If you want to read to US people about aircraft carriers, better if you read them talking about their own fleet, than about what Russia needs.
There is a recent interesting study about different options of aircraft carriers for the US:
https://www.rand.org/pubs/research_reports/RR2006.html
Aircraft Carrier Variants Considered
Our assessment of carrier alternatives and their operational effective-ness considered four ship concept variants:
•a follow-on variant continuing the current 100,000-ton Ford-class carrier but with two life-of-the-ship reactors and other equipment and system changes to reduce cost (CVN 8X)
•a 70,000-ton USS Forrestal–size carrier with an updated flight deck and hybrid nuclear-powered integrated propulsion plant with capability to embark the current large integrated air wing but with reduced sortie generation capability, survivability, ship speed, and endurance compared with the Ford class (CVN LX)
•a 43,000-ton variant of the USS America–class, fossil fuel–powered and arranged to support only STOVL operations but at a higher tempo than the current LHA 6 (USS America) (CV LX).1This variant would incorporate the larger ship’s beam excursion that the Navy examined in the USS Bougainville–class flight 1 studies.2
•a 20,000-ton variant that will resemble escort carriers that some allied navies currently operate (CV EX). Similar to the 43,000-ton variant, it will be conventionally powered and will operate STOVL aircraft.
1 We depart from the Navy’s convention of using the LH designation for STOVL support platforms. We use CV to ensure that it is clear that these proposed variants are replacements for the current CVN force.
2 Naval Sea Systems Command (NAVSEA) general-purpose amphibious assault ship (LHA) flight 1 studies examined alternatives of the LHA design for the USS Bougainville (LHA 8 ) AoA. NAVSEA, Surface Ship Design and Systems Engineering, provided the data.
These choices were consistent with congressional language in the FY 2016 National Defense Authorization Act.3
Capability Conclusions for Concept Variants Examined
Focusing on warfighting capabilities of the concept variants examined, a lower-cost Ford-class carrier (CVN 8X) might offer an alternative with little diminishment in warfighting capability and retention of the overall POR. However, the study’s excursion examining the business case for a life-of-the-ship reactor core, such as that now in the POR for all submarine classes, did not significantly lower cost. The Navy might want to consider Ford-class cost drivers that only marginally improve capability in light of the observation that, in general, the maximum SGR levels and survivability attributes might be more-viable trade-offs with the current concept of operations than that in effect when the ini-tial KPPs were validated. It is likely, in any case, that Ford-class carriers in the POR will continue to evolve to reduce procurement cost to some extent with some risk-based capability trade-offs, and it might be tech-nically feasible, at some point in the future, for a transition to an IPS, for example. The department and Congress might also move to acquire these carriers in increased orders of quantity to yield cost savings. But there is certainly a limit in the cost “floor” for the Ford-class carriers, and their warfighting capacity, as set in the initial requirements, comes with a cost.
One approach, such as the CVN LX concept variant, might offer significant procurement cost savings with an integrated, current air wing with capabilities near current levels but with less organic mission endurance for weapons and aviation fuel. It will not have the same SGR as the Ford class, but this might not be a significant limitation for many of the warfighting scenarios. It will be less survivable in some environments than the Ford POR ship, will have less redundancy than the Ford class, and will degrade in mission execution more rapidly with damage or loss of systems, and these factors might drive different oper-ation concepts. The major means of reducing cost is through loss in engineering redundancy, speed, and air wing fuel capacity, and these trade-offs could affect mobility and theater closure.
The concept variant CV LX, which pursues a larger version of the LHA 6 platforms, might be a low-risk, alternative pathway for the Navy to reduce carrier costs if such a variant were procured in greater numbers, as presented in our analysis. Over the long term, however, as the current carrier force is retired, CV LX would not be a viable option as the eventual carrier force unless displaced capabilities were reas-signed to new aircraft or platforms in the joint force, which would be costly. This platform would be feasible for a subset of carrier missions but, even for those missions, could require an increase in the number of platforms. This concept variant might, if procured in sufficient num-bers, eventually enable the Navy to reduce the number of Ford-class carriers in the overall force structure, but more-extensive analysis of missions, operations, and basing of such a variant and the supported air combat element are required.
The smallest concept variants reviewed, the 20,000-ton sea-based platforms, do not provide either a significant capacity or an integrated air wing and, thus, force reliance on other legacy platforms or land-based assets to provide key elements of capability—in particular, AEW. As such, this concept variant is not really a replacement for cur-rent aircraft carrier capability to much degree and would require other platforms, aircraft, weapons, and capabilities in the joint force. These platforms would be a viable pathway only in broad fleet architecture transformation providing a narrow mission set perhaps regionally and would require extensive analysis. Given that such a concept variant is not a viable replacement of an aircraft carrier, such analysis would be required to see whether any adjustment of the current aircraft carrier program would be feasible.A decision to use either of the smaller concept variants would require a revision of fleet concepts of operations, a refocusing of aircraft procurement to more STOVL strike fighters, and a larger force struc-ture to keep the same number of aircraft in the stressing fights. Neither variant would be effective in warfighting scenarios if it is the first on scene before the arrival of units possessing AEW, airborne C2, and EA.
Cost Conclusions for Concept Variants Examined
If CVN 8X results in small impact on capability, it also might have only incremental reduction in overall platform cost. The analysis examining cost reduction with transition to a life-of-the-ship reactor, such as that being done on submarine programs, does not appear to be cost-effective. Between the developmental costs and a reduced service life, there is little cost advantage in this variant. Forgoing the requirement for mid-life refueling work scope and some reduction in the mid-life modernization overhaul could add some operational flexibility, but the life-of-the-ship reactor path might not be beneficial from a business case perspective absent technical breakthroughs. We did not examine the technical aspect of such an approach.
The CVN LX concept would allow considerable savings across the ship’s service life and appears to be a viable alternative to consider for further concept exploration. Construction costs would be lower; design changes and life-cycle costs would reflect the lessons already applied in the Ford class. The reliance on hybrid drive with fewer mechani-cal parts than legacy platforms is likely to further reduce maintenance costs. However, CVN LX would be a new design that would require a significant investment in NRE in the near term to allow timely deliv-ery in the 2030s. The scope and resultant timeline for this concept vari-ant development, if determined to be feasible and acceptable, would likely move any transition to the mid-2030s, where the USS Ranger(CVN 82) of the Ford class now resides. That said, over time, the cost savings accumulate, and such a transition might present an alternative pathway to lower procurement costs in the medium term.
CV LX, although it requires a larger force structure, might still reduce overall construction costs if large carrier numbers were reduced. But, as described previously, reducing carrier numbers with the resulting loss of capability should not be pursued without extensive further analysis for all displaced missions in the joint force execution of warfighting scenarios and, potentially, regional basing and narrowly focused missions for these platforms. Any cost savings from reduc-tion in the aircraft carrier POR procurement would likely be offset to an unknown degree by a requirement for additional replenishment capacity; a shift in the procurement plan for strike fighters and other platforms; forward basing for these platforms; or the costs needed to develop or procure joint capability for displaced organic AEW, EA, and airborne C2 capability in the current CVW.
At the end of the report it is possible to see the letters that the US Navy send to the chairs of the US Senate and US Congres committees affected saying:
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RAND studied four notional aircraft carrier variants: 20,000, 43,000, 70,000 and 100,000+ tons displacement.
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Specifically, the two smaller variants (20,000 and 43,000 tons) would not meet current operational requirements, and would require new aircraft types and alternate concepts of operations
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Navy concludes that 70,000 ton variant has numerous engineering challenges that question its feasibility.
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