

IRST sensor is a much better means of air coverage which was first seen on Ka-52 prototype when arbalet radar wasn't ready to be installed on mast when it was in the requirements and later changed to nose mounted radar.

Werewolf wrote:

Cyrus the great wrote:
Wow, this is all very revealing information. The Eurocopter Tiger does not use a radar because the designers argue that electro-optical systems are superior.

For most situations and work and requirements of battlefield today they are superior and almost exclusivley the only tool to observe and target objects on the battlefield, however the necessity for attack helicopters to have a big picture of the battlefield ahead of them is key to maximizing effeciency and minimizing risk weights almost only on intel and means of data they can recieve.

TBH, sooner or later i expect one seat helicopters with direct aided link of weapon and navigation/communication system via datalink controlled by 1-2 persons that are on the ground, remotley controling weapons and targeting systems aswell aiding information to the pilot.

IRST sensor is a much better means of air coverage which was first seen on Ka-52 prototype when arbalet radar wasn't ready to be installed on mast when it was in the requirements and later changed to nose mounted radar.

Agreed, it's always great to have multiple targeting methods. I don't know about reducing the crew of the helicopter and putting reliance on data-links that can be hacked -- data links directly tied to the helicopter. I'm not versed in this field, and so I don't know if my fears are justified to any degree. We saw how easily a supposedly advanced American drone was hacked by Iran. Question: How does IRST compare to AESA radar in air to air detection? How does SAR and GMTI radars compare to MMW radar in ground detection?

It's just dawned on me that I haven't really thanked all the posters that have gone to the trouble of retrieving all those mounds of incredibly informative pieces of information. Thanks, mates.

Cyrus the great wrote:
Agreed, it's always great to have multiple targeting methods. I don't know about reducing the crew of the helicopter and putting reliance on data-links that can be hacked -- data links directly tied to the helicopter. I'm not versed in this field, and so I don't know if my fears are justified to any degree. We saw how easily a supposedly advanced American drone was hacked by Iran. Question: How does IRST compare to AESA radar in air to air detection? How does SAR and GMTI radars compare to MMW radar in ground detection?

Datalink and technologies to aid plattforms with a huge load of data information is always risky but due to the nature of Attack Helicopters being very fragile to ground fire but can outweight any artillery in firepower, accuracy and overall combat effeciency against various types of threats up different formations and fortifications which can be out of reach of most common artillery and MRLS they are and will be the backbone of "low cost" means of psychological warfare aswell accuratley destroying crucial and vital points of enemy formations and fortifications where artillery and sometimes even jets will not come as easily or at least as close to mobile or hidden targets.

Most of the time even advanced countries like US and Russia will not rely on such features even if they would have standardized such technologies, one of the reasons is also not to expose to much information which might be picked upon by enemy intel/EW units.

IRST compared to AESA radar will obviously be worse in range and resolution depending on weather and the IR "clutter" coming from surface at low altitude flight but it is a great subsidude to have an entirely passive optical "radar" with much better accuracy which does not give away its position. The IRST on russian jets was always one of the things that NATO feared or at least had respect for having capability to fly without radar but not flying blind in BVR range of up to 90km.

SAR is great for ground mapping but hardly useful for the military specified requirements of its different modes, of moving targets, friend and foe, automatic flight supporting systems like terrain avoidance might be good enough for it but SAR radars are specified for ground mapping from above, not so sure how they will perform in very low altitude flight (5-30m) if they can be even used for terrain avoidance, i don't know.

GMTI are the opposite, they are designed to pick up moving objects and are filtering every static object and suppressing clutter. The MMW radars already had/have for quite some time problems with static targets to keep them accuratley tracked or even pick them up and not filter them as "clutter" and GMTI will hardly be better, i would say worse for this requirement.

We use for ground targets MMW because so far they are the best bandwith for the job they are supposed to do. We will see MMW/IRST supliment at most, i doubt they will go for different solutions in bandwidth, the bandwidth is quite narrow for this job.

Helos can't fight fixed wing aircraft... they lack speed, range and altitude and their weapons are for air to ground use so covering them with AAMs is a waste.

Having said that the Mi-28MN will likely have the full air to air radar in a mast mount.

We had this discussion before iirc, it is not as defensless as most people believe. In tests of USAF they tested cobras vs F-4 and more modern fighters were fighters had lot of trouble even acquiring helicopters as targets due the nature of helicopters flying relative low and the visual overloaded surface distracts pilots aswell radar/IRST from acquiring quickly the helicopters as a target. They had to maneuver and make several strafes just to acquire them as a target, while helicopters due to their maneuverability, when having defensive means against air targets like ATAM's had scored hits against their predators.

Werewolf wrote:

Datalink and technologies to aid plattforms with a huge load of data information is always risky but due to the nature of Attack Helicopters being very fragile to ground fire but can outweight any artillery in firepower, accuracy and overall combat effeciency against various types of threats up different formations and fortifications which can be out of reach of most common artillery and MRLS they are and will be the backbone of "low cost" means of psychological warfare aswell accuratley destroying crucial and vital points of enemy formations and fortifications where artillery and sometimes even jets will not come as easily or at least as close to mobile or hidden targets.

Most of the time even advanced countries like US and Russia will not rely on such features even if they would have standardized such technologies, one of the reasons is also not to expose to much information which might be picked upon by enemy intel/EW units.

IRST compared to AESA radar will obviously be worse in range and resolution depending on weather and the IR "clutter" coming from surface at low altitude flight but it is a great subsidude to have an entirely passive optical "radar" with much better accuracy which does not give away its position. The IRST on russian jets was always one of the things that NATO feared or at least had respect for having capability to fly without radar but not flying blind in BVR range of up to 90km.

SAR is great for ground mapping but hardly useful for the military specified requirements of its different modes, of moving targets, friend and foe, automatic flight supporting systems like terrain avoidance might be good enough for it but SAR radars are specified for ground mapping from above, not so sure how they will perform in very low altitude flight (5-30m) if they can be even used for terrain avoidance, i don't know.

GMTI are the opposite, they are designed to pick up moving objects and are filtering every static object and suppressing clutter. The MMW radars already had/have for quite some time problems with static targets to keep them accuratley tracked or even pick them up and not filter them as "clutter" and GMTI will hardly be better, i would say worse for this requirement.

We use for ground targets MMW because so far they are the best bandwith for the job they are supposed to do. We will see MMW/IRST supliment at most, i doubt they will go for different solutions in bandwidth, the bandwidth is quite narrow for this job.

Thanks, Werewolf.


I definitely get your point: There are live risks for every platform and technology but that shouldn't completely restrict its use, especially when it's so effective on the modern battlefield. I really like the idea of using passive radar whenever the circumstances and weather conditions permit, so I think that IRST has a place on the modern attack helicopter.

I like the idea of using a multi-functioning AESA radar for both air-to-air coverage and ground coverage because it doubles the detection range without easily giving away its position and the fact that it can be used as a form of electronic attack. The Americans have apparently doubled the range of the Longbow radar to 16 km for tank detection, and so an AESA radar should be able to detect a tank as far as 32 km. Now I understand that an MMW radar may be better at ground mapping than the AESA radar, but that's where I think a complimentary SAR radar comes in.

Never heared of Longbow being upgraded or anything to achieve 16km for tank sized targets. Arbalet is already superior and detects metal grid bridges at 15km distance aswell buildings, but not tank sized targets.

Could you please put a link to where you got that from?

Werewolf wrote:Never heared of Longbow being upgraded or anything to achieve 16km for tank sized targets. Arbalet is already superior and detects metal grid bridges at 15km distance aswell buildings, but not tank sized targets.

Could you please put a link to where you got that from?

I came across a source that mentioned that the radar had its range extended to 16 km, but I can now only find two sources that speak about the radar of the AH-64E being twice of the block II Apache but I admittedly can't find anything about this radar specifically detecting a tank at 16 km.



https://www.flightglobal.com/news/articles/apache-to-benefit-from-comanche-178618/

http://www.airvectors.net/avah64.html

http://wiki.scramble.nl/index.php/Boeing_AH-64_Apache

The last source does speak about a 16 km range for the Block III Apache but it is less than reputable.

Looks like copy pasta, will need to look up for more specific information with sources that hold credibility.

Werewolf wrote:Looks like copy pasta, will need to look up for more specific information with sources that hold credibility.

I agree, because I had to scour the internet for those sources and only one is even remotely credible. If the Americans truly did double the range of the radar, it would be everywhere on the net. We would never hear the end of it from the ever more arrogant Americans. Until a more reputable source can corroborate the specs of that sole source, the Longbow only has a range of 8 km in comparison to the Arbalet's 12 km. The Arbalet has a clear range advantage over the Longbow in both air-to-air coverage and ground coverage.

Garry B wrote:Another aspect is that Longbow is expensive and most US Apaches don't even have the radar system fitted.

Exactly. The Apaches without the Longbow radar will have to rely on those that do via data-link. The Longbow is also very heavy.

I'm following that bitchfest too.

Can you enlighten me what is with Longbow Radar in helos ? Is it some sort of silver spoon to avoid Helos from threats ?