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    Russia's naval doctrine and strategy

    Tsavo Lion
    Tsavo Lion

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    Russia's naval doctrine and strategy - Page 5 Empty Re: Russia's naval doctrine and strategy

    Post  Tsavo Lion on Fri Aug 14, 2020 6:00 am

    you can't just go blasting aircraft out of the sky because you think they are flying too close to you...
    they'll take measures to prevent it. Most civ. planes cross the N. Atlantic & N. Pacific oceans on the great circle route, not over their wider parts. VMF ships would be going South, SW & SE, crossing those air routes in a few hours at most. Russian intel will monitor all air traffic, esp. originating from potential adversaries long before they come close. Any suspicious aircraft would be contacted & warned away- if it doesn't, measures would be taken against it.

    many of those ships incl. Slava in Nikolaev could still be used, reducing the need for new ships.

    there is no current urgent need for cruisers right now.
    if CGNs weren't useful, why modernize 2 of them? ! CG was even sent to E. Med. from the Pac. Fleet- if an extra Slava was active, it would be sent there instead.

    They wouldn't suggest it and republish it if they thought it was good for Russia...
    even a stopped clock shows correct time twice during a 24 period. The article is mostly a critique of the sorry state of their canals & waterways, not a recommendation/suggestion to course of action. The Russians know it as well as Western think tanks.

    Why would they want bigger ships on the Caspian?
    How much material do you think they need to move between the Caspian and Black Seas?
    for trade to grow &/ relieve other modes of more costly transport, canals should be deepened for bigger ships/barges. Sooner or later a waterway to the Persian Gulf would be built, increasing the need for them.  

    Water is not an option in most places in Russia because for half the year it is frozen.
    no, in the W. part it's not frozen for 10.5 months: From about mid-March to mid-December, the Volga is navigable throughout most of its course, although it is subject to much flooding in May and June, when it is fed by an immense amount of melting snow. https://www.telegraph.co.uk/travel/destinations/europe/russia/articles/Russia-river-cruise-guide/
    I never heard of the Volgo-Don canal being inoperable during winter:
    https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Volga%E2%80%93Don_Canal#Operation

    So what do you say to the host country... we are too tight arsed to pay for aircraft carriers so we are going to spend enormous amounts of money on aircraft and fuel and you get to pay for it...
    it won't be that much expencive- they already have those planes & the fuel will be produced locally, with Russian help if need be.
    Poland recognized the power of the Russian Su-30SM

    what is Putin going to say if he decides to call a surprise test of Russias strategic deterrence and wants all strategic bombers in the air fully armed to test how long it takes
    Even some ex-N/AF Tu-16s/M-4s (4 r on display https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Myasishchev_M-4#Aircraft_on_display), if still in storage, could be bought from former operators & given that task; a few older Tu-95/142/22/160s could be converted for that AA role & not be part of their strategic bomber force, since the Tu-160M2 production has been restarted.


    Last edited by Tsavo Lion on Fri Aug 14, 2020 6:24 am; edited 3 times in total (Reason for editing : add text)
    GarryB
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    Russia's naval doctrine and strategy - Page 5 Empty Re: Russia's naval doctrine and strategy

    Post  GarryB on Fri Aug 14, 2020 1:27 pm

    Most civ. planes cross the N. Atlantic & N. Pacific oceans on the great circle route, not over their wider parts.

    Really.... Mr Expert... so Air New Zealand planes and planes flying from Australia flying to London fly up the Pacific coast to Japan before flying across the Pacific... what a long way to go..

    Russian intel will monitor all air traffic, esp. originating from potential adversaries long before they come close. Any suspicious aircraft would be contacted & warned away- if it doesn't, measures would be taken against it.

    Of course all air traffic over military ships will be monitored... but how do they contact any plane in particular?

    If they had an aircraft carrier they could send up fighter planes to escort it, but without fighter aircraft their only alternative is radio and who is to say anyone on board the plane is awake... and why contact them anyway... civilian planes fly over military ships all the freaken time...

    if CGNs weren't useful, why modernize 2 of them? ! CG was even sent to E. Med. from the Pac. Fleet- if an extra Slava was active, it would be sent there instead.

    Right now they can't be replaced because they have no production alternative, yet they are only bothering to upgrade two out of the four.

    even a stopped clock shows correct time twice during a 24 period. The article is mostly a critique of the sorry state of their canals & waterways, not a recommendation/suggestion to course of action. The Russians know it as well as Western think tanks.

    Which sums it up perfectly... whining bullshit from a US bias thinktank who is not trying to be constructive or helpful, but destructive and malicious....

    Which is why I didn't read it...

    for trade to grow &/ relieve other modes of more costly transport, canals should be deepened for bigger ships/barges. Sooner or later a waterway to the Persian Gulf would be built, increasing the need for them.

    Most of the stuff coming from Iran is probably going all around Russia rather than directly to Sevastopol or the Crimea... it simply makes more sense to offload it in a port in the Caspian and put it on a train and then they can send it anywhere they like.

    AFAIK they don't build the ships that operate on the Caspian in the Caspian... which means all the Russian ships that operate there sailed there anyway so they should already fit through the canals.

    Any non Russian ships in the Caspian not fitting through Russian canals... tough...

    it won't be that much expencive- they already have those planes & the fuel will be produced locally, with Russian help if need be.

    The cost would be immense and the effective coverage it would provide would be pathetic so I think it is a silly idea and I don't think they would waste time trying to make it work.

    Even some ex-N/AF Tu-16s/M-4s (4 r on display https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Myasishchev_M-4#Aircraft_on_display), if still in storage, could be bought from former operators & given that task; a few older Tu-95/142/22/160s could be converted for that AA role & not be part of their strategic bomber force, since the Tu-160M2 production has been restarted.

    Older planes have even less range and would be sitting ducks that could easily be picked off... along with their refuelling aircraft... the cost of which would be as damaging as losing a lot of ships which would also happen too... just to save a few billion dollars building aircraft carriers...

    Sorry mate, but that is just a silly idea.

    I honestly dont know whether they have fuel for the terminal phase.

    They will be flying at altitudes of 40km and above and so the terminal phase would be a dive on the target... look up any weapon manual for air to air missiles and the range of the weapon is taken into account to determine launch ranges and the launch range for Zircon will allow the missile to manage its fuel and speed and altitude to ensure it is powered to impact because that makes it more effective.

    The AShM Kalibr accelerates before impact, but that is probably to cross faster the last 15-20 km where they can actually be detected, it may be just a fast burn rocket. As to the others, having fuel for the terminal attack means more range is available if they attack relying on their kinetic energy. I really don't know.

    Well do you think the subsonic all the way Kalibr will have fuel all the way to the target... I mean it could extend its range by a few kilometres if it just shut its engine down before impact and just coasted into the target... the lack of engine noise would make it harder to hear... Rolling Eyes but it would also slow down... especially if it performs evasive terminal manouvers too.

    The Supersonic anti ship Kalibr definitely does not hit the target with its rocket motor running but that is the thing about rocket motors... they burn fast and offer huge acceleration and then you cruise to impact... at very very low altitude a slow burning rocket motor to reduce drag and help maintain speed could be used too I guess, but it wont be powering into the target like a weapon with a scramjet could.

    The space big enough to carry UKSK is better used with fighter weapons and fuel, hangar volume and so on, me thinks.

    So you think being able to push a button and launch a 91ER1 missile at mach 2.5 to attack a submarine 40km away is a bad thing?

    UKSK take depth but the area in front of the Island is fairly useless for parking planes... you might get two or three there at best, but having missiles there and also along the outer edge of the entire flight deck for SAMs of all types just makes sense... It is an extra reason for people and things to not get close to the edge between where the deck is and it is dry and where the sea is and you drown or lose an aircraft or vehicle forever...

    Covering all those functions better at longer ranges is the reason why the carrier has an air wing... if the escort is going to be there anyway, why not let it carry a few 91R rockets? Or do you propose the carrier to go alone?

    The carrier needs to be able to operate alone if need be... and a CVN might need to rush to an area perhaps with only a cruiser escort... transferring from one area to another... it makes it flexible... it doens't have to stick close to this or that ship because this or that ship has the anti sub missiles it needs for protection...

    Besides being a capital ship it is going to get the attention of all sorts, which means it will need to carry S-500s and I doubt they will be fitted to Redut launchers.

    Worst case scenario the UKSK launcher could carry an extra 32 9M96 missiles (four per tube and 8 tubes), while at other times other missiles of various types could be loaded.

    It adds flexibility.
    LMFS
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    Post  LMFS on Fri Aug 14, 2020 3:38 pm

    GarryB wrote:the launch range for Zircon will allow the missile to manage its fuel and speed and  altitude to ensure it is powered to impact because that makes it more effective.

    The missile needs a certain energy and speed to make high g manoeuvring while finishing the approach to the ship. It is not a sustained turning and really in such cases you would need to make numbers to know for sure what can be done with the kinetic energy of the missile depending on its speed, drag, approach time, needed maneouvering and so on.

    Air density at 40 km is like 1% of that at sea level. A scramjet designed to operate at that altitude is going to operate with 100 times more air going into the intake? As said previously, at low altitude and very high speed the drag and temperature the inlet and engine would create may be a serious problem, it may well be better to detach the engine completely. Also: how long the descent to target is going to take and what a difference the engine operation will make? Is it not enough to do that descent supported by gravity? Until 20-15 km altitude there is no significant drag to defeat, so the time is like what, 3-5 seconds from that altitude to target? A missile flying on a lofted trajectory at high altitude can keep very high speed for very long range and extend beyond powered range for hundreds of km. So I don't know what is considered useful range and what is not.

    So you think being able to push a button and launch a 91ER1 missile at mach 2.5 to attack a submarine 40km away is a bad thing?

    No it is not... at least the carrier has a squadron of ASW helos and maybe UAVs too offering much better coverage than what any other surface ship can have. But I think it is very unlikely that the carrier is going to be alone without a sad frigate to help. This would be unheard of.

    UKSK take depth but the area in front of the Island is fairly useless for parking planes... you might get two or three there at best, but having missiles there and also along the outer edge of the entire flight deck for SAMs of all types just makes sense... It is an extra reason for people and things to not get close to the edge between where the deck is and it is dry and where the sea is and you drown or lose an aircraft or vehicle forever...

    USN has some new VLS that can be installed at the border of the hull. There was a corvette from Krylov with some similar approach. More equipment means less space for the air wing, more cost, less reliability and more crew. I think it is not worth it and read the guys from Krylov and Nevskoe saying the same. But maybe I am wrong!

    The carrier needs to be able to operate alone if need be... and a CVN might need to rush to an area perhaps with only a cruiser escort... transferring from one area to another... it makes it flexible... it doens't have to stick close to this or that ship because this or that ship has the anti sub missiles it needs for protection...

    It adds flexibility.

    IMHO that would be very problematic, because supporting the air wing is already very space and personnel demanding. The carrier is an specialised vessel.

    BTW, excerpts from interviews with Nevskoe's Vlasov for an authoritative opinion:

    - In your opinion, in what direction will aircraft carriers evolve?
    - First of all, the automation of such a ship should be increased, its electronic armament should be improved, the means of protection (for example, anti-aircraft weapons), the habitability for the personnel who will live on this ship should be improved. The aircraft fleet and all the necessary devices and mechanisms that this aircraft fleet will operate will be improved. Together with the development of our science and technology, these ships should also "grow".

    Whether they will be big or small is not an obvious question. But be that as it may, the seaworthiness of a small ship is much lower than that of a large one. And the restrictions on aviation flights directly depend on seaworthiness.

    - In our previous conversations we talked about the fact that the desire of the fleet to "stuff" as many functions into the ship as possible is, in general, ineradicable ...
    - And today, unfortunately, there are such tendencies. We are trying to resist them. Our opinion on this issue has not changed - an aircraft carrier must be an aircraft carrier. Don't blame him for everything you can. If the ship is large, this does not mean that it has to carry everything. Usually, several ships go with an aircraft carrier, which solve all related tasks. And his business is to launch and receive aircraft back.

    In addition, saturation with various systems and weapons will automatically lead to an increase in the cost of the project. The hull of the ship, "iron" is a penny in comparison with the cost of components, radio electronics, weapons. As soon as we start to "push" something into it, the price starts to rise. This is the most intelligible argument for those who expect everything from an aircraft carrier at once.

    https://tass.ru/interviews/4965950

    Any ship formation far from its native shores in the event of full-fledged hostilities is doomed to destruction without air support.

    If it is equipped with various weapons, the price will increase dramatically, if you put only anti-aircraft systems, the cost will be less.

    https://ria.ru/20140203/992456922.html
    Tsavo Lion
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    Post  Tsavo Lion on Fri Aug 14, 2020 7:11 pm

    quote]Really.... Mr Expert... so Air New Zealand planes and planes flying from Australia flying to London fly up the Pacific coast to Japan before flying across the Pacific...[/quote]
    "most planes" isn't = all planes.

    Of course all air traffic over military ships will be monitored... but how do they contact any plane in particular? If they had an aircraft carrier they could send up fighter planes to escort it, but without fighter aircraft their only alternative is radio and who is to say anyone on board the plane is awake... and why contact them anyway... civilian planes fly over military ships all the freaken time...
    their airline & traffic controllers may also be contacted, & they better not be flying over Russian ships that can be as trigger happy as the West. Why spend $Bs on CVNs just to be nice, "talking softly & carrying a big stick"? The Russians r, or should be, like the US Marines who "can be ur best friend or ur worst enemy".

    Right now they can't be replaced because they have no production alternative, yet they are only bothering to upgrade two out of the four.
    they may keep the other 2 & upgrade them later- stay tuned!

    Which sums it up perfectly... whining bullshit from a US bias thinktank who is not trying to be constructive or helpful, but destructive and malicious....
    by the same token, they may have published it to prevent canal modernization, using reverse psychology.
    Which is why I didn't read it...
    than u better not discuss its contents; if I was so biased, I would stop reading this forum all together!

    Most of the stuff coming from Iran is probably going all around Russia rather than directly to Sevastopol or the Crimea... it simply makes more sense to offload it in a port in the Caspian and put it on a train and then they can send it anywhere they like.
    N-S trade trade corridor from India will pass via Iran & the Crimea isn't its main destination by any measure.

    AFAIK they don't build the ships that operate on the Caspian in the Caspian...
    they do in Astrahan & Baku:  http://www.cnrg.ru/en/construction/
    https://www.korabel.ru/shipbuilding/shipyard/astrahanskoe_sudostroitelnoe_proizvodstvennoe_obedinenie.html
    https://www.aoosk.ru/en/companies/jointstock-company-shipbuilding-plant-lotos-/
    http://meb.com.ua/oile/RST12Ce.html

    Any non Russian ships in the Caspian not fitting through Russian canals... tough...
    good way to lose transit & port fees on ships from Kazakhstan, Azerbaijan & Iran.

    The cost would be immense and the effective coverage it would provide would be pathetic so I think it is a silly idea and I don't think they would waste time trying to make it work.
    not as immense as having CVNs that won't be there 24/7/365 anyway. The Germans with their long range Condors covered most of the N. Atlantic where it mattered until 1944 w/o any carriers:
    https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Fliegerf%C3%BChrer_Atlantik

    Older planes have even less range and would be sitting ducks that could easily be picked off... along with their refuelling aircraft...
    they can be given newer engines & avionics to perform better; tankers will be escorted by fighters & bombers armed with AAMs can protect themselves. AN-22/124s can be motherships for UCAVs, & they don't need refuelings to cross the N. Atlantic/Pacific.
    Besides developing hypersonic AshMs, in a few years the US will put weapons in space capable of hitting CVNs anywhere at anytime. With good targeting & guidance, even SSBNs can use SLBMs to slam warheads filled with concrete/high explosives on their decks from Ks of miles away.
    Russia can expand & grow her economy w/o much trade with L. America & Africa; it will take decades, if at all, to have the volume of trade worth investing in CVNs to protect it. As the Russian saying goes, Овчи́нка вы́делки не сто́ит. Translation: Lambskin is not worth currying.
    English equivalent: The game isn’t worth the candle
    .
    https://en.wikiquote.org/wiki/Russian_proverbs#%D0%9E


    Last edited by Tsavo Lion on Fri Aug 14, 2020 9:46 pm; edited 2 times in total (Reason for editing : add text)
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    Mindstorm

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    Post  Mindstorm on Fri Aug 14, 2020 8:01 pm

    I was out on holyday for a week therefore i had not chance to follow the posts added here.

    Now i will attempt to remedy Wink


    LMFS wrote:- The offensive / defensive balance of the vessels in the scenario is skewed by the really poor anti-ship potential of the US weapons, probably a result of the mentioned land-attack specialization of the USN and lack of true competitors. The FREMM frigates could well be capable of repelling the attacks of the subsonic Harpoon / JSM missiles, but what is their capability to threat the carrier group, only armed with 16 x subsonic, 185 km ranged NSM? What would be the proportion of SAMs and offensive weapons in the Mk41 VLS, considering the limitations in number and capacities of the RAM?

    The scenario i have proposed ,using as example US Navy simply because it is the Navy at world (probably the only one...) that has put aircraft carriers to the center of its force's composition architecture, is projected in the time frame where the most advanced version of US aircraft carrier -Ford Class-, theirs air wing - F-35 - and weapon systems -such as LRASM- will be available.

    In this time window the probable loadout of weapons in MK-41 launchers of FFGX frigates, for sea superiority role and maritime strik,e (maintaining reasonable self-defence capabilities) would be likely something like 10 LRASM, 12 SM-2/6 and 40 ESSM , obviously as said the hard defeat defense layers of each frigate will include also 21 RAM and the full loadout of 57 mm MAD-FIRES corrected anti-air rounds purposely developed for destroy long range subsonic missiles.

    The engagement range of those FFGX against high displacement enemy ships will be that of the LRASM they will carry in the MK-41 VLS (ostensibly no more than 10-12 missiles for ship).


    LMFS wrote:- Cost: without making a point of contention the data proposed, there are other options that don't change the substance of the comparison but produce less exaggerated values. The FREMM is estimated to cost USN an average of $800 million per unit, limit set is $950 million. $1.28 billion for the first unit, including design modifications. Data diverge from others presented in the original post, I have not dug deeper to check which ones are better.
    https://www.defensenews.com/naval/2020/05/05/5-things-you-should-know-about-the-us-navys-new-frigate/

    A CVN like Nimitz would offer no practical difference in performance for this example and USN reports them as costing $4.5 billion. Wiki reports 8.5 billion though.

    https://www.public.navy.mil/airfor/cvn71/pages/factsandfigures.aspx

    4 squadrons F-18 would be around $2.46 B, plus $700 million for 4 x E-2D

    https://news.usni.org/2019/03/21/42021

    The proportion if we use these values would be between ca. 10 and 15 FREMM frigates per carrier, which is surprisingly low, but even so the costs of a carrier group are way higher as we know, due to the whole escorting ships involved. I have not calculated them, since in the scenario only attacks by air power were considered for the carrier fleet.

    LMFS i have used the cost of the most up-to-date aircraft carrier now available worldwide - Ford Class- to make comparison in US Navy between equals : money spent on the most advanced aircraft carrier against the same money spent on the most advanced frigate, you want to use that of the Nimitz-class that would be enormously less efficient in maritime strike cause the huge limits of take-off fuel/weapon weight and sortie for day (for the most performant Nimitz-class in war time it was 140 sorties in 24 hours for a single day of conflict).

    For FFGX i have proposed a conservatively high price of a similar ship -650 ml. dollars- if it would be constructed by US shipyards and not procured on the market exactly like happen for its aircraft carrier and if difference of prices between domestic US procurements contracts and export ones can provide a guidance ,likely the price of an US-built FFGX would be also sensibly lower than $ 650 ml.

    The costs you have proposed for Nimitz class and its air wing (even discounting the helicopter groups and transport aircraft that would easily add another 1,5 billions $) is not realistic:

    - The latest Nimitz-class constructed -USS George H.W. Bush - had a price of 6,24 billions $ in 2009 dollars , in 2020 dollars adding all the other contracts of the last decade, its price would be about 8,4 billions $
    - The air wing of F/A-18E/F of a Nimitz class (44 aircraft) would have a cost of 3,778 billions $ -the contract you have quoted is a modification to an already existing one Wink The all unit procurement price for those systems is available in the US Department Of Defence's "Program Acquisition Cost By Weapon System 2021" of February 2020

    https://www.hsdl.org/?abstract&did=834726

    - The 4 E2-D would cost 1,47 billions $.
    -The 5 Growlers about 512 millions $

    Therefore the cost in 2020 of a significantly less performant Nimitz class with its air wing (without the ASW and transport helicopters, without F-35 and without the weapons on board) is about 14,16 billions $ , therefore for the same tax-payers money US Navy could procure 17-18 FFGX on the export market or 21-22 FFGX domestically produced.

    In neither instance that Nimitz-class cariier would have a single chance to win against the other side; this is exactly the reason those anachronistic WWII's leftovers need huge complements of destroyers ,submarine, and cruisers (that furtherly worsen the cost-efficiency parameters).

    In substance carrier's aircraft, to the contrary of WWII, do not provide any relevent coverage to the naval group in a condition of modern sea warfare between peers opponents, a task that is commited to the destroyer and cruiser complement and since half of '60 years absolve the unique role of expeditionary/remote power projection missions from sea sectors against ground targets of insulated inferior enemies ,in line with the violent imperialistic doctrine at the basis of US Navy's structure.

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    thegopnik
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    Post  thegopnik on Sat Aug 15, 2020 6:44 am

    @LMFS

    The drag is not a problem for air breathable missiles as it is for HGVs, ballistic missiles or ballistic missiles with thrust vectoring.

    https://sites.google.com/site/10000planeswithfacts/x-43 "A winged booster rocket with the X-43 itself at the tip, called a "stack", is launched from a carrier plane. After the booster rocket (a modified first stage of the Pegasus rocket) brings the stack to the target speed and altitude, it is discarded, and the X-43 flies free using its own engine, a scramjet." or this stating the same thing https://www.createdigital.org.au/scramjet-super-fast-experimental-engine-no-moving-parts/

    That's different from HGVs or ballistic missiles because their engines do not kick on after they reached their own max flight ceilings and usually their terminal phases slow down.

    The temperature is not a problem that is more of a concern for the U.S. if we were to compare the HTV-2 to Avangard Laughing yeah that's a roast that wont go away. And of course someone posted here a source I think of 4000 Celsius material that was created. While an X-15 scramjet from the US reached heat over 1480 Celsius going mach 6.7 so bumping up speeds should not be that much of a heating issue for the zircon
    GarryB
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    Post  GarryB on Sat Aug 15, 2020 11:04 am

    Any non Russian ships in the Caspian not fitting through Russian canals... tough...

    Perhaps that is the key... maybe they want the canals widened so in 10 years time they can start sailing bigger ships through there to get to the Caspian Sea to extract materials from the former Soviet States and perhaps Afghanistan through a former Soviet State and therefore bypass Pakistan...

    The missile needs a certain energy and speed to make high g manoeuvring while finishing the approach to the ship. It is not a sustained turning and really in such cases you would need to make numbers to know for sure what can be done with the kinetic energy of the missile depending on its speed, drag, approach time, needed maneouvering and so on.

    A missile that uses speed for effectiveness would benefit from being powered during its dive to target...

    Air density at 40 km is like 1% of that at sea level. A scramjet designed to operate at that altitude is going to operate with 100 times more air going into the intake?

    They make air intakes adjustable for that very reason.... look at the engine of the SR-71... the cone centre of it can be moved right forward at high speed reducing incoming air to a narrow slit around the outside of the cone into the intake.... most scramjets seem to have rectangular intakes so raising the lip to create a narrow slit inlet is probably the idea there too...

    As said previously, at low altitude and very high speed the drag and temperature the inlet and engine would create may be a serious problem, it may well be better to detach the engine completely.

    Even if it is running in idle to counter some drag in the last few seconds of flight the extra mass and material will add to the impact...

    No it is not... at least the carrier has a squadron of ASW helos and maybe UAVs too offering much better coverage than what any other surface ship can have. But I think it is very unlikely that the carrier is going to be alone without a sad frigate to help. This would be unheard of.

    Having large numbers of medium helicopters with dipping sonars triangulating the location of enemy subs is very useful but once the targets location has been approximated a mach 2.5 ballistic rocket will cover 40km in less time than it would take a torpedo or a helicopter to cover that distance... and it would mean those subs could continue listening for other targets and perhaps listen to the engagement to ensure a kill or request a follow up shot...

    A 90K ton aircraft carrier can carry dozens of UKSK launchers without problem... there will be plenty of corners with the space needed...

    USN has some new VLS that can be installed at the border of the hull. There was a corvette from Krylov with some similar approach. More equipment means less space for the air wing, more cost, less reliability and more crew. I think it is not worth it and read the guys from Krylov and Nevskoe saying the same. But maybe I am wrong!

    Apart from the hatches, these systems should have electronic monitoring systems and not need under deck access to check individual missiles like the Rif and Klintok missiles before them.

    Having 300+ short range SAMs sitting in launch tubes ready to go is vastly cheaper and more effective than trying to keep aircraft airborne 24/7 armed with live missiles just in case there is a surprise sneak attack like the one executed against the Saudis oil fields...

    For all we know these new photonic radars might be able to see 500m into sea water and submarines might be rendered useless, but it would likely still operate with a few around it... and having some land attack or anti sub or even anti ship missiles on board just makes it a more flexible ship/weapon system.

    They might develop a reusable vertically launched 10 metre long 750mm calibre UAV that is scramjet powered but can land using a tail hook back on the carrier.... launched from a UKSK launch tube... able to cruise out at mach 10 to use a radar and EO systems to scan the area and then fly back to be reused... the solid rocket fuel booster replaced and internal fuel replaced after landing and reloaded into the UKSK system where its batteries are recharged and electronics tested and checked in place... or perhaps a much slower HALE or MALE subsonic model for launch in bad weather conditions with serious crosswinds or other issues that prevent conventional aircraft taking off.  After a few dozen launches you could take out the unnecessary (more expensive) electronics (for reuse) and use it as a drone target for target practise or as a weapon to hit ISIS targets in Syria or Libya...

    IMHO that would be very problematic, because supporting the air wing is already very space and personnel demanding. The carrier is an specialised vessel.

    The role of the Russian aircraft carrier is to provide air cover for Russian surface ships and subs... effectively its job is to be the air force for the navy.... it is essentially being an AEGIS cruiser to protect the cruisers and destroyers of the Russian Navy... which are already better protected than US AEGIS cruisers....

    Why do you think a US AEGIS cruiser is not safe on its own?

    - First of all, the automation of such a ship should be increased, its electronic armament should be improved, the means of protection (for example, anti-aircraft weapons), the habitability for the personnel who will live on this ship should be improved. The aircraft fleet and all the necessary devices and mechanisms that this aircraft fleet will operate will be improved. Together with the development of our science and technology, these ships should also "grow".

    Redut and UKSK are not manually operated weapons that need rotary launch systems maintained and monitored... both will be operated from command by a sailor at a set of controls...

    Whether they will be big or small is not an obvious question. But be that as it may, the seaworthiness of a small ship is much lower than that of a large one. And the restrictions on aviation flights directly depend on seaworthiness.

    It also adds persistence when in operation... a carrier that can carry 90 fighters plus all the other aircraft it needs might have stores and supplies to operate for two or three weeks depending on the tempo of operations, but if you only load up 48 fighters but carry full munitions and fuel capacity that should mean operations for  four to six weeks just using standard available stores... without stacking shipping containers of extra material on empty areas on the deck for instance or in the hangar areas for those other 42 fighters you don't have on board...

    The operation might require 90 fighters but I think that is a bit excessive... but that is the point... having CVN with 90 fighters is more useful than three tiny carriers with 30 fighters each because a lot of the time you would probably take two of the smaller carriers when one big one would do...

    If you are worried about spending money then curl up in a little ball and let the rest of the world play soccer with you...  

    Usually, several ships go with an aircraft carrier, which solve all related tasks. And his business is to launch and receive aircraft back.

    The carrier is likely to be the flagship of any group of Russian ships and needs to be able to perform any role needed.... I am not saying put 152mm or 203mm artillery guns on it, but the universal attack missile launchers add flexibility and could be scabbed on the sides of the ship most of the way around without getting in anyones way and without reducing the number of type of aircraft carried... and the same for Redut and other systems.

    I am not saying they need 100 UKSK launchers on the ship... I don't think they should make it into an arsenal ship with thousands of missiles... but I would expect at the very least that there would be 6 Pantsir systems... one in each corner and two waist located systems... along with as many Duet gun mounts (6 double barrer turrets)... located close to the Pantsir systems, and I would think the new version of Naval TOR in a fixed cell launcher instead of the mechanised rotary system on the Kuznetsov could carry twice the number of ready to fire missiles in rather less space because the missiles are half the size and also no rotary launch systems with empty unused space, so two lots of 192 missiles... should be easy to fit.... so 384 missiles... and then I would go for perhaps 3 Redut systems on each side of the ship... front, middle, and rear on the edges out of the way, so that would be 6 x 12 launch tubes... assuming you are right with missile numbers then that would be 6 x  12 x 4 9M100 missiles which is 288 more missiles... so perhaps 8 UKSK launchers in total would give 48 anti sub rockets, or if necessary 400km range SAMs or 9M96 redut missiles or combinations of all three.


    In addition, saturation with various systems and weapons will automatically lead to an increase in the cost of the project. The hull of the ship, "iron" is a penny in comparison with the cost of components, radio electronics, weapons. As soon as we start to "push" something into it, the price starts to rise. This is the most intelligible argument for those who expect everything from an aircraft carrier at once.

    They could reduce costs by fitting for but not with some of the systems... the improved TOR missiles are cheap but accurate command guided missiles as are the Pantsir, so they would certainly be a priority over Redut and UKSK launchers which could perhaps be added later... all their new ships are getting these launchers so after a while the price should become more reasonable... because they will be standard.


    Any ship formation far from its native shores in the event of full-fledged hostilities is doomed to destruction without air support.

    To be fair, even without air support it would probably still be doomed, but with air support they will be able to extract a price from the enemy for fighting them that the enemy might not be prepared to pay.

    We have seen in Syria that air defences only can take so much... what is needed is an active defence that strikes back at the attacker to weaken and perhaps even stop attacks before they form up properly and become a real threat. Syrian fighter planes operating near Syrian borders looking for enemy aircraft launching stand off weapons would escalate the situation but also make Israel have to decide to continue an attack of 1,000 cuts in which they lose aircraft... which they can't afford, or escalate and perhaps lose even more aircraft which they can't afford or adopt a different tack to deal with their perceived problems like stopping supporting terrorists trying to over throw Assad and therefore give Iran no reason to have forces there in the first place...

    If it is equipped with various weapons, the price will increase dramatically, if you put only anti-aircraft systems, the cost will be less.

    The presence of a UKSK and all the needed software and electronics makes the ship more flexible and safer, and considering all their new destroyers and cruisers will have the exact launchers and software means it should not be a big problem as you are effectively installing a launcher that can launch a dozen different types of weapons... the hardware should be unified and standardised and the software too.

    "most planes" isn't = all planes.

    Even if it is just three planes a day it is a problem.

    their airline & traffic controllers may also be contacted,

    What traffic controllers? An Air New Zealand flight from Auckland to Hawaii on its way to the US to get to London is not under air traffic control all the way across the Pacific Ocean and contacting the Auckland office of Air New Zealand wont do you much good either.

    & they better not be flying over Russian ships that can be as trigger happy as the West.

    How would they even know? They have no surface search radar fitted AFAIK.

    If there is a military exercise then that is publicised but during peacetime and outside of conflict zones they don't say where their ships are.

    Why spend $Bs on CVNs just to be nice, "talking softly & carrying a big stick"? The Russians r, or should be, like the US Marines who "can be ur best friend or ur worst enemy".

    Because those billions of dollars spent on air power that operates everywhere you surface ships do makes them much safer and much more powerful... they can still talk softly, but it puts nails in the end of their stick and sets it on fire....

    they may keep the other 2 & upgrade them later- stay tuned!

    I think it would be good if they did... I would think after all this time they have new nuclear power plants for large ships so a big ship whose reactor is shot would be a good opportunity to take it out and deal with it, while at the same time put in a new NPP and give it a test in a real ship... a modern and much safer NPP that can operate without expensive and dangerous refuelling every few years would be an important step forward for them... a reactor that will operate for 30-40 years without refuelling would make nuclear propulsion rather cheaper and safer and testing it in a ship that has proven OK makes more sense that trying to fix large numbers of problems with lots of different brand new technologies never tested before like Zumwalt and Ford and LCS.

    by the same token, they may have published it to prevent canal modernization, using reverse psychology.

    Their reasoning is not Russias problem... the Russians will know what they want and need... they have not been getting their ideas from western think tanks so far, and it seems to be working out well for them.

    I rather suspect the west has plans to open up an alternate route to Afghanistan perhaps or some other dirty scheme.

    than u better not discuss its contents; if I was so biased, I would stop reading this forum all together!

    I appreciate what you are trying to say, but I would not expect anything of use or value from that source... they made their bed... I would not read anything from Hilary Clinton on what Russia can do to become great again... for the same reasons.

    N-S trade trade corridor from India will pass via Iran & the Crimea isn't its main destination by any measure.

    Getting taken off a ship and put on a train means the Russian ports in the Caspian will get work... sending it through canals into the Black Sea means it will then sail through the Black Sea and down past Turkey to European ports... how would Russia benefit from bypassing its own transport infrastructure from India to the EU?  For quite some time I suspect there will be little bulk transport from Iran to the EU, so we are just talking about stuff from India.

    they do in Astrahan & Baku:

    If they build them in the Caspian and find they are too big to leave then whose problem is that?

    Baku is not in Russia so it is not Russias problem if they can't leave the Caspian Sea...

    And they are hardly going to build ships in Astrakhan that are too big to get out if they need them to operate outside of the Caspian.... they could make them in the Crimea instead...

    good way to lose transit & port fees on ships from Kazakhstan, Azerbaijan & Iran.

    Good way to earn port fees transferring the goods from ships to trains to get to where they are going.

    If they want goods to travel via Russian canals then they need to send them on ships that conform to the size the canals can take.

    not as immense as having CVNs that won't be there 24/7/365 anyway.

    CVNs can move about with the groups of Russian ships that are doing things that are important... not every single Russian ship in international waters needs air cover but some of them will.

    With good targeting & guidance, even SSBNs can use SLBMs to slam warheads filled with concrete/high explosives on their decks from Ks of miles away.

    S-500 will be able to shoot such things down.
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    Post  GarryB on Sat Aug 15, 2020 11:05 am

    While an X-15 scramjet from the US reached heat over 1480 Celsius going mach 6.7 so bumping up speeds should not be that much of a heating issue for the zircon

    X-15 was a rocket... not a scramjet.
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    Post  LMFS on Sat Aug 15, 2020 12:23 pm

    @Mindstorm:

    Thanks for your answer, I will start giving some feedback below about concrete aspects of your reasoning and adding further sources of interest.

    Mindstorm wrote:In this time window the probable loadout of weapons in MK-41 launchers of FFGX frigates, for sea superiority role and maritime strik,e (maintaining reasonable self-defence capabilities) would be likely something like 10 LRASM, 12 SM-2/6 and 40 ESSM , obviously as said the hard defeat defense layers of each frigate will include also 21 RAM and the full loadout of 57 mm MAD-FIRES corrected anti-air rounds purposely developed for destroy long range subsonic missiles.

    Seems a balanced loadout. How many targets of the type subsonic / sea skimming AShMs do you estimate the FFGX could repel at the same time? VLS SAMs are going to be capable against all aspect attack and have active seeker in the terminal phase, while I assume RAM and the 57 mm gun can only cover one direction at the same time.

    I don't know if you were going to address it in another post, but I am interested in your opinion about ARMs like HARM being potentially used against a naval target. It would not be necessary, if USN was not pathologically fixated on land attack instead of naval strike to the point of not having state of the art AShMs, or even supersonic ones. But in the scenario proposed, which is a purely theoretical one, I consider it sensible as the air crews on the carrier would have no better option to defeat serious naval AD without using an absurd amount of missiles.

    The engagement range of those FFGX against high displacement enemy ships will be that of the LRASM they will carry in the MK-41 VLS (ostensibly no more than 10-12 missiles for ship).

    The unofficial sources I find refer 300 nm / 560 km range for the surface launched version of this missile. That would be essentially the same as the air launched version, but using a booster from ASROC. So the carrier remains unthreatened. Since the scenario is very theoretical, I struggle to imagine how it would be caught within range by the distributed fleet, unless under very fanciful conditions. The carrier would simply start by not coming close to shores where threats could be hidden, and in case of the distributed fleet going "kamikaze" (cannot find a better word) and making a synchronised approach in order to get in missile range, the carrier has a superior propulsion. What strategy may the distributed fleet, save for waiting in the shore for the carrier to approach, use to become a threat to it, if the carrier stays in open ocean?

    LMFS i have used the cost of the most up-to-date aircraft carrier now available worldwide - Ford Class- to make comparison in US Navy between equals : money spent on the most advanced aircraft carrier against the same money spent on the most advanced frigate,

    The reasons I propose the Nimitz are:

    - The bottleneck of the whole scenario is the lack of a capable anti-ship missile in the USN inventory. The carrier struggles to threat the frigates, and they don't threat the carrier almost at all. Therefore the type of carrier used, newer or older, is pretty much irrelevant, as far as it can store missiles, launch planes and have the propulsion to keep up with the frigates in the worst case.

    - Ford is extremely expensive without actually adding anything of worth to the naval strike role. In the doctrinal/budgetary discussion about carriers in the US that I find, the permanent issue is to justify the carrier's role as an effective tool for land attack, compared even to land based air power (!). That is what has shaped the Ford and what justifies the exorbitant prices the US MIC practises, because carriers allow US to police the world and that can be priced at a huge premium. But such approach is a military abomination.

    - The Ford represents the apex and probably last example of unchecked, blatant robbery of federal budget and criminal program management / risk conflation that we will probably see. In fact the FFGX is an answer to it, as are threats by Trump of cancelling EMALS.

    you want to use that of the Nimitz-class that would be enormously less efficient in maritime strike cause the huge limits of take-off fuel/weapon weight and sortie for day (for the most performant Nimitz-class in war time it was 140 sorties in 24 hours for a single day of conflict).

    I don't see that 140 sorties per day affect the chances of the frigates, since they cannot get offensive on the carrier. But just as a reference that I consider very valuable, the report of the 1997 SURGEX exercise with USS Nimitz should be kept in mind. They managed 975 sorties in 4 days, with a peak of 279 sorties on the 4th day, delivering 1336 bombs (again the land attack obsession) to targets in average 200 nm away and included a regular schedule of SEAD, supporting sorties, AEW, DCA etc. Apparently the carrier would have needed to resupply after one more day at this rate, and it is admittedly an exercise where everything was ready for a surge operational tempo, but the capabilities shown were real. Again, nowhere in the world would such sortie generation be needed for naval strike, if only they had some decent AShMs...

    https://apps.dtic.mil/dtic/tr/fulltext/u2/a362472.pdf

    Of course others (namely USAF, of course) replied questioning the results, but observe how they keep focusing on the land attack role in an exercise of short-sightedness:

    https://www.airforcemag.com/PDF/MagazineArchive/Documents/1999/March%201999/0399carrier.pdf

    For FFGX i have proposed a conservatively high price of a similar ship -650 ml. dollars- if it would be constructed by US shipyards and not procured on the market exactly like happen for its aircraft carrier and if difference of prices between domestic US procurements contracts and export ones can provide a guidance ,likely the price of an US-built FFGX would be also sensibly lower than $ 650 ml.

    The costs you have proposed for Nimitz class and its air wing (even discounting the helicopter groups and transport aircraft that would easily add another 1,5 billions $) is not realistic:

    Therefore the cost in 2020 of a significantly less performant Nimitz class with its air wing (without the ASW and transport helicopters, without F-35 and without the weapons on board) is about 14,16 billions $ , therefore for the same tax-payers money US Navy could procure 17-18 FFGX on the export market or 21-22 FFGX domestically produced.

    I will check the cost sources in detail but agree to use the proportion carrier / frigates you propose, it does not essentially affect my point

    In neither instance that Nimitz-class cariier would have a single chance to win against the other side;

    Could you explain how do you come to that conclusion? I don't know how many LRASM / Harpoon / NSM a carrier can store, the references about bombs I get are between 2,000 and 4,000, on SURGEX they should carry at least 500 t / close to 1700 units of Mk 82 and Mk 83 bombs. That would mean in weight something like 1000 units of NSM or 50 per frigate. Given the questionable effectiveness of the AShM used and its ability to pick the attack conditions, the carrier could use weapons simpler than LRASM, air released naval mines, or PGMs, depending on the way SM-6 missiles are used by the frigates and the range at which the fighters manage to approach. The question is that once more, the side with air power manages to chose the time and type of the attack and the surface (land) side remains on the defensive position and vulnerable to leakers, overwhelming attacks or any other successful approach by the attacking side. They could attack frigates one by one and overwhelm them, given they have the time on their side.

    this is exactly the reason those anachronistic WWII's leftovers need huge complements of destroyers ,submarine, and cruisers (that furtherly worsen the cost-efficiency parameters).

    The interesting thing is that the current, USN-specific doctrine has nothing to do with what carriers were created to do and what their function during WWII was, that is, to battle enemy fleets. It is a doctrinal dead-end street and carrier use should return to providing air cover to naval forces. That is the way useful and cost rational carriers can be created, not by trying to beat land based air forces in payload on target as the US does.

    In substance carrier's aircraft, to the contrary of WWII, do not provide any relevent coverage to the naval group in a condition of modern sea warfare between peers opponents, a task that is commited to the destroyer and cruiser complement and since half of '60 years absolve the unique role of expeditionary/remote power projection missions from sea sectors against ground targets of insulated inferior enemies ,in line with the violent imperialistic doctrine at the basis of US Navy's structure.

    In the presence of effective air launched AShM I think this does not fully adjust to reality, maybe you could give some feedback regarding the "Russian" scenario I proposed?
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    Post  LMFS on Sat Aug 15, 2020 1:15 pm

    thegopnik wrote:@LMFSThe drag is not a problem for air breathable missiles as it is for HGVs, ballistic missiles or ballistic missiles with thrust vectoring.

    Of course the speeds are different, but the inlet / engine generate massive drag if they need to be closed at low altitude. If used with very dense air, the ram compression + friction will increase the temperature substantially. And of course a strategic weapon and a tactical one have different sizes, prices and complexities.

    GarryB wrote:Even if it is running in idle to counter some drag in the last few seconds of flight the extra mass and material will add to the impact...

    I don't feel in conditions to support one opinion or other, there are no real examples that I know to compare. Hopefully soon we will know how the real thing is done.

    Having large numbers of medium helicopters with dipping sonars triangulating the location of enemy subs is very useful but once the targets location has been approximated a mach 2.5 ballistic rocket will cover 40km in less time than it would take a torpedo or a helicopter to cover that distance... and it would mean those subs could continue listening for other targets and perhaps listen to the engagement to ensure a kill or request a follow up shot...

    Yeah, no questioning the anti-submarine rocket makes sense.

    A 90K ton aircraft carrier can carry dozens of UKSK launchers without problem... there will be plenty of corners with the space needed...

    We wanted it to be 60-70 kt but ok... the VMF apparently wants that flexibility you mention, design bureaus say it makes no sense... I tend to think like them, since the carrier exists to cover the fleet and without a fleet you don't need a carrier, so you should count on a few frigates or destroyers at least with some UKSK and leave the carrier focus on what makes it valuable. But ok we will see.

    it is essentially being an AEGIS cruiser to protect the cruisers and destroyers of the Russian Navy.

    Big surface combatants are filled with missiles, the carrier is filled with planes. They can extend the range of the defence of other ships but as I say above, they are meant to operate with other ships that complement them. You could create a carrier that does it all, I think it would loose capacity in the air wing aspect, be complex, expensive and need a lot of crew. I just think it is more effective not to overcomplicate it.

    It also adds persistence when in operation...


    Very important. If you notice, USN carriers do not even have nuclear + boost propulsion, it is all nuclear, to sail 30+ kt at will. Such capacities have a cost of course.

    If you are worried about spending money then curl up in a little ball and let the rest of the world play soccer with you...

    West approved Very Happy

    but I would expect at the very least that there would be 6 Pantsir systems...

    I agree with the AD side, as far as it is medium and above all short range, with many independently targeted interceptors, and many Paket-NK systems. That is already a lot of equipment to install, use and maintain, on top of the air wing.

    To be fair, even without air support it would probably still be doomed, but with air support they will be able to extract a price from the enemy for fighting them that the enemy might not be prepared to pay.

    Not, if you don't mess too much with land forces, which you shouldn't if your military and political doctrine are reasonable...

    EDIT: we saw the containers on the drawing of the UDK, maybe this is the Russian answer to the need for flexibility in their ships and maybe it can apply to carriers too:

    https://iz.ru/1047958/roman-kretcul-aleksei-ramm/vyzvali-patrul-novoe-rossiiskoe-oruzhie-ispytaiut-v-severnykh-moriakh
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    Post  Tsavo Lion on Sat Aug 15, 2020 7:14 pm

    Perhaps that is the key... maybe they want the canals widened so in 10 years time they can start sailing bigger ships through there to get to the Caspian Sea to extract materials from the former Soviet States and perhaps Afghanistan through a former Soviet State and therefore bypass Pakistan...
    who "they"?

    Even if it is just three planes a day it is a problem. How would they even know? They have no surface search radar fitted AFAIK. If there is a military exercise then that is publicised but during peacetime and outside of conflict zones they don't say where their ships are.
    they could just periodically announce that any plane approaching a certain area will have its navigation gear malfunction- there r EW means already tried off Crimea & Syria.
    Because those billions of dollars spent on air power that operates everywhere you surface ships do makes them much safer and much more powerful... they can still talk softly, but it puts nails in the end of their stick and sets it on fire....
    VKS & NAF can do it for le$$. If they can't build artificial islands in the open oceans, floating air bases of steel & concrete big enough for AN-22/124s & TU-22/95/142/160s & MiG-31/35s & Su-27/30/34/35/57 & IL-38/476/8s & A-50/100s & ekranoplans/amphibians, powered by floating NPPs & w/o any EMALS CATOBAR that CVNs need can be built. With adequate SAMs & ASW, they won't need any DDG/CGs to protect them.
    https://vz.ru/world/2020/8/15/1055206.html

    Getting taken off a ship and put on a train means the Russian ports in the Caspian will get work... sending it through canals into the Black Sea means it will then sail through the Black Sea and down past Turkey to European ports...
    or to Ukraine, Bulgaria & Romania- the Danube River is navigable deep into C. Europe.
    how would Russia benefit from bypassing its own transport infrastructure from India to the EU? ..Good way to earn port fees transferring the goods from ships to trains to get to where they are going. If they want goods to travel via Russian canals then they need to send them on ships that conform to the size the canals can take.
    the Eurasian Canal may take some transit fees from Russia but will allow bigger cargo/warships to enter Caspian & later Indian Ocean & back via Iran, bypassing Turkey. So the VMF may send Black/Baltic/N. Fleet medium sized ships & subs to the Indian Ocean & back via the internal waterways, bypassing the N. Atlantic, Med. & Red Seas, saving a lot of time/$ while presenting less targets to others.
    If they build them in the Caspian and find they are too big to leave then whose problem is that? ..And they are hardly going to build ships in Astrakhan that are too big to get out if they need them to operate outside of the Caspian...
    "if u build it, they'll come", & every1 will benefit.

    Baku is not in Russia so it is not Russias problem if they can't leave the Caspian Sea...
    better transportation links=better economy & relations. Russia needs that to prevent Baku becoming another Belgrade or Tbilisi, courted by NATO, or a complete Turkish/Iranian/Chinese marionette.

    S-500 will be able to shoot such things down.
    not all of them, esp. when coming straight down. Long ranged torpedoes can also be fitted atop it or NATO SSKs can ambush CVNs & release them a few dozen miles away to explode underneath a CVN, detonating all the missiles & bombs in their holds.


    Last edited by Tsavo Lion on Sat Aug 15, 2020 9:30 pm; edited 2 times in total (Reason for editing : add link)
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    Post  Mindstorm on Sat Aug 15, 2020 9:16 pm

    LMFS wrote:Seems a balanced loadout. How many targets of the type subsonic / sea skimming AShMs do you estimate the FFGX could repel at the same time? VLS SAMs are going to be capable against all aspect attack and have active seeker in the terminal phase, while I assume RAM and the 57 mm gun can only cover one direction at the same time.


    I mean an insulated FFGx against an attack by LRASM delivered by carrier aircraft ? Probably between soft and hard suppression defensive systems no less than 35 incoming missiles within a very low time window, with a very high percentage of no "leakers" in the salvo.

    With a conservative 7 or 8 LRASM deceived by combination of Mk53 Nulka and SEWIP Block 2 (with the integration of a Sylena MK2 ,against similar subsonic missiles, probably even double this figure) you could account for the interception of the remaining 27-28 LRASMs with the expense of 6-7 SM-2/6, about 25 ESSM, 12-13 RAM and 6 o 7 salvo of 57 mm MAD-FIRES on the eventual leakers.

    To produce a similar salvo density (obviously totally insuffcient) against a single enemy frigate the carrier should organize the preparation load out and take-off of at least an E2-D and 17-18 F/A-18 (for 34-36 LRASMs) for a cycle of take-offs of not less than 3 hours , accepting in this way or an enormous penality to the combat range of the entire strike group (allowing the enemy unit/s to close the aircraft carrier for that "penalty" distance) maintaining missile salvo density or instead attack with only 6-7 aircraft at times producing a salvo density of no more than 12-14 missiles.

    This scenario obviously should take into account an enemy group of 21 or 22 FFGx not even in WWII an aircraft carrier could have survived a similar enemy formation even half of them would be too much.....


    LMFS wrote:I don't know if you were going to address it in another post, but I am interested in your opinion about ARMs like HARM being potentially used against a naval target. It would not be necessary, if USN was not pathologically fixated on land attack instead of naval strike to the point of not having state of the art AShMs, or even supersonic ones. But in the scenario proposed, which is a purely theoretical one, I consider it sensible as the air crews on the carrier would have no better option to defeat serious naval AD without using an absurd amount of missiles.

    Mine opinion ....and not only mine obvioulsy..... is that generally anti-radar missiles, even the most modern ones, have very few relevant employments in maritime operations against ships targets for strictly technical reasons

    - Modern radars have very small horizontal sidelobes, often actually not dosable at all , that cause a very significative degradation of the mean error of the anti-radiation missile guidance.
    - Antiradiation missiles can engage radars the wave lenght of which are ,among ship-born ones, mostly characteristic of engagement radars, not search radars (against which the mean error at target would be of dozen of meters), this is the reason for which US Navy in spite, of its range, name the new AARGM-ER as SEAD "Stand-in Attack Weapon", because it would be delivered in operations -mostly against ground targets- when enemy fire radars would have tracked an aircraft of an attack group.
    In substance against modern radars anti-radiation missiles are "duel" weapons mostly used to attempt to interrupt an attack on the aircraft of a strike Group.
    - The position of the radiating element in a ship is obviously not fixed like happen for fixed ground based radars and this contribute to significatively degrade the precision of the missile because the guidance's algorythms cannot progressively "construct" the position of the enemy radiating elements assuming its position as a constant (fixed in space).

    Tomorrow i will continue with the remaining questions.......

    x_54_u43 and LMFS like this post

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    Post  GarryB on Sun Aug 16, 2020 12:42 pm

    I don't know if you were going to address it in another post, but I am interested in your opinion about ARMs like HARM being potentially used against a naval target.

    The Soviets routinely used ARM Kh-22 and Kh-22M for naval and land attack use. Land attack against major radar and SAM sites, but at sea the USN tended to operate with strict emission control so the first missiles launched would need radars on to find their targets... but after they are detected the target carrier group will likely turn radars on because that is their eyes and they don't want to fight with their eyes closed... so the first wave of missiles being normal radar homing missiles but the second wave could include anti radiation missiles...

    I don't feel in conditions to support one opinion or other, there are no real examples that I know to compare. Hopefully soon we will know how the real thing is done.

    The scramjet engine can be turned off or on... so if they wanted to coast engine off to extend range they could do so while still conserving fuel to be used in the terminal dive to improve speed when you most needed it.

    There is little advantage to launching at targets beyond the effective range of the missile to have it glide down to the target at much lower speeds than it used to get there....

    Yeah, no questioning the anti-submarine rocket makes sense.

    The one currently used on ship based UKSK launchers is the 533mm model so they should be able to fairly easily design and make a much longer ranged weapon for carrier defence... take the Granit tubes out of Kuznetsov and replace it with perhaps four UKSK launchers for 32 tubes...

    We wanted it to be 60-70 kt but ok... the VMF apparently wants that flexibility you mention, design bureaus say it makes no sense... I tend to think like them, since the carrier exists to cover the fleet and without a fleet you don't need a carrier, so you should count on a few frigates or destroyers at least with some UKSK and leave the carrier focus on what makes it valuable. But ok we will see.

    The problem is that if you look carefully at a Frigate.... how many SAMs does it carry... an enemy might launch two or three anti ship missiles at each frigate, but against an aircraft carrier they are going to launch dozens... which Russian Frigate currently carries enough SAMs to stop dozens of missiles launched against ships around them? And that is the first attack because even if they blunt a first attack those ships need to rearm and reload which might be some distance away... once a country attacks these Russian ships they will not doubt get orders to engage nearby now enemy assets so UKSK launches which might result in more attacks on them... how are those two frigates you have with that carrier going for SAMs?

    If they manage to design a special double hull or triple hull that is clever and gives them a 45K ton carrier with the capacity of a US 90K ton carrier then that is great... I am not interested in weight... I am interested in capacity and I prefer they have too much capacity and not need it than not enough and have to build four CVNs instead of just needing two.

    A Russian CVN can be used to protect airspace too... so if need be they could park it off the coast in some area and declare their own no fly zone that helps the locals deal with belligerent neighbours for instance, or it might operate in an area of interest for Russia... parking a carrier in a region with pirates for instance... with aircraft and AWACs and inflight refuelling their fighters could cover an enormous area of territory... the naval infantry might be performing a landing operation which might require air control for a week or two...

    You could create a carrier that does it all, I think it would loose capacity in the air wing aspect, be complex, expensive and need a lot of crew. I just think it is more effective not to overcomplicate it.

    Yeah, I don't see how fitting one Redut missile launcher would require less crew than having 6 launchers fitted... they have mechanisms to open the hatches for launch... they are not manually operated, and they take very little space... as I said you could put them around the edge and it wont effect aircraft capacity or operations at all. They would increase costs but they don't need to fill them most of the time... they likely wont need a full compliment of aircraft for a while either if money is a problem...

    I agree with the AD side, as far as it is medium and above all short range, with many independently targeted interceptors, and many Paket-NK systems. That is already a lot of equipment to install, use and maintain, on top of the air wing.

    With electronic monitoring the vertically launched missiles should be fine for the entire cruise and not need any maintainence at all.

    Once it is installed it should be fine most of the time... unlike the air wing.

    Not, if you don't mess too much with land forces, which you shouldn't if your military and political doctrine are reasonable...

    Russia has shown rather less interests to interfere in the affairs of other countries than any country in the west, whose every breath is criticism against every country not doing as they are told...

    EDIT: we saw the containers on the drawing of the UDK, maybe this is the Russian answer to the need for flexibility in their ships and maybe it can apply to carriers too:

    Those "containers" sometimes were just half a metre tall on the deck... which suggests to me they are deck mounted launchers for Redut or UKSK or both.

    who "they"?

    America.... because in 10 years time when Putin is gone and they control the Kremlin and are using Russia against China they can use the canals to ship all the mineral booty they can extract from afghanistan and all the stans around it...

    they could just periodically announce that any plane approaching a certain area will have its navigation gear malfunction- there r EW means already tried off Crimea & Syria.

    So how does making civilian airliners lose navigation and have them fly around lost till they run out of fuel and crash any different from actually shooting them down?

    VKS & NAF can do it for le$$. If they can't build artificial islands in the open oceans, floating air bases of steel & concrete big enough for AN-22/124s & TU-22/95/142/160s & MiG-31/35s & Su-27/30/34/35/57 & IL-38/476/8s & A-50/100s & ekranoplans/amphibians, powered by floating NPPs & w/o any EMALS CATOBAR that CVNs need can be built. With adequate SAMs & ASW, they won't need any DDG/CGs to protect them.

    A barge big enough for An-124s to land on would be 500K tons and would be freaken enormous and would cost more than 20 traditional CVNs...

    or to Ukraine, Bulgaria & Romania- the Danube River is navigable deep into C. Europe.

    Why should Russia spend money making its canals bigger so Caspian Sea countries can send stuff to Central Europe and bypass them?

    the Eurasian Canal may take some transit fees from Russia but will allow bigger cargo/warships to enter Caspian & later Indian Ocean & back via Iran, bypassing Turkey. So the VMF may send Black/Baltic/N. Fleet medium sized ships & subs to the Indian Ocean & back via the internal waterways, bypassing the N. Atlantic, Med. & Red Seas, saving a lot of time/$ while presenting less targets to others.

    That would require a huge amount of work to upgrade their entire canal network... and at the end of the day essentially trades Turkey as the gate keeper for Iran as the gate keeper because Iran would need to build a canal and I rather doubt they will build a canal deep enough for Russia to move carriers through its country... that would be hugely more expensive than doing it for much smaller ships...

    "if u build it, they'll come", & every1 will benefit.

    How will they benefit?

    The Caspian Sea is not a huge bottleneck with billions of tons of cargo stuck there because there no way to ship it out of there...

    better transportation links=better economy & relations. Russia needs that to prevent Baku becoming another Belgrade or Tbilisi, courted by NATO, or a complete Turkish/Iranian/Chinese marionette.

    Baku is Azerbeizhan isn't it? Russia has reasonable relations, but even if they fall to HATO and the US... so what... they have no way of getting US or HATO ships there... or out.

    not all of them, esp. when coming straight down.

    Things coming straight down are coming straight which makes them easiest to shoot down for vertically launched weapons. For angled weapons like Patriot it would be a problem but S-500 is not Patriot.

    Long ranged torpedoes can also be fitted atop it or NATO SSKs can ambush CVNs & release them a few dozen miles away to explode underneath a CVN, detonating all the missiles & bombs in their holds.

    The Russians have something called PAKET that is designed to engage and destroy enemy torpedoes...

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    Post  LMFS on Sun Aug 16, 2020 2:07 pm

    GarryB wrote:so the first wave of missiles being normal radar homing missiles but the second wave could include anti radiation missiles...

    ARM and AShM can share many characteristics, as the Kh-31 in both versions proves. And modern seekers are multimode, for instance AARGM has a anti-radiation head but also home on jamming and active MMW radar. In the US case, they are already talking actively about the naval role of the ARMs, probably because they, as the numbers above illustrate, have no real means to attack serious AD with their current AShMs.

    The problem is that if you look carefully at a Frigate.... how many SAMs does it carry... an enemy might launch two or three anti ship missiles at each frigate, but against an aircraft carrier they are going to launch dozens... which Russian Frigate currently carries enough SAMs to stop dozens of missiles launched against ships around them?

    I already said the carrier should definitely have SAMs, because it needs to raise its saturation threshold to a very high level and act even against very fast missiles that cannot be covered by aircraft.

    But having said that, it is a major mission of the air wing to avoid:

    - Any other vessel (or aircraft) to reach launch position against the carrier or the fleet protected by it
    - To intercept as many of the incoming missiles and avoid depletion of ship's SAMs. Not too difficult against subsonic missiles launched from long distance, like the new AShM version of the Tomahawk for instance.

    They would increase costs but they don't need to fill them most of the time... they likely wont need a full compliment of aircraft for a while either if money is a problem...

    The more missiles and the more planes they have the better, how would I discuss that? I just think, based on what I read experts say and by compared analysis of existing designs, that there exists a compromise between one and the other, and my personal opinion is that a carrier is worth more because of its planes than because of its offensive missiles, so that is what I would prioritise if, for instance, space or crew for UKSKs would need to be diverted from the capacity of the air wing. Then, what is possible and what is not requires a detailed quantitative analysis and design work based on actual technical and economic constraints. I can only comment on very broad trends and principles. If they think 0, 1 or 8 UKSK fit in a carrier and make sense to VMF, I don't know.

    In any case I can only suggest to read the SURGEX report I linked the other day. It is very good to understand the huge organizational complexity and sheer amount of space needed to sustain the operations of the carrier.

    With electronic monitoring the vertically launched missiles should be fine for the entire cruise and not need any maintainence at all.

    In real life electromechanical systems break and electronic monitoring too... Razz

    Obvious but sometimes forgotten... there is no such a thing as a maintenance-free system, it requires the specialists, tools, equipment, documentation, spares... for the system itself and often overlooked, all its supporting subsystems in the ship. It may mean more or less burden, but always > zero.

    Russia has shown rather less interests to interfere in the affairs of other countries than any country in the west, whose every breath is criticism against every country not doing as they are told...

    Yeah, and that is why I think they can implement the naval strike carrier in a proper way. I guess this is going to surprise many people, given today's practical identification of the carrier with a land attack tool.
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    Post  Tsavo Lion on Sun Aug 16, 2020 9:06 pm

    America.... because in 10 years time when Putin is gone and they control the Kremlin and are using Russia against China they can use the canals to ship all the mineral booty they can extract from afghanistan and all the stans around it...
    I wouldn't give them so much credit for planning such long term projection- it's a wishful thinking that Putin's successors will be more pro-Western than he is. The Chinese may be a lot more successful in influencing/if not having a hand in installing them- they have Tokaev in Kazakhstan now.

    So how does making civilian airliners lose navigation and have them fly around lost till they run out of fuel and crash any different from actually shooting them down?
    that's the point- to avoid that, they'll stay away; as soon as it happens, the Russians would vector them out of the area.

    A barge big enough for An-124s to land on would be 500K tons and would be freaken enormous and would cost more than 20 traditional  CVNs...
    then An-22s & IL-476/8/106s would still be enough. A huge platform will give them more capability leaving CVNs in the dust so it's worth it. Also, it could be used for A2/AD &/ no fly zone enforcement w/o having to sell any or as many S-400/500s.

    Why should Russia spend money making its canals bigger so Caspian Sea countries can send stuff to Central Europe and bypass them?
    they do it already, only on a smaller scale:
    https://menafn.com/1098257059/Fleets-of-the-Caspian-amid-emerging-profitable-trends https://www.ocean-team.com/
    https://www.nytimes.com/2018/01/01/world/asia/china-kazakhstan-silk-road.html
    https://www.crisisgroup.org/europe-central-asia/central-asia/245-central-asias-silk-road-rivalries

    New N-S river route to C. Asia will negate at least some of that loss:
    https://www.cacianalyst.org/publications/analytical-articles/item/13554-kazakhstan-as-an-arctic-state-and-a-maritime-power.html

    That would require a huge amount of work to upgrade their entire canal network... and at the end of the day essentially trades Turkey as the gate keeper for Iran as the gate keeper because Iran would need to build a canal and I rather doubt they will build a canal deep enough for Russia to move carriers through its country...
    they need to improve/upgrade it anyway; Iran will need Russia's help in canal construction & won't even think of closing it; no1 is suggesting using it to deploy UDKs & CVNs.

    How will they benefit? The Caspian Sea is not a huge bottleneck with billions of tons of cargo stuck there because there no way to ship it out of there...
    stronger economies=stability on Russia's perimeter.

    Baku is Azerbaijan isn't it?  Russia has reasonable relations, but even if they fall to HATO and the US... so what... they have no way of getting US or HATO ships there... or out.
    true, for big ships; small boats can be brought in on C-17/5s &/ via Turkey & Georgia. They can also send crews & weapons/gear to be placed on ships of littoral navies.

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    Post  Mindstorm on Sun Aug 16, 2020 11:15 pm

    I continue......

    LMFS wrote:
    The unofficial sources I find refer 300 nm / 560 km range for the surface launched version of this missile. That would be essentially the same as the air launched version, but using a booster from ASROC. So the carrier remains unthreatened. Since the scenario is very theoretical, I struggle to imagine how it would be caught within range by the distributed fleet, unless under very fanciful conditions. The carrier would simply start by not coming close to shores where threats could be hidden, and in case of the distributed fleet going "kamikaze" (cannot find a better word) and making a synchronised approach in order to get in missile range, the carrier has a superior propulsion.

    I believe that the concept of "maritime distributed lethality" (or "modular naval force concentration" in the domestic version od the concept) is not perfectly clear.....

    The possibility of disperse and mask an high number of lower tonnage/lower signature among littoral elements and civil sea ships do NOT aim at allow your group of ships operating from there.

    The purpose is instead to negate to the enemy the initial position of wide majority of your units so that its ISR and and Command and Control assets must find each of them and follow each of them separately splitting its surveillance resorces (in particular UAVs and surveillance aircraft) in the space and in the time and rendering them much more easier to destroy -because you cannot provide the necessary CAP protection to each of those UAV/Aircraft like in a recce mission against a large ship force concentration  -.  

    Enemy at this time will manage to detect and maintain track only of a fraction of those relatively low tonnage ships when them will exit from theirs masking sites (proceeding toward the next one if possible) to converge toward enemy ship's formations to conduct cooperatively an attack on them with long range weapons .

    After that attack they retain the option to continue to operate in a singular formation or disperse and mask among civilian traffic or in littoral formations.


    LMFS wrote:What strategy may the distributed fleet, save for waiting in the shore for the carrier to approach, use to become a threat to it, if the carrier stays in open ocean?

    Try to not reason in abstract ,naval warfare in real word do not happen on an infinite surface without geographical elements and point of strategic interests Wink

    Point of "Superiority at Sea" is to gain control of the sea sectors ,routes and strategically important coastal infrastructures of the enemy , so to "strangle" its logistical, economic and production's potential and naturally also the possibility to resupply and repair its naval units.

    Let make an example using greography of USA and the Federation (as they was two nations identical ) with the first employing its resource in a single Nimtz-class carrier with its complement of fixed-wings aircraft and the second using the same resources to procure (in a way absolutely inefficient) 22 FFGx.

    Let we choose the most favourable scenario for the aircraft carrier : open Pacific Ocean west CONUS side (choosing a scenario like Baltic, Northern or Black Sea would had very quickly transformed in a turkey shoot for the FFGx's side)  


    https://www.daftlogic.com/projects-google-maps-distance-calculator.htm#

    The two groups of 11 FFGx would be likely dispersed on the coast of Чуко́тка and Камчатка peninsula ; let begin saying that positioning the opposing aircraft carrier past the Aleutians Arcipelago, to avoid to be trapped and fall within range of engagement of opposing forces, the US Navy side would have effectively consigned control over Alaska sector to the opposing side that could be free to organize an attack with cruise missiles and cover amphibious and airborne attacks against the key airfields, radar installations and, above all, missile defense installations placed there.

    But let continue our scenario moving the interst of sea control of this finctional Federation and its modular maritime strike forces more to the South.....

    The aircraft carrier could be placed about 400-450 km SE of the western part of the Alesians so that its F/A-18-E/F with 2 LRASM (attacking at groups of 5 aircraft at times so to not suffer huge penalties to theirs combat range for wait the preparation and take -off from the carrier of others F/A-18-E/F) could attack enemy ships up to 1282 km far away (390 nm -722,28 km- with two external tanks of 1818 liter and the two LRASM).

    Enemy FFGx frigates will move ,let put at a speed 20 knots, from theirs dispersed positions converging in two groups of long two SE and E vectors towards Aleutians islands where they will cover and disperse behind the islands.

    Let image that space based and long range UAVs or sea bed sensors (the on board E2-D will detect those frigates well within engagement range of theirs LRASM therefore chance of survival are all on third party detection) manage to detect and discriminate from civil maritime traffic very optimistically 13 on those 22 frigates.

    Those two groups of FFGx frigates will reach on average the archipelago in 29 and 34 hours at this 20 knots speed and therefore those detected will force the aircraft carrier at move in the opposite direction since hour 15-18 hours - hoping that the wind's direction will be benevolent allowing the aircraft to still taking off - let put at a speed of 24 knots but toward South to avoid to be eventually trapped , within the next 80 hours by one of the frigates groups, proceeding S-SE for some dozen of hours long western continental US's coast.


    In this time frame at this distance (390 nm) the carrier could organize only about 1,2 sorties for each of its F/A-18, taking into account the additional reduction to the range from hour 15-18 therefore 52-53 aircraft for 104 -106 LRASMs (almost the entire LRASM production of 2019-2020 and 2021 amounting to 118 missiles !!!) at groups of 10-12 missiles at times.

    As said that amount of missiles will struggle to produce even one or two leakers (capable at maximum to damage one) against 2-3 FFGx frigates let alone two groups of 11 FFGx.....

    Next stage ,after 12-13 hours from the dispersion and riorganization long Alesians Islands, would be toward US coast , for a variable distance of about 2800-3400 km from the arcipelago.

    Those frigates will take control of western continental US sectors and probably destroy or assist other units in destroy major ports, military shipyards (including where aircraft carriers are constructed, repaired and resupplied) military industrial centers and weapon depots about 75 to 94 hours  

    The aircraft carrier would deplete its stock of stand-off missiles (employing also half of the entire US production of SLAM-ER)....obviously no carrier in reality will ever carry or be materially capable to host even only a fraction of a similar amount of stand-off maritime strike missiles.....by the next 72 hours

    http://www.deagel.com/equipment/Offensive-Weapons/Harpoon.htm

    Results, with a good amount of luck, would be the incapacitation or the sink of 3-4 FFGx frigates on the 22 in total and unluckly also.......the loss of the sea control and probably the infrastructures entire US West Coast !

    This finctional scenario is obviously very simplicistic, but render clear what you obtain in terms of maritime control potential with the two options anything else left out.

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    Post  LMFS on Mon Aug 17, 2020 5:35 am

    Mindstorm wrote:I mean an insulated FFGx against an attack by LRASM delivered by carrier aircraft ? Probably between soft and hard suppression defensive systems no less than 35 incoming missiles within a very low time window, with a very high percentage of no "leakers" in the salvo.

    Yes, that is what I meant. The amount is appalling, but I actually don't think it would be very different from reality, in the conditions you are considering. I assume a salvo being launched within few seconds from different directions and a time for the ship's AD from discovery at ca. 15 km to potential impact of each single missile a little below 1 minute.

    Things would be a bit different with the one  below I guess Wink

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    With a conservative 7 or 8 LRASM deceived by combination of Mk53 Nulka and SEWIP Block 2 (with the integration of a Sylena MK2 ,against similar subsonic missiles, probably even double this figure)

    This is maybe a not so relevant detail in the big picture, but the current crop of missiles with two way datalinks + E-2D in the area makes the guidance an apparently trivial issue, unless I am missing some fundamental fact. I see it not completely obvious for the ship's EW to fool such weapons when left on their own, due to multimode seekers with passive radar locators, ESM/ECCM, IIR and other rather advanced technology, and practically impossible when external high-end platforms are providing the targetting. Unimpeded by enemy air power, the carrier fleet can keep their surveillance of the targets with all the advantages it implies.

    To produce a similar salvo density (obviously totally insuffcient) against a single enemy frigate the carrier should organize the preparation load out and take-off of at least an E2-D and 17-18 F/A-18 (for 34-36 LRASMs) for a cycle of take-offs of not less than 3 hours ,

    There are some important comments here:

    > Based on the SURGEX report I linked, the Nimitz could generate, on average, 11.6 sorties per hour over a 24 h period (officially considered time by USN is 240 sorties over 24 h or 10 per hour). But that means, considering ALL the operations needed on board, with the differences in tempo between day and night, and in a sustained way. Short term launching of ready planes into the air has a pace of roughly 4 launches per minute. BTW, the act of launching the whole air wing of the carrier is called Alpha Strike and it is considered to take roughly half an hour, including lifting, arming, fuelling and staging the planes. The flight deck can handle roughly 30 aircraft simultaneously, before getting overcrowded.

    https://www.quora.com/How-long-does-it-take-an-aircraft-carrier-to-get-all-of-its-fighters-into-the-air
    https://www.gao.gov/assets/670/667092.pdf
    https://apps.dtic.mil/dtic/tr/fulltext/u2/a362472.pdf

    > Based on the fit checks done on the F-18E/F, 4 JSM could be carried by each plane. In this case as said the bottleneck is not the warhead size or other missile parameters, but its mere ability to impact the target. So a rational planer would, IMHO, try to first and foremost find the most effective way to pierce the ship's AD, since once impacts start onboard either a mission kill is obtained or subsequent attacks are way more likely to succeed, for obvious reasons. The size of the air wing needed for the 40-strong salvo would go down to 10 aircraft.

    https://www.kongsberg.com/newsandmedia/news-archive/2013/kongsberg-and-boeing-complete-joint-strike-missile-jsm-check-on-fa-18-super/

    I am deliberately not including considerations about the employment of ARMs here.

    Under the conditions given above, the time to launch (for the effects of this particular case) an air wing with 40 AShMs in the air would be from 2.5 to 5 minutes, depending on whether JSM or LRASM are used. This has crucial consequences for the rest of the calculations done in this scenario.
     
    Mine opinion ....and not only mine obvioulsy..... is that generally anti-radar missiles, even the most modern ones, have very few relevant employments in maritime operations against ships targets for strictly technical reasons ++

    Just some fast thoughts here:

    > As said above, I don't know what prevents the E-2D or even the fighters of the fleet from taking care of the targetting in such case. Given the capacities of the USN AWACS and the available radar horizon (it could also operate passively beyond radar horizon in fact), the operation of the HARM or even better the upcoming AARGM-ER for faster and longed ranged flight, could be controlled by data link and hence make it largely independent on the difficulties you are commenting. I assume the range of the SM-6 on-board smaller than the radar range of the E-2 (>500 km) and even then I assume AAMs from the fighters' attack wing could eventually intercept them if needed.

    > The current loadout of the F/A-18E/F is 6 x HARM per plane, which would substantially increase the chances to saturate the ship's AD, much more if the notably higher speed of the missile is considered. As said above, the payload on target is way lower than with purpose-built AShM, but the goal is to crack the defences open and then use bigger warheads to finish the job, once the ship has been damaged. For a the same 10 planes air wing considered above, a 60 missile salvo would be obtained, without considering that the saturation threshold against such missiles would probably be substantially lower than against subsonic ones (even if they can be detected before by the ship's radars due to their different flight profile).

    > I read repeated claims about AARGM starting to being considered as a potential weapon for naval strike, I cannot tell if they are on the right track or not. But in the place of the USN I would explore this possibility indeed, because as you are explaining, the current effectiveness of their AShM against strong AD is, at least on paper, very poor.


    Last edited by LMFS on Mon Aug 17, 2020 12:42 pm; edited 1 time in total
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    Post  Tsavo Lion on Mon Aug 17, 2020 6:11 am

    IMO it's worth mentioning that AShM/HARMs can be launched by B-1B/52s, F-16s & P-3/8s as well:
    https://news.usni.org/2019/12/19/next-generation-anti-ship-missile-achieves-operational-capability-with-super-hornets

    Thirty B-52Gs were further modified to carry up to 12 AGM-84 Harpoon anti-ship missiles each,..
    https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Boeing_B-52_Stratofortress#Armament

    https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/General_Dynamics_F-16_Fighting_Falcon#Specifications_(F-16C_Block_50/52)

    https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Lockheed_P-3_Orion#Specifications_(P-3C_Orion)
    https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Lockheed_P-3_Orion#United_States
    https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Boeing_P-8_Poseidon#Specifications_(P-8A)
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    Post  Mindstorm on Mon Aug 17, 2020 12:51 pm



    LMFS wrote:Yes, that is what I meant. The amount is appalling, but I actually don't think it would be very different from reality, in the conditions you are considering. I assume a salvo being launched within few seconds from different directions and a time for the ship's AD from discovery at ca. 15 km to potential impact of each single missile a little below 1 minute.

    Actually even if LRASM would proceed at only 5 m above wake since 50 km (a feat that is well beyond the limits of its aerodynamics layout and that would significatively reduce its range) the radar horizon for the EASR of FFGX would be about 32 km.
    Taking into account real height of approach of LRASM you have something a bit over 40 km.



    LMFS wrote:This is maybe a not so relevant detail in the big picture, but the current crop of missiles with two way datalinks + E-2D in the area makes the guidance an apparently trivial issue, unless I am missing some fundamental fact. I see it not completely obvious for the ship's EW to fool such weapons when left on their own, due to multimode seekers with passive radar locators, ESM/ECCM, IIR and other rather advanced technology, and practically impossible when external high-end platforms are providing the targetting.

    Probably you simply miss that missiles close the ships and move away from elements capable to provide third party guidance and that at 50-60 km from ship the guidance channels will be clompletely drowned by the EW on board the ship (or in this instance several ships) that boast also a much greater potential than any airborne one.

    Best protection against EW for anti-ship missiles is very high speed because the homing systems on board each missile can acquire the target position at distance where the jamming density -that obviously disperse about at the square of distance - from enemy ship is still too low and the missile can proceed up to a precomputed impact point , executing pseudo-random high-G manoeuvres, without any more correction from the homing system.

    There are some important comments here:

    LMFS wrote:> Based on the SURGEX report I linked, the Nimitz could generate, on average, 11.6 sorties per hour over a 24 h period (officially considered time by USN is 240 sorties over 24 h or 10 per hour). But that means, considering ALL the operations needed on board, with the differences in tempo between day and night, and in a sustained way. Short term launching of ready planes into the air has a pace of roughly 4 launches per minute. BTW, the act of launching the whole air wing of the carrier is called Alpha Strike and it is considered to take roughly half an hour, including lifting, arming, fuelling and staging the planes. The flight deck can handle roughly 30 aircraft simultaneously, before getting overcrowded.

    I know very well the document you have pointed out, the SURGEX was executed with targets placed at 200 nautical miles from the Nimitz carrier (practically well within engagement range of an enemy maritime strike group) with a weapon load out of only 1000 punds of gravity bombs and two AIM-9.

    The maritime strike scenario in the Pacific has a distance to cover...and need for additional fuel with the related logistic preparations and repair times - more than double of that modeled in the US Navy Surgex exercise and the loadout of each F/A-18 is near five times more.

    As said i have put irreasonably favourable conditions for the carrier, that would never materialize in the reality, only to provide an extreme picture of the difference in potential.

    In reality what will reasonably happen is that ISR assets will detect only a small part of the enemy dispersed strike group ,the carrier will operate in its sector launching wasteful attacks towards the few units they have detected while all the corvettes/frigates undetected will come well within delivery range of theirs salvo of anti-ships missiles that E-2D will detect at not more than 250-300 km from the carrier.

    Some hours after the sunk of the carrier with all its aircraft on board all military analysts at world will point to the anachronistic, criminal conservatism of carrier's apologists.
    LMFS
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    Post  LMFS on Mon Aug 17, 2020 2:04 pm

    Mindstorm wrote:
    Probably you simply miss that missiles close the ships and move away from elements capable to provide third party guidance and that at 50-60 km from ship the guidance channels will be clompletely drowned by the EW on board the ship (or in this instance several ships) that boast also a much greater potential than any airborne one.

    True, I was not assuming a per default activation of the ship's EW (the missile being at 60 km from the ship, the crew would still be unaware of the attack) in order not to make easier their location on a passive mode or the home on jamming mode of the missile's seekers. Would not the simultaneous jamming of guidance channels and the use of decoys be contradictory?

    I know very well the document you have pointed out, the SURGEX was executed with targets placed at 200 nautical miles from the Nimitz carrier (practically well within engagement range of an enemy maritime strike group) with a weapon load out of only 1000 punds of gravity bombs and two AIM-9.

    We would need to make a quantitative analysis to see what the maximum range of the planes would be in the configuration we decide as correct. The reasons why on a first approach I have disregarded to do that are:

    > The range of the air launched missiles is equal or superior to the surface launched ones, even considering the later have a booster. This is arguable, since I find no official data for either modality, but the air launched option has the advantage of the carrier plane being able to increase altitude or speed release differently to a fixed surface launch and I take this fact as an additional safety margin
    > The 200 nm mentioned in the report refer to the use of bombs, not missiles. So the target location in the SURGEX would correspond to the launching point of the missiles in our scenario, and it would be already almost 400 km away from the carrier (and already nearly out of range for the frigates' offensive weapons), to which the actual range of the air launched missiles would need to be added. So there is a robust margin for the carrier's aviation in this regard.
    > The report explains that those 200 nm were not representative of the maximum range at which the missions could actually be performed with the sortie rate and fuel load used by the planes

    The maritime strike scenario in the Pacific has a distance to cover...and need for additional fuel with the related logistic preparations and repair times - more than double of that modeled in the US Navy Surgex exercise and the loadout of each F/A-18 is  near five times more.

    See above regarding the range necessary in the scenario. Using the JSM the offensive load of each F-18 would be roughly 1.5 tons, without considering AAMs. The planes used in SURGEX carried either 1,000 or 2,000 lb bombs, for a load of 500 or 1,000 kg + AAMs.

    As said i have put irreasonably favourable conditions for the carrier, that would never materialize in the reality, only to provide an extreme picture of the difference in potential.

    In reality what will reasonably happen is that ISR assets will detect only a small part of the enemy dispersed strike group ,the carrier will operate in its sector launching wasteful attacks towards the few units they have detected while all the corvettes/frigates undetected will come well within delivery range of theirs salvo of anti-ships missiles that E-2D will detect at not more than 250-300 km from the carrier.

    I will address this in your previous post about the Pacific scenario.
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    Post  Mindstorm on Mon Aug 17, 2020 6:24 pm

    LMFS wrote:make easier their location on a passive mode or the home on jamming mode of the missile's seekers. Would not the simultaneous jamming of guidance channels and the use of decoys be contradictory?

    This is a misconception : emitter locating systems ,also in their much more performing space-separed fixed ground based versions, have a precision of some hundreds of meters and are mostly used to merely cue a missile in the right area so that terminal homing can complete the engagement.

    The so called "home-on-jam" capability is today a feature almost useless against very agile frequency hopping modern radar/jammers (the reason: the radiation source computation by part of the processing systems produce positional ambiguity incompatible with the realization of engagement).


    False radar portrays of the defended ship with the IR opaque aerosols screen before them will all sit in the same area of uncertainty and therefore a fraction of the inbound missiles (already at 10-12 km) will begin to aim for the false targets.


    LMFS wrote:> The range of the air launched missiles is equal or superior to the surface launched ones, even considering the later have a booster. This is arguable, since I find no official data for either modality, but the air launched option has the advantage of the carrier plane being able to increase altitude or speed release differently to a fixed surface launch and I take this fact as an additional safety margin
    > The 200 nm mentioned in the report refer to the use of bombs, not missiles. So the target location in the SURGEX would correspond to the launching point of the missiles in our scenario, and it would be already almost 400 km away from the carrier (and already nearly out of range for the frigates' offensive weapons), to which the actual range of the air launched missiles would need to be added. So there is a robust margin for the carrier's aviation in this regard.

    Those mission was executed at 200 nautical miles (about 370 Km) from the Nimitz carrier included the 3-4 nautical miles of the bombs (5-7 km) therefore those F/A-18 and 14 flown only 365 km with about 600 kg of ordances , in mine example those same aircraft would have flown 390 nautical miles (723 km ) with 2270 kg of ordnances and two conformal 1818 liters fuel tanks ....that probably cannot even mount in this configuration.....

    Practically in order to produce the makeshift of a surge in the number of sorties US Navy officials have reproduced WWII missions, with even the same range and type of weapons (that is exactly where carriers shine), if any it prove the ridiculous anachronism of carrier apologists if a conflict against an advanced enemy is taken in consideration.

    LMFS wrote:> The report explains that those 200 nm were not representative of the maximum range at which the missions could actually be performed with the sortie rate and fuel load used by the planes

    Obviously but increasing even of a low percentage the mission distance and sophostication and mass of weapons to be employed (much much more labour intensive than MK-83 dumb bombs) the sorties rate would collapse to discouraging figures because:

    -Each aircraft must obviously cover the additional distance in both directions
    -Each aircraft need much more fuel and carry much bigger weapon load and both increase the drag, lower the excess power disposable and lower the authonomy and the average speed to the target area
    -Each aircraft reequire much more labour hours to prepare before the mission and for returning operative after one is completed
    -Weapon require much more time to be mounted, fixed and programmed

    As said i have put unreasonable bonus to the carrier side considered the huge inbalance of forces between the two sides procured with the same resources.
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    Post  LMFS on Tue Aug 18, 2020 1:31 am

    Mindstorm wrote:This is a misconception : emitter locating systems ,also in their much more performing space-separed fixed ground based versions, have a precision of some hundreds of meters and are mostly used to merely cue a missile in the right area so that terminal homing can complete the engagement.

    Ok thanks

    two conformal 1818 liters fuel tanks ....that probably cannot even mount in this configuration.....

    I guess it could due to to the four wet stations in the wings, but the load and DI would be substantial in that configuration. The NATOPS manual provides very accurate data in case we want to do a precise drag / range calculation.

    Russia's naval doctrine and strategy - Page 5 Index10

    Obviously but increasing even of a low percentage the mission distance and sophostication and mass of weapons to be employed (much much more labour intensive than MK-83 dumb bombs) the sorties rate would collapse to discouraging figures because:

    -Each aircraft must obviously cover the additional distance in both directions

    This was already considered in the exercise, they even provided an additional table with the potential max range for the strike sorties generated:

    Russia's naval doctrine and strategy - Page 5 Surgex10

    In any case this is the size of the safety margin for the carrier to which the range of the aircraft missiles must be added, not the real distance to the target.

    I believe that the concept of "maritime distributed lethality" (or "modular naval force concentration" in the domestic version od the concept) is not perfectly clear.....

    The possibility of disperse and mask an high number of lower tonnage/lower signature among littoral elements and civil sea ships do NOT aim at allow your group of ships operating from there.

    The purpose is instead to negate to the enemy the initial position of wide majority of your units so that its ISR and and Command and Control assets must find each of them and follow each of them separately splitting its surveillance resorces (in particular UAVs and surveillance aircraft) in the space and in the time and rendering them much more easier to destroy -because you cannot provide the necessary CAP protection to each of those UAV/Aircraft like in a recce mission against a large ship force concentration

    Understood and in agreement.

    This relates to my first comments to your scenario. I agree a defending fleet can use the coast and spread itself to make ISR efforts more difficult. What I have difficulty understanding is how such a fleet deploys far from the own coast. The use of the carrier near of the own shores makes no real sense since air power is already available there.

    The kind of fleet you propose, without air cover and advanced airspace surveillance is highly vulnerable in the high seas. The smaller the ship, the smaller its autonomy and its susceptibility to sea state, to navigate and to use weapons. Attacks can come from below its radar horizon and create situations where the short range defences are saturated or simply caught by surprise.

    As to the evolution of the warfare in naval domain, I agree there will be a strong increase in distributed offensive means as you say, but also the corresponding advances in AI, unmanned vehicles and space based monitoring act to counter them and mane manageable the increasing amount of information needed to keep control of the tactical situation. For a vessel of medium displacement and slow as a frigate to go within 500 km of a carrier with AWACS, fighters on CAP and in the future numbers of HALE/MALE UAVs in the open oceanic environment unnoticed is not something I can easily accept. Long range hypersonic weapons can push the limits of this airspace control, but current subsonic missiles and surface assets don't do it.

    To the Pacific scenario.

    Try to not reason in abstract ,naval warfare in real word do not happen on an infinite surface without geographical elements and point of strategic interests

    I try to keep the discussion far from too many case-specific details, but I agree the new weapons are making this more difficult, because with ranges reaching > 1,000 km the size of the theater becomes almost of oceanic size.

    Let make an example using greography of USA and the Federation (as they was two nations identical ) with the first employing its resource in a single Nimtz-class carrier with its complement of fixed-wings aircraft and the second using the same resources to procure (in a way absolutely inefficient) 22 FFGx.

    This is not very realistic because as said the idea is to use the carrier for deployments far from the homeland. The distributed fleet starts in home territory, which is opposed to how I would see reasonable to compare with a carrier, when it would need to cross an ocean to intervene in a remote conflict.

    choosing a scenario like Baltic, Northern or Black Sea would had very quickly transformed in a turkey shoot for the FFGx's side

    Agree, using a carrier in such an environment makes no sense at all.

    The aircraft carrier could be placed about 400-450 km SE of the western part of the Alesians so that its F/A-18-E/F with 2 LRASM (attacking at groups of 5 aircraft at times so to not suffer huge penalties to theirs combat range for wait the preparation and take -off from the carrier of others F/A-18-E/F) could attack enemy ships up to 1282 km far away (390 nm -722,28 km- with two external tanks of 1818 liter and the two LRASM).

    What is the need to stay so far from the targets? The carrier has superior propulsion so they can maintain distance as needed. As seen before, the attack groups can be bigger because they can be launched in few minutes (4.5 minutes for the air wing size you calculated).

    Taking the proportion of missiles you calculated, 36 missiles x 22 frigates would mean 792 LRASM, which is clearly an exaggeration but I think ultimately within the magazine capabilities of a Nimitz carrier (standard CVN load as mentioned in SURGEX is 800 x Mk 82, 900 x Mk 83 and 200 x Mk 84). As said I don't consider this way of attacking the FFGX not even close to the optimum, but let us explore it.

    Enemy FFGx frigates will move ,let put at a speed 20 knots, from theirs dispersed positions converging in two groups of long two SE and E vectors towards Aleutians islands where they will cover and disperse behind the islands.

    I assume this convergence of forces is just to facilitate the analysis, but in any case such result would be natural if they ever come to pursuit the carrier.

    Let image that space based and long range UAVs or sea bed sensors (the on board E2-D will detect those frigates well within engagement range of theirs LRASM therefore chance of survival are all on third party detection) manage to detect and discriminate from civil maritime traffic very optimistically 13 on those 22 frigates.

    I don't understand your reasoning regarding the E-2D not being able to detect the frigates until they are within range to attack the carrier? Their radar has range in excess of 500 km, which is roughly the radar horizon available at their operational altitude and they can stay on station for hours hundreds of km away from the carrier (range ca. 2700 km + air refuelling capable). So the frigates would be detected well before being able to attack the carrier.

    So, how long would it take for the carrier to take care of the frigates?

    Using the combat range you calculated, 2 hours per sortie would be IMHO a rough but acceptable flight time (1.8 h for F-18 in the SURGEX, considering they were kept waiting in the air according to the max mission range in the table above). With 44 strike planes onboard, two attacking groups could be used in parallel and the rest 8 planes could be used to speed up the tempo. We can consider a cycle of one group of sorties every two hours, well within demonstrated surge capabilities. As the frigates have to come closer to get in range of attack, the carrier will manage its speed to facilitate aircraft operations and can allow the frigates to come closer, as far as they stay outside of their attack range (ca. 500 km). Within the proposed 29 and 34 hours and assuming two groups of 11 frigates are attacked in open sea according to their proximity to the islands, the first group is completely eliminated and the second loses 6 units (sorry but I don't understand why you consider the frigates sailing in open sea manage to avoid detection by AWACS, so I don't know how to compute which ones you think are being detected and which not). After that period, 5 units remain and it is not clear to me whether you would assume they would manage to hide or go away or keep trying to get offensive. In my logic, search groups would be launched by the carrier to find and destroy them.

    Assuming all of the above is wrong and the frigates get in position to attack the carrier:
    With the 22 frigates attacking from 500 km and assuming the E-2D are operational, there would be roughly 30 minutes to intercept as many incoming missiles as possible and the carrier's air wing needs to act defensively now. Since we are considering that the frigates reach somehow the carrier, I assume the carrier itself is aware and has had the chance of preparing the planes needed for an interception mission. 14 AAMs per F/A-18E/F means the whole fleet's LRASM loadout of 10 x 22  = 220 LRASM would be ideally intercepted by just 16 planes, which could be launched within 5 minutes since the first missiles are detected, without the ship's SAMs even needing to start operating. This, considering that carriers never operate without at least some AEGIS destroyers and therefore this example is abusing a bit the air wing, but I get this goes both ways and the FFGX also may be used in a better way.

    As said i have put unreasonable bonus to the carrier side considered the huge inbalance of forces between the two sides procured with the same resources.

    Interestingly I have a similar sensation that the carrier's many possibilities and degrees of freedom have not been used in the scenario because of a completely artificial bottleneck caused by the USN's obsession with land attack and neglect of maritime strike incl. current lack of proper AShM. Also the utilization of the carrier without a fleet is a bit senseless, but I understand the idea was to compare both options in as pure a way as possible.

    In fact, I think an air wing of Su-33 with Kh-31 could get this mission done on a fraction of the time and the cost...  Rolling Eyes

    To conclude, since I doubt that I can say much more about this issue without repeating myself: I think the correct way of using the carriers is having a complete fleet of offensive and defensively capable ships, like the ones VMF is building now, and protect them with a layer of air power, which is trivially done close to the homeland's shores with land-based aircraft, but can only be proportioned in the far sea regions with the participation of a carrier. A proportion of two / three naval strike carriers to be used when needed and sufficient amount of other vessels that can be used independently does not create an exaggerated burden on the navy's budget (they will be way cheaper than land-attack, payload-on target oriented ones) and is key to create a capable oceanic fleet. I didn't thought that I would come to disagree with you, but it seems this is the case... Smile
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    Post  Mindstorm on Thu Aug 20, 2020 3:20 pm


    I was a pair of days out of city.
    Let resume from where we was. Wink


    LMFS let me start saying that both me and you know perfectly that this "Surgex "exercise was nothing more than a "puppet parade" constructed purposely by US Navy Command officials attempting to defend the role of aircraft carriers with severe personell and material augmentations and choosing ad hoc missions and equipemnt involved (in particular distance to targets and weapons of airwings) to produce absolutely unrwalizable sortie rate.

    But i want to continue the analysis only to show how even within those parameters the cost and operative efficiency of aircraft carriers in any other role except remote ground attack against terribly inferior enemies is terribly low.

    LMFS we are attempting to compute how much time would be required to the airwing to conduct long range operations and at what costs in terms of on-board fuel and ordance stock ,in other words what can produce the entire potential of an aircraft carrier in terms of sea control in a not WWII scenario.

    * A little note to the edge : we can say that also for that long pasted historical instance several military analysts argue today that the real central element allowing the effective use of airpower against Japanese and German Navy was not the magical quality of air power at sea but much more trivially the fact that in both instances the code for communication and command of the enemy had been breached and allied Navy commander could plan and organize attack and defense from stand-off knowing in advance the exact position and the movement of enemy surface units.

    Lacking this game-changing "allowing" element probably today we would talk of a series of terrible allied defeats in the Pacific Ocean and Mediterranean Sea.


    LMFS wrote:This was already considered in the exercise, they even provided an additional table with the potential max range for the strike sorties generated:

    Russia's naval doctrine and strategy - Page 5 Surgex10

    In any case this is the size of the safety margin for the carrier to which the range of the aircraft missiles must be added, not the real distance to the target.

    Not, it was neither considered and neither could be executed at the condictions and preparations realized in this exercise.

    What pag. 5 say is simply the maximum potential range of the aircraft at standard flight time and in-area times of stance in the same missions realized of the exercise and not obviously those effectively reacheable at the conditions realized in the exercise's missions; practically they describe the maximum potential of the aircraft in the mission configuration

    If you observe at pag 31 you can see that among all the 727 strike missions completed in the 4 days and 2 hours :

    - About 68% has been conducted within 100 nmi (let put optimistically 70 n.mi on average from the carrier and therefore 66/67 n.mi - 122/124 km - effectively covered before bomb's release)
    - About 24% has been conducted within 150 nmi (let put optimistically 130 n.mi on average fron the carrier and therefore 126/127 n.mi -233/235 km - effectively covered before bomb's release )
    - About 8% has been conducted at 200+ n.mi up to 280 n.mi (let put optimistically 250 n.mi on average fron the carrier and therefore 246/247 n.mi -455/457 km - effectively covered before bomb's release )

    Those aircraft involved in the SURGEX exercise have therefore optimistically covered on average 94,6 n.mi or 175 km from the carrier in theirs strike missions.
    With theirs very light 2 AIM-9 and two 500 punds bombs weapon load we can assume an average speed, at 10.000 meters of altitude of mach 0,9 (limit to transonic) about 1078 Km/h for an average time of flight to target of 9,7 minutes and 19,4 minutes of mission's flight , adding other 2 minutes of additional standing in the area we have an average strike mission's time of 21,4 minutes.

    Is eveident that is just this very reduced flgiht time (caused by the purposely chosen targets positioned at very small distance ) togheter with the personell augmentation at allow the enormous surge in the numbers of sorties.

    Now in our maritime strike scenario the F/A-18E/F would cover 390 n.mi or 722,28 km before LRASM relaease with a weapon and CFT load of over 5.3 tons.
    Assuming a flight toward the delivery point at the same 10.000 m altitude at an optimistic speed of 0,7 mach - 754,74 km/h for the way heavier and drag-generating load, you have an average time of flight to target of about 57,5 minutes and 1 hour and 55 minutes of mission's flight .

    That mean that very optimistically the very low range ground strike missions in the SURGEX have required less than 4,8 less time than the maritime strike missions in open Pacific Ocean of the scenario proposed !!
    Naturally also the preparations before and after each maritime starike mission -and the fuel and weapons and repair times required - would be immensely more labour and time-intensive in comparison.


    LMFS wrote:This is not very realistic because as said the idea is to use the carrier for deployments far from the homeland. The distributed fleet starts in home territory, which is opposed to how I would see reasonable to compare with a carrier, when it would need to cross an ocean to intervene in a remote conflict.

    I agree that it is absolutely not reasonable, because in the reality those carriers would almost certainly operate at thousands of km from CONUS in closed sea theatres (Baltic, Mediterranean Sea, Black sea, Persian Gulf etc....) and at only some hundreds of km from enemy EEZ, where would be trapped within engagement range even of coastal-batteries of enemy antiship missilse ,let aside ship and submarine mounted ones, and theirs weapon load would be constituted at 85-90 % of air to ground and air to air ordances ,not anti-ship missiles.

    The scenario chosen is the most favourable for the "perpetual-retreat" tactic ,that obviously would be irrealizable in reality because no technology capable to change wind direction exist today and at speed of over 20 knots in a forced direction it would be absolutely impossible to execute any take-off (above all with that weapon and fuel load) except with almost perfect cross wing direction.
    But i have assumed, for pure sake of argumentation, that the wind's direction would perfectly match the directions where enemy group of ships alternatively pull the carriers.......admitting that the carrier would be even aware that a group of those low tonnage ships would be coming toward it in a particular direction ,models now existing suggest the opposite.....


    LMFS wrote:Taking the proportion of missiles you calculated, 36 missiles x 22 frigates would mean 792 LRASM, which is clearly an exaggeration but I think ultimately within the magazine capabilities of a Nimitz carrier (standard CVN load as mentioned in SURGEX is 800 x Mk 82, 900 x Mk 83 and 200 x Mk 84). As said I don't consider this way of attacking the FFGX not even close to the optimum, but let us explore it.

    The figure is for a single salvo against an insulated frigate with the defending ship using about half of its interceptors , in reality density of the most well executed salvo attack will never reach density greater than 12-13 missiles for minute and the frigates would converge in strike groups of at least 3 or 4 units capable each to cover the others, exchange data and jamming power for a significative surge of the PK of each single interceptor.

    LMFS wrote:assume this convergence of forces is just to facilitate the analysis, but in any case such result would be natural if they ever come to pursuit the carrier.

    Convercence ,in particular of units eventually discovered by subamrines or ISR aircraft happen to increase the anti-ship missile's salvo density and cooperative defensive performances.


    LMFS wrote:I don't understand your reasoning regarding the E-2D not being able to detect the frigates until they are within range to attack the carrier? Their radar has range in excess of 500 km, which is roughly the radar horizon available at their operational altitude and they can stay on station for hours hundreds of km away from the carrier (range ca. 2700 km + air refuelling capable). So the frigates would be detected well before being able to attack the carrier.

    That radar detection range is for bomber type airborne targets , detecting a surface reduced radar signature low tonnage ship on the sea clutter is all another story.....the 4 E-2D on board a Nimitz in war time situations can assure, through rotation, the continual presence at no more than 100-150 n.mi from the carrier and provide guidance toward 90 degrees in the direction of propable attack of the enemy to the air wing to attempt to intercept enemy bombers.
    It is a classical procedure for carrier in play since the Cold Warknown as "Outher Air Battle" ( today USN has lost the F-14 and its interception capabilities).


    Pag. 51

    https://csbaonline.org/uploads/documents/CVW_Report_Web_1.pdf

    Without Space and Submarine based third party surveillance the discovery of enemy ship units would happen by pure chance ,likely by very long endurance UAVs and also in this instance the chance of discovery of the Nimitz calss carrier and of 22 dispersed frigates would be worlds a part in terms of probability of happening.

    The range i have proposed in mine scenario take into account space based and sea bed based sensor network providing to the carrier the capability to attack enemy frigates at safe distance (and obviously discover and follow a single flat top behemoth such as a Nimitz is for radar satellites orders of magnitude easier than discover and maintain contact with 22 reduced signature low tonnage ships).

    Why so long stand-off range ? Because allowing some groups of enemy ships to come closer ( let put at 800-900 km) to the carrier would expose it to the deadly risk that one or more groups not previosuly discovered would come near delivery range and the carrier at this point would confront several groups contemporaneously.

    LMFS wrote:14 AAMs per F/A-18E/F means the whole fleet's LRASM loadout of 10 x 22 = 220 LRASM would be ideally intercepted by just 16 planes, which could be launched within 5 minutes since the first missiles are detected, without the ship's SAMs even needing to start operating. This, considering that carriers never operate without at least some AEGIS destroyers and therefore this example is abusing a bit the air wing, but I get this goes both ways and the FFGX also may be used in a better way.

    I sincerely prefere to not elaborate of that…… Very Happy

    LMFS you are too intelligent and long time versed in military related matters to ignore that aircraft and theirs A-A missiles (unless purposely conceived and built for the mission) are almost useless in missile defense roles, the chances even only few interceptions are so incredibly low that US Navy ,in theirs models of carrier’s defense from anti ship missiles, discard it entirely and compute instead only the performances of the complex AEGIS AD systems on board the numerous ships parts of the carrier battle group that are present with almost the only role to provide cover to the otherwise totally defensless aircraft carrier.

    Therfore i will consider all that that story on the 14 AAM missiles on the F/-18 and the 220 LRASM as a funny boutade…..
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    Post  Tsavo Lion on Thu Aug 20, 2020 7:48 pm

    ..those carriers would almost certainly operate.. in closed sea theatres (Baltic, Mediterranean Sea, Black sea, Persian Gulf etc....)
    they won't sail into Baltic & Black Seas, & I doubt the Persian Gulf- too close to Russian/Iranian shore based aviation & AShMs. Recently I heard that a USN CSG left a certain E. Med. Sea area after failing to locate a VMF Kilo SSK.
    If a capable adversary decides to attack a CSG, it will use multiple platforms- i.e. subs, aircraft, ekranoplans, & BMs, not just FFGs, if only to increase chances of success & minimize its own losses. 
    The Chinese will always have more $ to spend on CVNs than the Russians. 
    China will trade with the same countries Russia hopefully will, & when the time comes they can have a division of labor- the PLAN/AF guards the SLOCs with its CBGs,etc. while the VMF/VKS/Army guards the NSR/BRI & provides ISR. 
    Why duplicate an effort? After all, the UK, Japan, SK, & Australia all rely on the USN CVNs & don't even think of building their own. 
    The Economist’s explanation for Russia’s new strategic effectiveness is two-fold. ‘In 20 years, Mr Putin has turned Russia’s armed forces from an ill-managed bunch of poorly equipped conscripts into a well-armed, largely professional fighting force. But he has also been politically more astute than the West, both in swiftly seizing opportunities and in sticking by his allies’, it says. [url=https://www.aspistrategist.org.au/gdp-isnt-everything/#:~:text=This shows that Russia's economy,compared with Australians' US%2453%2C400.]https://www.aspistrategist.org.au/gdp-isnt-everything/#:~:text=This%20shows%20that%20Russia's%20economy,compared%20with%20Australians'%20US%2453%2C400.[/url]


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    Post  LMFS on Fri Aug 21, 2020 12:18 am

    @ Mindstorm:

    I will try to document as good as possible my answers, I think it is better so than giving just my opinion or vague references, but it will take a bit more time.

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