T-95 Tank Development

Pugnax wrote:Guys the reason i mention the old T-10,despite its short comings,. T-10 was the the last Soviet tank design to terrify Nato.In the early 80s during my service,we werent afraid of T-54/55/62,T-64/72/80 were considered to be full of design bugs rendering them of limited use.The T-10 was considered the most heavily armoured Soviet design,a match to the British Chieftain.Where the T-10 was,was definitely going to be a hot spot.Just a case of an old warrior clutching at doctrines and terrors from days gone by.Imagine an 18 year old clutching an FN,hoping the Carl Gustav round wouldnt bounce off Ivans armour while wishing his shell scrape was just 4 inches deeper.

T-64 and T-72 were very much ahead of their NATO contemporaries. Until Abrams and Leo came around, NATO was in trouble, at least as far as tanks are concerned.

They were both far superior to T-10, which while an advanced design for its time (especially in terms of fire control), was badly outdated by that point, and nothing special.

I am curious exactly what design bugs all the tanks you listed have, that apparently slow, lumbering, outdated T-10 did not...

I have always treated Soviet era equiptment with greater respect than most of my compatriots,the fact that in the1982-85 era only Nato had thermal imaging means that armoured encounters would be in favour of Nato in every single engagement,especially when coupled with longer range fire effectiveness if the Nato 105/120mm guns and greater crew proficiencies of Nato crew.Warpac hostilities would have been suicidal at conventional levels.Indeed havent former east german records concluded that hostilities were to be intiated by a massive medium and short range nuclear strike with WarPac units closely following and exploiting the chaos.

Soviet doctrine was far more defensive than most western analysts give it credit for.

True and same goes for today's Russia.

in the1982-85 era only Nato had thermal imaging means that armoured encounters would be in favour of Nato in every single engagement,especially when coupled with longer range fire effectiveness if the Nato 105/120mm guns and greater crew proficiencies of Nato crew.

I am in the strange impression that your opinions on this subject ,likely "warped" by the enormous amount of low level PR innuendo and clichès purposely conceived and spread in the West in the Cold War , are not merely totally out of line but even at the exact opposite of factual reality !! .

Sometimes ago i posted this article which ,together with two others similar articles and the precise references to the Jane's Defense articles named "Impenetrable Russian Tank Armor Stands Up To Examination" (the existence of which with the linked tests is even comically negated where possible in open media ...miracles of the PR's machine ) on the dread experimental results obtained by the Pentagon equipe directed by Leland Ness on orginal specimens of Soviet T-72A and B with K5 ERA at theirs time validating the surprising and worrisome experimental results obtained by the famous Prof. Manfred Held on the same MBTs covered an year before in the Jane's article named "Russian Tanks Immune to Attack Says German Expert", caused two different times ,very strangely, my immediate and inexplicable remotion on two other forums and the frantic cancellation of majority of mine posts....when someone say the Freedom of Information .
Maybe you will get a more realistic and serious picture of what was the status in the armour and anti-armour technology between URSS and NATO just in the years you refered to.

Warpac hostilities would have been suicidal at conventional levels

Excuse me Pugnax, when possible i avoid to deride a position mantained by anyone, but when it appear so immensely and irreconcilably far for factual reality i cannot stop myself.

NATO in the Cold War was ridiculously outnumbered and outgunned in virtually any segment of battlefield agents in the Continental Theatre and virtually ALL studies, simulations and projections conducted by NATO in the Cold War the UNIQUE solution offering a real chance to prevent Soviet Forces from obtaining a victory even offensive for easiness was the massive and extensive employment of Tactical Nuclear Weapons (NATO conventional forces in the European continent had ,in reality , the only purpose to slow and "channel" Soviet Forces to render them more vulnerable to "nuclearization's lines")

Image that even today some US authorities (in particular Republican ones) has even questioned the recent choice by part of B Obama's administration to expand the instances of "no-first use" of nuclear weapons on security basis recalling that only them prevented URSS from invading ,practically unhindered , Europe during the Cold War.
I think that i don't must recall to you what was the point of the CFE Treaty for NATO ,but in the opposite instance i report down here a little extract from "

"It is important to remember the CFE Treaty’s original goals. For the United States and its NATO allies, the CFE Treaty offered the unique opportunity to address the dangers of an overwhelming Soviet and Warsaw Pact superiority in conventional weapons in Europe. This superiority made war, if it came, very difficult to win and unlikely to proceed without NATO having to resort to nuclear weapons.
Soviet and Warsaw Pact superiority in the Cold War manifested itself in three ways: first and foremost, substantial numerical superiority in all key categories of conventional force equipment and manpower; second, overwhelming Soviet superiority of weapons and forces within the Eastern bloc; and third, a geographic advantage in the forces deployed forward in Europe, especially due to the deployment of a large number of Soviet troops in East Germany.

The CFE Treaty sought to address all three issues by establishing equal equipment limits on the member states of the two alliances at lower levels, placing sub-limits on the amount of equipment that could be held by any single member of either alliance, and, through a structure of concentric zones, introducing sub-limits in the center of Europe and in the CFE “flank” regions."

Warpac hostilities would have been suicidal at conventional levels

Among the comical reality's overturning operated by the strong Cold War PR machine this is ,i must admit, one of the most funny and creative in absolute .

Interesting, the BGM-71E couldn't defeat soviet ERA even with a tandem warhead.

Lets just say for the record we are lucky to have survived the weapons build up and machinations of both cold war sides military industrial complexes.As far as supremacy the dog chases its tail in an endless circle,from the outside it appears a game,from the inside it is one deranged dog.

The whole purpose of "eastern europe" for the Soviets was to ensure that the ground being fought over was not Soviet.
As you say... a conflict like that and both sides lose... very badly.
Just as well it never happened.

That was not true already since end of '50 years : as well highlighted in the documents now declassified and penetrated in the West ,such as the Czechoslovak and Polish documents by 1964 and 1968 showing a part of the Warsaw Pact's plan for a war in Europe, URSS planners had foreseen the chance to consistently win a war in Europe characterized by extensive use of tactical nuclear weapons by both sides on the basis of the experimental results proving the very high resilience of purposely equipped armoured and motorized divisions to indirect and secondary effects of nuclear weapon's detonations.

In this optic ,enclosing also the active using of tactical nuclear weapons by part of Soviet Forces in..."response" ...to that of NATO Forces, with the aim to attack directly NATO's nuclear weapon's depots and airbases , a central factor playing in favour of the feasibility and positive success chances of a similar plan was the huge advantage not only numerical but also in the composition of Force's Structure enjoyed by Warsaw Pact over NATO (the former had a very high Force's fraction composed by Armoured and anti-NBC equipped motorized and self propelled artillery divisions against a much greater fraction of immensely more vulnerable Air Force's vehicles and light divisions of the latter).
The two elements playing,in reality, more strongly against the realization of such a Soviet plan was :

1) URSS planners ,in spite of strong indicators, was not totally sure that the lack of employment of strategic weapons or direct attack on US soil would have assured that the conflict would have not escaladed toward a full ...and truly apocalyptic...thermonuclear war.

2) Until the appearance of RSD-10 URSS had no nuclear weapon capable of a truly selective ,surgical strike on enemy key assets ,factor that would have greatly increased the chance of extensive involvement of civil populated area in the opening nuclear strike at its own time increasing the chances of realization of the risks described in point 1.

Those tow extracts from comments ,by respectively Petr Luňákto and Gen. William E. Odom, to the now declassified 1964 Czechoslovak invasion plans can get some light on those points.

"In the thinking of the Czechoslovak and probably of the Soviet military headquarters of the time, nuclear weapons would determine the speed of war but not its entire character.
Since nuclear arms considerably shortened the stages of war, according to the Eastern logic, it became necessary to try to gain the decisive initiative with a powerful strike against enemy forces, making use of the moment of surprise.
Contrary to the U.S. doctrine of massive retaliation, the Soviet bloc's response would have made use not only of nuclear weapons, but, in view of Soviet conventional superiority, also of conventional weapons. This massive retaliation, in the Soviet view, did not make planning beyond it irrelevant. Contrary to Western planners of the time,Soviet strategists assumed that their massive strike would only create the conditions for winning the war by the classic method of seizing enemy territory.
Once persuaded by the preposterous idea of winning a nuclear war, Eastern bloc operational plans looked upon such a war a realistic scenario thereby downgrading any Western deterrent and making a war perilously more realitic as a prospect."

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“The Plan of Actions of the Czechoslovak People’s Army for War Period, “ dated 1964, is of special interest to me. During 1955-58, I served as company grade officer in a mechanized infantry battalion in the 6th Armored Cavalry Regiment in Germany, and also in the tank battalion of the 11th Airborne Division. The armored cavalry screened the Czech border from Hof in the north to Passau in the South.
The 11th Airborne Division operated behind the reconnaissance screen of the armored cavalry and planned to fight delaying actions, slowing down and frustrating advancing Warsaw Pact forces. Having spent months on the border, seeking any sign of an impending invasion by Soviet and Czech forces, and having practiced delaying operations beginning on a line slightly northeast of Amberg-Regensburg-Landshut-Deggendorf, falling back over days and weeks to successive north-south lines of Augsburg-Weissenburg, Ulm-Crailsheim, Heilbronn-Stuttgart, and finally to the Rhine River, this recently published Czech war plan has a very personal impact.

I and my fellow officers naturally wondered if we had a serious chance to achieve our mission in the late 1950s. Judgments were mixed. Most of us realized that we needed many more armored units to deal with the swift offensive the Warsaw Pact forces were obviously preparing. Instead of tanks, we received a reorganization and tactical nuclear weapons. The 11th Airborne was converted to a “pentatomic” division with a flatter command structure and five “battle groups” instead of three regiments with three battalions each. It was to canalize enemy attacking columns and strike them with low-yield nuclear weapons, such as the “Honest John” (a short range rocket system) could deliver.

Whether these tactical nuclear weapons would have been effective is debatable, but had the 11th Airborne Division been a tank division, the odds would have been greatly improved.
Back at the Armored School in 1959-60, I learned that a great deal of a nuclear weapon’s effects, such as blast, heat, and radiation, could be mitigated by armor-protected vehicles–considerably more than the popular image at the time and especially today would have it. Not only could armored forces greatly reduce potential casualties from tactical nuclear strikes; they could also move through contaminated areas rather safely, keeping their troops from suffering radiation exposure at dangerous levels.
While these realities made use of tactical nuclear weapons far more conceivable, even advantageous, other realities, such as tree blow-down, residual radiation, fires, and other collateral damage, promised that they would complicate military operations for the side hat used them. In other words, they were a mixed blessing, but even the undesirable effects – creation of unintended obstructions – might contribute to slowing a Soviet-Warsaw Pact offensive."

Eh, win or not, a war would still have been debilitating.
BMP-1 and T-55 may have had NBC overpressure systems, but honestly, who wants to fight in that environment or trusts the equipment to keep them safe reliably in such a hostile scenario?

The point is that the "win" the Soviets were aiming for was the complete destruction of NATO forces... they weren't planning to attack and occupy western europe, they were planning to level western europe to remove the threat it embodied as a response to an attack from NATO.

Yes GarryB that is absolutely true , even if it is important to point out that the ultimate goal of Soviet planners, as outlined by the result of very accurate russian studies and projections of those years, was to irreparably sever European continental countries and Middle East from USA's influence or indirect "control" causing ,in this way , American economy (strongly dependent on its Transatlantic "colonial" markets and resources) to crumble literally into dust within few months.

About the counteroffensive doctrine mantained by URSS we must say that, while formally true, this approach begun to informally shift toward a more offensive doctrine when already at the beginning of '60 years ,with intelligence monitoring of NATO forces becoming more reliable, was totally clear to any Soviet general, that NATO lacked absolutely the conventional means to mount even only a worthy defense and even less an offensive operation of any sort.

In reality the world was never more near to the realization of this plan by part of URSS than beginning of '80 years, when the "explosive" combination of operative introduction of 15Zh53-2 IRBM (Pioneer-UTTH Mod 2) and the truly suicidal Naval doctrine pursued by the then US Navy Secretary John Lehman (one of the most "loved" , western military figures among Soviet military operatives of those years , who had put an enormous fraction of the US Navy surface and submarine unities well within the reach of a simply devastating "Pearl Harbour-like" attack of Warsaw Pact's Air and Naval Forces) had created an imbalance of forces between the two sides so big that only the possible risk of thermonuclear strategic esclation of the conflict by part of NATO prevented a similar offensive from being realized .

Looks like a new photo of 195.



http://andrei-bt.livejournal.com/160661.html

Zivo wrote:Looks like a new photo of 195.



http://andrei-bt.livejournal.com/160661.html

Turret looks chaotic. Whats that box above gun, a radar of some sort?

Zivo wrote:Looks like a new photo of 195.



http://andrei-bt.livejournal.com/160661.html

the fact that there's only half of it in picture..make me think that the photographer might troll us somewhat.

Oh and the resolution is nice

Viktor wrote:

Zivo wrote:Looks like a new photo of 195.



http://andrei-bt.livejournal.com/160661.html

Turret looks chaotic. Whats that box above gun, a radar of some sort?

I think it's a bolt on steel/wood box to prevent us from getting a good view of the turret's shape.

It looks like the driver's head poking up on the left side of the hull.