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    Older warfare performance and short/mid-term decomissions

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    Vote (multiple choice allowed) for the armored vehicles under 15 tons performing well enough in the War of Donbas to avoid a total decommission by the end of this decade.

    [ 10 ]
    20% [20%] 
    [ 11 ]
    22% [22%] 
    [ 2 ]
    4% [4%] 
    [ 9 ]
    18% [18%] 
    [ 0 ]
    0% [0%] 
    [ 7 ]
    14% [14%] 
    [ 6 ]
    12% [12%] 
    [ 4 ]
    8% [8%] 
    [ 1 ]
    2% [2%] 
    [ 1 ]
    2% [2%] 

    Total Votes: 51

    eehnie
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    Older warfare performance and short/mid-term decomissions

    Post  eehnie on Thu May 14, 2015 6:33 am

    I have been reading with interest the forum by some days/weeks before registering. It is very interesting. There are multiple posts about the new warfare designed in Russia, as everyone would expect, but I'm missing in the forum a talk about the older warfare that is last part of their active life for a modern war in the Russian European and Asian environment, and about the future decommissions that can come in the short-mid term.

    Obviously, the War in the Donbas is becoming at this point a real test for the Russian designed warfare, for the older warfare, in an environment where more modern small arms and ammunitions are used too. From what I see, some aged designs are performing well still and keep being useful. The artillery systems and the surface-air and surface-surface missile systems are performing well still.

    Also the T-72 seems to be performing better than the T-64 proving that the recent decommission of the T-64 in Russia was right.

    And finally, I see, without being an expert, that the armored vehicles under 15 tons are performing also weakly in terms of protection to the crew, and in terms of destruction rate. All the warfare used in this war as APC and IFV seems to be weakly armored in relation to the ammunition and small arms used against them. I would say that this is a trouble that appeared too for the US in other recent wars as the War in Irak and the War in Afghanistan.

    Analyzing the loses of both sides in the War of Donbas, counted in lostarmour.info, and comparing them with the number of armored vehicles of every class included in sources like globalsecurity.org, we can see how the Ukranian army has lost until today about a 10% of their armored vehicles, but there are some cases with bigger loses, thanks to be very used vehicles, but also thanks to a weak performance in terms of armored protection. This 10% includes not the armored vehicles that the Ukranian ground forces lost in Crimea (it would be very interesting to know their loses in this región in order to know their total loses).

    If I'm not wrong this will be the last war for the T-64. With only Ukraine and Uzbekistan having them and with the high destruction rate for them in the War of Donbas, it seems that there is not a future for them after this war. Even I would not be surprised if Uzbekistan sell their T-64 to be used by one of the sides in this war. If I'm not wrong, there are not T-64s in the Russian ground forces, but also some other armored vehicle performing weak in this war, can lead for some new decommission in the Russian Army.

    Without include the BM-21 and the SA-13, because they are rocket or missile launchers (performing better in this war), and the newer BMD-4, these are the russian designed armored vehicles under 15 tons that can be in the talk about low performance in therms of protection (despite some of them, 2S23 and BMD-3, seem not to be used in the war):

    2S23
    BMP-2
    BTR-80
    BMD-3
    BMP-1
    MT-LB
    BTR-70
    BMD-2
    2S9
    BTR-D
    BMD-1
    BRDM-2

    In every case you can include all the variants under the term.

    How do you see the performance of the used armored vehicles in the war (by both sides)? Do you think some conclusions can be useful for close but not used in the war armored vehicles?

    Which would be performing better? Which would be performing worst? Do you see some total decommission as consequence of the performance in the war of Donbas or these armored vehicles are performing well enough to have a longer life in the Russian army?

    I hope all this can be interesting for you to talk about.

    PS: Feel free to add news refered to possible or real decommissions in the sort-term or in the mid-term, related or not with the war in Donbas.


    Last edited by eehnie on Mon Apr 25, 2016 9:34 am; edited 2 times in total

    KoTeMoRe
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    Re: Older warfare performance and short/mid-term decomissions

    Post  KoTeMoRe on Thu May 14, 2015 11:39 am

    eehnie wrote:I have been reading with interest the forum by some days/weeks before registering. It is very interesting. There are multiple posts about the new warfare designed in Russia, as everyone would expect, but I'm missing in the forum a talk about the older warfare that is last part of their active life for a modern war in the Russian European and Asian environment, and about the future decommissions that can come in the short-mid term.

    Obviously, the War in the Donbas is becoming at this point a real test for the Russian designed warfare, for the older warfare, in an environment where more modern small arms and ammunitions are used too. From what I see, some aged designs are performing well still and keep being useful. The artillery systems and the surface-air and surface-surface missile systems are performing well still.

    Also the T-72 seems to be performing better than the T-64 proving that the recent decommission of the T-64 in Russia was right.

    And finally, I see, without being an expert, that the armored vehicles under 15 tons are performing also weakly in therms of protection to the crew, and in terms of destruction rate. All the warfare used in this war as APC and IFV seems to be weakly armored in relation to the ammunition and small arms used against them. I would say that this is a trouble that appeared too for the US in other recent wars as the War in Irak and the War in Afghanistan.

    Analyzing the loses of both sides in the War of Donbas, counted in lostarmour.info, and comparing them with the number of armored vehicles of every class included in sources like globalsecurity.org, we can see how the Ukranian army has lost until today about a 10% of their armored vehicles, but there are some cases with bigger loses, thanks to be very used vehicles, but also thanks to a weak performance in terms of armored protection. This 10% includes not the armored vehicles that the Ukranian ground forces lost in Crimea (it would be very interesting to know their loses in this región in order to know their total loses).

    If I'm not wrong this will be the last war for the T-64. With only Ukraine and Uzbekistan having them and with the high destruction rate for them in the War of Donbas, it seems that there is not a future for them after this war. Even I would not be surprised if Uzbekistan sell their T-64 to be used by one of the sides in this war. If I'm not wrong, there are not T-64s in the Russian ground forces, but also some other armored vehicle performing weak in this war, can lead for some new decommission in the Russian Army.

    Without include the BM-21 and the SA-13, because they are rocket or missile launchers (performing better in this war), and the newer BMD-4, these are the russian designed armored vehicles under 15 tons that can be in the talk about low performance in therms of protection (despite some of them, 2S23 and BMD-3, seem not to be used in the war):

    2S23
    BMP-2
    BTR-80
    BMD-3
    BMP-1
    MT-LB
    BTR-70
    BMD-2
    2S9
    BTR-D
    BMD-1
    BRDM-2

    In every case you can include all the variants under the term.

    How do you see the performance of the used armored vehicles in the war (by both sides)? Do you think some conclusions can be useful for close but not used in the war armored vehicles?

    Which would be performing better? Which would be performing worst? Do you see some total decommission as consequence of the performance in the war of Donbas or these armored vehicles are performing well enough to have a longer life in the Russian army?

    I hope all this can be interesting for you to talk about.

    PS: Feel free to add news refered to possible or real decommissions in the sort-term or in the mid-term, related or not with the war in Donbas.

    2 points


    1. Ukraine has lost more than 10% of its war park. Poroshenko put it at 60/65% of the available resources after August. It did even worse since then with over 1100 AFV's destroyed including 150 or so tanks. This is a quarter of the Ukrainian T-64 pool. And about Half of the vehicles not in storage.

    The available armour for this was 3600 units, tops all AFV involved.

    2. We don't know what is performing "better" given the totally inept way, both sides (bar Russian volunteers) are using them. In my opninion it is the survavibility post-hit that makes the 64 puzzling. Some of them seem to take hits and stay put, some of them look like cauliflowers after being hit. WE would have to have a complete typology of the losses in order to say, so and so.

    At the end of the day, just like in the desert, it comes down to force multipliers and tactics. This isn't "older" warfre, this is second line warfare after in hypothetical peer'contest, both sides have been bogged down to an attrition game. This kind of warfare, is bound to become the future if big players go against eachother.

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    Re: Older warfare performance and short/mid-term decomissions

    Post  eehnie on Thu May 14, 2015 4:15 pm

    KoTeMoRe wrote:2 points

    1. Ukraine has lost more than 10% of its war park. Poroshenko put it at 60/65% of the available resources after August. It did even worse since then with over 1100 AFV's destroyed including 150 or so tanks.  This is a quarter of the Ukrainian T-64 pool. And about Half of the vehicles not in storage.

    The available armour for this was 3600 units, tops all AFV involved.

    2. We don't know what is performing "better" given the totally inept way, both sides (bar Russian volunteers) are using them. In my opninion it is the survavibility post-hit that makes the 64 puzzling. Some of them seem to take hits and stay put, some of them look like cauliflowers after being hit. WE would have to have a complete typology of the losses in order to say, so and so.

    At the end of the day, just like in the desert, it comes down to force multipliers and tactics. This isn't "older" warfre, this is second line warfare after in hypothetical peer'contest, both sides have been bogged down to an attrition game. This kind of warfare, is bound to become the future if big players go against eachother.

    I agree about the bad use of the of armament by the Ukranian side. Even it seems so obvious to me, despite being not an expert, how the militia is doing better in terms of military strategy, tactics and in the use of the warfare. Being realistic, the words of P Poroshenko are not credible at all. If a 60/65% would have been destroyed after august, today they would have nothing in the front line because January and February have been months of heavy loses for the Ukranian ground forces. I take these comments of Poroshenko as part of his calls to the NATO for more warfare.

    But I agree that the real loses are higher than this 10%. This number is like a mínimum for their loses, like a count of certified loses, including not the loses in Crimea and including not the warfare that can not be used at this point and need some reparation before to be combat ready. And still a 10% of the total number of armored vehicles of the country is very high. and it only can go to worse.

    I think the complete analysis of the performance of the warfare in the War of Donbas will be done with more time. At this point for me it is difficult to advance on it, despite I try. I hope we can advance on it.

    Despite the bad use of warfare in this war, that would not be improved by other low experienced armies in other wars around the world, it seems possible to reach some conclusions. As example, in the good side, it seems that mid size aged armored vehicles (roughly between 15 and 30 tons), most of them artillery, air defense and surface-surface rocket and missile launchers can have still a future, and can be attractive for a number of countries. Even the most aged ones seems to have a place today with improved ammunitions. It would not be rare to think about some of them even returning to production for export. I mean not all the conclusions of the war will be negative.

    KoTeMoRe
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    Re: Older warfare performance and short/mid-term decomissions

    Post  KoTeMoRe on Thu May 14, 2015 4:50 pm

    eehnie wrote:
    KoTeMoRe wrote:2 points

    1. Ukraine has lost more than 10% of its war park. Poroshenko put it at 60/65% of the available resources after August. It did even worse since then with over 1100 AFV's destroyed including 150 or so tanks.  This is a quarter of the Ukrainian T-64 pool. And about Half of the vehicles not in storage.

    The available armour for this was 3600 units, tops all AFV involved.

    2. We don't know what is performing "better" given the totally inept way, both sides (bar Russian volunteers) are using them. In my opninion it is the survavibility post-hit that makes the 64 puzzling. Some of them seem to take hits and stay put, some of them look like cauliflowers after being hit. WE would have to have a complete typology of the losses in order to say, so and so.

    At the end of the day, just like in the desert, it comes down to force multipliers and tactics. This isn't "older" warfre, this is second line warfare after in hypothetical peer'contest, both sides have been bogged down to an attrition game. This kind of warfare, is bound to become the future if big players go against eachother.

    I agree about the bad use of the of armament by the Ukranian side. Even it seems so obvious to me, despite being not an expert, how the militia is doing better in terms of military strategy, tactics and in the use of the warfare. Being realistic, the words of P Poroshenko are not credible at all. If a 60/65% would have been destroyed after august, today they would have nothing in the front line because January and February have been months of heavy loses for the Ukranian ground forces. I take these comments of Poroshenko as part of his calls to the NATO for more warfare.

    But I agree that the real loses are higher than this 10%. This number is like a mínimum for their loses, like a count of certified loses, including not the loses in Crimea and including not the warfare that can not be used at this point and need some reparation before to be combat ready. And still a 10% of the total number of armored vehicles of the country is very high. and it only can go to worse.

    I think the complete analysis of the performance of the warfare in the War of Donbas will be done with more time. At this point for me it is difficult to advance on it, despite I try. I hope we can advance on it.

    Despite the bad use of warfare in this war, that would not be improved by other low experienced armies in other wars around the world, it seems possible to reach some conclusions. As example, in the good side, it seems that mid size aged armored vehicles (roughly between 15 and 30 tons), most of them artillery, air defense and surface-surface rocket and missile launchers can have still a future, and can be attractive for a number of countries. Even the most aged ones seems to have a place today with improved ammunitions. It would not be rare to think about some of them even returning to production for export. I mean not all the conclusions of the war will be negative.

    The problem again is what you read in that Porohenko statement. I read that 60% of the available armament for the ATO at that time was KO. Which isn't surprising at all. Between failures, mission kills and outright destruction the losses on the UA side were well in the threshold of 60%.

    Then you have the pictures themselves. In Kiev and Kharkov you had at least a couple of hundred of decaying tanks. The change in IFV's too was noticeable. While from June to Octobre the BMP-2 was ubiquitous, from November onwards more and more BMP-1 were making apparitions. Worse, UA started using T-64A's and had to sequester Congos 64BV1M1. These are tell tale signs that Ukraine has issues keeping up with reconditioning of its old stocks and that many machines were lost and had issues cannibalizing more for the ATO. One of the great inputs of the Russian help (Nay sayers be damned) is the persistent targeting of war materiel. It is typical, Russia wants to show Ukraine, war is futile, by knee capping it.

    On the assets, doesn't mean much, often decried Soviet legacy tanks are showing good enough in Syria and in Ukraine. This goes to show that preparation and tactical awareness is still the most important asset on the battlefield. Experience comes handy, but both sides were novices (including Russian input).

    You can use pretty effectively all the Ukrainian armament, if you have the required C2/C3 and troops whose indoctrination and formation doesn't limit to hold this, pew pew, march etc.

    One thing that I've observed from the most proficient NAF units, is the rather large inner-unit autonomy (we're not speaking about Sparta or Somali that IMO are distraction and irregular warfare units). But I'm speaking about those units that in the peak of Illovaisk took it to the chin and hold the line. In Debaltsevo the uneven performance was a direct result of people with different agendas trying to do everything but the essential. IE close the cauldron, shut the side paths and bomb the hell out of UA henchmen.

    Personally I'm in awe at the devilish precision (relatively) of a dumb system like the BM-21. The strike on Krammatorsk airfield (despite the civilian casualties) was also a hell of a shot. This has clearly opened the eyes of many people who were used to send the super duper bombers, sit back and go after to thrash the 3rd world country of the moment.

    One of the things also is that in this war people know eachother by heart. Russians know everything Ukraine can throw at them. Ukrainians generally as well, off course this parity in intelligence is broken by the shape of both armies, but this fratricide just shows that you don't engage in wars you can't win, you just bend over and take it.

    cracker
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    Re: Older warfare performance and short/mid-term decomissions

    Post  cracker on Thu May 14, 2015 5:46 pm

    all these AFVs have a use in a low ass conflict like that, even BMD-1 will ve a force multiplier in 2060.


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    Re: Older warfare performance and short/mid-term decomissions

    Post  eehnie on Fri May 15, 2015 12:30 am

    KoTeMoRe wrote:The problem again is what you read in that Porohenko statement. I read that 60% of the available armament for the ATO at that time was KO. Which isn't surprising at all. Between failures, mission kills and outright destruction the losses on the UA side were well in the threshold of 60%.

    Then you have the pictures themselves. In Kiev and Kharkov you had at least a couple of hundred of decaying tanks. The change in IFV's too was noticeable. While from June to Octobre the BMP-2 was ubiquitous, from November onwards more and more BMP-1 were making apparitions. Worse, UA started using T-64A's and had to  sequester Congos 64BV1M1. These are tell tale signs that Ukraine has issues keeping up with reconditioning of its old stocks and that many machines were lost and had issues cannibalizing more for the ATO. One of the great inputs of the Russian help (Nay sayers be damned) is the persistent targeting of war materiel. It is typical, Russia wants to show Ukraine, war is futile, by knee capping it.

    On the assets, doesn't mean much, often decried Soviet legacy tanks are showing good enough in Syria and in Ukraine. This goes to show that preparation and tactical awareness is still the most important asset on the battlefield. Experience comes handy, but both sides were novices (including Russian input).

    You can use pretty effectively all the Ukrainian armament, if you have the required C2/C3 and troops whose indoctrination and formation doesn't limit to hold this, pew pew, march etc.

    One thing that I've observed from the most proficient NAF units, is the rather large inner-unit autonomy (we're not speaking about Sparta or Somali that IMO are distraction and irregular warfare units). But I'm speaking about those units that in the peak of Illovaisk took it to the chin and hold the line. In Debaltsevo the uneven performance was a direct result of people with different agendas trying to do everything but the essential. IE close the cauldron, shut the side paths and bomb the hell out of UA henchmen.

    Personally I'm in awe at the devilish precision (relatively) of a dumb system like the BM-21. The strike on Krammatorsk airfield (despite the civilian casualties) was also a hell of a shot. This has clearly opened the eyes of many people who were used to send the super duper bombers, sit back and go after to thrash the 3rd world country of the moment.

    One of the things also is that in this war people know eachother by heart. Russians know everything Ukraine can throw at them. Ukrainians generally as well, off course this parity in intelligence is broken by the shape of both armies, but this fratricide just shows that you don't engage in wars you can't win, you just bend over and take it.

    Then you read it as the 60-65% of the total warfare of the country being not ready to be used, or being destroyed. It would mean that Ukraine had after August about 3500-4000 armored vehicles ready to use. Maybe. Even it would be higher than my estimation.

    For me, most of the warfare that need reparation is off only temporarily. It is question of money (not many) and time to put most of these stocks in the road for the war in better or worse condition (surely with lower quality standards still). Only the scrapped material has not a solution, the rest can have at least a bad solution. And I think they will do it. Also I think they will find every piece of Russian warfare remaining in the countries to the west of Ukraine, but surely all it will not make a difference in the result of the war. They tried with their best warfare in the first months of the war being unsuccesful.

    In the case of the militia, it is very positive for them to see how they are keeping the loses under the level of the captured warfare to the Ukraine armed forces. No doubt, it is a merit.

    I also see the BM-21 performing well in military terms. After this war I think it would be still a decent number of governments interested about to buy them, even used ones. Also I think more aged warfare in line with the BM-21 or a little better like the SA-13, 2S1, 2S34, SA-8, 2S25, SS-21, 2S31, SA-6, BM-27, ZSU-23-4, SS-C-1B, SS-23, 2S3, 2S4, 2S5, SA-4, T-72 and BM-30, plus the newer BTR-90, BMP-3 and BMD-4 would be interesting for many countries. I would not be surprised if some are recovered for production and export with modern ammunition. In the age of drones (most of them easier to destroy than aircrafts), every air defense system can be more demanded, plus other launcher systems (artillery, rocket launchers).

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    Re: Older warfare performance and short/mid-term decomissions

    Post  George1 on Fri May 15, 2015 1:34 am

    from that list, only BTR-80 and BMP-2 would be useful for Internal Troops. All the other types should be decommissioned. Its time for a full scale modernization in Russian Army

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    Re: Older warfare performance and short/mid-term decomissions

    Post  eehnie on Fri May 15, 2015 12:49 pm

    One question that I'm not being able to solve myself.

    I'm not being able to find the year (roughly) when the production of the MT-LB, BRT-70 and BTR-D (including variants) was finished. Someone know about it? Some of them can be still in production?

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    Re: Older warfare performance and short/mid-term decomissions

    Post  KoTeMoRe on Fri May 15, 2015 1:24 pm

    eehnie wrote:
    KoTeMoRe wrote:The problem again is what you read in that Porohenko statement. I read that 60% of the available armament for the ATO at that time was KO. Which isn't surprising at all. Between failures, mission kills and outright destruction the losses on the UA side were well in the threshold of 60%.

    Then you have the pictures themselves. In Kiev and Kharkov you had at least a couple of hundred of decaying tanks. The change in IFV's too was noticeable. While from June to Octobre the BMP-2 was ubiquitous, from November onwards more and more BMP-1 were making apparitions. Worse, UA started using T-64A's and had to  sequester Congos 64BV1M1. These are tell tale signs that Ukraine has issues keeping up with reconditioning of its old stocks and that many machines were lost and had issues cannibalizing more for the ATO. One of the great inputs of the Russian help (Nay sayers be damned) is the persistent targeting of war materiel. It is typical, Russia wants to show Ukraine, war is futile, by knee capping it.

    On the assets, doesn't mean much, often decried Soviet legacy tanks are showing good enough in Syria and in Ukraine. This goes to show that preparation and tactical awareness is still the most important asset on the battlefield. Experience comes handy, but both sides were novices (including Russian input).

    You can use pretty effectively all the Ukrainian armament, if you have the required C2/C3 and troops whose indoctrination and formation doesn't limit to hold this, pew pew, march etc.

    One thing that I've observed from the most proficient NAF units, is the rather large inner-unit autonomy (we're not speaking about Sparta or Somali that IMO are distraction and irregular warfare units). But I'm speaking about those units that in the peak of Illovaisk took it to the chin and hold the line. In Debaltsevo the uneven performance was a direct result of people with different agendas trying to do everything but the essential. IE close the cauldron, shut the side paths and bomb the hell out of UA henchmen.

    Personally I'm in awe at the devilish precision (relatively) of a dumb system like the BM-21. The strike on Krammatorsk airfield (despite the civilian casualties) was also a hell of a shot. This has clearly opened the eyes of many people who were used to send the super duper bombers, sit back and go after to thrash the 3rd world country of the moment.

    One of the things also is that in this war people know eachother by heart. Russians know everything Ukraine can throw at them. Ukrainians generally as well, off course this parity in intelligence is broken by the shape of both armies, but this fratricide just shows that you don't engage in wars you can't win, you just bend over and take it.

    Then you read it as the 60-65% of the total warfare of the country being not ready to be used, or being destroyed. It would mean that Ukraine had after August about 3500-4000 armored vehicles ready to use. Maybe. Even it would be higher than my estimation.

    For me, most of the warfare that need reparation is off only temporarily. It is question of money (not many) and time to put most of these stocks in the road for the war in better or worse condition (surely with lower quality standards still). Only the scrapped material has not a solution, the rest can have at least a bad solution. And I think they will do it. Also I think they will find every piece of Russian warfare remaining in the countries to the west of Ukraine, but surely all it will not make a difference in the result of the war. They tried with their best warfare in the first months of the war being unsuccesful.

    In the case of the militia, it is very positive for them to see how they are keeping the loses under the level of the captured warfare to the Ukraine armed forces. No doubt, it is a merit.

    I also see the BM-21 performing well in military terms. After this war I think it would be still a decent number of governments interested about to buy them, even used ones. Also I think more aged warfare in line with the BM-21 or a little better like the SA-13, 2S1, 2S34, SA-8, 2S25, SS-21, 2S31, SA-6, BM-27, ZSU-23-4, SS-C-1B, SS-23, 2S3, 2S4, 2S5, SA-4, T-72 and BM-30, plus the newer BTR-90, BMP-3 and BMD-4 would be interesting for many countries. I would not be surprised if some are recovered for production and export with modern ammunition. In the age of drones (most of them easier to destroy than aircrafts), every air defense system can be more demanded, plus other launcher systems (artillery, rocket launchers).


    Nope i read it like, 60% of the war material we allocated (read scraped together) to ATO was gone. Which indeed given their age, the opponent, the troops available etc wouldn't have gone beyond a thousand(1000) units tops. Let's all remember that the ATO up until July was roughly 10 to 15K people bundled together from every possible service, source etc. You had the UA MVD, their MOD, the Volunteers etc. And indeed in August all that fancy patchwork of idiots got hosed.

    Now the available units (including storage) would have been around 3.6K even 4K and the mobilization would have put the manpower at 55/60K all troops considered. Which for a country like Ukraine is abysmal. It's a matter of chronology.

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    Re: Older warfare performance and short/mid-term decomissions

    Post  GarryB on Fri May 15, 2015 2:16 pm

    Let me put the BMD in perspective...



    The BMD is all about mobility...


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    Re: Older warfare performance and short/mid-term decomissions

    Post  Werewolf on Fri May 15, 2015 3:02 pm

    GarryB wrote:Let me put the BMD in perspective...



    The BMD is all about mobility...

    From when and where was this picture taken?

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    Re: Older warfare performance and short/mid-term decomissions

    Post  eehnie on Fri May 15, 2015 9:00 pm

    GarryB wrote:Let me put the BMD in perspective...



    The BMD is all about mobility...

    I'm not an expert, but being armored vehicles, I think the protection of the crew would be also in the mix.

    Mobility+Protection.

    No?


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    Re: Older warfare performance and short/mid-term decomissions

    Post  KoTeMoRe on Fri May 15, 2015 9:02 pm

    Werewolf wrote:
    GarryB wrote:Let me put the BMD in perspective...



    The BMD is all about mobility...

    From when and where was this picture taken?
    Kosovo> Post RU SFOR's rodeo in Prishtina.

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    Re: Older warfare performance and short/mid-term decomissions

    Post  GarryB on Sat May 16, 2015 10:36 am

    I'm not an expert, but being armored vehicles, I think the protection of the crew would be also in the mix.

    Mobility+Protection.

    No?

    Not really.

    the mix for armoured vehicles is mobility, protection, and fire power, and armoured vehicles are a combination of these... ie heavy protection effects mobility... a good vehicle generally has good features in all three areas... the T-34 is a good example for its time... good armour, good protection, good gun power. Each area can be broken down further of course... mobility includes speed and ability to ford and climb obstacles or operate on soft ground and indeed how reliable the vehicle is and how far it can drive on one tank of fuel. Protection includes how it copes with contemporary enemy weapons and how well it protects the crew. Fire power is fairly broad too... can you see well enough to find targets before they shoot at you, do you have the weapon types available to do the job at hand etc etc.

    Modern BMDs are not super heavy protected vehicles because they have to be dropped from an aircraft... drop a Bradley from an aircraft and spend two weeks digging it out of the hole it creates.

    BMDs score well for mobility and fire power, but low for protection because they are designed to be dropped in the middle of no where well behind enemy lines and to engage poorly defended rear area installations... nuclear weapons, airfields, HQs, centres of communications... things that would be useful to capture rather than just destroy with air power.

    Compared to the western equivalents (ie trucks) the BMD is well protected, well armed, and mobile... fully amphibious and protected from small arms and shell splinters.


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    Re: Older warfare performance and short/mid-term decomissions

    Post  eehnie on Sat May 16, 2015 6:45 pm

    GarryB wrote: Not really.

    the mix for armoured vehicles is mobility, protection, and fire power, and armoured vehicles are a combination of these... ie heavy protection effects mobility... a good vehicle generally has good features in all three areas... the T-34 is a good example for its time... good armour, good protection, good gun power. Each area can be broken down further of course... mobility includes speed and ability to ford and climb obstacles or operate on soft ground and indeed how reliable the vehicle is and how far it can drive on one tank of fuel. Protection includes how it copes with contemporary enemy weapons and how well it protects the crew. Fire power is fairly broad too... can you see well enough to find targets before they shoot at you, do you have the weapon types available to do the job at hand etc etc.

    Modern BMDs are not super heavy protected vehicles because they have to be dropped from an aircraft... drop a Bradley from an aircraft and spend two weeks digging it out of the hole it creates.

    BMDs score well for mobility and fire power, but low for protection because they are designed to be dropped in the middle of no where well behind enemy lines and to engage poorly defended rear area installations... nuclear weapons, airfields, HQs, centres of communications... things that would be useful to capture rather than just destroy with air power.

    Compared to the western equivalents (ie trucks) the BMD is well protected, well armed, and mobile... fully amphibious and protected from small arms and shell splinters.

    Of course there is a balance, this was just what I mean with Mobility+Protection. It is not posible to forgive the protection, because it is important for the live of the crew. This is why they use armored vehicles. Of course this type of vehicles will not be as protected as bigger armored vehicles, but lower protection means not low protection. I think this is a very important detail. I think this is why the new BMD-4 has bigger armored protection and size.

    I do not consider Western options as superior in overal terms. They have the same trouble vs the modern man-portable arms and ammunitions. The American casualties in the Wars of Iraq and Afghanistan prove it. Surely the entire concept must be under revisión.

    Today there are two types of warfare having trouble with the progress in small arms. By one side the armored vehicles under 15 tons (roughly), by other side the helicopters. Both concepts must have an evolution around two basic ideas:

    - Low protected military warfare must avoid to have a crew.
    - The warfare with a crew must increase the protection without lose other habilities.

    In overall terms I think the Russian Armed Forces are taking the right decissions in the last years, in order to improve the defense of the Russian territory. It seems that the new armored vehicles can be a solution for the next 30 years and are improving effectively the level of the previous warfare. While I have not enough knowledge about the details, the overall policy seems to go by the right way for Russia.

    While this posts are talking about posible decommissions of the older warfare less adapted to the modern small wheapons, I do not think Russia will reduce the current number of land armored vehicles.

    I tend to think that Russia will increase the artillery, the air defense, the surface-surface number of launchers and even the number of tanks, to include in the system the defense of Crimea and to improve the overall level of the defense. This would be done thanks to build new warfare and even with a return to the active service of some warfare in the reserve.

    For the APC and IFVs I think the policy will be more a policy of replacement (and sale of the decommissioned warfare).

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    Re: Older warfare performance and short/mid-term decomissions

    Post  eehnie on Fri Jun 26, 2015 5:35 pm

    Some data of the loses of the Ukranian armed forces in Donbass and Crimea.

    In overall terms, the data offered by lostarmour.info seem good enough. The alone part where I see them failing a little is about to identify the loses of the Ukranian Armed Forces before the begin of the combats in Donbass. They are not reporting the mobile warfare captured in Crimea and the armoured vehicles captured in Donbass before the combats, (as example the capture of 25 PTS-2 egineering vehicles based on the T-64 captured is not reported, but later some of them are reported as loses for Novorrussia).

    Taking into account their reports, with some aditional data about the captured warfare before the combats (that is not complete still), and the data of warfare for Ukraine before the war, my counts for the loses of the Ukranian Armed Forces are:

    12.14% 1378 pieces of mobile land warfare.

    40.00% 24 SA-11/17 (almost all the loses in Crimea)
    32.98% 31 SA-10/12  (all the loses in Crimea)
    12.50% 5 2s19
    10.79% 15 BM-27
    8.33% 2 2S5
    6.91% 32 2S3
    6.25% 10 T-72 (including engineering vehicles based on T-72)
    5.00% 30 2S1
    2.86% 2 SA-19 2S6
    2.40% 3 SA-8
    2.00% 1 GMZ-3
    1.01% 1 2S7
    0.00% 0 T-80 (including engineering vehicles based on T-80)
    0.00% 0 SA-4
    0.00% 0 ZSU-23-4
    0.00% 0 SA-6
    0.00% 0 SS-1 Scud
    0.00% 0 SS-21
    0.00% 0 BMP-3
    0.00% 0 BM-30

    34.94% 138 BTR-80
    29.49% 23 BMD-2
    26.71% 383 BMP-2
    25.00% 15 BMD-1
    18.18% 8 BTR-D
    17.65% 25 BTR-60
    11.94% 8 2S9
    10.83% 65 BRDM-2
    7.16% 24 BM-21
    7.12% 61 BTR-70
    5.99% 87 BMP-1
    5.74% 120 MT-LB
    0.00% 0 SA-13
    --------- - 2S23 (Ukraine has not them)
    --------- - BMD-3 (Ukraine has not them)

    22.81% 253 T-64 (including engineering vehicles based on T-64)
    3.75% 3 T-55 (including engineering vehicles based on T-55)
    0.00% 0 FROG-7
    0.00% 0 T-54 (including engineering vehicles based on T-54)

    2 BTR-3
    7 BTR-4

    As said before, some of the loses of Ukraine in Crimea and Donbass before the begin of the combats remain to be included (T-64, ZSU-23-4,...). My stimation of the total number of loses for Ukraine would be around 1550.

    Of course a good part of the remaining land warfare of Ukraine is not combat ready (but this is something that money and time can fix in part).

    And finally the data about the heavy towed artillery:

    20.00% 37 2A65B MstaB
    6.40% 32 MT-12 Rapira
    4.29% 19 2A18M D-30
    0.00% 0 2A36 GiatsintB
    0.00% 0 2B16 Nona-K

    1.34% 3 D-20
    ?.??% 2 BS-3


    Last edited by eehnie on Sat Nov 12, 2016 5:27 am; edited 20 times in total (Reason for editing : Update)

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    Re: Older warfare performance and short/mid-term decomissions

    Post  eehnie on Tue Jul 21, 2015 4:19 am

    As commented in other topic, surely the heavy towed artillery that need trucks to be moved is between the less modern armament of the Russian army today. Self-propulsion, higher protection for the crew and lower costs in the long term thanks to have lower crews are good features in favor of the self-propelled artillery over the towed artillery.

    This is another important reason to think not about decommissions of self-propelled artillery pieces in the short-mid term. While there are towed pieces in active service, the towed pieces should be decommissioned first. Even I would replace towed active pieces by self-propelled pieces recovered from the reserve. It would be very easy since there is a high correlation between both types of pieces, and there is a reserve of these self-propelled pieces. It would apply to:

    2a19 T-12 Rapira 100mm
    2a18M D-30 122 mm (the self-propelled version would be 2s1 with 2 less in the crew)
    2a36 Giatsint B 152mm (the self-propelled version would be 2s5 with 3 less in the crew)
    2B11 2s12 Sani 120mm
    2B16 Nona K 120mm (the self-propelled version would be 2s9 with 1 less in the crew)
    2a65b Msta B 152mm (the self-propelled version would be 2s19 with 3 less in the crew)

    In the future surely between the high caliber man-portable arms and the self-propelled artillery, the place of the heavy towed artillery seems well covered. The first total decommissions in the Russian ground forces (including the reserve) should not come from the Surface-Surface, Surface-Air, Self Propelled Artillery and even Tanks. I would expect the first decommissions coming from the Towed Artillery and the oldest light armored vehicles that are in this topic. Surely the poll of this topic is reflecting well the situation.


    Last edited by eehnie on Sun Aug 30, 2015 3:58 am; edited 2 times in total (Reason for editing : Some Improvement)

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    Re: Older warfare performance and short/mid-term decomissions

    Post  eehnie on Sun Jan 10, 2016 8:54 pm

    Has been the D-30 towed howitzer decommissioned?

    Looking more closely to the situation of the towed artillery in the Russian armed forces, I find these days some reference to the retirement of the active service in the Russian armed forces of the 2A18M D-30 howitzer.

    https://ru.wikipedia.org/wiki/%D0%A1%D0%BF%D0%B8%D1%81%D0%BE%D0%BA_%D0%BE%D1%80%D1%83%D0%B6%D0%B8%D1%8F_%D1%81%D1%83%D1%85%D0%BE%D0%BF%D1%83%D1%82%D0%BD%D1%8B%D1%85_%D0%B2%D0%BE%D0%B9%D1%81%D0%BA_%D0%A0%D0%BE%D1%81%D1%81%D0%B8%D0%B9%D1%81%D0%BA%D0%BE%D0%B9_%D0%A4%D0%B5%D0%B4%D0%B5%D1%80%D0%B0%D1%86%D0%B8%D0%B8#.D0.90.D1.80.D1.82.D0.B8.D0.BB.D0.BB.D0.B5.D1.80.D0.B8.D1.8F

    http://theminiaturespage.com/boards/msg.mv?id=298028

    Barin1 (from the article) wrote:As announced recently, Russia is about to retire its arsenal of D-30 howitzers, that were widely used in Soviet and later in Russian Army for about 50 years.Production was stopped in first half of 1990s, it was a hard time for all military production. Due to this fact, the barrels were detoriating without possibility of replacement, so it is more or less expected that most of 5000 of D-30 will be moved to artillery bases for inspection, some will be scrapped some might be sold somewhere as M-30 in 80s.
    Those in good conditions will still be used in VDV and the brigades, deployed in the south. Pretty sure there's still plenty of shells left.
    I have a soft spot for this howitzer, as I was trained as operator, took part in many drills in heat and cold and really liked it.
    It was widely produced, sold to some countries where it was mounted on older tanks chassis (Syria nd Egypt), it was also licensed to some countries (Yugoslavia, Iraq).
    General idea is that it will be replaced by self-propelled guns and 152 mm howitzers…another cold war warrior is gone, but I will remember it.

    Both articles metion a posible retirement of the D-30 in 2013.

    I have been trying to find more references unsuccesfully, but being not Russian speaker I can not extend my research to Russian sources. Maybe someone can help checking more about this info in Russian language sources.

    The case of the Russian Wikipedia seems based on The Military Balance.


    Last edited by eehnie on Wed Feb 17, 2016 7:15 am; edited 1 time in total (Reason for editing : To include the quote)

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    Re: Older warfare performance and short/mid-term decomissions

    Post  franco on Sun Jan 10, 2016 9:46 pm

    eehnie wrote:
    Has been the D-30 towed howitzer decommissioned?

    Looking more closely to the situation of the towed artillery in the Russian armed forces, I find these days some reference to the retirement of the active service in the Russian armed forces of the 2A18M D-30 howitzer.

    https://ru.wikipedia.org/wiki/%D0%A1%D0%BF%D0%B8%D1%81%D0%BE%D0%BA_%D0%BE%D1%80%D1%83%D0%B6%D0%B8%D1%8F_%D1%81%D1%83%D1%85%D0%BE%D0%BF%D1%83%D1%82%D0%BD%D1%8B%D1%85_%D0%B2%D0%BE%D0%B9%D1%81%D0%BA_%D0%A0%D0%BE%D1%81%D1%81%D0%B8%D0%B9%D1%81%D0%BA%D0%BE%D0%B9_%D0%A4%D0%B5%D0%B4%D0%B5%D1%80%D0%B0%D1%86%D0%B8%D0%B8#.D0.90.D1.80.D1.82.D0.B8.D0.BB.D0.BB.D0.B5.D1.80.D0.B8.D1.8F

    http://theminiaturespage.com/boards/msg.mv?id=298028

    Both metion a posible retirement of the D-30 in 2013.

    I have been trying to find more references unsuccesfully, but being not Russian speaker I can not extend my research to Russian sources. Maybe someone can help checking more about this info in Russian language sources.

    The case of the Russian Wikipedia seems based on The Military Balance.

    They are still active in the Airborne units ~120

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    Re: Older warfare performance and short/mid-term decomissions

    Post  GarryB on Mon Jan 11, 2016 5:21 am

    The thing is that some times the lighter towed versions are more useful for some situations.

    Saying towed guns will be replaced by self propelled guns is like saying RPGs will be replaced by Kornets.

    There are situations where an RPG... whether reusable like an RPG-7 or RPG-29, or disposable like an RPG-26 or RPG-29, is more useful and more flexible than a Kornet.

    Even light short range guided missiles like Metis-M1 will not replace unguided rocket launchers because it will always be more expensive and heavier.

    Compared with an RPG-29 the Metis is rather more capable... better range, better accuracy, but also more expensive and complicated and delicate and requiring more maintainence.

    If the target is 1.8km away then Metis is the best choice, but if the target is a bunker 300m away then an RPG-29 round is much cheaper and accurate enough and powerful enough to get the job done.

    there is no real advantage to only having one or the other... the best situation is to have both.

    As I think I mentioned in the other thread... we have now seen Coalition and I suspect a new towed model will soon be revealed... smaller and lighter with less range but will be an effective weapon.

    Personally I think a towed 120mm gun/mortar would be the better solution as it is light enough and powerful enough... if you want to get into an artillery duel with an enemy then use Smerch.

    A towed 120mm weapon with guided shells should be enough for most battlefield targets that need engaging... otherwise call in an air strike.


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    Re: Older warfare performance and short/mid-term decomissions

    Post  eehnie on Mon Jan 11, 2016 2:05 pm


    I think the key is to be man-portable or not. The man-portable guns of big caliber of different types (surface-air, surface-surface, anti-tank, mortars,...) have a bright future.

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    Re: Older warfare performance and short/mid-term decomissions

    Post  GarryB on Tue Jan 12, 2016 3:54 am

    I agree... the concept of a guided 152mm towed tank gun is very interesting... the large calibre is good for HEAT projectiles and their diameter makes them more effective at penetrating armour, while HE rounds can contain large amounts of HE making them more powerful, while the APFSDS will be very powerful even with a shorter barrel simply because they are already very very powerful.

    The large calibre means fire and forget guided rounds are much more practical due to the sheer volume with a large shell and again a shorter barrel wont effect performance so much here either.

    With AA guns in 57mm calibre a light towed model again becomes interesting with guided shells making fire against air and ground targets much more effective... one shot one kill almost.

    And of course mortars will always be popular for lobbing HE over short distances...


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    Re: Older warfare performance and short/mid-term decomissions

    Post  eehnie on Wed Feb 17, 2016 1:07 am


    The question is that I think it is not the best to compare man-portable guns like the RPGs with heavy towed guns. The man-portable guns are not towed, they are easily mobile, a lot easier than heavy towed guns.

    If we compare heavy towed artillery with other types of heavy towed guns, like towed Surface-Surface (including MRLS) and Surface-Air systems, we can see how them have been progressively retired, and it would not be rare to see the same process for the heavy towed artillery in the following years.

    Man-portable guns of big caliber are in part responsable of the declining of the heavy towed guns.

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    Re: Older warfare performance and short/mid-term decomissions

    Post  eehnie on Mon Apr 18, 2016 1:41 pm

    It is interesting to see the results of the two twin topics (for land warfare and for air warfare) combined. It can be a good exercice to take an overall view of the situation. It is possible to do it because the vote for every piece of warfare is independent thanks to have the multiple vote allowed.

    This is the link to the topic for air warfare:

    http://www.russiadefence.net/t4343-older-warfare-performance-and-short-mid-term-decommissions

    Every vote to every piece of warfare is a vote of a person that thinks that the piece is performing well enough to avoid a total decommission (including of the reserve) before the end of the decade.

    Almost all the models have some vote of people that thinks that will not be retired, but some have more than others. According to the people that voted, the most likely models to be retired from active service and from the reserve would be (in this order):

    BTR-70
    BMD-1
    BRDM-2
    BMP-1
    Il-38
    Be-12
    BTR-D

    MiG-25
    2S9
    Mi-14
    BMD-2
    Tu-95/142
    MT-LB
    BMP-2
    Ka-27/28/29/31/32/35
    BTR-80
    Mi-24/25/35
    Su-25/39
    Mi-28
    Ka-50/52

    To note that when two models have the same number of votes I put first the model with earlier data of end of production, and if the production is not still officially finnished, I put first the model with earlier data of begin of production.

    Of course do not expect all to be retired in less than 5 years from now, but, I think the results are interesting and accurate. The warfare with lower number of votes seems fairly to be the warfare with higher probability of a total decommission before the end of the decade. And with more votes in both topics, the results only will improve.


    Last edited by eehnie on Sat Nov 19, 2016 10:19 am; edited 6 times in total

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    Re: Older warfare performance and short/mid-term decomissions

    Post  eehnie on Sat Aug 13, 2016 2:18 pm

    Russia donated in 2016 20 BTR-70 to Kyrgyzstan.

    http://kabar.kg/eng/society/full/15212

    http://www.armyrecognition.com/february_2016_global_defense_security_news_industry/army_of_kyrgyzstan_takes_delivery_of_btr-70m_8x8_armoured_personnel_carrier_from_russia_11102161.html

    Before the donation, the most reliable sources were talking about 95 BTR-70s in the Russian Armed Forces. The donation would mean an important reduction of the presence of this vehicle in the Russian Armed Forces.

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