Russian Naval Construction Plans and Numbers

How much does the ocean fleet cost?

This entry is a proof of the previous one (ref. 1) and aims to convince doubters and strengthen their own confidence that by the middle of the 21st century Russia will be able to build a full-fledged ocean military fleet that will occupy the second strongest in the world in terms of combat capabilities, or even divide the first with the US Navy (provided that by impact power one of our ships will be equal to two American, which is quite possible). Below is a summary table, the strength and number of explanations for the cost of combat ships of the main classes and production capacities for their construction are explained.



https://navy-korabel.livejournal.com/198699.html

Construction of warships of the ocean and far sea zone for the Russian Navy as of 10/01/2018

"About emergency measures to resolve the critical problems of our surface shipbuilding"

On the web resource vpk.name published another material of Maxim Klimov "On emergency measures to resolve the critical problems of our surface shipbuilding," which outlines the author's views on this issue.

1. Critical issues:

the ships of the near zone are worn out, outdated, have actually lost their combat significance;

the ships of the far zone are outdated, worn out, the roads are in operation, only a few are left, the ship "collapse" in the early 2020s is inevitable.

new projects and modernization:

frigates of project 22350 - ordered 4, yes, we need a larger ship (project 22350M) - but we don’t have a power plant for it so far, so it’s advisable to increase the 22350 series (at least to 6 - 3 for the Northern Fleet and 3 for the Pacific Fleet);

Corvette 20386 is a vicious concept, extremely weak weaponry, but the main thing is not even this, but the fact that a number of fundamental technical problems regarding the functioning of this project as a combat system have not been solved yet.

Large landing ship project 11711 - with all the flaws of the project today is the most effective project for the far zone (+ such ships are needed just for the functioning of the Navy), and therefore it is absolutely incomprehensible to limit the series to 2 units (and one on the NF), the required minimum is 2 units 11711 (and modernized with enhanced weapons!) As part of the Black Sea Fleet and Pacific Fleet, with a constant bothering in the far zone (Indian Ocean) of one such LLS;

Project 22160 patrol ship - a scam by SPKB and a number of persons - everything is clear by the shortage of speed, after the seaworthy it will be clear (which is already clear now) and on the extremely limited seaworthiness on the use of helicopters and boats; however, the main thing is a vicious and erroneous concept - new threats and conditions require the use of much stronger ships in the far zone;

Minesweeper Project 12700 is an outdated concept, in fact, it is “a ship before the first modern mine” (on which either the fuel pump itself or its only TNPA will be blown up) + problems with the production of a power plant (PJSC “Zvezda”);

The Project 22800 is the most successful project of the present, but ... it actually was not needed by the Navy (since the upgrading of Project 1234 would be much more effective, and not for Uran, but for Caliber!, With the critical problem of the Navy unsecured anti-submarine defense in the near zone) + problems with the power plant (PJSC "Zvezda");

Large anti-submarine ships of project 1155 - modernization is late - because “Tighten up” the maximum service life of cable routes + high operating costs, it is advisable to limit the modernization (“Caliber” - to regular PU KT-100, repair of the air defense system with new units from “Tor”, repair of power plant, new radar, “Minotaur” ...);

Heavy nuclear missile cruisers project 11442(M) is terribly expensive, and the concept of this modernization is wrong (the “new Yamato”), obviously the modernization of other ships on this project is impossible financially and inexpedient for operational reasons (what Yamato against aviation in 1945 showed exhaustively) .

A good option would be a normal modernization of 20380 (“Caliber” on inclined launchers, a “tower” with a radar from 22800, etc.), but Almaz Central Design Bureau “rested” in 20386 ...

At the same time, the “near zone” is simply “naked” - both in the part of the anti-submarine defense (PLO) and in the mine defense (PMO), and according to the “long-range” collapse awaits us in the coming years.


2. Solution.

It is obvious that the Navy and the military-industrial complex are critically necessary mass series of efficient ships - both for the near and far zones.

And that "that is" is advisable:

an increase in the 22350 series by at least another 2 units (3 each in the NF and PF);

11771 series increase by 2 units (for the Black Sea Fleet and Pacific Fleet);

project 22160 - not to lay new ones, but the only effective opportunity to use the constructed and pledged ones is to ensure the safety of the Nord Stream route;

taking into account the actual situation with the power plants, contacts to the Far Eastern 22800 should be canceled, and the already constructed small missile ships (in the “west”) should be completed by using diesel engines and the small output that Zvezda can provide - there are simply no other options;

modernization of the MRK pr.1234 continue with the equipment of the “Kalibr” KRO (with inclined PU);

modernization of 12700 in the process of mass production (with the completion of the first buildings) with the elimination of existing shortcomings

The main thing - we need new projects:

OVR Corvette;

expeditionary frigate "far zone";

A new minesweeper (Base minesweeper and in the future - mine-hunter).

Due to deadlines, “shipbuilders” blame contractors, but there are “parts” that can reliably be counted on and provide for the emergency construction of ships, and prevent a “ship collapse” in the early 2020s. At the same time, it is obvious that, taking into account the financial situation, the cost of new ships should be strictly limited.

The most acute situation on the TLO near zone. From what you can reliably count on - "Kolomna" (GEM) and "Minotaur". The project on which you can quickly “assemble” (and according to the “org. Scheme of Karakurt” - through the State Contract with the plant for construction) is the “small Cheetah”. The real (as shown by "Karakurt") term from "start" to GI is 3 years. At the same time, it is advisable to conduct the construction and delivery of ships in pairs (“half-division”) - taking into account the specific features of the application (group tactics).

Similarly, by “far-field ship” (“expeditionary frigate”) - “assemble” something that can be quickly and reliably calculated. The power plant is obviously diesel (Kolomna), (3xDRA12000). At the same time, it is important to lay down the possibility to install the planned GES 20386 on subsequent ships of the series (so as not to "throw out the results of the ROC" in the basket). At the same time, the term from “start” to GI of 4.5 years is real.

The closest conceptual analogue is a massive (more than 50 hulls) series of the OBV Navy Corps of the People's Republic of China, Project 056.


Tab1
MSCH 12700 has 3 key drawbacks:

the outdated concept of the MIP (ship “before the first modern mine”);

knowingly unsecured actual explosion resistance;

inability to solve multipurpose tasks (at least at the level of pr.266M).

+ to this - problems with a series of diesel engines (real capabilities of PJSC "Zvezda" - one set per year). Obviously, ships are needed, but they need modernization.

In this situation, there is simply no alternative to the emergency series of radio-technical equipment based on the project 10750E (with import substitution and increase in performance characteristics). The organizational chart is similar to “Karakurt” (through the state contract with the plant).

In addition, the new minesweeper project of moderate displacement (about 500 tons) is definitely needed, which really provides a way to a new level of software and meets the highest requirements. But until we get the experience of using (including extended tests and research drills) with new mine action equipment and radio-technical equipment, we can’t even write a valid TTZ for a new PMHC today.

Note. It is advisable to strictly limit the cost of new projects ships:

Minehunter 2.5 billion rubles;

OVR corvette 5 billion rubles;

“Expeditionary frigate - 15-20 billion rubles.


3. Organizational issues

There is simply no alternative to the use of diesel engines in order to resolve the issue with the power plant of pr.22800, despite all the “assurances” of officials.

Option - the use of diesel engines M507 with Small anti-submarine ships (with their replacement with OVR corvettes) provides already constructed and laid-off Small rocket ships, even taking into account the capabilities of one “Star”, i.e. This is a reliable and guaranteed solution to the problem.

At the same time, it is advisable to raise the question of “BU” not only for 507 vehicles, but also for everything possible - for example, the artillery at the stern of the Small anti-submarine ships and Small anti-submarine ships (naval personnel) is in quite good condition and with a large resource it makes a lot of sense other fleets) use it on new ships. Similarly, permission to use, in agreed cases, products for general industrial use or those with a Register.

Given the situation and the "legal conditions", this decision (resolution) can be made only by the Supreme Commander. Accordingly, it is advisable to urgently prepare a report and documents on these issues.

https://bmpd.livejournal.com/3416084.html

Suggestions above is author's personal views

Translation maybe isnt good in some points