Stilleto was considered one of their best missiles are you trying to say it was useless?
That is why I am suggesting your information is bollocks... or if you prefer... bullshit.
I actually don't know, just reporting what I have read. If I had read it from just from one source, wouldn't have thought twice about it but now am suspicious. I do agree that it doesn't make a lot of sense to have a system that cannot be put into use in a very short time.
GarryB wrote:I actually don't know, just reporting what I have read. If I had read it from just from one source, wouldn't have thought twice about it but now am suspicious. I do agree that it doesn't make a lot of sense to have a system that cannot be put into use in a very short time.
Multiple sources are not better if they are just copying and pasting the same crap... I have read from multiple sources that Russian tank mounted main gun autoloading systems removed arms on a regular basis, yet I am still waiting to see the parades of one armed Russian tankers.
Sadly to stupid to think for yourself and too lazy to check facts do not seem to be barriers to being a source of information in the west.
GarryB wrote:Very simply an SLBM attack on Soviet ICBM fields would have given them approximately 5 minutes to launch... which includes time to actually make the decision to launch a full retaliation strike, or in the case of an error to do nothing... there would be no time to mount warheads or pump fuel into missiles...
Stilleto was considered one of their best missiles are you trying to say it was useless?
That is why I am suggesting your information is bollocks... or if you prefer... bullshit.
Our research relied on openly available information about a series of orders issued in 2009 by the
Chief of General Staff of the Russian Armed Forces. These orders assigned distinct insignias to a
number of military units that have been otherwise identified as being part of the 12th Main
Directorate. Additional research of various open sources, such as social media accounts, online fora,
and collaborative mapping platforms, corroborated this information and allowed to identify the links
between units and the organizational structure shown in Figure A1. Publicly available commercial
satellite imagery helped identify the locations of potential storage sites exhibiting the distinct physical
features described in this appendix.
miketheterrible wrote:And what is the credibility of that? Russia wouldn't place its storage units right at the borders of Russia. Something is seriously wrong here. Pavel Podvig is evident that this may be garbage.
Most of its data is 2012 too it seems.
Our research relied on openly available information about a series of orders issued in 2009 by the
Chief of General Staff of the Russian Armed Forces. These orders assigned distinct insignias to a
number of military units that have been otherwise identified as being part of the 12th Main
Directorate. Additional research of various open sources, such as social media accounts, online fora,
and collaborative mapping platforms, corroborated this information and allowed to identify the links
between units and the organizational structure shown in Figure A1. Publicly available commercial
satellite imagery helped identify the locations of potential storage sites exhibiting the distinct physical
features described in this appendix.
franco wrote:miketheterrible wrote:And what is the credibility of that? Russia wouldn't place its storage units right at the borders of Russia. Something is seriously wrong here. Pavel Podvig is evident that this may be garbage.
Most of its data is 2012 too it seems.
Our research relied on openly available information about a series of orders issued in 2009 by the
Chief of General Staff of the Russian Armed Forces. These orders assigned distinct insignias to a
number of military units that have been otherwise identified as being part of the 12th Main
Directorate. Additional research of various open sources, such as social media accounts, online fora,
and collaborative mapping platforms, corroborated this information and allowed to identify the links
between units and the organizational structure shown in Figure A1. Publicly available commercial
satellite imagery helped identify the locations of potential storage sites exhibiting the distinct physical
features described in this appendix.
Not sure about the site on the Ukrainian border. These sites were all active, in fact I have a list of 14 sites. I have been watching that site to see if it closes down and nothing yet. If you remember when the West was screaming back in 2014 about all the Russian soldiers on the border ready to invade Ukraine. Some Western reporters traveled the length of the border looking for Russian soldiers within a 100 km's of the border. The only forward deployed Russian soldiers on the border they found was the 3 paratrooper bn's the Russian had inserted between the Ukrainian border and this storage facility less then 30 km away. And this article like everything else we post here has some element's of fact coupled with some not so correctional. I place the highest level on what comes out of the General Staff but even those have to be viewed with some doubt IMO. I have a rule in that I don't say anything unless I feel it is at least 90% correct and I never claim to be 100%.
franco wrote:Agreed and there was another facility in Pskov region that was within 30 km's of Belarus and Latvia. It was closed down. Surprised that this one has not been. Could be weapon empty (one should hope) and left officially open to mess with the Ukrainians.
franco wrote:
New START data exchange shows the United States and Russia are on track to meet the limits
The U.S. State Department released aggregate New START numbers from the 1 September 2017 data exchange. Russia declared 1561 deployed warheads, 501 deployed launchers, and 790 total launchers. In March 2017 the numbers were 1765, 523, and 816 respectively.
The U.S. numbers in September 2017 were 1393 warheads, 660 deployed and 800 total launchers (1411, 673, and 820 in March 2017).
There has been a lot of speculation that Russia might not be able (or is not going) to comply with the New START limits by the February 2018 deadline. It was never clear what what was behind these speculations, since Russia always had plenty of options to choose from - from withdrawing old R-36M2 and UR-100NUTTH missiles from service to decommissioning even older Project 667BDR submarines. Figuring out what exactly has been done may take some time, though.
eehnie wrote:franco wrote:
New START data exchange shows the United States and Russia are on track to meet the limits
The U.S. State Department released aggregate New START numbers from the 1 September 2017 data exchange. Russia declared 1561 deployed warheads, 501 deployed launchers, and 790 total launchers. In March 2017 the numbers were 1765, 523, and 816 respectively.
The U.S. numbers in September 2017 were 1393 warheads, 660 deployed and 800 total launchers (1411, 673, and 820 in March 2017).
There has been a lot of speculation that Russia might not be able (or is not going) to comply with the New START limits by the February 2018 deadline. It was never clear what what was behind these speculations, since Russia always had plenty of options to choose from - from withdrawing old R-36M2 and UR-100NUTTH missiles from service to decommissioning even older Project 667BDR submarines. Figuring out what exactly has been done may take some time, though.
Between the 289 not deployed Russian launchers I assume it would be safe enough to say:
12 Tu-95 in the reserve
32-48 of 2-3 submarines in the reserve (recently one returned to active service)
210 SS-25 likely in the reserve
some SS-18 silos
franco wrote:eehnie wrote:franco wrote:
New START data exchange shows the United States and Russia are on track to meet the limits
The U.S. State Department released aggregate New START numbers from the 1 September 2017 data exchange. Russia declared 1561 deployed warheads, 501 deployed launchers, and 790 total launchers. In March 2017 the numbers were 1765, 523, and 816 respectively.
The U.S. numbers in September 2017 were 1393 warheads, 660 deployed and 800 total launchers (1411, 673, and 820 in March 2017).
There has been a lot of speculation that Russia might not be able (or is not going) to comply with the New START limits by the February 2018 deadline. It was never clear what what was behind these speculations, since Russia always had plenty of options to choose from - from withdrawing old R-36M2 and UR-100NUTTH missiles from service to decommissioning even older Project 667BDR submarines. Figuring out what exactly has been done may take some time, though.
Between the 289 not deployed Russian launchers I assume it would be safe enough to say:
12 Tu-95 in the reserve
32-48 of 2-3 submarines in the reserve (recently one returned to active service)
210 SS-25 likely in the reserve
some SS-18 silos
Some SS-19 also, still seems a lot.
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