Russian Nuclear Triad: Status and Warheads

kvs wrote:

Hole wrote:Trident II weighs 59 tons. Bulava 37 tons.

US solid rocket fuel tech used in the Trident II has not improved since it was first deployed (1990).  Russian solid rocket fuel has
advanced at least a factor of two in energy density for the same mass of fuel.  That easily explains the difference since
the US solid rocket fuel was better than what as available to the USSR during the 1980s.

That's true! Trident II is a good piece of technology, but it was not really improved since the 90'ies.

The USA lacks in hypersonic and missile technology, because since 9/11 USA focused at "war on terror". Focus was SOF, very high mobile units, good SIGINT and HUMINT.

GarryB " patience is a virtue"

At least in the internet you are by far the most patient person I ever saw.
It's funny that the troll don't compare air defense systems, or what those bombers will launch.

New START data as of 1 March 2020

The U.S. State Department released aggregate New START numbers from the 1 March 2020 data exchange. Russia declared 1326 deployed warheads, 485 deployed launchers, and 754 total launchers. In September 2019 the numbers were 1426, 513, and 757 respectively.

The drop in the number of deployed warheads is quite notable (although not unprecedented), but all it would take is standing down one R-36M2 regiment. Given the change in the number of deployed launcher, it appears that quite a few Topol ICBMs have been withdrawn from service as well.

The U.S. numbers in March 2020 were 1373 warheads, 655 deployed and 800 total launchers (1376, 668, and 800 in September 2019).

Speaking of New START, a few days earlier Russia and the United States agreed to postpone their inspections and the BCC session because of the COVID-19 crisis. They did manage to conduct 2 inspections each since February 5, 2020 (out of the annual quota of 18).

https://carnegie.ru/commentary/81983

Decoding Russia’s Official Nuclear Deterrence Paper

The demise of strategic arms control with the ever more likely expiration of the New START Treaty next February leaves nuclear deterrence as the only guarantee of national security for the nuclear weapons states. Responding to this situation, the Kremlin has come up with a policy paper called Nuclear Deterrence Policy Guidelines (NDPG) spelling out the principles of Moscow’s deterrence strategy. Roughly equivalent to the Nuclear Posture Review (NPR) in the United States, such a document had previously remained unpublished, as an annex to the country’s Military Doctrine. Making it public now sends several important messages not to be ignored.

One is to respond to Western interpretations of the Russian strategy as providing for “escalation for de-escalation,” i.e., first use of nuclear weapons to avert defeat in a conventional conflict. The Kremlin paper says up front that “in the event of a military conflict, nuclear deterrence should prevent the escalation of hostilities and allow their termination on conditions acceptable to Russia and its allies.” This seems to corroborate the common Western view that, should Russian forces face the prospect of being defeated in a collision with NATO, they would use tactical nuclear weapons.

However, this provision in the newly published document is contained in the paragraph referring to the general strategy of deterrence, rather than in the section which sets out specific conditions for the use of nuclear weapons. It can be inferred from this that, in order to stop the fighting, Russia relies on the power of nuclear deterrence—its relevant capabilities and readiness—rather than on the actual use of nuclear weapons. This has allowed retired General Viktor Esin, former chief of staff of the Strategic Rocket Forces, to claim that the Kremlin paper debunks Western interpretations as false. Indeed, the notion of a limited nuclear war has always been alien to Russian strategic thinking: unlike for the United States, any such “limited” war would be fought in, or close to, Russia’s territory.

Few people in NATO would probably agree. They may point to the language in the document that repeats the Russian Military Doctrine’s statement that Moscow would use nuclear weapons in response to a conventional aggression if the very existence of the state was in danger. Questions will remain, but at least Russia has officially responded to the “escalate to de-escalate” theory.

Another message is directed at U.S. NATO allies. The Russian deterrence policy paper makes it clear that deployment of ballistic missile defenses, INF missile systems—whether nuclear-tipped or conventional—and other advanced weapons in the territory of non-nuclear weapons states in the vicinity of Russian borders would make them targets of Russian nuclear deterrence. Recent developments in NATO, such as the development of small-yield nuclear weapons, or suggestions of moving U.S. tactical nuclear weapons even closer to Russian borders, have caught Moscow’s attention. In particular, deployment of new-generation U.S. INF systems to Europe, irrespective of the nature of their warheads, would be seen as a highly dangerous development.

Should this happen, Russian strategic command centers would be at risk of a decapitating strike. In that case, Russia’s nuclear posture would probably have to change, making it more aggressive. We are not there yet. The Kremlin’s NDPG names launch on warning as the basic response to nuclear attack. The way this is formulated in the paper can be read that the president may give the launch order once he is satisfied that the signal of an adversary’s missile attack received from the early warning system is authentic. Many Russian experts consider such a posture too risky, in view of potential malfunctioning of the warning system, which happened more than once during the Cold War. They consider a retaliatory strike that is launched after enemy warheads have actually exploded in one’s territory as both safer—in terms of preventing a possible mistake—and still capable of annihilating the enemy country. However, the development of U.S. missile defenses and the possibility of the deployment of weapons systems in space makes Russian nuclear strategists stick to launch on warning: the posture that Moscow has maintained from the Cold War period.

Finally, the Kremlin policy guidelines provide for the deployment of nuclear weapons in response to an attack against the critical national infrastructure that is responsible for controlling and employing nuclear weapons. This new provision may refer, for example, to cyberattacks that can disable Russian strategic command and control systems.

The publication of the Russian Nuclear Deterrence Policy Guidelines is a welcome step in the sense of producing more clarity on the issue. However, the timing of the publication suggests that the Kremlin takes a world without arms control seriously and is preparing for it. While there is a nod in the text to international treaties and commitments, there is also a general understanding that soon there will be none left. “Potential enemies” are not named in the guidelines, but the reference to “countries that regard Russia as a potential enemy” is crystal clear on that score.

In a world where major powers are unconstrained by mutual obligations regarding their most powerful arms, proper communication is key to avoid fateful mistakes. New arrangements including all relevant players and embracing all kinds of strategic weapons will take many years to negotiate. Never in the last half-century have Moscow and Washington lived under such conditions, and they have to not only build guardrails around their confrontation, but also allow a measure of mutual transparency. Discussion of military issues among professionals with the purpose of understanding the other side better is absolutely necessary. The U.S. NPR and now Russia’s NDPG present rich material for such dialogue. Adversaries should not be allowed to become enemies by mistake.

Arrow wrote:blah blah blah

ROFL!! Still working hard to prove you're a friggin idiot? Oh well, I guess that consistency can be a virtue!

I don't know if this was posted already, a very good interview to Vladimir Evseev about Topol, Barguzin and balance of strategic forces in general:

https://ria.ru/20200723/1574725606.html

LMFS wrote:I don't know if this was posted already, a very good interview to Vladimir Evseev about Topol, Barguzin and balance of strategic forces in general:

https://ria.ru/20200723/1574725606.html

Vladimir Evseev: PGRK Topol held back the United States when Russia was weak

Exactly 35 years ago, on July 23, 1985, the Topol mobile soil complex (PGRK) with the RT-2PM intercontinental ballistic missile first took up combat duty near Yoshkar-Ola. The technological know-how put into it by Soviet scientists has made it possible to create a whole family of mobile systems - the most modern of them, the RS-24 Yars, is now actively entering service with the Russian Strategic Missile Forces (Strategic Missile Forces).
An expert in the field of strategic weapons, candidate of technical sciences Vladimir Evseev , who served in the Yoshkar-Ola division of the Strategic Missile Forces (1986-1991) and worked at the head institute of the missile forces - the 4th Central Research Institute of the Ministry of Defense of the Russian Federation, told in an interview with RIA Novosti correspondent Ivan Suraev about the role of Topol. in the strategic containment of the United States in one of the most difficult periods in the history of Russia, the capabilities of the new generation PGRK and the prospects of the Barguzin railway missile complex project.

- Vladimir Valerievich, what were the prerequisites for the creation of "Topol", what tasks was this complex supposed to solve?

- Let's start with the fact that the structure of the strategic nuclear forces (SNF) of the Soviet Union and the United States was fundamentally different. The States have always relied on the first disarming strike, for which they intended to use submarine ballistic missiles (SLBMs), and later added non-nuclear precision weapons to this. The USSR, and then Russia, could not afford to have a similar number of strategic missile submarine cruisers (RPK SN).
Moreover, today the combat potential of American Ohio-class SSBNs is greater than that of the Russian Borei SNBMs, if we take the number of SLBMs on board (24 Trident-2 missiles versus 16 Bulava missiles). If you look at our warhead (BB) and the American warhead, then with the same nuclear explosion power, the American one is more compact.

Then we staked on a counter-counter strike, and if we talk about today, then on a deep counter strike. The latter presupposes a retaliatory strike after the defeat of the main number of silo launchers (silos), airfields of permanent base of strategic aviation and the locations of the PKK SN by American strategic nuclear forces and precision weapons. For its implementation, mobile carriers were needed - mobile-soil missile systems (PGRK) or combat railway missile systems (BZHRK).

- Who is the author of the idea to place a strategic missile on a mobile chassis?
- This is the great merit of our designer Alexander Davidovich Nadiradze. Thanks to him, we were gradually able to develop a solid-propellant missile potential comparable to that of the United States. Back in 1957, his project to create a mobile ICBM won the competition of the USSR Ministry of Defense.
It was him and the team that he headed even before the establishment of the head developer of our strategic and tactical ballistic missiles - the Moscow Institute of Thermal Engineering (MIT) - that I would call the authors of this concept.

- What is the uniqueness of these complexes, what was the fundamental difference from its predecessor PGRK "Temp-2S"?
- The biggest drawback of "Temp" was its low shooting accuracy. With a circular probable deviation (CEP) equal to one kilometer for Temp-2S missiles, it was possible to provide a retaliatory strike against cities and large military bases, but the defeat of well-fortified underground command posts was almost impossible.
The Topol had much less KVO - about 300 meters, maybe even 250. Thanks to the increased firing accuracy, the scientists managed to reduce the power of the rocket's nuclear charge, which is a big step forward. If earlier, to solve a combat mission, two or three warheads were required, now no more than one or two. This is very important in the context of strategic offensive arms reduction (START).
At the same time, the payload increased - 1.2 tons for the "Topol" versus 940 kilograms for the "Temp", which allowed us to place on the missile a complex of means of overcoming antimissile defense (KSP ABM). We are talking, for example, about various kinds of false targets, dipole reflectors, as well as active interference stations.
American strategic missile defense systems, located in Alaska and California, intercept BB missiles outside the atmosphere - the cover of the Topol is very well provided there; it is extremely difficult to intercept a warhead against the background of false targets. This degree of cover compensated for the problem that the Topol warhead, unlike the American Minuteman III ICBM, is a monoblock, and not a MIRV (MIRV).

- The sighting system for "Topol" was produced by the Kiev Central Design Bureau "Arsenal", it was replaced by a Russian analogue during the upgrade to the level of "Topol-M": how difficult was it to replace this system, what are the advantages of the Russian sight?
- According to available data, thanks to the installation of the Russian system, the KVO indicator at Topol-M was reduced to 150 meters, and most importantly, we ceased to depend on Ukrainian suppliers for this sensitive nomenclature, as recent history has shown, this was critically important.
Considering the common Soviet past, when the enterprises of our countries were integral parts of a single military-industrial complex, the replacement of any Ukrainian components is an extremely difficult issue.
Here I cannot fail to note the role of MIT General Designer Yuri Semenovich Solomonov, whose lobbying potential helped to establish cooperation between Russian defense enterprises and reach the state in times of troubles when our defense industry was barely surviving.
If it were not for him, then I have little idea how we would have been able to keep the cooperation inherited from the USSR of almost 500 defense enterprises, which ended up in various forms of ownership with often unprofitable production. It was especially difficult for enterprises specializing in the production of strategic missile weapons, the export of which is prohibited by law, and the domestic order was extremely limited.

- Today the number of Topol PGRK is decreasing, it is being replaced by RS-24 Yars complexes: do the remaining Topol have a future in the structure of the Strategic Missile Forces? Does it make sense, in your opinion, to extend its service life?
- Despite the fact that we have only about 36 such missile systems (RK) in service, they still have a combat potential. To extend the service life, missiles are fired from the existing ammunition load, which reduces the stock of existing missiles.
At the same time, it seems to me that Topol has already reached its limit, after all, 35 years in service is a significant period, there is a factor of moral and technical obsolescence.
Nevertheless, he did his job: in the conditions of the most difficult economic situation, the collapse of industrial cooperation, including with Ukraine, and a certain political dependence on Washington, in which the Russian Federation found itself in the 90s, it was "Topol" that provided the possibility of a guaranteed response missile strike.
Of course, at that time the United States tried to push us through - there were some agreements on the non-deployment of the Topol missile by staying in places of permanent deployment and so on, but the fact remains that Topol was a significant factor in the strategic containment of the United States. Secondly, the appearance of the Topol served as the basis for the creation of a line of strategic missiles of this class.

The head of the FSMTC of Russia Dmitry Shugaev estimated the portfolio of defense orders with Turkey at $ 1 billion. Boris Rozhin, an expert at the Center for Military-Political Journalism, on the air of Sputnik radio, listed the types of Russian weapons that are in greatest demand in the world.
In addition, this complex has become a serious factor in countering the US missile defense: liquid-propellant and solid-propellant missiles have active sections of different duration. For liquid-propellant rockets, it is at least five minutes, while for solid-propellant rockets it is already three minutes. The reduced active phase of the missile made it extremely difficult to intercept it, since it is easiest to shoot it down on the active phase of the flight, until the BB separated.
The very factor of uncertainty about the location of missile systems is extremely unnerving for the Americans. No matter how they declare their superiority, they are well aware that McNamara's criteria (Robert Strange McNamara, US Secretary of Defense 1961-1968 - Ed.), According to which irreparable damage to the enemy is the destruction of 60% of the economic potential and half population of the country, are no longer applicable to the present. Today, the destruction of one major city like Los Angeles would be such a shock for the country that it would be almost impossible to survive.
This means that now, for a retaliatory strike, it is no longer required to deliver thousands of charges to the territory of the United States, several dozen high-powered weapons will be enough. According to American experts themselves, the US missile defense system will be able to intercept a single launch, in the future - a group launch (up to one regiment), but now it is impossible to repulse a massive strike.

- It is known that a launch vehicle was created on the basis of Topol, which launches commercial satellites into orbit: how successful was the experience of such a conversion, is there a potential for using new Russian long-range missiles for peaceful purposes?
- When a missile system is removed from service due to falling under international treaties or the development of a service life, it must be disposed of. Disposal of solid-fuel missiles is a very difficult and costly process, so it would be advisable to dispose of some of the missiles by launching them.
As a rule, Topol and Yars rockets can be easily adapted to launch low-orbit satellites to an altitude of up to a thousand kilometers. I believe that such an application is a good idea, since it solves several problems at once, these launches could be carried out from Plesetsk and Vostochny.

- Initially, it was assumed that, in addition to the wheeled chassis, the Topol would be placed on a railway platform, then this idea was revised in favor of another project - the Molodets railway missile system, but it has also been removed from service today. Do you think the Russian Strategic Missile Forces need a new BZHRK, will the Barguzin project be resumed?
- I believe that the deployment of the Barguzin would be the most effective response to the strategic threat posed by the growth of NATO military bases near the Russian borders.

- Why, in this case, this project was paused?
- I believe that the Russian leadership was counting on the extension of the Prague (2010) START Treaty (START-3. - Ed.), But now such a prospect is becoming less and less likely. Another reason for the project being frozen is the financial issue. In terms of its characteristics, the Barguzin significantly surpasses the Molodets - it had a too heavy rocket that did not fit into a regular carriage, which was a serious unmasking factor. In addition, the launch of such a rocket caused a serious deformation of the railway track - it was necessary to make special ramps with reinforced coatings, otherwise the rails went underground by 1.5 meters, the car could simply tip over.
All this greatly reduced the effectiveness of the old BZHRK, the main advantage of which was to be stealth. It was relatively easy to figure out where the Molodets took off from the fortified sections of the railroad tracks.

Barguzin, on the other hand, thanks to a lightweight rocket that is included in a regular carriage, can launch on any section of the railway. If it is necessary to retaliate, this complex will be more effective than the Topol and Yars type PGRKs, because in order to launch them, they will have to go into the field area and deploy there, becoming vulnerable to the enemy for some time. The positional area of ​​their deployment is also relatively limited. Barguzin has practically no unmasking signs.
The new BZHRK is the trump card that we can use in case of aggravation of the situation, and the Americans are well aware of this.

- How long will it take to put it into operation?
- In my estimation, it will take about 3-5 years to create a prototype rocket, flight tests and development of various systems, for a rocket complex this is a very short time.

- The US leadership announces the creation of missiles with a speed of Mach 17. Does this mean that the Russian Yars and Topol missiles are becoming obsolete and it will be easy to shoot them down with new interceptor missiles?
- The United States is in the position of catching up on this issue. Their development is still at the testing stage, while we are in service with production samples and have even created an ICBM that allows you to fire a hypersonic aircraft at a speed of 27 mach. We are talking about the Avangard missile system, which the Americans do not even plan to create analogues - they simply do not have such a scientific and technical reserve in this area.
Indeed, an airborne hypersonic complex is being created in the United States today. I very much doubt that the rocket speed of Mach 17 declared by President Donald Trump is true. Most likely, we are talking about 10 swings, like our "Dagger". The American potential makes it possible to create such a weapon, but it will take a lot of time - we are talking about three years, we will not sit idly by at this time either.

The statements of the American leadership in this case are designed for an internal audience, which they want to calm down by sending a signal: everything is in order, we have hypersound. Good, but even the DPRK has hypersonic weapons!
As for the American missile defense system, I have studied this issue in sufficient detail and I can say that its effectiveness is also greatly exaggerated. This is confirmed by Japan's recent refusal to deploy Aegis Ashore systems. According to some reports, the Japanese argued their decision by the fact that during the shooting of these interceptor missiles, their units fell into the country.
It would not be a strong exaggeration to say that the main function of the American missile defense system is to counter information and create a favorable image of the President of the United States of America. It is difficult for her to intercept the Topol missile equipped with a concealment complex; this is not a training ground, where the calculations know the launch site, trajectory and characteristics of the target in advance.
It was possible to increase its effectiveness by deploying an anti-missile defense space echelon, but for this it is necessary to deploy a very large constellation of low-orbit satellites, which even Washington cannot afford to maintain.

- What system will replace the outgoing Topols and the Yars being deployed today? What will be the focus in creating a new generation of ICBMs?
- I believe that we should continue to rely on a guaranteed retaliatory strike, not even a retaliatory strike. Here we must understand that the time for a US strike against Russia with ballistic missiles with SSBNs is 10-12 minutes - under current conditions we simply will not have time to deliver a retaliatory strike, we need to prepare for a deep retaliatory strike. For this we need missile systems, whose deployment is unknown, which is extremely problematic, given the growing capabilities of American satellite reconnaissance.
So far, we do not know whether the Prague START Treaty will definitely terminate, besides, it is possible that this document may be terminated if the obligations are actually preserved. If the parties really stop fulfilling any obligations, we will need to create a new PGRK.
It should be a multiple warhead complex like the Yars, possibly with even more warheads. At the same time, the designers will be faced with the task of increasing the accuracy of shooting and payload while maintaining the existing mass and dimensional characteristics of the complex, while 1, 2 tons remain the limit for us. It would also be necessary to increase the firing range from 12,000 kilometers, like the Yars, to 16,000.
The entire cycle of creating a missile complex would take about 10 years, which would be required to develop it, create samples, build the appropriate infrastructure and establish production.

A new piece in Krasnaya Zvezda about the Russian nuclear doctrine and the increasing risks of a confrontation with US:

http://redstar.ru/ob-osnovah-gosudarstvennoj-politiki-rossijskoj-federatsii-v-oblasti-yadernogo-sderzhivaniya

New START data as of 1 September 2020

The U.S. State Department released aggregate New START numbers from the 1 September 2020 data exchange. Russia declared 1447 deployed warheads, 510 deployed launchers, and 764 total launchers. In March 2020 the numbers were 1326, 485, and 754 respectively.

The U.S. numbers in September 2020 were 1457 warheads, 675 deployed and 800 total launchers (1373, 655, and 800 in March 2020).

If the treaty is not extended, this will be the last regular data exchange between the parties. And it appears that inspections and BCC sessions, suspended be the COVID-19 pandemic in April 2020, have not resumed yet.

Absolute protection: what capabilities will the new command post of Russia's strategic nuclear forces have

A new command post for strategic nuclear weapons is almost ready in Russia. This was stated by Russian President Vladimir Putin at a meeting with the leadership of the Ministry of Defense and defense industry enterprises. According to him, the safety margin of the item is planned to be "extremely high".

Anyone knows where this is located?

"The first after the extension of START-3": Russia and the United States exchanged data on nuclear arsenals

After the extension of the Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START-3), the first exchange of data on the nuclear arsenals of the two countries took place between Russia and the United States. This is stated in the message of the American State Department.

Russia and the United States have updated data on strategic forces. The last exchange of information between Moscow and Washington took place last year and reflected data on the number of strategic delivery vehicles and nuclear warheads as of September 1, 2020.

According to new data, Russia has increased the number of nuclear warheads and their carriers, while the United States, on the contrary, has reduced it. As follows from the report, during the reporting period, Russia increased the number of nuclear warheads by nine, bringing their total number to 1,456 (in September last year it was 1,447).

The United States has reduced the number of nuclear warheads by 100, bringing their number to 1,357; in September 2020, the report indicated 1,457 warheads.

During the same period, Russia put into operation three carriers of nuclear weapons , indicating the number of deployed intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs), submarine ballistic missiles (SLBMs) ​​and heavy bombers - 517, as of September last year there were 510. The

United States showed a reduction in nuclear weapons carriers by 24 units, indicating 651 carriers (September 2020 - 675).

In addition, Russia increased the number of deployed and non-deployed launchers by three, indicating their number equal to 767. In turn, the United States noted that their number of launchers has not changed compared to the previous reporting period and remained the same - 800 pieces.

According to the START-3 treaty, Russia and the United States must provide new data on nuclear arsenals every six months.

Spending on nuclear weapons increased despite pandemic. China second largest spender after the U.S

https://d3n8a8pro7vhmx.cloudfront.net/ican/pages/2161/attachments/original/1622825593/Spending_Report_Web.pdf?1622825593

Maybe China's nuclear arsenal is far more than the publicly stated 350 warheads.

Austin wrote:
American ABM systems are not only creating an “illusion” of safety from a retaliatory strike but can themselves be used to launch a sneak nuclear attack on Russia.[/b]

Will anyone please explain what exactly they are saying here? How can U.S ABM systems be used to launch a nuclear attack against Russia?

Because the systems in Poland and Romania use the same silos as the Burke class ships = can launch cruise missiles.

The Russian Armed Forces will receive 15 new intercontinental missiles by the end of the year

The Strategic Missile Forces (Strategic Missile Forces) will be reinforced with 15 new intercontinental ballistic missiles by the end of 2021. This was announced on Tuesday, August 10, by the Deputy Minister of Defense of the Russian Federation Alexei Krivoruchko at a single day of acceptance of military products.

According to him, the Russian Armed Forces will also receive three Bastion coastal missile systems and seven anti-aircraft missile systems.

In turn, the commander of the 13th missile division, Major General Andrei Cherevko, reported to Defense Minister Sergei Shoigu that the first regiment of strategic missile systems with the Avangard hypersonic gliding unit in full force would take up combat duty by the end of the year.

He also spoke about the work on the preparation of two silo launchers with missiles. Rearmament is being carried out according to the approved schedule. Loading missiles into silo launchers and making them ready for combat use is planned for the fourth quarter of the year.

“In the period until 2023, another missile regiment in the 13th missile division with the Avangard strategic missile system will be put on alert,” Cherevko added.

Shoigu, for his part, also set the task for the indicator of the modernity of weapons in the army to reach 71.9% by the end of 2021.

On August 6, Shoigu announced that flight tests of the new Russian Sarmat intercontinental ballistic missile would begin this year and should be completed in 2022. The first missile regiment will enter the Strategic Missile Forces (Strategic Missile Forces) also in 2022.

Earlier, on June 28, Russian President Vladimir Putin announced that the Sarmat ICBM, the Zircon hypersonic missile and the new S-500 air defense system would soon be on alert. He noted that hypersonic weapons - the Avangard and Dagger complexes - have already been put on alert.

In addition, in early June, sources in the military department told Izvestia that the newest anti-missile for the S-500 is currently in a high degree of readiness. The ammunition was successfully tested at the Sary-Shagan training ground in Kazakhstan.

https://translate.google.com/translate?hl=en&sl=ru&tl=en&u=https%3A%2F%2Fiz.ru%2Frubric%2Farmiia&sandbox=1

NOTE: production and deployment of the Avangard continues at 2 per year. A full regiment would be 6 units so production is due to increase if a second regiment of six is due over 2022-2023.

New START data as of September 2021

The U.S. State Department released aggregate New START numbers from the 1 September 2021 data exchange. Russia declared 1458 deployed warheads, 527 deployed launchers, and 742 total launchers. In March 2021 the numbers were 1456, 517, and 767 respectively.

The U.S. numbers in September 2021 were 1389 warheads, 665 deployed and 800 total launchers (1357, 651, and 800 in March 2021).

In its own release, Russia repeated its concerns about conversion of 56 Trident II launchers and 41 B-52H bombers as well as about training silos.

https://russianforces.org/blog/2021/10/new_start_data_as_of_september.shtml

The Strategic Missile Forces will receive more than 20 launchers with Yars, Avangard and Sarmat ICBMs in 2022

MOSCOW, December 21. / TASS /. More than 20 launchers with Yars, Avangard and Sarmat intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs) will be put on alert by the Strategic Missile Forces in 2022. This was announced on Tuesday by the Minister of Defense of the Russian Federation, General of the Army Sergei Shoigu, at an expanded meeting of the collegium of the military department.

"Priority tasks for 2022. Rearmament: put on alert in the strategic missile forces 21 launchers with intercontinental ballistic missiles Yars, Avangard and Sarmat," Shoigu said.

According to the head of the Ministry of Defense, two strategic missile carriers Tu-160M ​​will be supplied to the aviation strategic nuclear forces, the Borei-A nuclear submarine Generalissimus Suvorov is also planned to be accepted into the fleet, and the Aerospace Forces will have five divisional sets of the S-400 anti-aircraft missile system. "Triumph".


https://tass-ru.translate.goog/armiya-i-opk/13258739?_x_tr_sl=ru&_x_tr_tl=en&_x_tr_hl=en

Is there any indication that the Russians will move towards large numbers of cobalt bombs to try and counter the overwhelming numbers of nato forces?

The whole idea of using cobalt bombs is kind of overblown. AFAIK Russia has no such weapons.
They are possible to do but no one is doing it.
That would basically be a hydrogen bomb with a cobalt tamper. The cobalt gets irradiated on detonation and becomes radioactive.

And against military purposes they make no sense. That is a large scale population destruction weapon.