Older warfare performance and short/mid-term decomissions

Scrapping report of the 3Q of the decade for the heavy land combat material (January 2016 - June 2018)

Isolate units and/or broken parts of heavy land combat material to continue:

BMP-3: Sale and auction of scrap material related to some engineering vehicle.
SA-11/17: Sale and auction of scrap material.
GMZ-1/2/3: Sale and auction of scrap material related to some engineering vehicle.
2S1: Sale and auction of scrap material and some spare part related to some engineering vehicle.
BMP-2: Sale and auction of scrap material.

Bigger amounts of heavy land combat material to continue:

MT-T: Sale and auction of scrap material related to some engineering vehicle.
T-72: Sale and auction of scrap material only related to engineering vehicles.
MT-LB: Sale and auction of scrap material.

Bigger amounts of heavy land combat material in process of exhaustion for the mid-term:

BRDM-2: Sale and auction of scrap material and spare parts.
BMP-1: Sale and auction of scrap material and spare parts.

Bigger amounts of heavy land combat material in process of exhaustion for the short-term and with exhaustion finished:

T-55: Sale and auction of scrap material only related to engineering vehicles.
T-54: Sale and auction of scrap material only related to engineering vehicles.
AT-T: Sale and auction of scrap material of engineering vehicles.
BTR-60: Sale and auction of scrap material and spare parts.
GT-MU: Sale and auction of scrap material.
BTR-50: Sale and auction of scrap material and spare parts.

Liquidation of heavy land combat material which exhaustion was likely completed by the end of 2015:

PT-76: Sale and auction of spare parts.
BRDM-1: Sale and auction of spare parts.

Looking at the reports I tend to think that:

- The scrapping activity in this time has been focused on infantry combat vehicles and engineering combat vehicles mainly.
- The scrapping activity in this time is decreasing, and since the begin of 2017 the reports talk only about combat engineering vehicles and some isolate unit and/or brocken part of more modern combat material
- There are not reports of scrapping of Main Battle Tanks in this time.
- There are not reports of scrapping of Towed Artillery pieces in this time.
- The scrapping process of the T-64 tanks, including engineering variants, seems near the end, if not finished.
- The scrapping process of the T-62 tanks, including engineering variants, seems near the end, if not finished.
- The scrapping process of the T-55 tanks, including engineering variants, seems near the end, if not finished.
- The scrapping process of the T-54 tanks, including engineering variants, seems near the end, if not finished.
- The scrapping process of the AT-T engineering vehicles seems near the end. Remains the biggest at this point.
- The scrapping process of the BTR-60, including engineering variants, can be finished in 2017.
- The scrapping process of the GT-MU, including engineering variants, seems near the end, if not finished.
- The scrapping process of the SA-9, was surely finished before 2016. If some, last units present after 2016 to aid.
- The scrapping process of the BTR-50 was likely finished in 2015/2016. In 2016 would be the liquidation of the last spare parts.
- The scrapping process of the PT-76 was surely finished before 2016. In 2016 would be the liquidation of the last spare parts.
- The scrapping process of the BRDM-1 was surely finished before 2016. In 2016 would be the liquidation of the last spare parts.
- The scrapping process of the BM-13, was likely finished before 2016. If some, last units present after 2016 to aid.
- The scrapping process of the 023mm ZU-23(-2), was likely finished before 2016. Last units present after 2016 to aid.
- The scrapping process of the 152mm D-20, was likely finished before 2016. If some, last units present after 2016 to aid.
- The scrapping process of the 130mm M-46, was likely finished before 2016. If some, last units present after 2016 to aid.
- The scrapping process of the 057mm S-60, was likely finished before 2016. If some, last units present after 2016 to aid.
- The scrapping process of the 152mm ML-20, was likely finished before 2016. If some, last units present after 2016 to aid.
- The scrapping process of the 203mm B-4(M), was likely finished before 2016. If some, last units present after 2016 to aid.
- The scrapping process of the 160mm M-160, was likely finished before 2016. If some, last units present after 2016 to aid.
- The scrapping process of the 122mm M-30, was likely finished before 2016. Last units present after 2016 to aid.
- The scrapping process of the 100mm BS-3, was likely finished before 2016. Last units present after 2016 to aid.
- The scrapping process of the 152mm D-1, was likely finished before 2016. If some, last units present after 2016 to aid.
- The scrapping process of the 082mm Vasilek, was likely finished before 2016. If some, last units present after 2016 to aid.

At the begin of the decade, with the begin of the State Armament Program 2011-2020 it was announced a plan for the scrapping of 10000 thousands of armoured combat vehicles. Later, by the end of 2017 it was announced a reduction of this plan to 4000 units. Likely the most imporant part of the scrapping of these 4000 units was done at the begin of the decade, when the effect of the wars of Syria (since 2011) and Novorussia (since 2014) in the oldest part of the Russian military arsenals was not totally clear still.

For the 4Q of the decade, it is to be expected a lower scrapping activity on heavy land combat material. Surely the scrapping plan for heavy combat engineering vehicles will be finished soon, and if there is some surviving unit of the heavy land combat material marked in red very likely will go fast to Syria, except in the case of the T-64, that seems more focused toward Novorussia at this point.

To note that the scrapping activity on heavy land material has been in this 3Q of the decade, and is at this point, far bigger on heavy land auxiliary material than on heavy land combat material.

Like in other cases

https://www.russiadefence.net/t5778p150-soviet-ifv-bmp-1-bmp-2#228037

in the case of the artillery, the Soviet Union and later Russia signed agreements for reduction of armament and followed a policy of keeping the most modern and powerful armament, exporting intensely the mid-age, at the time, armament, and leaving the less modern and less capable armament for reduction and scrapping.

Looking at the public data we can see:

- D-30 122mm: Production data minus export data (including all units of former Soviet Republics) gives a result that only can cover the number of D-30 remaining in active service in Russia. Russia would not have a reserve of D-30.
- D-20 152mm: Production data minus export data (including all units of former Soviet Republics) gives a result that is compatible with the total exhaustion of the D-20 in Russia. Russia would not have a reserve of D-20.
- M-46 130mm: Production data minus export data (including all units of former Soviet Republics) gives a result that is compatible with the total exhaustion of the M-46 in Russia. Russia would not have a reserve of M-46.

These would be the artillery weapons of mid age at the time, intensely exported in the 1980s and the 1990s. At this point only a small amount of D-30 artillery pieces remain in active service in the Russian armed forces. The reports of large stocks of D-30 artillery pieces in the reserve would not be compatible with the number of units that reached other foreign armed forces (like it happens with the BMP-1).

In the other side, from the contrast between production numbers and export numbers (including the units inherited by the rest of former Sovietic Republics), and respecting the numbers in active service of the Msta-B, Giatsint-B and (M)T-12, we see how

Msta-B reserve + Giatsint-B reserve + (M)T-12 reserve from this contrast is approximately the same than Msta-B reserve + Giatsint-B reserve + (M)T-12 reserve + D-30 reserve from the habitual reports.

I would imagine that the announcement of a reduction in scrapping and upgrades is likely due to Syrian conflict. Russia is likely now at a level it's fairly comfortable with and keeping items for another potential conflict in Donbass. As well as re-arming south ossetia and abakhzia when time is right.

MOSCOW, July 4 (Itar-Tass) - RIA Novosti. The number of models of weapons and military equipment decreased in the Armed Forces of Russia from 2014 from 3,900 to 2,600 items, follows from the materials of the Book of Records of the Armed Forces, published on Wednesday on the website of the Ministry of Defense.

"The type of weapons, military and special equipment of the Armed Forces developed in 2014 made it possible to reduce the branded composition of the weapons, military and special equipment fleet from 3.9 to 2.6 thousand samples," reads the materials of the RF Armed Forces Records Book.

It is noted that such a reduction made it possible to reduce the costs of maintenance of machinery.

What does that even mean?

miketheterrible wrote:What does that even mean?

In 2014 the Russian Military had 3900 different models of military equipment, ordnance or weapons in their inventory. Today it is 2600 different models with the most obsolete 1300 retired, destroyed or sold off.

That makes sense. Thanks.

It's stupid to have too many different systems in operation. Ruins logistics.

franco wrote:MOSCOW, July 4 (Itar-Tass) - RIA Novosti. The number of models of weapons and military equipment decreased in the Armed Forces of Russia from 2014 from 3,900 to 2,600 items, follows from the materials of the Book of Records of the Armed Forces, published on Wednesday on the website of the Ministry of Defense.

"The type of weapons, military and special equipment of the Armed Forces developed in 2014 made it possible to reduce the branded composition of the weapons, military and special equipment fleet from 3.9 to 2.6 thousand samples," reads the materials of the RF Armed Forces Records Book.

It is noted that such a reduction made it possible to reduce the costs of maintenance of machinery.

This is an important new in the refered to the decommissions in the Russian Armed Forces. There was some link?

The new would mean a confirmation that the wave of decommissions of the last years would be in a very advanced stage.

Surely there are still some items more that can be finished in the short term, it seems clear in the case of the auxiliary ships, but this new would confirm that in most of the cases the process of decommission would be totally finished.

In overall terms this is positive for Russia:

- Standardization increased.
- Storage space liberated.
- Storage costs decreased.
- Weakest and oldest items used properly as help to allies, with minimal scrapping.

Article from RIA Novosti and they were quoting an apparent article on the Ministry of Defense website. One must remember that they have been saving equipment since WW2.

About the reserve of towed artillery, like explained in a previous comment, doing a contrast between the total number of units produced, and the units exported to/inherited by other countries, we can see how the numbers would near this (A=Active, R=Reserve):

200 A -- 2356 R -- 2A65 Msta-B
50 A -- 2980 R -- 2A36 Giatsint-B

124 A -- 62 R -- 2B16 Nona-K
526 A -- 3082 R -- (M)T-12
150 A -- 0 R -- 88 Non military use 2A18 D-30

1050 A -- 8470 R Total

Instead of the numbers habitually given by sources like the Military Balance:

200 A -- 600 R -- 2A65 Msta-B
50 A -- 1100 R -- 2A36 Giatsint-B

124 A -- 0 R -- 2B16 Nona-K
526 A -- 2000 R -- (M)T-12
150 A -- 4400 R -- 2A18 D-30

1050 A -- 8100 R Total

The Russian reserve of towed artillery is of better quality than what the sources are reflecting habitually. This explains a bigger use of the 2S1 and the Msta-B than what would be expectable according to the numbers of the habitual sources.

The last 3, marked in pink, are likely to be exhausted in the following years. Very likely use in Syria.

Scrapping report for the heavy land combat material (January 2016 - December 2018)

Isolate units and/or broken parts of heavy land combat material to continue:

BMP-3: Sale and auction of scrap material related to some engineering vehicle.
SA-11/17: Sale and auction of scrap material.
GMZ-1/2/3: Sale and auction of scrap material related to some engineering vehicle.
2S1: Sale and auction of scrap material and some spare part related to some engineering vehicle.
BMP-2: Sale and auction of scrap material.
BMD-3: Sale and auction of scrap material.

Bigger amounts of heavy land combat material to continue:

T-72: Sale and auction of scrap material only related to engineering vehicles.
MT-T: Sale and auction of scrap material related to some engineering vehicle.
MT-LB: Sale and auction of scrap material.

Isolate units and/or broken parts of heavy land combat material with expected exhaustion for the mid-term:

100mm (M)T-12: Sale and auction of scrap material.

Bigger amounts of heavy land combat material with expected exhaustion for the mid-term:

BRDM-2: Sale and auction of scrap material and spare parts.
BMP-1: Sale and auction of scrap material and spare parts.

Bigger amounts of heavy land combat material in process of exhaustion for the short-term and with exhaustion finished:

T-54/55/62: Sale and auction of scrap material only related to engineering vehicles.
AT-T: Sale and auction of scrap material.
GT-MU: Sale and auction of scrap material.
BTR-60: Sale and auction of scrap material and spare parts.
BTR-50: Sale and auction of scrap material and spare parts.

Isolate units and/or broken parts of heavy land combat material in process of exhaustion for the short-term and with exhaustion finished:

85mm D-44: Sale and auction of scrap material.

Liquidation of heavy land combat material which exhaustion was likely completed by the end of 2015:

PT-76: Sale and auction of spare parts.
BRDM-1: Sale and auction of spare parts.

Looking at the reports, in the refered to heavy land combat material I tend to think that:

- The scrapping activity in this time has been focused on infantry combat vehicles and engineering combat vehicles mainly.
- The scrapping activity in this time only included some isolate unit of air defense, surface-surface-systems, artillery and tanks.
- The scrapping activity in this time has been decreasing in the refered to heavy land combat material and by the end of 2018 is more focused on heavy land, sea, and air auxiliary material.
- The scrapping process of the T-64, including engineering variants, likely was finished before 2016. If some, last units present after 2016 to aid.
- The scrapping process of the T-54/55/62, including engineering variants, likely has been finished in 2018. If some, last units present in 2018 to aid.
- The scrapping process of the AT-T likely has been finished in 2018. If some, last units present in 2018 to aid.
- The scrapping process of the BTR-60, including engineering variants, likely has been finished in 2018. If some, last units present in 2018 to aid.
- The scrapping process of the GT-MU, including engineering variants, likely has been finished in 2018. If some, last units present in 2018 to aid.
- The scrapping process of the SA-9 surely was finished before 2016. If some, last units present after 2016 to aid.
- The scrapping process of the BTR-50, including engineering variants, likely has been finished in 2018. If some, last units present in 2018 to aid.
- The scrapping process of the PT-76, including engineering variants, surely was finished before 2016. In 2016 would be the liquidation of the last spare parts.
- The scrapping process of the BRDM-1 surely was finished before 2016. In 2016 would be the liquidation of the last spare parts.
- The scrapping process of the BM-13 likely was finished before 2016. If some, last units present after 2016 to aid.
- The scrapping process of the 023mm ZU-23(-2) likely was finished before 2016. Last units present after 2016 to aid.
- The scrapping process of the 152mm D-20 likely was finished before 2016. If some, last units present after 2016 to aid.
- The scrapping process of the 130mm M-46 likely was finished before 2016. If some, last units present after 2016 to aid.
- The scrapping process of the 057mm S-60 likely was finished before 2016. If some, last units present after 2016 to aid.
- The scrapping process of the 152mm ML-20 likely was finished before 2016. If some, last units present after 2016 to aid.
- The scrapping process of the 203mm B-4(M) likely was finished before 2016. If some, last units present after 2016 to aid.
- The scrapping process of the 160mm M-160 likely was finished before 2016. If some, last units present after 2016 to aid.
- The scrapping process of the 122mm M-30 likely was finished before 2016. Last units present after 2016 to aid.
- The scrapping process of the 85mm D-44: likely has been finished in 2018. If some, last units present in 2018 to aid.
- The scrapping process of the 100mm BS-3 likely was finished before 2016. Last units present after 2016 to aid.
- The scrapping process of the 152mm D-1 likely was finished before 2016. If some, last units present after 2016 to aid.
- The scrapping process of the 082mm Vasilek likely was finished before 2016. If some, last units present after 2016 to aid.

At the begin of the decade, with the begin of the State Armament Program 2011-2020 it was announced a plan for the scrapping of 10000 thousands of armoured combat vehicles. Later, by the end of 2017 it was announced a reduction of this plan to 4000 units. Likely the most imporant part of the scrapping of these 4000 units was done at the begin of the decade. The wars in Novorussia and Syria absorbed a good part of the material to be scrapped, where this material proved to be useful still.

For the last 2 years of the decade, it is to be expected low scrapping activity on heavy land combat material. Basically isolate units and broken parts of more modern material. It is possible to begin to see increasing scrapping activity in the heavy land combat material which exhaustion can be expected for the mid-term:

120mm Nona-K
BRDM-2
BMP-1
BMD-1
100mm (M)T-12
122mm D-30

To note that the scrapping activity on heavy land material has been in these years much bigger on heavy land auxiliary material than on heavy land combat material.

PS: IF there is some new report in the last days of 2018, will be included in this resume.