Russian Military Reform

NOTE: interesting if correct. Will have to await more details.


Russian Army Air Defense turned over to Aerospace Force command — sources
Its formations and units were previously both part of the Ground Forces and the Air Defense Forces of the Aerospace Forces

MOSCOW, February 27. /TASS/. The Russian Army Air Defense was removed from the Army chain of command and was turned over to Aerospace Force command, two sources close to the Russian Defense Ministry told TASS.

"Yes, it is so. This is the already accomplished fact," one of them said. Another source confirmed this piece of information.

TASS has no official confirmation for this piece of information.

https://tass.com/defense/1581853

NO, it would be a total revolution there.

The Russian Defense Minister announced that Russia would train more officers.

   "A phased increase in the size of the Armed Forces involves the training of more officers," Shoigu said during a conference call.

He noted that today in the universities of the RF Ministry of Defense they train in 280 specialties. At the same time, interest in engineering specialties has increased, which the minister associated with the operation of the latest models of equipment and weapons.

As Shoigu noted, the rating of popular educational institutions of the Ministry of Defense is headed by flight schools, command universities of the Ground Forces and the Ryazan Airborne School.

This year, the Russian Ministry of Defense plans to recruit about 18,000 motivated and trained students and cadets. At the same time, special attention will be paid to the children of military personnel participating in the special operation, as well as students of the Suvorov, Nakhimov and presidential cadet schools.

https://tvzvezda-ru.translate.goog/news/2023371315-3pii0.html?_x_tr_sl=auto&_x_tr_tl=en&_x_tr_hl=en-GB&_x_tr_pto=nui

In Russia, a large-scale information campaign is being prepared to recruit contract soldiers into the army. According to URA.RU, its start is scheduled for April 1, by the end of the year it is planned to attract about 400 thousand professional soldiers to the Armed Forces throughout the country. The relevant introductory materials have already been sent to the regions, the governors are doing preparatory work.

The need to make the troops more professional and increase the number of contractors in December 2022 was announced by the head of the Ministry of Defense of the Russian Federation Sergey Shoigu at the board of the department. Pointing to the growing threat from NATO, he said that the army staff should be increased from 1.15 to 1.5 million troops. At the same time, almost half of them — 695 thousand - should be contract employees. According to Shoigu's plans, by the end of 2023, the number of professional military personnel should be increased from 400 to 521 thousand people.

https://ura.news/articles/1036286412

A draft law on a gradual increase in the draft age to 21-30 years has been submitted to the State Duma. A transitional period with a gradual change in the "classic" age scheme of 18-27 is expected until 2026. From January 1, 2024, citizens aged 19-30 will be called up, from 2025 they will start with 20-year-olds. Men over the age of 27 who have not served in the military will be able to join the army "if they wish".

A draft law on changing the age limits for military service has been submitted to the State Duma of the Russian Federation . This was reported on the website of the lower house of the Russian parliament.

It is planned to raise the draft age of conscripts from 18-27 years to 21-30 years. The transition is planned in stages - until 2026. That is, in 2024, from January 1 to December 31, citizens of the Russian Federation aged 19 to 30 will be called up. From 2025, the draft will begin with 20-year-olds. In 2026, military registration and enlistment offices will already be waiting for Russians aged 21 and older.

At the same time, the bill provides for the possibility to serve "at will" - for 18-year-olds after 2024. In addition, citizens aged 27-30 years old who are in the reserve and did not serve "without legal grounds for doing so" will also "be able to do military service at will."

If the law is passed, then deferments from service will be valid "until their term expires or the grounds disappear."

As stated in the explanatory note to the bill, an increase in the draft age will free the military commissariats from the need to issue deferments to schoolchildren and students during their studies. In addition, the financial obligations of the budget for the organization and conduct of medical examinations should be “reduced” - in the amount of more than 639 million rubles annually.

The bill also applies to migrants from countries near and far abroad. If visitors become citizens of the Russian Federation under the age of 30, they will have to register for military service - according to Article 4 of the Federal Law No. 9 "On military duty and military service."

The amendment should enter into force on January 1, 2024.

Andrei Kartapolov, Chairman of the State Duma Committee on Defense , specified that conscriptions in 2023 will be held according to the current rules.

The bill arose after the statement of the head of the Ministry of Defense Sergei Shoigu - at the end of 2022, he called for raising the draft age in the country. On January 12, the press secretary of the President of the Russian Federation, Dmitry Peskov , said that Vladimir Putin "conceptually supported" the idea, but "the details and design of the idea are from the Ministry of Defense."

Shoigu also recommended "allowing conscripts to switch to a contract from the first day of service."

Viktor Sobolev, a member of the State Duma Defense Committee , noted that he saw no point in raising the draft age. According to him, the lower bar at 21 is “neither here nor there”, because a potential conscript at this age has not yet graduated from a university or institute.

At the same time, Klavdiya Bakumenko, head of the legal support department for clients at PryzivaNet, said in a conversation with the News.ru portal that raising the draft age will allow graduates of vocational schools and colleges to enroll in higher education until the age of 21 and receive a deferment. Now people with a secondary special education need to serve their service before entering a university.

At the same time, Bakumenko added, the new norms can reduce to a minimum the number of conscripts eligible for a deferral of up to 27 years for master's and postgraduate studies. Therefore, “the total number of men” who can be drafted into the army will increase.

https://www-gazeta-ru.translate.goog/army/2023/03/13/16390813.shtml?_x_tr_sl=ru&_x_tr_tl=en&_x_tr_hl=en

Can the Russian BARS grow into a reserve army

The most motivated units and subunits taking part in the special operation in Ukraine on our part are considered to be the Airborne Forces, the Marine Corps, attack aircraft of the PMC "Wagner" and the former People's Militia of the LDNR. At the same time, they often completely undeservedly forget to mention the fighters of the so-called BARS, who showed themselves well during the NWO. Who are these "barsiks" and why the experience of using them can be so important?

BARS

The effectiveness of the actions of Russian paratroopers and marines is explained by their high level of training, discipline and unique corporate culture. This is really the military elite of our army and navy, the only question is who and how exactly uses them. The success of the Wagner attack aircraft is based on extensive real combat experience abroad, well-established internal cooperation, as well as iron discipline. The motivation and resilience of the "policemen" of Donbass is based on 9 years of combat experience in confronting the Armed Forces of Ukraine and a clear understanding of what exactly they are fighting for. Behind the backs of the People's Militia of the LDNR are their homes and families.

These are those units and subunits that are capable of not only holding the defense, but also quite successfully attacking, subject to competent planning and organization. However, BARS fighters rightfully stand on a par with them, who showed quite effective combat operations, stamina and perseverance. In particular, it was BARS-13 that for a long time held back the offensive of the Armed Forces of Ukraine in Krasny Liman, having no really heavy weapons. Who are they, these "barsiks"?

In 2021, when the premonition of the inevitability of a direct clash with Ukraine was more and more clearly in the air, the Russian Ministry of Defense launched a project to prepare a combat-ready army reserve. The following figures may indicate how necessary this is. In the United States, the combat reserve has 374 thousand people, in China - 600 thousand, in Israel - 430 thousand, and in Germany - 85 thousand. The first three countries from the list are constantly in readiness for war, and in Germany, apparently, something bad is suspected. In the United States, the mobilization reserve training system includes three stages and makes it possible to reasonably count on a "reserve army" of up to 5.5 million people.

So, in 2021, in the Southern Military District, which was chosen as a trial site, the formation of the Army Special Combat Reserve, or BARS, began. His idea was good: after the completion of military service, a reservist who had not wasted his skills in his VUS could conclude a contract with the Ministry of Defense of the Russian Federation and maintain a state of combat readiness without interrupting his main work in civilian life. For being in an active combat reserve, passing training sessions and military training, a BARS fighter should have received additional monetary rewards, as Colonel Konstantin Zapatotsky, head of the organizational and mobilization department of the Southern Military District, explained to the Zvezda TV channel:

The state guarantees appropriate payments to the reservists. So, for three days in the classroom, an officer will receive up to 10 thousand rubles, a sergeant-soldier - up to 5 thousand rubles. For 30 days at military training, an officer will receive from 30 to 75 thousand rubles, a soldier - up to 25 thousand rubles. When concluding the first contract, a lump-sum payment of up to 66 thousand rubles will also be made to an officer, up to 39 thousand rubles to a soldier-sergeant, depending on the term of the contract. It is concluded with the preservation of the main place of work of the reservists. In addition, if necessary, they are guaranteed free medical care and insurance payments. After the end of the first three-year contract and at the conclusion of a new one, reservists are entitled to a one-time cash payment in the amount of a monthly salary, monthly bonuses are provided for continuous stay in the reserve in the amount of 10%.

Every month for 3 days it was required to take part in training sessions, annually - at training camps for up to 20 days. After a year of being in the reserve, one could be certified for the next military rank. The number of BARS in the Southern Military District was to reach 38 thousand people. This experience was also extended to the Central Military District.

What did it give in practice?

With the start of a special military operation, the Ministry of Defense of the Russian Federation received several tens of thousands of combat-ready reservists, who, unlike those mobilized, do not have to be driven around training grounds for months until they get into shape and restore forgotten skills in their military registration specialty. Detachments of "barsiks" proved to be one of the most prepared, organized and disciplined. In other words, the experiment as a whole was successful. However, it is impossible not to mention the reverse side of the coin.

So, there were quite a few questions about the legal status of the BARS fighters, in which they took part in the SVO, the size of the due cash payments and social guarantees from the state. There were also claims that some of the most trained units and divisions of the Russian army were forced to fight with a minimum of heavy weapons, like some kind of militias, which significantly reduced the effectiveness of their actions. What can we conclude?

BARS instead of Guards?

In fact, the idea of ​​BARS is quite close to the concept of the US National Guard, which we talked about in detail earlier. The difference between the American National Guard and the Russian Guard is that the former is a branch of the US Armed Forces and an army combat reserve, where retirees serve mainly in combination with their main work in civilian life. The Russian National Guard is not subordinate to the Ministry of Defense of the Russian Federation or the Ministry of Internal Affairs, but personally to the President of the Russian Federation, being his “personal” army, being sharpened mainly for police functions. During the NMD, the National Guard really had to fight, but then certain problems emerged with the preparation and weapons used, because full-fledged large-scale military operations are, by definition, not their main profile.

That is, the Russian Guard and the US National Guard are two fundamentally different structures with different tasks. The army special combat reserve is as close as possible in its essence to the American National Guard and therefore showed noticeable results in the NVO zone. The problem of BARS is its legal status and armament, which is incomparable with the US National Guard, which has not only tanks, cannons and MLRS, but even all types of aviation, up to fifth-generation F-35 fighters, with the exception of strategic bombers. To imagine that our "barsiki" will have personal support in the form of the Su-57, somehow does not work, but it's a pity.

Summarizing, we can conclude that the Special Combat Army Reserve should be developed and strengthened by eliminating the above remarks. BARS may well eventually grow to a full-fledged reserve army of the RF Ministry of Defense.

https://topcor-ru.translate.goog/33737-mozhet-li-rossijskij-bars-dorasti-do-rezervnoj-armii.html?utm_source=warfiles.ru&_x_tr_sl=auto&_x_tr_tl=en&_x_tr_hl=en

NOTE: there have been 14 or so of these BARS units identified as operating in the SMO zone.

A ready reserve is an excellent idea.
Also because the russian armed forces are a mix of conscript and contract soldier and they want to remain such for excellent reasons.
So a reserve force that could immediately fill up the rank of those operative units that are fuelled with conscripts even in case of an operation abroad is a must.
The other need that the article seems to somewhat hint is the necessity of re-orienting the focus of infantry training, so to include the capacity of operate against enemy entrenched in urban settlements/fortified lines of defences.
There was also there plans to arrange units of assault engineers for the role but I would dare to say that the scale in which such tactics are actually been used exceed even the possibility of using highly specialized units (still absolutely necessary ) but have to extend even to normal troops.
BARS in this regard could be extremely useful as they could be instructed in order to gain additional expertise added to the normal training they got as conscripts.
Contracted personnel training would in the meantime shift their own focus, with some units passing from being a strictly mechanized assault units to true shocktroopers i.e, from Desant to Udar.

s BARS separate from Rosgvardiya?

The article mixes those up, when it calls the BARS units Putins own domestic army

That's the Rosgvardiya , which is a national guard on its own and which fought in the SMO

The BARS from what I understand are separate units from the reserve

If they are distinct, then the comparison would be:

Rosgvard - National Guard
BARS - Army Reserve

The US National Guard is a State controlled Military Reserve versus the Army Reserve which is Federal government controlled. Anglo Saxon states don't have anything like the Rosgvardiva units other then SOBR (SWAT).

Also BARS is under control of the Army not Rosgvardiya... it is an "active reserve" as opposed to the present "reserve list" system.

being his “personal” army

The President is the CinC of Rosgvardija. But he is also the Supreme CinC of the Armed Forces.
The only difference is that there is no Minister in between.

National Guard in the USA is state controlled while the Reserve are not about fighting troops but materials (so it's comparable to long storage depots in Russia).
There is nothing like Rosgvardjia in Usa (well, not exactly as they have the Coast Guard)  and generally speaking in countries with a Common Law system, while such corps are widely present in the ones of Civil Law System (China has also).

Each country has their own provisions for what it came to the reserve system, Russian having still a compulsory service could rely on the advantage of  a way larger base of potential candidates for this role.
Also the passage to a 21 years conscription call came the same reason: calling on persons that have already acquired through schooling an higher level of professional skills before entering the military instead of bothering to form them in house.

And yes, Rosgvardjia with OMON, SOBR, former MVD and PP troops is used in urban combat together with VDV , Fleet Infantry and Wagner and that because all those are trained and organized for a type of close quarter combat AKIN to the one required against deeply entrenched enemies.
AKIN, let's repeat: it means that they are way better than normal field troops for such a task BUT still situation is far from the optimal.

If Russia plans to enter the major cities they need the regular troops and probably the people they drafted to get used to going door to door as well. I am pretty certain that Russia can achieve their initial goal of liberating the whole of the Donbass with the techniques they are using. But breaking down the Kiev regime will take more than what they are doing right now. At least Kharkov and Zaporozhye should be taken. Plus probably the whole of the East bank of the Dnieper so they can have a solid defense line against a natural barrier. Otherwise Ukraine will just continue using GMLRS on Donbass.

For this they need a minimum of another 500k troops. For now, at this rate, conquest of Donbas itself is a matter of years. In addition, the Ukrainian offensive is now coming after a year of the SMO. We'll see if there's another "tactical" withdrawal from different regions.

For this they need a minimum of another 500k troops. For now, at this rate, conquest of Donbas itself is a matter of years. In addition, the Ukrainian offensive is now coming after a year of the SMO. We'll see if there's another "tactical" withdrawal from different regions.

No, Russia has enough troops mobilized to handle all of the Ukraine's remaining forces. The Ukraine's remaining forces being mostly now in the Donbass readying their own offensive, and this is a large group of experienced forces. The Ukraine has even stripped its forces on the border with Belarus just to feed more reinforcements into the Donbass.
But with this group destroyed, it's an open highway to the rest of the Ukraine.

What is happened with the units of the 11 AK? They were moved out from the Kaliningrad regio to the Ukrainian front but after that I can not find anything about them. Are they still operating on the Ukrainian front?

Although I'am not a general, it seem rather odd to move them out of the enclave. If something happens in the Kaliningrad region you have more problems getting them back in.

They would not have been moved out. Maybe a battalion at a time just for the experience factor. It has a tendency to be reported as whole regiments when it actually is only a battalion. A grain of salt with any media report or rumor anywhere. Unless the Russian government reports it, then it remains suspect... and even then it could just be a misdirection.

For those of you who have an understanding of warfare tactics and have been watching the new tactical changes evolving (including some old ones reappearing) of the SMO.

FULL ARTICLE: https://topwar-ru.translate.goog/215312-voenkor-prizval-pereosmyslit-strukturu-i-taktiku-vdv-specnaza-i-pehoty-na-osnove-opyta-specoperacii.html?_x_tr_sl=auto&_x_tr_tl=en&_x_tr_hl=en

I would dissent on a point of the article: russian infantry squad is not more lightly armed than others.
Right the contrary: one GPMG and a reusable rocket launcher take out four man to operate, add that the assault section use AK with underneath grenade launcher , so that the only one with a simple AK is the squad leader.
Problem is that there are not enough of "real" infantry in the order of battle of any operational unit, let's imagine in the whole of the SV.

Add that the motostrelci also, not just VDV and spetsnats are trained as a pure mobile force and not as one that is intended to operate in close quarter battles, in cities or against trenches network to get the real dimension of the actual mess .

Naturally, literally NO ONE, both in the East than in the West have previously even imagined that the new technologies would have such an effect when used in a large scale conflict between equals.
Everyone tough that drones, UAS and PGMs would have expanded the range and the fluidity of manoeuvres and fire engagements and not instead that we actually experiment mutatis mutandis a return to WWI warfare.
A.t.c. also the experience in Syria, and previously the so called Toyota wars showed actually the opposite scenario (that still remain valid as shown by AFU success in Kharkiv region) of very fast advances of light forces.
So, a general reform would be necessary, both in the training than in the same shape and balance of forces in combat units.
IMHO about all of the proposed increase of personnel should go to infantry (drone operators being the sole exceptions)and even more precisely to the assault section at the squad /platoon level.

Apparently the Russian solution to this problem has been a change in tactical operations. A Battalion Tactical Group (Btg) was found to be too big in the new battlefield and not big enough to cover zones. A standard BMP/BTR platoon did not cut it at all so the Russians have gone to a Company Tactical Group for most combat cases.

This unit is flexible but most would look like this:
- standard Motor Rifle company (3 platoons and command unit = 10 BMP/BTR, 24 mounted crew and 72 dismounts) plus the following support elements
- section of the Battalion Automatic Grenade launcher platoon (1 BMP/BTR, 2 crew and 5 dismount)
- section of the Battalion Antitank platoon (1 BMP/BTR, 2 crew and 7 dismounts)
- 2 sniper teams (previously removed from the company structure, 4 dismounts)
- combat sappers from the attached Battalion Sapper platoon (4-6 dismounts and 1-2 K9's)
- section of mortars from Battalion Mortar battery (2 x 120/82mm mortars, crews 8-10 plus section commander, forward observer and radio operator)
- tank platoon (3 tanks, 9 mounted crew) NOTE: have seen mention of operations in which 2 platoons or 6 tanks have been attached

This unit would reorganize into dismounted and mounted sections. The dismounted would be organized as such:
- company command element (6-8 dismounts)
- 2 assault platoons organized into 2 assault sections (10-12 dismounts each) and a platoon command element (4-6 dismounts)
- 1 fire support platoon commanded by the 3rd Motor Rifle platoon commander organized with 2 ATGM teams, 2 AGL teams, 2 sniper teams, 2 HMG teams and 2 mortar teams

The mounted unit would be organized into 3 groups of 4 BMP/BTR each with either 1 tank attached or the 3 tanks could operate as separate group. Mounted units would remain under cover as much as possible employing the carousel method of firing upon designated targets.