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    Russian Space Control System (SKKP)

    magnumcromagnon
    magnumcromagnon


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    Russian Space Control System (SKKP) - Page 2 Empty 821st Main Space Intelligence Centre,

    Post  magnumcromagnon Sat Nov 07, 2020 2:00 pm

    magnumcromagnon wrote:
    Russia gears up for electronic warfare in space (part 1)
    Russian Space Control System (SKKP) - Page 2 4056a

    https://www.thespacereview.com/article/4056/1

    Here's the 2nd part to this:
    Russia gears up for electronic warfare in space (part 2)
    Russian Space Control System (SKKP) - Page 2 4060a
    A signals intelligence site (code-named 1511/2) under construction near Pionerskiy is intended to intercept signals from foreign satellites (Google Earth image taken on May 22, 2020).

    [Part 1 was published last week]

    Space-based electronic warfare

    Russia may also be working on a capability to perform electronic warfare (EW) from space. Interest in this arose back in the 1980s as part of a large-scale effort to develop countermeasures against America’s Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI), which was aimed at forming a space-based shield against incoming Soviet missiles. One of many projects proposed at the time was a space-based EW system called OREST-02 (an unknown acronym), which is seen in a list of space-based systems intended to attack targets on land, in the oceans and in the air.[1] There are no indications that OREST-02 ever went beyond the proposal stage and the plans were likely shelved after the collapse of the Soviet Union.

    Whatever the true purpose of OREST was, space-based electronic warfare was included as an objective in a long-term policy for Russia’s electronic warfare program approved by the Russian government in January 2012.
    Nevertheless, another project with the name OREST got underway on July 31, 2007, under a government contract concluded between the Ministry of Defense and RKK Energiya, best known as a manufacturer of Russian crewed spacecraft. Although nothing has ever been revealed about its purpose, the identical name would suggest that it was a revival of the Soviet-era proposal or an adapted version of it. All that is known about OREST comes from a handful of court documents and company annual reports. Also known as 14K040, the project envisaged the launch of experimental satellites called Filin (“eagle owl“) that would operate in conjunction with a ground-based segment developed by PAO Radiofizika. It was canceled in 2010 because it had “lost its relevance”.[2]

    Whatever the true purpose of OREST was, space-based electronic warfare was included as an objective in a long-term policy for Russia’s electronic warfare program approved by the Russian government in January 2012. A summary of this policy published online mentions the need to deploy “multifunctional space-based EW complexes for reconnaissance and suppression of radio-electronic systems used by radar, navigation and communications systems.”[3]

    In early 2015, Igor Nasenkov, a deputy director of the KRET holding, revealed that some of its companies were engaged in developing an “integrated multifunctional airborne and space-based electronic warfare system” designed to “protect military technology from detection and destruction”, but also “to knock out and suppress the enemy’s radio-electronic systems.” Nasenkov said the system, which he called unrivaled in the world, was seen as an “asymmetric response” to the development of new American “airborne and space-based combat systems” as well as the deployment of a US anti-missile system in Europe. He said the space-based component of the system was classified, admitting only that KRET was working on “specialized on-board equipment for a future electronic warfare satellite.”[4] A similar statement was made by a KRET representative at the Aero India 2015 airshow in Bangalore in February 2015.[5] Remarkably enough, another deputy general director of KRET, Yuriy Mayevskiy, contradicted his colleagues several months later by declaring that placing EW payloads into space would violate international law.[6]

    The KRET officials were possibly referring to a nuclear-powered satellite called Ekipazh (meaning both “crew” and “horse-drawn carriage”). Also designated 14F350, this is being developed by KB Arsenal in St.-Petersburg under a contract signed with the Ministry of Defense on August 13, 2014.[7] Ekipazh appears to be an outgrowth of a nuclear-powered satellite platform called Plazma-2010 and will be equipped with a thermionic nuclear reactor of the Krasnaya Zvezda organization that is referred to in a handful of procurement documents as “Product 295”.[8] Articles published by KB Arsenal in official electronic warfare yearbooks for 2014, 2015, and 2016 outline plans for nuclear-powered satellites using the Plazma-2010 platform that could be used for electronic warfare “in and from space,” suggesting they could be used against both space-based and ground-based targets. The presence of a nuclear reactor would make it possible to install “jammers operating on a wide range of frequencies” and place such payloads into highly elliptical and geostationary orbits for “uninterrupted suppression of electronic systems in large areas.” The spacecraft would be delivered to their operational orbits by an electric propulsion unit that would also be powered by the nuclear reactor. The EW mission would require a reactor generating at least 30 to 40 kilowatts, allowing the satellites to be launched by the Soyuz-2.1b rocket. For more advanced EW missions, the performance would have to be increased to 100 kilowatts, necessitating a switch to the more powerful Angara-A5 rocket.[9] In late 2014, KB Arsenal’s director Andrei Romanov hinted at the company’s interest in a mission of this type, saying that it was focusing on space-based “armament systems” that would meet the demands of “future warfare.”[10] Also noteworthy is that a PhD dissertation related to Ekipazh was reviewed among others by a specialist of the Gagarin Air Force Academy’s research institute for electronic warfare, based in Voronezh.[11]
    Russian Space Control System (SKKP) - Page 2 4060b
    An electronic warfare satellite proposed by KB Arsenal in launch and orbital configuration. (credit: Russian electronic warfare yearbook for 2015.)

    Ekipazh is not to be confused with an ambitious project to develop a one-megawatt space-based nuclear reactor, a joint effort by Roscosmos and the Rosatom State Atomic Energy Corporation which started in 2010. KB Arsenal became involved in this project in 2014, acting as a subcontractor to the Keldysh Research Institute. In November 2017, KB Arsenal was assigned to perform a research project called “Yadro” (“core”) with the goal of studying possible missions for the reactor. This would have to result in determining technical specifications for satellites with a reactor capacity ranging from 100 kilowatts to one megawatt to be developed under a follow-on effort called Nuklon. Tender documentation for Yadro released online mentioned electronic warfare as one of the potential missions along with remote sensing, communications, interorbital transport, and directed energy transfer using lasers. The electronic warfare payloads would have to be capable of interfering with “control, intelligence, communications and navigation systems.”[12] The Solar System missions widely advertised for the one-megawatt reactor in the early years of the project were notably absent from the objectives, although Roscosmos did recently unveil plans for a one-megawatt reactor by the name Nuklon that is supposed to fly to Jupiter in the early 2030s. More details on Ekipazh and the one-megawatt reactor can be found in an in-depth article published here last year.[13]

    Sledopyt: eavesdropping on foreign satellites

    A key aspect of electronic warfare is the collection of intelligence on an adversary’s electronic systems. Russia is currently constructing three ground-based signals intelligence (SIGINT) sites intended to pick up and analyze radio signals emitted by foreign satellites flying over Russian territory. These will complement the information obtained by the optical telescopes and radars that constitute the country’s Space Surveillance System (SKKP). Although they have not been specifically linked to Russia’s EW program, the intelligence gathered by these sites could potentially be used to help prepare electronic attacks against foreign satellites.

    Although they have not been specifically linked to Russia’s EW program, the intelligence gathered by these sites could potentially be used to help prepare electronic attacks against foreign satellites.
    The SIGINT facilities are being built under a project known as Sledopyt (“pathfinder”), the existence of which was first revealed in 2013 by the commander of Russia’s Aerospace Forces Aleksandr V. Golovko, who called it “a network of specialized complexes to monitor radio-emitting spacecraft.”[14] In an interview published in March 2015, another Russian military official disclosed that construction of these sites was getting underway in the Moscow, Kaliningrad, Altai, and Primorskiy regions and that they would replace a mobile satellite SIGINT system known as Moment.[15] Also known as 14G6, only one of these is believed to have been deployed, several kilometers to the south of Noginsk-9 (also known as Dubrovo), a small military town about 60 kilometers east of Moscow which is home to the headquarters of Russia’s space surveillance network. Moment consists of five dish antennas, some of which can be seen in a Russian TV report aired in 2015. Available information indicates that Moment was conceived back in the 1990s, but didn’t become operational until early this century. There were plans for an upgraded system called Moment-M, but these do not seem to have materialized.
    Russian Space Control System (SKKP) - Page 2 4060c
    Screenshot from a Russian TV report showing three antennas of the Moment SIGINT complex situated south of Noginsk-9.

    While nothing more has been publicly revealed about Sledopyt, a significant amount of information on the project can be gleaned from openly available procurement and court documents. These show that the project officially got underway on July 24, 2009, with a contract awarded to the Radio Research and Development Institute (NIIR) and is also called 14Ts032 (14Ц032 in Cyrillic). Original plans called for the construction of four sites with the general code name “1511”:

    -1511/1 : near Noginsk-9 (Moscow region)
    -1511/2 : near Pionerskiy (Kaliningrad region)
    -1511/3 : near Sukhodol (Primorskiy region)
    -1511/4 : near Shakhi (Altai region)

    The first site (1511/1) is situated in the immediate vicinity of the Moment complex. Two others (1511/2 and 1511/4) are located right next to satellite tracking facilities. Building contracts for the four sites were awarded by the Ministry of Defense in 2015. All of them are visible in Google Earth imagery, except for 1511/3. According to one court document, construction of 1511/3 had to be suspended at an early stage after an archeological discovery was made on the planned building site.[16] However, 1511/3 was still included in a contract signed earlier this year for systems needed to transmit data between the Sledopyt sites and the space surveillance headquarters in Noginsk-9, indicating it has not yet been canceled.[17]

    The Sledopyt sites have a similar lay-out and consist of separately located antenna complexes to pick up satellite signals with low frequencies (IPK-N or “502”), medium frequencies (IPK-S or “503”) and high frequencies (IPK-V or “504”) as well as an H-shaped “technical building” (“501”) to collect and relay the obtained information. Also part of the SIGINT complexes is a structure 70 meters high referred to as a “calibration tower” (also called “505”) which is situated about one to two kilometers from the main site.
    Russian Space Control System (SKKP) - Page 2 4060d
    Map of the 1511/1 Sledopyt site published in procurement documentation.
    Russian Space Control System (SKKP) - Page 2 4060e
    The 1511/1 Sledopyt site, situated about two kilometers south of Noginsk-9, is seen in this Google Earth image taken on June 14, 2020.
    Russian Space Control System (SKKP) - Page 2 4060f
    Drawing of the calibration tower for the 1511/4 site published in procurement documentation.
    Russian Space Control System (SKKP) - Page 2 4060g
    The calibration tower of the 1511/1 SIGINT complex, situated about one kilometer south of the main site, casts a long shadow in this Google Earth image taken on June 4, 2020. Just to the north of the tower are the dish antennas of the older Moment SIGINT complex.

    Several technical papers on ground-based satellite signals intelligence written by specialists of the Mozhaiskiy Military Space Academy in St.-Petersburg are likely related to Sledopyt. One of them was co-authored by an engineer involved in a “construction project” at Noginsk-9, a clear reference to the 1511/1 site.[18] The articles note that SIGINT systems offer advantages in satellite identification over radar system, which are restricted to observing low-orbiting satellite, and optical telescopes, which may be hampered by poor meteorological and atmospheric conditions. They can be used to study various features of satellite signals such as their spectral characteristics, frequency range, polarization, and radiation pattern, which in turn can provide information on such things as the type of antennas carried, the satellite’s orientation in space, and the sort of data it collects and sends back to Earth. The articles describe a three-step digital processing technique that makes it possible to extract telltale information from the signals about the satellite’s nature and capabilities. One of the papers focuses in particular on observations of radar-equipped remote sensing satellites, a possible indication that foreign military radar reconnaissance satellites such as the American Lacrosse and Topaz satellites will become prime targets for Sledopyt.[19]

    Google Earth imagery indicates that there has been little, if any, progress in the construction of the three Sledopyt sites in the past two years or so and none of them is likely to be fully operational yet. Court documentation confirms that there have been serious delays in the project, which are at least partially due to Western-imposed economic sanctions. The July 2009 contract between the Ministry of Defense and NIIR was even annulled in November 2018.[20] A new contract concluded between the two parties on March 20, 2019, presumably set new timelines for the project.[21] In a recent interview, the head of the space surveillance headquarters, Sergei Suchkov, mentioned the development of a system to pick up radio signals from satellites (most likely Sledopyt) as one of the goals to be accomplished as part of a program to modernize Russia’s space surveillance network before 2025.[22]

    Additional signals intelligence on foreign satellites is possibly being collected by a satellite called Olimp-K/Luch, launched on September 28, 2014. For the past six years or so, the satellite has been drifting across the geostationary belt and has parked near more than a dozen commercial communications satellites for periods ranging from several weeks to several months. It would appear to be the Russian equivalent of two top-secret American signals intelligence satellites launched in 2009 and 2014 and variously referred to as PAN, CLIO, and Nemesis.

    Tobol: protecting Russian satellites from electronic attack

    Another project related to Russia’s electronic warfare program is called Tobol (the name of a river running through both Russia and Kazakhstan), also designated 14Ts227 (14Ц227 in Cyrillic). Infrastructure for this project with the code name “8282” is being built at a number of satellite tracking facilities belonging to Russia’s so-called Command and Measurement Complex (KIK), which is operated by the Ministry of Defense. The following Tobol sites are mentioned in publicly available documentation (also given are the numbers of the satellite tracking facilities (NIP) where they are located as well as the military units operating those facilities):

    -8282/1: near Shcholkovo (Moscow region) (NIP-14) (military unit 26178)
    -8282/3: near Ulan-Ude (Republic of Buryatiya) (NIP-13) (military unit 14129)
    -8282/4: near Ussuriysk (Primorskiy region) NIP-15) (military unit 14038)
    -8282/5: near Yeniseisk (Siberia) (NIP-4) (military unit 14058)
    -8282/6: near Pionerskiy (Kaliningrad region) (no known NIP number) (military unit 92626)
    -8282/7: near Armavir (Krasnodar region) (no known NIP number) (military unit 20608)

    There is no sign in the documentation of a site called 8282/2. However, some documents mention the construction of infrastructure for Tobol near Krasnoznamensk (Moscow region) and Maloyarоslavets (Kaluga region), referring to it as 8282/OKR. Krasnoznamensk is home to the Titov Main Test and Space Systems Control Center, the main control center for Russia’s fleet of uncrewed satellites. Maloyarоslavets (more specifically a nearby place called Kudinovo) is the location of the NIP-8 satellite tracking station (operated by military unit 34122).

    None of the publicly accessible documents reveal anything about the exact purpose of Tobol. However, the fact that the infrastructure is co-located with satellite tracking facilities would indicate that it is aimed at protecting Russian satellites from electronic attack rather than launching electronic attacks against foreign satellites.
    An official document containing a list of military construction projects identifies 8282/7 as one in a series of “electronic warfare complexes for space-related purposes.”[23] The prime contractor for Tobol is Russian Space Systems (RKS), a Moscow-based company that plays a leading role in developing hardware for satellite tracking stations. A government contract for what is called Tobol-1 was signed between the Ministry of Defense and RKS on May 3, 2012, but there are some indications that the project may have started earlier than that.[24] In some court documents, Tobol is also linked to two government contracts signed between the same two parties on December 30, 2013, although at least one of those seems to have been for general work on Russia’s satellite ground control network in the period 2014–2016 rather than being specifically related to Tobol. As can be determined from various company annual reports, RKS’s subcontractors for Tobol include the Vladimir Design Bureau of Radio Communications (the prime contractor for Tirada-2), the Special Technological Center (STTs), and NPO PM-Razvitiye, all three of which are involved in Russia’s EW program.

    Building contracts for most of the Tobol sites make it possible to determine that the work involves both the adaptation of existing buildings and the construction of new infrastructure. The latter includes what are literally called “radiotechnical positions” (RTP) that are part of “stationary specialized complexes” (SSK). These consist of a number of dish antennas, with documentation for the 8282/3 and 8282/5 sites giving antenna diameters of 2 , 7.3, and 9.1 meters. Also part of the new infrastructure are transformer substations and diesel power stations, presumably to generate power for the RTPs.[25] A recent PowerPoint presentation that somehow ended up online provides an update on the construction of 8282/3 near Ulan-Ude and shows the site’s layout, making it possible to locate the complex on Google Earth.[26]
    Russian Space Control System (SKKP) - Page 2 4060h
    Drawing of the 8282/3 site near Ulan-Ude. The buildings with dish antennas in positions 1 and 2 existed before the start of the Tobol project. The core of Tobol appears to be an array of dish antennas and towers seen in position 6.
    Russian Space Control System (SKKP) - Page 2 4060i
    Google Earth image of the 8282/3 site at NIP-13 near Ulan-Ude (image taken on July 6, 2019).

    A similar looking site can be seen in images of the NIP-4 satellite tracking facility near Yeniseisk, which is the location of 8282/5.
    Russian Space Control System (SKKP) - Page 2 4060k
    Google Earth image of what is probably the 8282/5 site at NIP-4 near Yeniseisk (image taken on May 20, 2019).

    No obvious signs of Tobol-related construction work are seen in imagery of the other sites. This could be indicative of delays, but it is also possible that at some of the sites the work is largely limited to adapting existing infrastructure and is therefore hard to pick up in satellite imagery. Documents for the sites near Pionerskiy and Armavir (8282/6 and 8282/7) describe the Tobol hardware there as being mobile, with some of them saying that the hardware for 8282/6 will be co-deployed with Fazan and Varan. These are the names of truck-mounted satellite tracking systems that are known to be based at both locations. The site near Pionerskiy is situated in the immediate vicinity of the 1511/2 Sledopyt SIGINT site and the one near Armavir is located right next to a Voronezh-DM type early warning radar complex.

    None of the publicly accessible documents reveal anything about the exact purpose of Tobol. However, the fact that the infrastructure is co-located with satellite tracking facilities would indicate that it is aimed at protecting Russian satellites from electronic attack rather than launching electronic attacks against foreign satellites. With electronic protection being considered an integral part of electronic warfare, such an objective would still fit Tobol’s description as a network of “electronic warfare complexes.” The Titov Main Test and Space Systems Control Center near Krasnoznamensk, which, judging from the aforementioned PowerPoint presentation, plays a coordinating role in the Tobol project, has an electronic warfare division that is engaged in the electronic protection of both tracking stations and orbiting satellites. One of its tasks since the 1970s has been to ensure the proper functioning of Russian satellites in case they are attacked by ground-based and air-based jamming systems of “the likely adversary.”[27]

    One clue about the project’s goals comes from the review of a PhD dissertation published in 2013. This says that 14Ts227 has equipment to monitor signals of navigation satellites with the aim of protecting them against “narrowband interference.” More specifically, it is capable of determining “the modulation of navigation signals with 90% accuracy at a signal-to-noise ratio of 30 decibels.”[28] The review was written by Vladimir M. Vatutin, who heads a department within Russian Space Systems and is identified in the PowerPoint presentation on the 8282/3 site as Tobol’s chief designer.

    Over the years, Vatutin has co-authored several papers and patents that are apparently related to the protection of satellites from electronic attack. Some of the patents describe an array of ground-based antennas that would be used to pick up and jam what are called “unauthorized signals” sent to satellites or relayed via satellites to the ground. They would make use of an effect known as tropospheric scatter in which some of the energy of a signal passing through the troposphere is reflected back to Earth. In one of the proposals, unauthorized signals uplinked to a satellite would be picked up by a so-called “tropospheric station” and instantaneously analyzed to create jamming signals that would be beamed up to the satellite to suppress the unauthorized signals.

    In another scenario, unauthorized signals downlinked from a satellite to the ground would be identified by “monitoring stations,” following which the tropospheric stations would transmit jamming signals that would reach receivers after being reflected off the troposphere and cancel out the effects of the unauthorized signals. The advantage of these seemingly cumbersome techniques is that they obviate the need to install anti-jamming systems aboard the satellites themselves. Schematic representations of the proposed systems depict Glonass navigation satellites as the targets of the unauthorized signals, but they are not specifically mentioned in the accompanying patent descriptions and may just be used as an example.[29] It is not clear, however, if there is any link between Tobol and the systems presented in these patents.
    Russian Space Control System (SKKP) - Page 2 4060l
    Drawing from a 2016 patent co-authored by Tobol’s chief designer. “Unauthorized signals” (designated S(t)) sent to a satellite are partially reflected by the troposphere (5), picked up by a “tropospheric station“ (7) and analyzed, following which jamming signals (Sn(t)) are sent to the satellite to nullify the effects of the unauthorized signals.

    Another sign that Tobol has something to do with electronic protection comes in RKS’s procurement plan for 2015, where the Russian abbreviation for electronic protection (REZ) is linked to “radiotechnical positions” for something called 14Ts225, which appears to be part of 14Ts227.[30]

    Since the beginning of this century, Russia has been gradually building up a capability to perform electronic warfare against orbiting satellites.
    If the Tobol sites are indeed intended to defend Russian satellites against electronic attack, they would have to perform that task only for satellites that are in view of Russian ground stations but would still be vulnerable to electronic attack from outside the country’s borders. This makes the high-orbiting Glonass navigation satellites as well as geostationary communications satellites the only likely candidates for the electronic protection role. Russian communications satellites in particular could be targeted by the top-secret US Counter Communications System (CCS), a mobile space electronic warfare system that can be deployed globally to deny adversary satellite communications. The first two CCS units are believed to have been delivered in 2004. The latest upgrade, called Block 10.2, was officially announced as “the first offensive weapon system assigned to the United States Space Force.” The United States is also likely to possess advanced systems for downlink jamming or spoofing of satellite navigation signals in a local geographic area.

    Although Tobol would seem to have a defensive rather than an offensive role, Russian Space Systems is also doing research on electronic attack systems. A paper published in the company’s corporate magazine last year (and also co-authored by Vatutin) discusses the possibility of using EW techniques to prevent both optical and radar reconnaissance satellites from sending images to data relay satellites as they fly over foreign territory. This proposal reflects the growing interest in the use of EW systems to counter foreign reconnaissance assets. The paper caught enough attention to be picked up by several Russian media early this year, after which it was removed from RKS’ website.[31]

    Conclusion

    Since the beginning of this century, Russia has been gradually building up a capability to perform electronic warfare against orbiting satellites. There is convincing evidence that at least four ground-based mobile electronic warfare systems have the ability to interfere with satellite operations, with two of them (Tirada-2 and Bylina-MM) focusing on communications satellites and two others (Krasukha-4 and Divnomorye) on radar reconnaissance satellites. Tirada-2, which comes in at least four versions (Tirada-2S, 2.2, 2.3, and 2.4), and Bylina-MM together seem to cover most of the frequency bands used by communications satellites. Work may also be underway on a ground-based EW system (KRBSS) targeted against LEO satellite constellations as well as an airborne system (Porubshchik-2) with an electronic warfare counterspace capability. A nuclear-powered satellite (14F350/Ekipazh) under development at KB Arsenal may well be designed to carry the first ever space-based EW payload. Intelligence in support of these EW systems may be collected by three SIGINT complexes currently under construction at various locations in Russia as part of the Sledopyt project. In addition to that, infrastructure being built at a number of Russian satellite tracking facilities under the Tobol project may be intended to protect Russian satellites from electronic attack.

    The EW systems operating in the radio band of the electromagnetic spectrum will be complemented by ground-based and airborne laser systems (Peresvet, Kalina, and Sokol-Eshelon) designed to dazzle or blind satellite sensors. Besides all that, Russia is also continuing the development of more traditional kinetic ASAT weapons. A ground-based direct-ascent ASAT system called Nudol has undergone test flights since 2014. Speculation that a surface-to-air missile called S-500/Prometei can also be used against satellites was confirmed by the commander of Russia’s Aerospace Forces Sergei Surovikin in an interview published this summer.[32] A mobile anti-satellite “strike system” referred to by one Russian military official as Rudolf may be yet another ground-based kinetic counterspace weapon.[33] Work is also in full swing on an air-launched co-orbital ASAT system named Burevestnik.[34] This includes the construction of new infrastructure at the airport of the Plesetsk Cosmodrome, most likely to support flights of the system’s MiG-31BM carrier aircraft.[35] Finally, high-speed objects ejected from two Russian satellites (Kosmos-2521 and Kosmos-2543) in October 2017 and July 2020 may well have been tests of another orbital ASAT system, possibly under a project named Nivelir. Few of these systems seem to have reached operational maturity yet, but once they do, they should give Russia a counterspace capability unmatched by that of any other country in the world.

    https://www.thespacereview.com/article/4060/1

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    George1
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    Post  George1 Sun May 09, 2021 2:34 pm

    Russian optoelectronic complex "Okno-M" recorded an increase in activity in space
    Yesterday, 14: 20
    40

    According to the Ministry of Defense of the Russian Federation, the Russian optical-electronic complex "Okno-M" recorded a significant increase in activity in space. This complex operates in the Tajik Sanglok Mountains, which are part of the Pamir Highlands.

    The agency reports RIA News.

    "Okno-M", located at an altitude of more than two thousand meters above the level of the World Ocean, since the beginning of 2021, has controlled the movements of about 30 thousand space objects. This is much more than last year. Then, during the whole year, the complex monitored 25 thousand objects. This indicates a significant and dramatic increase in activities in outer space.

    Optical-electronic complex "Okno-M" is capable of monitoring the situation at an altitude of 120 thousand meters to 50 thousand kilometers. At the same time, even at the maximum distance, it can track objects no larger than a tennis ball.

    The complex was installed and started to work in 1999. It was originally called "Window". Then its maximum range was 40 thousand kilometers. After the modernization carried out in 2014, it began to "see" 10 thousand kilometers further and received a new name - "Window-M".
    https://en.topwar.ru/182764-rossijskij-optiko-jelektronnyj-kompleks-okno-m-zafiksiroval-usilenie-aktivnosti-v-kosmose.html

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    Post  George1 Mon Oct 04, 2021 1:25 pm

    Russia to deploy 12 laser optical systems for space control by 2025


    The first laser optical system of a new generation has entered combat duty in the Altai Region

    MOSCOW, October 4. /TASS/. About 12 new laser optical systems for monitoring outer space will go operational in Russia by 2025, the Defense Ministry told the media on Russia's Space Forces Day.

    "Within the framework of implementing the program for perfecting and developing the Russian system of monitoring outer space Russia's Space Forces are pushing ahead with the effort to create a new generation of specialized ground-based system of monitoring outer space. By 2025, Russia will deploy more than 12 new laser-optical and radio-technical systems based on different principles of detecting and identifying space objects," the Defense Ministry said.

    The first laser optical system of a new generation has entered combat duty in the Altai Region. Currently the forces of the German Titov Main Test Space Center runs more than 300 advanced or upgraded systems of control of space satellites.

    Also, research is in progress into the command and measurement systems of a new generation.

    "The commissioning of unified command and measurement systems will make it possible to make the transition to new technologies of controlling Russia's orbital group of satellites and dramatically reduce the list of older generations of control systems on duty," the Defense Ministry said.

    Russia's Space Forces mark its professional holiday every year on October 4. On this day in 1957, the space era was ushered in when the first satellite was launched from the Baikonur space site.

    https://tass.com/science/1345325

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    Post  George1 Sun Nov 07, 2021 12:58 pm

    Interview of the Chief Designer of the Russian Space Control System


    November 6th, 22:45
    The news agency "Interfax" published is interesting to interview the chief designer created with the leading role of PJSC "Interstate Joint Stock Corporation" Vympel "(as part of the JSC" Concern "EKO" Almaz-Antey ") of the Russian space control systems (SKKP) Vitaly Goryuchkina. Optoelectronic complex for recognition of space objects 54Zh6 "Okno" of the Russian Space Monitoring System (SKKP) in Nurek (Tajikistan) (c) Ministry of Defense of the Russian Federation

    Russian Space Control System (SKKP) - Page 2 93005610

    Vitaly Goryuchkin, Chief Designer of the Russian Space Control System (SKKP), spoke in an interview with Interfax correspondent Artem Rukavov about the modernization of the SKKP facilities, the problem of space debris in low-Earth orbit and plans to create an international center to illuminate the space situation.


    - Vitaly Arkadievich, what is the Outer Space Control System now?

    - The outer space control system is a distributed information system, which includes a command post, a communication system and observation means: radars, optical means of both the SKKP system itself and functionally attracted from other systems, for example, a missile attack warning system: System is able to process information from the attracted optical means. And commercial organizations.

    Based on all this information, the main catalog of the outer space control system is kept, in which we store information about the current state of all near-Earth space objects, about events that have occurred, such as maneuvers, destruction, deorbiting, dangerous encounters, as well as about predicted events. All of this information is used for the benefit of the respective consumers.

    - How effective is the Russian space control system?

    - The effectiveness of the outer space control system is assessed by a sufficiently large number of indicators, such as completeness of control, accuracy and reliability of information. Today we are solving all our tasks at the level that is presented to us.

    - What are your plans for the modernization of the system and its development?

    In addition to the introduction of new surveillance equipment, it is planned to modernize all existing ones, that is, we are improving both surveillance equipment and software - their interface with the command post. In particular, we are expanding the number of tasks that they solve, as well as the types of information that they allow to receive. For all means of the space control system, these works are carried out continuously.

    - What is the overall role of the "Okno" complex in the SKKP?


    - The Okno complex in Tajikistan plays an important role, also because it is located outside the Russian Federation, which in turn expands the controlled outer space zone.

    - Was his security increased against the background of the aggravation of the situation in Afghanistan?

    - Undoubtedly.

    - In 2016, in the Altai Territory, the first of four complexes of the SKKP, planned to be created in Russia, began to work. What are the intermediate results of the complex operation?


    - The optoelectronic complex, which began to work, is one of the means of the outer space control system. The complex in Altai is working successfully, contributes to the maintenance of the catalog in volumes approximately comparable to the "Window", in terms of non-coordinate measuring information, it can even be more.

    It is envisaged to create similar complexes, which will be located in Crimea, Buryatia and in the Primorsky Territory.

    - When is it planned to deploy new means of space control system in Crimea?

    - In Crimea, work is being completed on the installation of an optical-electronic complex and it is planned that from next year it will already go on duty. In the near future, it is also planned to deploy a new optoelectronic station with a larger telescope there.

    - What orbits will they be primarily oriented to?


    The main purpose of these telescopes is to monitor high-orbit space objects. But the complexes include telescopes capable of receiving information about low-orbit small-sized objects.

    - Are the means of observing space objects being developed from space?

    - A separate direction in the development of the SKKP is, of course, the development of observational facilities. These should be tools that provide increased accuracy in collecting information, we must learn to control smaller objects. They are more difficult to control. Our goal is to know where it is, where it might go, and so on. We need some way to move the observation facilities outside the Russian Federation. Let's say some kind of agreement with friendly countries. One of the ways out of this situation is the development of space-based space control devices.

    In general, the global trend is towards the creation of orbital constellations for various purposes. Countries that cannot afford a ground-based outer space control system due to their territorial limitations are planning to put control systems into space. We have such plans, work is underway to create such a system. But in fact, the space constellation is a very expensive and very difficult tool.

    - Are you planning to install Russian SKKP complexes abroad?


    - International contractual work is underway, which provides for intergovernmental agreements on obtaining information from other systems located abroad.

    - What is this international contractual work?

    - The domestic control system is currently in rather difficult conditions, but we are trying to correspond to the current moment, to rebuild and develop its elements in order to be ready for the new challenges of tomorrow. This is a very difficult task. In general, there are two full-fledged national-level control systems in the world that solve a large volume of tasks and possess a wide range of different information means - in the United States and in Russia.

    The development of the control system must certainly be intensive, technical and scientific problems must be solved, including the use of contractual, organizational, diplomatic methods. For us, the task of trying to move the means of the control system outside the borders of the Russian Federation is especially urgent and provide information from the control system to as many information consumers as possible.

    The issue of compliance with treaty obligations is now an acute problem at the level of the United Nations, since the rules governing the use of outer space are not very clearly spelled out. In this regard, the United States is trying to go its own way, to take everything into its own hands, do not agree to any general equal treaties and dictate its own terms. Russia spoke at the UN platforms with a proposal to create an international platform for the collection and exchange of information on space objects and events.

    In Russia, we are taking the initiative to create an interdepartmental center for lighting the space situation, which will have to combine information and issue it to consumers in Russia and abroad.

    - What will be the center's work?

    - We believe that we have a large amount of information about near-earth space and this information needs to be made available, that is, not to close it, not to classify it, but on the contrary to disclose it. We must show that we have this information, that we see and control space. And so that operators and organizations have some access to this information on a par with information that they receive from the United States. This will lead to the fact that there will be several sources, the objectivity of coverage will increase, the reliability of information will increase, attention to our system will increase at the international level, including within the country, the importance and value of this information, which is necessary for the development of the system, will be more realized. We are working with Roscosmos in this direction.

    - The head of Roscosmos, Dmitry Rogozin, was just proposing to create a unified international system for monitoring space debris. How do you feel about the idea of ​​obliging the creators of satellites to bring spent vehicles out of orbit?

    - Now there is such a requirement that the creators of satellites take their satellites out of orbit. In low orbits, it can be brought down so that it burns up in the dense layers of the atmosphere. In geostationary orbit, they are lifted into higher disposal orbits. There they can exist for quite a long time, relatively without interfering with anyone. There is a requirement for the disposal of devices, but it is another matter that not all of them are fulfilled in good faith, and there are also emergencies when the device loses control.

    - In your estimation, in how many years will the space debris problem become critical?

    - There are suggestions that it has already become critical. Experts say that the so-called Kessler effect has already begun - this is when a chain reaction begins (a hypothetical development of events when the clogging of the near-Earth orbit with space debris will lead to the fact that the near space will become completely unusable - IF). This is one of the hypotheses, but with such a rate of development that we now see, with the number of devices that are being withdrawn, I believe that in the next 10 years with a high probability the situation will become very close to critical or become critical if we do not develop any then new methods to control and prevent such situations. One of the tasks of the control system is reliable high-precision tracking of a huge number of small-sized objects, so that we can avoid destruction as a result of collisions with space debris of large spacecraft, accompany launches to monitor countries' compliance with treaty obligations to minimize launch elements that become space debris. Of course, this is a global problem. In this regard, it should be solved by all together.

    There are many ideas for clearing space from existing space debris, but they are still closer to the fantastic.

    - What means of observation are the main ones for detecting and tracking space debris?

    A particularly acute problem of space debris is in the region of low orbits with heights of up to 3.5 thousand km. The collision in this area of ​​the satellites Iridium-33 and Kosmos-2251 in 2009 led to the formation of more than 600 fragments of space debris. The situation was aggravated by the tests of anti-satellite weapons of the USA and China. As a result of the defeat of the Fengyun satellite by a Chinese anti-satellite missile, more than 2,300 fragments of space debris were formed, which can be in orbits for tens to hundreds of years, creating a real threat to operating spacecraft.

    The main means of work on low-orbit space objects are radar stations. Optical observation devices do not fully provide the possibility of independent tracking of LEO space objects.

    But it is worth noting that in the region of high orbits, especially in the geostationary region, the problem is very acute.

    Small objects are a big problem for the control system. There are preliminary estimates of the number depending on the size: more than 5 cm - more than 100 thousand space objects, more than a million space objects with a size of about 1 cm.

    The radars that we have - monitoring system radars, missile attack warning radars, including the new Voronezh line of high factory readiness radars - successfully solve the tasks of tracking not too small objects.

    However, specialized powerful radars are needed, which will solve the problems of precisely monitoring small space objects.

    - How is it all calculated?

    - There are tools that assess the level of debris in outer space: specialized radars that simply look up into a narrow area and assess the intensity of the passage of the observed objects through the radar zone.

    - To what extent does the creation of satellite constellations like Starlink and OneWeb increase the risk of "clogging up" the Earth's orbit?

    “It can and does create a very big problem. Starlink is a very large, just a huge group, incomparable with everything that came before. If by 2020 the low-orbit constellation consisted of about 4-5 thousand active vehicles, including the area of ​​geostationary orbits, then in 2020-2021 SpaceX launched more than 1,300 vehicles into orbit and it is planned to launch 12 thousand vehicles in a low region with a further possibility of increasing to 40 thousand ... That is, this is an unprecedented grouping. In theory, they provide broadband Internet access from anywhere in the world, although they can solve other problems, for example, provide operational communications anywhere and solve problems for the consumer, including the military.

    The growth of the Starlink constellation leads to an increase in the number of LEO spacecraft several times, that is, the situation is already quite acute. And with an increase in the grouping, the probability of collisions will proportionally increase. If there are several collisions, each of which will generate up to several thousand objects, then this can lead to irreversible consequences.

    It should also be borne in mind that these devices are valid for five years. Accordingly, out of 12 thousand satellites every year, 2,400 must be de-orbited in order to burn up in the dense layers of the atmosphere and launch as many new satellites to take the place of those that have failed. All this gives rise to new launch fragments, a lot of active orbital motion, that is, it will be a rather tense and complex situation that will be quite difficult to control.

    - What ways out of this problem can be?

    - More attention to the spacecraft constellation is not something that we will find ourselves with after a while, but an upward long-term trend that is constantly involving new players.

    The technologies of mass production devices, cluster launch technologies are being mastered. All this simplifies and reduces the cost of launching a payload into outer space. Many states, companies and organizations are already planning to withdraw their large groupings of vehicles. In conditions of insufficient orbital motion regulation, this can lead to a problem. Good regulation requires both a technical control base and a legal base, which at the moment also requires significant development and elaboration at the international level.

    - Are American military satellites being monitored in low Earth orbit? Western media write about the sending of equipment to the ISS to track the launches of hypersonic missiles, which will subsequently be installed on satellites in low orbit.

    - We follow closely and attentively all spacecraft, including American ones. Of course, the Ministry of Defense of the Russian Federation pays more attention to foreign vehicles that have signs of military and dual-use.

    Yes, the Americans are developing and developing their own space warning echelon that can detect both ballistic and hypersonic vehicles. The constellation should include up to 28 spacecraft equipped with optical information transmission facilities. Some of the devices provide a transport bus, providing the ability to instantly receive information from any spacecraft and bring information to the consumer anywhere in the world. This project demonstrates approaches to the development of space infrastructure, ensuring its reliability, continuity and globality. The involvement of such companies as SpaceX and L3Harris in the creation of space systems will provide an opportunity for a fast and high-quality deployment of the group.

    We are now witnessing a technological revolution in space exploration, which is already leading to a radical change in the use of near-Earth space by the world community and to an explosive growth in the number of space objects and space debris in low and high orbits. The domestic control system of outer space is one of the key elements of presenting objective information about the state of the entire space constellation.

    The rapid development of technologies does not stop and it is very difficult to predict the appearance for a rather long period of time and makes us look for ways to develop the domestic SKKP without stopping. Chief Designer of the Russian Space Control System (SKKP) Vitaly Goryuchkin (c) PJSC "Interstate Joint Stock Corporation" Vympel "

    https://bmpd.livejournal.com/4425915.html

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    Russian Space Control System (SKKP) - Page 2 Empty Re: Russian Space Control System (SKKP)

    Post  Hole Sun Nov 07, 2021 1:09 pm

    Russian Space Control System (SKKP) - Page 2 000187
    Add to that the complex in Crimea.

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