TR1 wrote:Mindstorm, can you elaborate your thoughts on Lehman?
My though or opinions have no importance at all ,here i limit myself at refer the military historical facts as seen from the Soviet point of view; the subject obviously would require a very, very extensive coverage ,but today i have a bit of work-free time and i will attempt to cite ,in brief, some of the central points of the question.John Lehman
, after its promotion to Secretary of US Navy in 1981, immediately begun a surprising and very deep reformulation of US Navy's stance, size, composition, positioning and principles of operation
toward an significantly more "aggressive" philosophy ,with patrols patterns and high concentration of NATO naval units very near URSS's controlled sea sectors and buffer zones outside Soviet Navy's "sanctuaries".
Within less than an year and half from Lehman promotion at Secretary of the Navy in Reagan Administration - after an initial distrust by part of Soviet generals of the effective actuation of a similar [b]clearly suicide plan by part of a new appointed Secretary so young ,inexperienced and moreover devoid of any specific technical knowledge
- the new Secretary became quickly one of the most "beloved" Western figure and a sort of unexpected blessed gift occurred in URSS favour.
Among other of its "creative" gems remain also its [in]famous proposal to eventually contrast a Soviet offensive in Europe opening an opposing ground front ,firstly with a successful landing operation in...... Russia Far East and ,then, fighting theirs half-Earth long way toward Moscow through Siberia
(no surprise that among the jokes on it one the most common sounded about : "Pray the God to preserve Secretary Lehman in spirit ,in health and.....in charge"
Those are some of the grave information lacking
which ,at the beginning of '80 years, had lead to those suicide decisions
1) US military authorities had very scarce information
, if any, on the real capabilities and concept of operation of the new series of elements of RORSAT
, Upravlyaemyi Sputnik - Aktivny (US-A ) [satellites Kosmos-1176 ,Kosmos 1249 and subsequent
] and EORSAT
Upravlyaemyi Sputnik - Passivny (US-P) [satellites Kosmos 1220 ,Kosmos 1260 and subsequent
] put in orbit just in those years.
2) NATO Command
,at cause of what described in point one and of warped parameters on the weapons mounted on Soviet ships/submarines and "sleeping" layers of the new active bottom sea mines penetrated in western dossier, had practically no clue on the real average time of designation and range of engagement of allied unities by part of Warsaw Pact's air/sea/undersea based elements and....Ground Missile Forces
3) US military authorities had no idea of the dept of exposure and extension of the NATO's Navy key data compromission by part of Walker/Withworth 's spy ring
(ironically just John Lehman
was forced to admit
some years after that in those years URSS was aware of the position of NATO submarines and ships practically all time
Those are some of empiric factors linked to the Lehman's Navy doctrine
1) The backbone of NATO [b]Navy surface elements become stationed practically on a permanent basis well within engagement range of both First and Second "ring" of long range Soviet bombers
(and very often outside coverage of ground based NATO Air Force) and virtually all Soviet submarines and ships armed with P-500 and P-700 missiles
2) NATO Navy Surface AND Submarine Force was denied suddenly the Dispersion factor
that had worked up to this point as a strong complicating element for Soviet Forces to pin point theirs position and follow theirs movements ,restricting of several orders of magnitude the search area by part of Soviet air and space based sensor systems
(element that togheter with the outstanding capabilities offered by the new RORSAT/EORSAT elements and the data on position ,patrol areas and SOSUS coming from Walker/Withworth 's spy ring created a truly critical as unknow situation for NATO Navy security)
3) The very high concentration in few sectors of both nuclear powered attack and
,even more, US submarines with strategic ballistic missiles created a situation capable to put in enormous risk the entire bulk of NATO strategic delivery capabilities.
Unknow to majority of common people ,in fact, is the notion that submarines ,and in particular westren-built ones, are fatally
(at cause of the natural medium element where submarine operate - water, a shock wave conductor literally thousands of times better than
earth and hundreds better than air - and the peculiar low deepth's limit
and lack of titanium double hull
) several hundreds of times more vulnerable to thermonuclear explosions in respect to Silo based or ground mobile ICBMs
up to the point that the owning of even only a very rough positional coordinate of several dozen of km are more than sufficient to destroy them ,also in group, before those submarines would get any chance to retaliate
(theirs times of reaction and delivery are very low for strategic standards) ; the precise delivery ,just in those years ,in plain sea of 15Zh53-2 IRBM's RV had a precise validation aim.
....From what just said amyone can easily infere that Submarine only factors of protection in a full thermonuclear war scenario are : Undetectability, Dispersion and Depth
About this third point (and some references to previous ones )and the situation of those years you can read here :