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Deep Throat wrote:Nothing wrong with it but the questions related to jamming of cruise missiles were not asked .
I fear that you have not read it attentively or integrally....
To resume in the simpler way the main concept about the subject in question : any Navy a world (and even more US Navy) is perfectly aware of a series of inescapable technical problems related to jamming modern AshM and much more high supersonic ones.
Those factors differentiate substantially ECM warfare in Naval operations from Aerial ones.
1) A very basic concept
: not radiating radars are obviously completely immune to active jamming interference 
. Now a less obvious and widely known concept : to the contrary of what usually portrayed in low level debates on this subject (usually by part of people completely oblivious of the fundamental discriminating factors between defensive radar's jamming operation in air and naval operations) sophisticated high-supersonic anti-ship missiles not actually radiate AT ALL in theirs terminal phase of the engagement .
Those missiles simply proceed , executing contextually high G evasive maneuvers and employing a vast array of active and passive countermeasures, toward a pre-computed intercept point - coming from a composite radar "picture" originating from a multi-point , data sharing and crossing , pseudo random short-burst pulses by part of missiles in the pack carrying on very brief and far over the horizon pop-out maneuvers acting as momentary "missiles swarm leaders" (see under.....)- that theirs slow ,clumsy and hundreds-meters-long targets are totally incapable to avoid by any mean.
2) Jamming signal density at radiating point follow the square function of distance , therefore the widely increased range at which an high-supersonic AshM swarm can begin to proceed toward unavoidable intercept points ,without the requirements of any further target positional update, generate exponentially bigger interference's radiated power requirements and moreover easily simplify , in particular for modern adaptive high-noise amplifiers - efficiency of signal-to-noise data selection s' algorithms and active side lobe cancellation
What up said, combined with the forced area's density compression , limited mobility and..... constant altitude plane....... of the high RCS targets composing a CVBG also terribly complicate ,or even negate "tout court", if we talk of very up-to-date AShM specimens, chances to conduct successfully jamming attempts in the only effective window of exposure (pseudo-random pop-out maneuver by part of the momentary active tracking swarm's leading missiles) by part of third part assets placed on different planes and/or azimuth, like airborne one at example, for the possibility to capitalize in Dolph-Tschebysheff side lobes highly selective DoA signal processing and rejections algorithms.
This mean that the active jamming systems on board of the same targeted ships become very often the unique possible ECM option against high supersonic missiles in theirs window of exposure.
3) Active jamming chances of success against modern arrays are highly "time-sensitive" ; therefore the multi direction, pseudo-random, short-burst pulses employed by part of the high supersonic maneuvering missiles ,popping out momentarily from radar horizon to contribute at create the "composite" radar picture of the enemy naval group, immensely exacerbate the already titanic problems up exposed facing the ECM systems defending a CVBG.
For all the reason cited naval operations defenses against highly supersonic missiles capable of swarm attacks must forcibly rely almost exclusively on hard kill neutralization of the menaces and also here the very high speed and maneuvering performances and active countermeasure of such AShMs enormously contribute at render very very difficult the task.
Deep Throat wrote:This guy is from the US Army . What will he know about the Navy ? His comments are frankly sophomoric in nature .
Do you have even only listened what it actually said ?
It has cited a statement of US Navy Admiral Hyman G. Rickover the same father and conceiver of US Navy nuclear fleets !!
In spite of that cold awareness of theirs clear vulnerability in an open war against an high-end opponent it remained the bigger defender of the nuclear powered supercarriers …….and at reason, under an aggressive and expansionistic POV, seeing the immense military influence’s pressure that the US has exerted in all those years just thanks to expeditionary capability of its CVBGs.
