Tank Warfare: Russian Armour vs Western Armour

Mindstorm two questions

1) The Frontal Armour of M1A2 SEP is stated at 900 - 950 mm KE and 1500 mm CE , is there any round internally available that would penetrate the frontal armour for such tanks ? Or the frontal armour of Western tanks remain immune to any known weapon ?

2 ) Do you have any update on Armata Tank development or it just reamains too classified ? Thanks

The Frontal Armour of M1A2 SEP is stated at 900 - 950 mm KE and 1500 mm CE

The central point here is: stated by who ?

The same gang of ignorant mercenaries strangely avoiding like the death simple ,even intuitive concepts, as specific armoured mass to volume index ?
The same strangely ignoring that even only the physical LOS of frontal turrett armour in T-90A is significantly higher than Leo-2A5 ?
The same selling ,comically ,to theirs interlocutors ridiculous ,low level platitudes such as : western tank more heavy = more heavily armoured ?


Those comical,amateurish, figures for frontal armour level of M12A2(useful ,at maximum, for make some laughters with your friends) circulating on the net remind to me those circulating on the engagement range of AIM-120 series ,triggered ,ostly by the infamous "article" on designation-system site

[url=http://www.designation-systems.net/dusrm/m-120.html ]www.designation-systems.net/dusrm/m-120.html [/url]

Observing those "magical" figures ,cited even as acquired data on internet by part the horde of blind, ignorant fanaticals, (try only to remember how much times you have heard them ...) someone could argue that missile engine technology and aerodynamic solutions in USA scientifical community had reached alien-like level 20 years ago considering the unescapable size and weigth constraints within which the AIM-120 series was designed ,exactly how someone could infer that english composite armor technology has reached alien-like level and absurd level in the mass efficiency factor if was capable not only to compensate for a so penelizing internal volume to mass index but even to produce results superior to MBT which can count on an armour's physical LOS significantly gretaer in theirs frontal projection .

Sadly for them ,however, when someone begin to talk seriously of those subject employing serious,professional, sources the Hollywood-like myths immediately shatter and reality quickly realign itself around much less sensational facts, perfectly in line with rational parametrical boundaries of its components.

[url=http://www.strategycenter.net/research/pubID.181/pub_detail.asp ]www.strategycenter.net/research/pubID.181/pub_detail.asp [/url]

Austin you are an Indian citizen, you have seen an USAF colonel "selling" in a very mean way, closed between four walls,to its brothership friends (among squall,laugthers,SU-30MKI equiped with Tumansky engines and Mig-21 Bison equiped with Elta radar ) a creative "version" of the events at Red Flag 2008 completely overturning the results and the stunning achievements which IAF's officials and pilots had brought to home thanks to hard,serious work and very high level professionalism and that them rightly was celebrating in those same instants in open media in India and you have observed this ridiculous, totally imaginative, private speech become ,for over an year and half ,an official debriefing of Red Flag 2008 !! and even cited as a source by majority of brainless fan-boys in search of any type of pretext to take a revenge for the humiliation of Cope India 2004.

Just the behaviour and ,let me say that, the incredible technical ignorance, of this colonel in its speech in front of its team-mates give to you a pale idea of the blind mindset at the basis of the perverse mechanisms i have previously described .

When you see this type of data,ask to yourself :
Are those data rationally compatibles with irreducible parametrical informations at our disposition ?
Are them compatibles with unescapables physical constarints in which them operate ?
Is present any motivation or side interest for which those data should be not coorect....very often even in a self embarassing measure ? (try only to image what would happen if someone would attempt to form an opinion on MiG-35 capabilities on the basis of the comically corrupted figures of its parameters present at pag 77 of "Dogfight!: India’s Medium Multi-Role Combat Aircraft" by Ahley Tellis ... )

Actually I know about the Colonel statement and his mindset and had the IAF had not rebuffed it , it would have been a gospel truth amongst all Western Trade Magazines like Janes and other , if memory serves me right in reality the USAF did not win a single combat against the IAF Su-30MKI and lost all

But coming back to the topic of Longer Slender APFSDS or Shorter Thicker APFSDS , some one would argue why not a longer thicker APFSDS then to take care of ERA + Composite armour.

I think the issue is neither a Longer Slender or a Shorter Thicker or a Longer Thicker APFSDS is a solution to the problem but a right L/D ratio APFSDS against a given Armour/ERA is a solution.

If a longer slender APFSDS penetration is reduced by ERA and a Shorter Thicker APFSDS is defeated by composite armour then its very much possible that Longer Thicker APFSDS might just prove ineffective against both.

I think the Russians are no fools to not have a longer slender APFSDS as a solution to all problem western armour neither are West foolish enough to keep on increasing length in the hope it will penetrate better.

Both parties are limited in their knowledge of Armour composition of the other and same goes for ERA , so they keep developing APFSDS based on what they know will work based on their own research and their experience from older model ERA and composite armour obtained from either parties including APFSDS.

There is some serious gray area where no body known how their APFSDS will react to specific armour unless they face each other in real combat and they will never know.

That leave room for PR from both sides , I for think both sides might be knowing how some things work which they may not be entirely aware how other thinks dont work , O am sure atleast one will be proven more wrong then the other.

But coming back to the topic of Longer Slender APFSDS or Shorter Thicker APFSDS , some one would argue why not a longer thicker APFSDS then to take care of ERA + Composite armour.

For two main reasons :

1) A greater diameter obviously increase the interaction surface between the rod and the armour, with the effect of a greater dispersion of the finite kinetic energy delivered by the penetrator at the instant of the contact and during the tunnelling action over a far wider area.

2) A long rod with an increased diameter ,moreover,would result in a round with a much,much greater mass with the obvious effect in acceleration capability by part of the main gun, average speed and stability problems both during the fire sequence and in fly.

I think the Russians are no fools to not have a longer slender APFSDS as a solution to all problem western armour neither are West foolish enough to keep on increasing length in the hope it will penetrate better.

Western designers are all except fools, them have simply selected the solution more rational.
An APFSDS ,indipendently from presence or absence of ERA, must at the end confront the passive armour of the target; what sense should have design a round including features aiding it at defeat dynamic protectyion of heavy ERA when those same features would renders it uncapable to penetrate the armour of the standard MBT available in its same time frame? (above all taking also into account that ERA don't cover the entire target area of a MBT and almost always work only for one hit in a certain point).

Increasing L/D ratio ,a trend constant in APFSDS's design from well before the introduction of second generation ERA, has allowed western designers to mantain a certain capability and chance to penetrate, at useful operational ranges, frontal passive armour of the main contemporary russian tanks operative in the same span of time, in particular those not covered by ERA tiles or even some weak spots covered by ERA ; any deviation from this conceptual route would have produced a round effectively uncapable to penetrate opponent's MBT frontal protection in any spot.

There is some serious gray area where no body known how their APFSDS will react to specific armour unless they face each other in real combat and they will never know.

I agree perfectly with you on that.

Mindstorm , so let me ask you a follow on question what has then prevented the Russian designer from developing a longer slender APFSDS considering till date none of the Western tank have deployed ERA in significant number ?

Developing a longer slender APFSDS is not a rocket science and what the russian need is just a modified autoloader which they could have developed.

Why has russia chosen to develop a some what shorter APFSDS with thicker sabot and did not join the race for longer and longer APFSDS like US is developing with M829A3 and now underdevelopment A4 ?

Check the US APFSDS round
http://tkfiles.storage.msn.com/x1pi7ndPRYteRu6EPHxcjpJ6w356rm-gITpKKV9fbp3AwNBRuBFNeBjebzkPafpcPHEWK-JcVf0vVxPmVcgfftbJGm6FeF38DRb99PCbrR9JpFvHNVp3F0RaQ

Mindstorm wrote:10) In several tests conducted in front of Indian delegation using latest foreign munitions of the M829A2 type conducted from 250 meters against T-90S devoid of the normal built-in reactive armor the turrett resulted completely impentrable !!

From what i have read on other boards on this issue ,US never exported M829A2 DU rounds but only Tungesten rounds , so what is more likely to have been tested is 120mm KEW-A2 round.

Here are the details of it http://defense-update.com/products/digits/120ke.htm

KEW-A2 (General Dynamics)
The 120mm KEW-A2 cartridge is uses a tungsten penetrator, and is proposed as an alternative for depleted uranium based KE projectiles. KEW-A2 uses 8.6kg of JA-2 propellant, accelerating the 7.6kg projectile to a muzzle velocity of 1,700 m/sec. The projectile uses the tungsten rod, steel fin and sabot fabricated from composite materials. ot, fired at a muzzle velocity of 1,740 m/sec generating chamber pressre of 5,800 bar.

11) Even only tyhr physical thickness of T-90 turrrett armor is in therange of 70-95 cm ,with 45 cm in the firing port area, a Leopard -2A5 show a physical thickness for the same area of 65 cm and 35 cm in the area of gun mantlet

This part of Leo 2A5 too is disputed ,This is what Damian told me about leo 2 armour

link

Some pictures that he had sent me on Leo 2 armour

https://2img.net/r/ihimg/photo/my-images/231/p1190540q.jpg/
https://2img.net/r/ihimizer/img21/5435/p1190535.jpg
https://2img.net/r/ihimizer/img718/3633/p1190532.jpg

Mindstorm wrote:
Increasing L/D ratio ,a trend constant in APFSDS's design from well before the introduction of second generation ERA, has allowed western designers to mantain a certain capability and chance to penetrate, at useful operational ranges, frontal passive armour of the main contemporary russian tanks operative in the same span of time, in particular those not covered by ERA tiles or even some weak spots covered by ERA ; any deviation from this conceptual route would have produced a round effectively uncapable to penetrate opponent's MBT frontal protection in any spot.

Yes that makes sense now.

Is K-6 made with different pinciple compared to K-5 ?

This part of Leo 2A5 too is disputed ,This is what Damian told me about leo 2 armour

DamianThis is obvious lie.

We have messures made on real Leopard 2 tank, front armor on the left side of turret is at least 800mm, armor behind main sight is 650mm + 200mm in front of main sight in Leopard 2A5/A6 tanks, below sight we again have ~800mm

Some pictures that he had sent me on Leo 2 armour

https://2img.net/r/ihimg/photo/my-images/231/p1190540q.jpg/
https://2img.net/r/ihimizer/img21/5435/p1190535.jpg
https://2img.net/r/ihimizer/img718/3633/p1190532.jpg

I am surprised any day more on the capacity to do litterally anything in order to mantain alive beloved metropolitan legends (even when obviously ,totally out of line and devoid of any type of rational and factual foundation), coming even to a selective blindness capable to let the acceptance of twisted or inconsistent proofs while ,contestually ,completely forgetting crushing ones.

I want to start from the pics ,which it declare to have received from "friends of an its friend", ; the first one is obviously NOT a Leopard 2 A4/A5 left side turret armoured section for no other than simple, crushing, self evident geometrical reasons. [see down]

Austin i image that you have already noted,moreover, that, except in the third (which naturally perfectly confirm the Leo-2A4's armour LOS figures and the ratio between that and the other section) ,very strangely no other turrett's visible constructive elements are present for reference.

Do you remember mine first suggestion about the acceptance and reliability of suspect informations ?
"Are those data rationally compatibles with irreducible parametrical informations at our disposition ?"

Well give a look at THIS very illustrative photo of a Leopard-2 A4 turrett in construction without the armour module blocks inserts







You will note ,over the absolute inconsistency of the left turrett armour module (that virtually with more LOS ) with that "thing" in the first image envoyed to you, also that this photo allow to execute precise measurements of the ratio with other Leo-2A4 well know visible structural elements employing established, unescapable parametrical measures .

From that fact result absolutely clear that a measure of 800mm (80 cm) for the left side armour side would be not only totally irreconcilable with LOS of side of turrett but also with the width's figure of the whole MBT (3,75 meters) ,conversely the figure of 65 cm collimate perfectly with the ratio of all the previously mentioned well established dimensional figures.
At this point become even more interesting observe another time the third pic envoied to you; a part for the comical, even clumsy attempt to increase the LOS measuring from ...the centre of the periscope area !!! and... in oblique !!! this image with a visibles structural element render even more clearly evident as also the figure of 60 cm for LOS of this armour section ,taked correctly from the right of the periscope to the base is perfectly sound and in line with the dimensional ratio with any other constructive element of the Leo-2 A4 MBT.






Just for reference that is a comparative draw maked by Harkonnen (alias ....Andrey Tarasenko !) on the real ratio between LOS armour level of the Leopard-2A4 a T-80U and T-72B ; note the difference in overall armoured surface area ,size of turrett's frontal protection and angle at which enemy fire are uncapable to hit the side in T-80U and T-72B and on western like design







Note the perfect consistency of all those elements with what previously asserted on the problem of armoured mass to surface index and on overall mass of a MBT and its internal volume ;those grossly "inflated" LOS for western MBTs (a desperate operation for attempt to mantain alive a childish irrational platitude) would not only collide with structural positioning of other elements and with the same ratio with the well known figures of theirs platform's size, but would bring the weight factor at level even more ridiculous than that already caused by the necessity to protect a MBT's structure horrible plagued by a titanic fraction of internal volume.


To be continued....

Even more intersting is that what presented until now ,a great fraction of which debated in particular in this topic at Tank net, the following


http://208.84.116.223/forums/index.php?showtopic=14592&st=0


started just by the same Andrej Tarasenko to debunk one time for all the ridiculous idiocies commonly circulating on frontal armour level of western "heavy" tanks ,claimed to be more thick than corrispective of Russian-built MBTs (please read it entirely ,in particular read with attention the "interventions" of pfcem and Sebastian Balos and you will realize how those idiocies and comical claims originate and spread even with the use of completely invented data !!).

What is even more interesting is that those elements was so factually and rationally well grounded that ...the same Damian was employing them in a debate just on this same subject !!!


http://www.militaryphotos.net/forums/showthread.php?158677-Tanks-with-urban-survivability-kits./page4

As you see Leo2 isn't best armored tank, in some areas some russian tanks are better armored, in some other western tanks have better protection.

Now should become even more intesting to hear from him where "vanish" the remaining Leo-2A4 s' armoured mass weigth if, its total mass was absolutely comparable with that of M1 Abrams ,for its own admission Leopard-2 turrett was even smaller than that of M1 Abrams ...and ,for some strange reason, i perceive that ,in its intention, that element was named as it was a disadvantage !!!..... and it claim for M1 Abrams not only a greater armour's LOS overall but also "~300mm LOS thick on full side armor lenght"

Mindstorm thank you for taking the effort to respond , I wanted to know your views on the following

1> Why has russian APFSDS turned to be shorter and thicker compared to western APFSDS when Longer Slimer APFSDS are known to penetrate better for composite armour better then shorter thicker APFSDS ? Why dont Russian develop longer slimmer APFSDS any reason for this ?

2> What is Russian Idea for Armata Universal Combat Vehical ? Do they want to streamline logistics by using common chasis or is it something else.

3> What is the development on APFSDS front , why dont Russian use DU round to the extent US uses ?

Mindstorm thank you for taking the effort to respond , I wanted to know your views on the following

1> Why has russian APFSDS turned to be shorter and thicker compared to western APFSDS when Longer Slimer APFSDS are known to penetrate better for composite armour better then shorter thicker APFSDS ? Why dont Russian develop longer slimmer APFSDS any reason for this ?

2> What is Russian Idea for Armata Universal Combat Vehical ? Do they want to streamline logistics by using common chasis or is it something else.

3> What is the development on APFSDS front , why dont Russian use DU round to the extent US uses ?

What said on those subjects by GarryB in its post is ,as always, all correct and rationally well centred ; i can only stress some points.

1) In half of '80 and beginning of '90 years Soviets was sure to enjoy ,in the armoured sector ,in a possible high mobile multi-front offensive in the Great European Plain ,a crushing advantage on NATO not only quantitative but also qualitative ; this element was crucial in slow-down R&D efforts in the field of tank round design and evolution.
This belief was founded on some cardinal elements of Soviet MBT's classical structural design mixed to some "new" developed (for the time) capabilities, signally :

1) Wide stand-off fire capability ,assured by theirs gun launched ATGM capable, moreover, to pose also a very serious danger to CAS aircraft and combat helicopters.
2) Ever improving multilayered passive armour already capable to stop, in the turrett's frontal projection, vast majority of KE and CE round of western MBT of the time , passive armor which combined with the effects of second generation ERA rendered them incredibly resilient to almsot all anti-tanks weapons present in NATO arsenal in those years (as realized by NATO experts of the sectors only after live tests on original Soviet specimens at half of '90 years)
3) The very compact structure ,with slow silhouette ,small internall volume, reduced target area projection and low weight ,over the obvious advantages in terms of : armoured mass to volume index, lower fuel consuption ,shortened logistical footprint,ease of rail and aircraft trasport of the forces, improved off road mobility, faster capability to reach force concentration etc..etc... was capable also to assure a significantly higher percentage of enemy miss-fire in the high mobile engagements that Soviets expected to characterize a conventional conflict in Europe.
4) Could count on the pernicious effects achieved ,both at a tactical and a strategical level, by theirs strctured disinformation campaign aimed both to western military operatives and the the analyst community ; very successful,in the period,at corrupt the same foundations (employing very often empyrical purposely crafted "proofs" to reiforce technical beliefs totally out of line....) of western strategic and tactical models of representation and obviously tactical and startegical solutions and doctrine.
5) Soviet experts was sure that the round operative with armoured forces was more than capable to penetrate NATO's typical MBT of the time

On the last sentence can be interesting red what writed Viktor Murakhovsky on the tests of 3BM42 APFSDS "Mango", in service on Russian tanks since 1986 :

" 125-mm 3VBM17 round with 3BM42 APFSDS projectile «Mango» was put into service in 1986. The advanced power projectile is designed to modern updated armored vehicles with combined armor protection. It has complicated structure, which includes solid ballistic and armor-piercing cap, armor-piercing damper and two penetrators made of high-duty tungsten alloy.
The penetrators are fixed in the hull by a steel body made of low-melting- temperature alloy. When it penetrates, the steel body melts and the penetrators move to the penetrating pipe without consuming energy to leave the hull.The sabot is madeof V-96C1 alloy with advanced characteristics.

When the projectile was tested the projectile engaged a multilayered armor, which simulates the armor of than cutting-edge tanks: seven- layer armor at an angle of 30 and 60 degrees; three-layer armor at an angle of 65 degrees; steel homogenous armor plate. The tests proved that the 3BM42 APFSDS projectile penetrated the armor which is the same as used in the main battle tanks M1, M1A1 «Abrams» etc. "

It continue specifying that the round had a guaranteed piercing performance, at a distance of 2000 m and 0/60 degrees, of 450/230 mm and an average piercing performance at a Distance of 2000 m always at 0 degrees of 500 mm.

From all those elements ,combined witht the "blacks" '90 years, we can deduct that ,at the exact contrary of western scientifical community of the sector ,alarmed by the sudden discovery of the level of resiliency reached by original MBT's specimen with seven layer composite armors (for avoid the enrmous problem represented by the new, second generation,heavy dynamic protections) before SU's collapse in the sector lacked even the technical motivations for engage in an urgent evolutive R&D effort in the APFSDS /HEAT round field.

Thanks Mindstorm , Garry for putting up to my questions and patiently answering them

So 3BM42 APFSDS projectile with a guranteed penetration of 450 mm at 0 degrees and an average of 500 mm was guranteed to penetrate NATO tanks of that time which is quite good.

But since then the APFSDS development has remained static , I have also heard that the 3BM42M APFSDS was never put into production due to bureaucratic reason ?

Coming to back to the next two decade of development , as we can see from the video and even from Chief Designer statement , the T-90MS affords a frontal protection figure of 850 mm for KE and 1200 for CE and is stated to be similar to modern Western but heavier tank.

So we must assume that in future any apfsds should be able to penetrate ~ 900 mm of RHA and 1300 mm of CE for high probability of frontal penetration at 0 degrees.

Since the current best APFSDS we know is 3BM42 ( we really do not know the figure for new 740 mm APFSDS ) and the best CE figure for Reflex missile is 900 mm CE.

It is quite clear that none of the Russian tank based KE and CE would penetrate the frontal armour of modern Western Tank like M1A2SEP or Leo 2A7 ?

is there any significant development work going on in APFSDS and CE sphere in Russia to deal with NATO threats ( i am excluding bigger rounds like kornet and focussing on tank based capability )

Thanks.

Modern real world experience also tells us the greatest threat to armour is not other tanks, it is air power.

I am sorry for say that so harshly ,but that is one of those cheaply selled misconceptions absolutely devoid of any factual foundation at which i always refere ; at the exact opposite, if possible, any pasted operational theater of war has systematically proved, in an irrefutable way, that air forces are totally uncapable to inflict significative losses to ground forces (in particular armoured ones) even in heavenly favourable scenario,taking into account very prolongued time windows, against enemies devoid of any serious/modern AD network and lacking any capability to attack the airfields from which opposing air attacks come from  !!

     
Take, at example, Gulf War:  at the beginning (in plain war) Coalition Air Force Command had declared to have destroyed in the month and half of dedicated operations before G-day (start of ground operations) about 50% of Iraqi ground forces ( 47% of Iraqi armoured forces ).
That figure, already disowned as completely wronged by the same Coalition Forces assessing in first person what was the reality on the ground..., shrinked more and more ,at an unbelievable pace, as the results and version of battle damage assessment studies and data was updated .

At the end of this process we have the verdict of the last CENTCOM data, certifying that less than 10% of the iraqi armoured losses -9,6 %- was inflicted by Air Forces in over a month and half after litterally several hundreds dedicated operations ,while all the remaining losses was inflicted, in less than 3 days, by the Coalation ground forces ; in particular the majority of losses to iraqi armoured divisions was inflicted by Coalition artillery and infantry/IFV TOW missiles ,often against not manned MBTs (both elements well attestd by the same survey of M. Held "Warhead hit distribution on main battle tanks in the Gulf War").

You can read on this subject "Gulf War: The Complete History" by Thomas Houlahan - director of the Military Assessment Program of the William R. Nelson Institute for Public Affairs at James Madison University -,i suggest this book because ,if from a side, it is truly complete and provide a very detailed,integral description of the weapons and tactics employed by Coalition forces in the ground engagements from the eyes of an operative,it represent,contemporaneously, also a perfect example of the high degree of misconceptions and totally false informations which Soviets managed to inject copiously in the minds even of western military insiders, just thanks to the "supporting" factor represented by theirs purposely designed export models),but naturally,by now ,any serious publication report those definitive data.

-Interesting are also the declarations of captured Iraqi ground forces commanders : almost all of them asserted to being full of hopes before the ground offensive assessing that NATO Air Forces was capable to inflict in a month and half very minor losses only to see Coalition artillery,mechanized infantry and MBTs obliterate majority of theirs pieces in a pair of hours (at example the chief of 48th iraqi artillery division,captured by the UK 4th armoured brigade, declared that its division had lost just eleven pieces in all the month and half of Air Force's attacks and....eighty-seven pieces in less than 40 minutes from the artillery attack of US VII Corps !!!

   
Let me spare to you the example ,even more disastrous, of Kosovo War .....also here initial claims by part of Air Forces Command of several hundreds of Serbian MBTs destroyed 500 artillery pieces ,thousands of infantry troops killed, shrinked progressively more and more (mostly for the "annoying" element represented by European war commission and theirs survey's data) up to...14 tanks destroyed , 18 APC and 23 artillery pieces ! ! !  ; and naturally also the last conflict in Lybia is a clear proof od what said up to this point.

Is important to stress that ,over the absence of any type of serious AD (an element already capable to overturn completely the equilibrium in similar conflicts), none of those opponents owned any military mean capable to attack air bases used by enemy Air Forces in the theater of operation , in presence of this class of weapons (the proliferation of which is normally strictly controlled by international arms control treaties and usually present only in the arsenals of major world powers) even only attempt prepare an air campaign become absolutely impossible if not a true suicide act.  

Air Forces in the last 20 years became more and more popular ,against the typical immensely inferior enemy ,simply because it is a military mean ,in spite to be immensely expensive and time-inefficient, allowing to mantain friendly losses very low ,often even to zero ( with the obvious implications in terms of inpact on internal public opinion and media) ,allowing a fast response to international emergences and to limit the civil losses through the employment of PGM and don't force to invade another country (an important factor in mantaining international community support to the military operation ) ; Ground Forces in a tiny fraction of the time required to aircraft to take off from its airbase , deliver theirs ordances and return at the airfield, can deliver litterally ,in the same area, dozen of thousands times the destruction power delivered by Air Forces.
Simply them are less suited for minor local conflicts characterizing the actual international political scenario.

GarryB wrote:Sad really, but the truth is that a single Su-25 armed with 8 x 500kg cluster bombs with top attack bomblets is likely a much greater threat to enemy armour than a single T-90, yet in many ways the hidden truth is that an Su-25 and a T-90 are much more capable together, because an Su-25 can't hold the ground it clears the enemy from.

Depends on the quality of AD network the single Su-25 faces , it wouldnt take more than couple of Igla-S to beat the brat if they come in low and fast to beat the armour and if Igla-S forces them not to fly low then the ability to attack ground elements like armour degrades , now mulitply that more capable AD like Tunguska or Tor or others.

Persident-S or any thing like that is not a fool proof system and there are laser guided and radar guided missiles too.

Like I said it depends on the kind of AD network with the accompained by armour one faces will determine how effective air power is , ultimately if they want to do serious damage they will have to fly low and slow be it aircraft or even chopper and they could fall prey to a robust AD

You don't climb out of a perfectly good vehicle and run when tanks are coming... you turn the vehicle around and drive away at top speed.

The only reason you would park your vehicle neatly at the side of the road and leg it is if the threat was air power.

In the 2008 South Ossetia war , Georgia forces beginned the famous quick retreat (or we should say ,more correctly, the route), with abandoned APC, MBT and supply vehicles, after the russian counteroffensive in response to the third attempt by part of Georgian forces to enter in Tskhinvali ;that counteroffensive was conducted mostly with very dense artillery barrage , MLRS flank saturating attack, and a "two-heads" IFV/MBT and infantry conducted counteroffensive; the result of that is in the words of one of the Georgian officials involved in the last fatal offensive :

"I had never even only envisioned something similar.... it was something like the hell".

To obtain what russian forces have achieved in 5 days, employing very limited number of forces ,at very low costs and ,even more important, avoiding to employ any strategically crucial or up-to-date weaponry or command and control systems , an approach completely centred around Air Forces (in opposition to Air force as nothing more than one of the components of the multi-branch operation) would have required some months and dozen of times the costs - without taking into account the surrending of important data on modern up-to date weapon systems , a thing that Russians ,for theirs tradition, attempt to avoid like the death - .

In Gulf War vast majority of iraqi vehicles was abandoned in the 72 hours of ground offensive and not in the month and half of NATO air attacks -when ,at maximum, them was leaved ummanned for some time,witht eh crew going for some time under anti-bomb shelters, waiting the end of the attack to collect damaged equipment to be repaired-.

I repeat for the umpteenth time , a squadron of aircraft in an offensive mission based on an airfield at 600 km from the area of operation, in order to complete its task, must : mount the weapons for the mission ,much more costly than theirs ground counterparts greatly limited by the obvious volumetric and weigth constraints imposed by the same platform, refuel , and all of us know perfectly what enormous quantity of fuel is required by a vehicle that need to costantly fight force of gravity and manoeuvre for hundreds of kilometers ,cover the space up to its targets ,station for some time in the place and return to its base ,with its clear implications in term of the time window involved.
Now in the same time required to this squadron to conduct a single mission an artillery brigade can deliver 70-80 times the destructive power delivered by the aricraft squadronand at a tiny fraction of the costs .
For provide only an idea : a single salvo (38 seconds) from a single BM-30 Smerch with cluster warhead missile can cover 672000 m2 (a square of about 820 meters of side !!! ) a typical brigade of Smerch include 18 launchers and ,in the last version of launcher/recharger vehicles, can shoot a salvo each 18 minutes ...clear the concept ?

Yes, that's very wise. And you wouldn't risk to loose a multimilion machine either. Although aircraft can be surgical and very precise.
In fact in kosovo bomb war, NATO plans couldn't come down low to hit tanks and troops because of the heavy aa defences. I wouldn't make tanks be able to defend itself, but a helicopter aa is enough. So you should have dedicated aa viehcles
In case of low aa defence, airpower is murdering and devastating.

"Yes, that's very wise. And you wouldn't risk to loose a multimilion machine either. Although aircraft can be surgical and very precise.
In fact in kosovo bomb war, NATO plans couldn't come down low to hit tanks and troops because of the heavy aa defences. I wouldn't make tanks be able to defend itself, but a helicopter aa is enough. So you should have dedicated aa veihcles
In case of low aa defence, airpower is murdering and devastating."

Yes, but that don't finish here , a single attack to the airfield where yuor aircraft are forced to reside ,an easy, fixed target full of very soft-skin vehicles and against which is possible to concetrate any quantity of stand -off weapons (such as cruise/ballistic missiles) and your air centric structure collapse in few minutes litterally !!
Is just for this reason that this type of offensive means,capable to quickly change the balace of power in a region and completely rule out some military offensive options, are strictly controlled by international treaties banning the export and the uncontrolled spreading of those long range weaponry ; in presence of them ,in fact ,not merely conduct, but even only prepare an air campaign become a true "mission impossible".

Ground forces ,obviously, are not vulnerable to this type of "beheading" attacks , but are contemporaneously also more difficult to deploy in distant theatres of operation and generate great problems of compliance with international laws and conventions.