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    Russia's naval doctrine and strategy

    SeigSoloyvov
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    Post  SeigSoloyvov on Wed Sep 09, 2020 8:30 pm

    RTN wrote:
    Mindstorm wrote:I mean an insulated FFGx against an attack by LRASM delivered by carrier aircraft ? Probably between soft and hard suppression defensive systems no less than 35 incoming missiles within a very low time window, with a very high percentage of no "leakers" in the salvo.
    An adapted 155mm M109 Paladin howitzer, under the control of the Advanced Battle Management System (ABMS), shot down a cruise missile during exercise.

    Once the land version goes into production we can develop a similar naval gun as well. This is a very cost effective way to shoot down several cruise missiles.

    In all fairness the BQM-167 Skeeter which was the simulated target goes at most 0.93 Mach, A Kaliber does between 2.5 or 2.9

    That's a massive difference and you forgot the mention the Paladin missed a shit ton before it finally got a lucky hit and that was the only hit in the entire exercise via the Paladin.

    In an attack with multiple missiles and much faster missiles that idea would be dead weight.

    This was just a research concept nothing more and it will not see the light of day.
    GarryB
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    Post  GarryB on Thu Sep 10, 2020 5:22 am

    An adapted 155mm M109 Paladin howitzer, under the control of the Advanced Battle Management System (ABMS), shot down a cruise missile during exercise.

    Once the land version goes into production we can develop a similar naval gun as well. This is a very cost effective way to shoot down several cruise missiles.

    I would agree, and it is a useful technology to be moving forwards with, but in 1982 when the British sent a force to retake the Falkland islands they had a variety of ships with a variety of weapons... from the archaic Sea Slug and Sea Cat, to the modern and impressive Sea Wolf and equally impressive (on paper) Sea Dart.

    The Sea Wolf was shown in tests to be able to hit a 114mm artillery shell in mid flight... so in theory any group of ships where one ship was armed with Sea Wolf should have been safe from an attack by Exocet missiles.

    Didn't work out that way.

    But the Russians are working on guided shells and airburst rounds for intercepting flying objects with large calibre rounds... when they are flying level and straight they are relatively easy targets so firing shells at them makes a lot of sense.... even at distances like 50km away a 152mm air burst shell could shatter a low flying subsonic cruise missile if it is flying straight and level and not changing speed... a four round burst that brackets the area the missile is going to be in when the rounds arrive would be very efficient and cheap... and forcing enemy missiles to start manouvering at greater distances will reduce their effective range and energy...

    But it is always easier to attack.

    In all fairness the BQM-167 Skeeter which was the simulated target goes at most 0.93 Mach, A Kaliber does between 2.5 or 2.9

    Also very true... but not all targets are as capable as the Kalibr... having gun shells you can fire at the easy targets frees up more missiles and more missile guidance channels to engage the harder ones.

    It would be interesting though... because airburst rounds that spew 10kgs or more of ball bearings in the air in front of an incoming threat could be useful if you can get some material in the path of the weapon... in that case its own speed would count against it...

    As they might say.. not hugely likely to work but ...worth a shot... Smile

    That's a massive difference and you forgot the mention the Paladin missed a shit ton before it finally got a lucky hit and that was the only hit in the entire exercise via the Paladin.

    So a bit of work to do...

    The irony is that with EM technology guns are going to become much more interesting soon...

    And they are always versatile.

    You can fire warning shots at Pirates... or you can just sink them.... Smile

    In an attack with multiple missiles and much faster missiles that idea would be dead weight.

    I think there are a lot of other situations that ship, or Russian ships could be involved in that don't involve enormous numbers of hypersonic weapons attacking them... in which case a gun can be more than just dead weight... it can be useful.

    Hell... the Bulgarians and Russians had a joint venture in the 1980s to create a jamming round for the 152mm calibre guns... you fire it like a normal round... they reach about 22km but will jam SW and VSW radio communications to disrupt enemy command and control within a 700m radius of where the shell lands for 1 hour.

    They created a 122mm calibre model too.

    How hard would it be to put a jammer or decoy emitter into a shell that can be fired away from the ship to distract incoming missiles... you could give it wings and basic propulsion and make it a UAV that flys around for an hour or two emitting a jamming signal.... the incoming missiles might home on jam but the likelyhood of them actually hitting such a small target would be very low so it could keep operating for long periods and distract several enemy missiles... if it is a 152mm calibre you could fire the round 70km away from the ship... and soon 170km away from the ship...

    This was just a research concept nothing more and it will not see the light of day.

    That is a shame for the US because the potential is enormous even if the actual results to date are not impressive...
    Tsavo Lion
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    Post  Tsavo Lion on Thu Sep 10, 2020 8:15 am

    They are laying down two helicopter carrier landing ships which will require fixed wing air cover to have any chance of ever actually being useful... that alone requires aircraft carriers.- they won't operate out of range of land based aviation, either deployed or at home bases. wrote:
    Russia has no alternative overland trade routes that don't go through hostile countries...- China, Mongolia, Kazakhstan, Belarus, NK, & later Japan & SK that will stop being hostile after railroads/bridge/tunnels r built & opened.

    It is experimental... even if it only had one AWACS plane and one Inflight refuelling plane that would be fine for testing.... AEW can continue to be done by Ka-31.- I'm surprised they didn't start working on the Yak-44 or its follow on again.

    Sitting duck my ass... what sitting duck carries 12 supersonic 7.5 ton anti ship missiles and well over 200 SAMs to defend itself... including about 12 30mm 6 barrel gatling guns? And that ignores the Fighter aircraft it carries...- the USS Vincennes that shot down the Iranian A-300 wasn't a sitting duck either, but u keep saying an AWACS is needed to avoid that. W/o it, it may become an ugly duck after its group shoots down a civilian plane by mistake.
    F-18E/Fs, B-52s, P-8s & U-2s can also detect surface ships from high altitudes. https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Boeing_F/A-18E/F_Super_Hornet#Specifications_(F/A-18E/F)
    https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Boeing_B-52_Stratofortress#Specifications_(B-52H)
    https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Boeing_P-8_Poseidon#Specifications_(P-8A)
    https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Lockheed_U-2#Specifications_(U-2S)

    Some B-1Bs or B-2s could be given more powerful surface search radars as well:
    https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Rockwell_B-1_Lancer#Specifications_(B-1B)
    https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Northrop_Grumman_B-2_Spirit#Specifications_(B-2A_Block_30)
    marcellogo
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    Post  marcellogo on Thu Sep 10, 2020 10:25 am

    So, you are talking about guided naval gun rounds and limit yourself to american failures without EVER mentioning VULCANO and DART that are actually operative and work flawlessly at a fraction of cost? Mad
    Have we Italians in the forum to be offended or what?
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    Post  Sujoy on Thu Sep 10, 2020 10:58 am

    GarryB wrote:But the Russians are working on guided shells and airburst rounds for intercepting flying objects with large calibre rounds...
    152mm guided shells - Impressive! Which ones are these? Are these guided shells only for the Army or also the Navy?

    GarryB wrote:even at distances like 50km away a 152mm air burst shell could shatter a low flying subsonic cruise missile if it is flying straight and level and not changing speed... a four round burst that brackets the area the missile is going to be in when the rounds arrive would be very efficient and cheap... and forcing enemy missiles to start manouvering at greater distances will reduce their effective range and energy...
    If those incoming missiles are capable of High G manouvering then probably they can't be hit. Hypersonic cruise missiles will probably have High G manouvering capabilities.
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    Post  LMFS Yesterday at 3:25 pm

    A piece by Alexander Shishkin, shipbuilding engineer and author of navy-korabel.livejournal.com, related to our previous discussions in this thread and with solid information about OTH targeting, naval strike and employment of naval aviation in VMF vs. USN scenarios:

    Are Russian missiles capable of hitting an American aircraft carrier?

    18 November 2019, 18:10

    The tactical anti-ship cruise missiles (OTN anti-ship missiles) 3M55, 3M45 and 3M70 of the Onyx, Granit and Vulkan missile systems are rightfully considered the pride of the Russian Navy. However, there is an opinion that their outstanding flight range (500-700 km) is not provided with reliable target designation, and therefore is useless in practice.

    In other words, it is generally accepted that the means of destruction available to Russia (which the media call nothing other than "aircraft carrier killers") are almost meaningless in modern conditions. And all due to the fact that the Navy does not have the tools necessary to guide long-range missiles. They say that the Tu-95RTs reconnaissance and target designation aircraft and the space group, which in Soviet times solved this problem, no longer exist, and the new system has not been created. This means that in a real confrontation with the US Navy, Russian sailors will fire missiles at aircraft carriers "with their eyes closed" (without seeing the target). Needless to say, in such circumstances, there can be no question of any successful attacks and targeted hits.

    Is it really? Let's try to figure it out. Let's leave behind the scenes the A-50 / A-100 radar patrol and guidance aircraft (RLDN) and the Sunflower over-the-horizon radar station tied to the shore. Let us consider only those means that make it possible to counter the most dangerous surface enemy of the Russian Navy - the American aircraft carrier strike groups (AUG) in the open ocean.

    In space

    At present, a grouping of spacecraft (SC) of the newest system of maritime space reconnaissance and target designation (MCRTs) "Liana" is being formed in near-earth orbit. Its predecessor ("Legend"), despite the chronic  understaffing,  for 33 years  regularly provided  intelligence to the main headquarters of the Navy, the headquarters of the fleets and directly ships - carriers of anti-ship missiles.

    According to open information, the Liana should include two Pion-NKS radar reconnaissance spacecraft (RLR) and two Lotos-S radio-technical reconnaissance (RTR) spacecraft. Two regular "Lotos" are already in their orbits (launched in 2017–2018). The launch of the Peonies is expected in 2019–2020. Satellites of two different types are needed to make the intelligence more reliable.

    A constellation of four spacecraft operating in sun-synchronous orbits with an altitude of 900 km is capable of providing a daily (once every 24 hours) survey of any point on the planet, if the swath of each spacecraft is equal to the turn-to-turn interval at the equator with a small (10%) overlap , i.e. about 800 km.

    This value and even its doubling (up to 1600 km) can be considered easily achievable taking into account the fact that: 1) the small Russian RLR satellite  "Condor" with a  mass of 1150 kg has a swath of 1000 km (500 km each to the left and to the right of the flight path); 2) the swath of the radar of the outdated American Lacrosse spacecraft is estimated at 2 × 1000 = 2000 km; 3) the reconnaissance band of the US Air Force RTR satellites "Ferret" was already in the 1980s about 6000 km. Moreover, taking into account the approximately threefold superiority of passive (radio-technical) spacecraft over active (radar) spacecraft in width of view, it can be assumed that four Liana satellites will be able to cover a strip with a total width of 12800 km (2 × 1600 RLR and 2 × 4800 RTR).

    This means that the number of flights of the spacecraft of the new ICRC system over the same point of the World Ocean in one day can reach four, and the time interval between flights can reach six hours. During this time, the US Navy AUG can travel only 120 miles (220 km) on an economic run. Theoretically - in any direction, but in wartime - without changing the combat course (for example, for rapprochement with the enemy's naval strike group, the coordinates of which were obtained from their space forces). Thus, the six-hour data obsolescence should not critically affect the results of missile firing of the naval strike group (KUG) of the Russian Navy.

    In addition, if necessary, the position of the spacecraft orbital plane can be corrected using low-thrust engines, namely, it can be shifted in the direction of the Earth's rotation (from west to east). Then at each new loop the satellite will catch up with the AUG leaving from under it and, in fact, "hang" over the enemy ships (pass over them once every 103 minutes).

    It is clear that in the event of a major war, the orbital groupings of the belligerent parties will be quickly destroyed, and the data received from them will be hopelessly outdated within a day.

    To restore the efficiency of space reconnaissance and target designation, it will be necessary to launch backup spacecraft. You can forget about cosmodromes (priority targets for a nuclear missile strike). The best approach would be intercontinental ballistic missiles capable of launching a payload of the order of 3300/3800 kg (the mass of the US-P / US-A spacecraft of the Legend system).

    Unfortunately, the least vulnerable (mobile) missile systems (ICBMs) Topol-M, Yars and Bulava have a throw-weight of less than 1200-1400 kg (for Sineva 2000/2800 kg). The heavy "Voevoda" and "Sarmat" with 10 warheads are the "sacred cows" of the Strategic Missile Forces, the main weapon of retaliation, and are unlikely to be used for other purposes. The most suitable candidates for the role of a hot reserve, perhaps, can be considered the silo launch rockets  Strela (based on the UR-100N UTTKh ICBM) and  Dnepr  (based on Voevoda), but with light RLR spacecraft of the Kondor type ...

    Above the water

    It is generally accepted that even in the absence of space target designation, the US Navy's AUG has phenomenal combat capabilities - sometimes  we are talking  about a depth of defense of 1500 km (this is the opinion of the former commander of the Russian Black Sea Fleet, Admiral Komoedov). In fact, the carrier-based aircraft RLDN (AWACS) E-2C / D "Hawkeye", loitering at a "typical" distance from the aircraft carrier of 320 km (200 statute miles) at an altitude of 9400-11 300 m, is capable of confidently (when the onboard radar is active mode) to detect targets of the "missile cruiser pr. 1164" type at the range of the radio horizon. In other words, 410-450 km from the patrol line or 730-770 km from the center of the order of the aircraft carrier group.

    In the passive mode (radio direction-finding), the detection range is approximately doubled, but the information received loses in reliability. This unreliability can be exacerbated by enemy countermeasures, including limiting the operation of radio-electronic equipment for radiation and distorting radio-technical portraits of ships.

    Theoretically, "Hawkeye" can detect the operating RES at a distance of 1200 km from the AUG. In this case, after additional reconnaissance of targets by the Growlers (EA-18G), the strikes by the Harpoons from the Super Hornets (F / A-18E / F) will follow - wave after wave, which will not be so easy to reflect. At the same time, the aircraft carrier strike group, maneuvering accordingly, may simply not allow the Russian KUG, which is moving under continuous attacks from carrier-based aircraft, to reduce the distance and approach the rocket firing range.

    However, being an excellent means of long-range reconnaissance, the Hawkeye also acts as an unmasking feature of the AUG. Radiation from the powerful E-2 airborne radar will be immediately detected by the radio-technical means of the KUG of the Russian Navy. After the discovery of a carrier-based RLDN aircraft, patrolling tacks 160 km (100 st. Miles) perpendicular to the course of the aircraft carrier group, it will be possible to determine the bearing on the AUG and the distance to it. Further advancement of the anti-aircraft KUG in the radar silence mode (using from time to time only short intra-squadron communication) will give it a chance to covertly approach the anti-ship missile launch line.

       Additional opportunities to counter the AUG of the Russian Navy will receive after the adoption of the anti-ship missile system 3M55M ( Onyx-M ) with a range of 800 km and the completion of the repair of the Admiral Kuznetsov.

    The Su-33s based on Kuznetsov are, among other things, capable of: 1) performing the functions of a combat air patrol (BVP), patrolling for two hours at a distance of 250 km from the shipborne aircraft carrier group; 2) using the N001 airborne radar (SUV " Sword "), to detect aircraft carriers at a distance of 350 km, fighters - at a distance of 150 km; 3) attack air targets with R-27P missiles   from a distance of 110 km.

    The practical application of the Su-33 in the initial phase of an aircraft carrier battle can be represented as follows. Having received a warning about radiation from the "Hawkeye" from the L-150  "Pastel" station , the patrol fighter calls a pair on duty for additional reconnaissance and destruction of the RLDN aircraft and "Hornets" BVP, followed by the identification of the location and course of the AUG, after which the first of the two rises from the aircraft carrier shock squadrons MiG-29K (accompanied by the Su-33) for a missile attack.

    As for reconnaissance ships, due to their low combat stability, they are not very suitable for operational target designation in wartime, but they are indispensable for compiling a database of radio technical portraits of potential enemy ships. Without such portraits, the work of passive intelligence means is impossible.

    Under water

    The main advantage of the submarine forces is stealth, which makes the submarine a priority means of dealing with the AUG. In the event of the outbreak of global hostilities, the task of updating the space target designation data received by the atomic submarine cruisers (APCR) pr. 949A and 885 deployed in the ocean during the threatened period will require the use of an onboard sonar system.

    The detection range of surface ships by modern high-power SACs in the noise direction finding mode is kept in strict confidence. It can only be argued that it is not lower than that of MGK-540 Skat-3, which is twice as  powerful  as its predecessor in terms of energy potential (MGK-500 Skat, 230 km).

    It turns out that even the APCR pr. 949A with the "Granit" SCRC can independently detect the enemy's AUG at a distance commensurate with the firing range of their anti-ship missiles (460 and 500 km, respectively). At the same time, submarine cruisers patrolling at low noise speeds (5-10 knots) on the target movement route identified by the ICRC will remain outside the detection and destruction zone of multipurpose nuclear submarines that provide anti-submarine defense of the AUG, being ahead of the order at a distance of about 100 nautical miles (185 km) ...

    The fact that the submarine, forced to move at the same (much noisier) speed as the aircraft carrier formation it covers (20 knots), will inevitably be detected first, and the range of its weapons (MK 48 torpedoes) does not exceed 50 km.

    Besides...

    A new big war at sea, for which one must prepare in order to avoid it (si vis pacem, para bellum), of course, will not be reduced only to battles between aircraft carrier and anti-aircraft forces. In all naval theaters of operations, clashes will occur between naval formations that do not have RLDN aircraft. Their duties will have to be taken over by deck helicopters.

       Using shipborne helicopters for additional reconnaissance of the AUG is not only useless, but also harmful.

    Even the modernized Ka-27M can detect enemy surface ships at a distance of no more than 250 km, and fighter-type air targets - 70 km (Ka-27M) and 100-150 km (Ka-31), being at an altitude of 3500 m. 200 km from their carriers. This is much worse than the capabilities of the Hawkeye. In other words, a patrol helicopter loitering at the front line in front of the KUG will only contribute to its earlier detection by the enemy.

    It's another matter if the KUG is opposing a similar naval grouping of the navies of the NATO countries, consisting of destroyers and frigates. In this case, the Ka-27M will be able to provide target designation for firing anti-ship missiles of the Onyx (albeit not at full range), Caliber (3M54 anti-ship missiles), Uranus and Moskit complexes. Instead of deck helicopters or together with them (for a preliminary control center), radar systems of the Monument type can be used with a passive channel with a surface target detection range of at least  450 - 500 km.

    Even diesel-electric submarines of the previous generation (project 636.3) with MGK-400M "Rubicon-M" are capable of attacking enemy ships at over-the-horizon ranges from under the water  . The export version of this complex in the noise direction finding mode can detect NK at a distance of 100 km. Taking into account that this parameter should be noticeably higher for its own fleet (125-150 km), the detection range of the newest SJSC Lira (NNS project 677) with large-area noise direction-finding antennas may well reach 250-300 km.

    Conclusion

    It would be strange if the ammunition (in our case, the rocket) was developed by itself, and not in conjunction with the weapon control system, which ensures its use for a given range. This article certainly contains some inaccuracies and even errors caused by a lack of reliable source information. However, the picture as a whole is as follows - accurate target designation for firing operational-tactical anti-ship missiles of the Russian Navy at the maximum (over-the-horizon) range is possible and is ensured in practice.

    https://vz.ru/opinions/2019/11/18/1004334.html
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    Post  Arrow Yesterday at 4:14 pm

    Very interesting. There is nothing in the text about the 3M22 missiles, the range of which exceeds 1000 km, and almost any new VMF ship can be armed with Cirkon. There are OTH radars that can detect ships at distances of thousands of kilometers. Missiles such as the P-800 and 3M22, and even the older P-700, can steer themselves. They just need rough coordinates.

    The question is when will Russia become a navy power?
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    Post  LMFS Yesterday at 7:42 pm

    Arrow wrote:There are OTH radars that can detect ships at distances of thousands of kilometers.

    The author was focusing on an open ocean confrontation, so OTH and such land based assets were removed from the equation. Navy is a power projection tool, so that is the proper approach IMHO.

    The question is when will Russia become a navy power?

    This guy's blog is named "Open ocean fleet: third attempt", so he is precisely following the development of the VMF into a force of global reach. It may sound pretentious now to aim to that and in fact that would be one of the biggest success of the USN, deterring other navies from even trying to confront them, but all indicates VMF command has a clear idea that the navy needs to be capable of operating autonomously far from Russian shores and what needs to be done to develop it in that direction. New carriers will take 15 years to be available. No substantial amount of modern ocean-going vessels / attack subs / modern aviation will be available before 2030, most probably. In the meantime Russia cannot push a confrontation with US in the open oceans beyond the point of showing a certain deterring capability (that means, the USN would have the upper hand but they would most likely pay a high price in case of an actual armed exchange with the VMF). Thankfully Russia does have a sizeable missile advantage that will help them bridge the period of time until the shipbuilding industry is brought up to speed. As far as I see it, what they need the most in terms of fleet vs fleet, open ocean confrontation is a RLDN / AEW aircraft of much better characteristics of what they have and strike capabilities / high-end air launched AShMs adapted to their Su-33/MiG-29K.
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    Post  Tsavo Lion Yesterday at 8:09 pm

    The USA borders only on 3 countries, 2 of them on land while the RF borders on the USA in the Bering Strait & 13 on land + Japan near the Kurils.
    At best, she's ~75-80% continental & 20-25% naval power now. Even if she never gets above 50% in naval power, it'll be enough.
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    Post  Isos Yesterday at 9:25 pm

    Russia has always considered its navy as the least important compared to air force and land force.

    Now their priority for the navy is nuclear deterrence and kalibr numbers.

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    Post  Tsavo Lion Yesterday at 9:34 pm

    And having enough ships/subs  to defend the NSR, SSBN bastions, & LHDs to defend her coasts & interests elsewhere.
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    Post  Arrow Yesterday at 9:41 pm

    o he is precisely following the development of the VMF into a force of global reach. wrote:

    VMF is not developing as a global force, but to defend Russia's coastal zones. The reactivation of the old destroyers is not very good evidence of the development of Russian shipyards. This suggests that they are unlikely to enter the world's oceans soon.
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    Post  LMFS Today at 12:43 am

    To the naysayers: read the Russian naval strategic development documents, I cannot provide better proof than that about the views and plans of the people calling the shots. 22350, 22350M, modernised 1155 and 1144, the 1164, the Kuznetsov are all ocean going ships. VMF spends a significant amount of time very far from the Russian shores, read their fleet commanders' interviews in Krasnaya Zvezda. They are highlighting the role of SSNs and Tsirkon in sub-strategic deterrence too, that means they plan to park their subs in front of US if the need comes and that requires a significant amount of them and all their supporting assets. Examples signalling their intent are quite abundant.

    Of course it will take time, the industry must rebuild completely. Of course the first priority is always survival (or militarily speaking, strategic deterrence), but once that is ensured, the development of the navy as the way to enable Russia to establish relationships with other countries and its strategic relevance in the long run is clear for Russian leadership and perfectly enshrined in those documents. Russia is no conversely "exceptional" country that does not need to trade and to make allies as much as possible. Strategically it cannot voluntarily create a void for US, China or other powers to fill it and use the money and influence resulting from it to harm them. The competition between the big world powers will take place in Eurasia and abroad, this is a unavoidable principle of geostrategy. Russian leadership are only being humble and unbiased enough to admit they will need to take part in that struggle too, if they are to preserve Russia's development and hence security in the long run.

    The fact that Russia has failed several times in the attempt of creating a blue water navy in the last century only proves that they are frequently their worst enemy, not that it is technically / economically beyond their capabilities or some kind of dirty neo-colonial luxury. This approach shows a lack of perspective and an ideological blinding of the pragmatic, state-oriented kind of thinking that must be employed to guide the country and its military.

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    Post  Arrow Today at 6:38 am

    22350M does not exist. The 22350 frigate is far too little. Even that's 10 target pieces. The other ships are Soviet antiquities. Russia need more oceanic ship i think. New ship no old soviet destroyer.Are they still having trouble building the 22350 since they're upgrading the old destroyers?
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    Post  Big_Gazza Today at 7:46 am

    Arrow wrote:22350M does not exist. The 22350 frigate is far too little. Even that's 10 target pieces. The other ships are Soviet antiquities. Russia need more oceanic ship i think. New ship no old soviet destroyer. Are they still having trouble building the 22350 since they're upgrading the old destroyers?

    Soviet antiques? You mean similar to the Nimitz class where all but 3 were laid down in Soviet times?...

    The efficacy of a warship is dependent on its condition, its maintenance and how hard it has been worked, not on how old it is. Russia isn't about to throw away perfectly useable frigates like the 1155s just because they have a touch of grey around the temples...  I do too, and I've got loads of potential left Laughing

    BTW the 22350s are being built at Severnaya Verf in St Petes so modernisations of 1144/1155 don't affect their program or schedule.

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    Post  Tsavo Lion Today at 8:04 am

    Most of their 40 icebreakers can be armed & act as FFG/DDG/CGNs, if need be. Besides, dozens of container/bulk/general cargo/oil tanker ships can also get new container missile systems, turning them into CGs. 
    Ship shortage problem solved.

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    miketheterrible
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    Russia's naval doctrine and strategy - Page 7 Empty Re: Russia's naval doctrine and strategy

    Post  miketheterrible Today at 8:06 am

    That is what is done in the past too. So yeah, not like Russia is short during wartime.

    BTW, arrow and the Chinese guy in China ship thread are saying almost exact same stuff. I presume same user.

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    Russia's naval doctrine and strategy - Page 7 Empty Re: Russia's naval doctrine and strategy

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