USA & Israeli involvement in Transcaucasia aimed at RF & Iran

In both public statements and private meetings, the US national security adviser made it clear that Washington is now closely scrutinizing Armenia’s relationship with Iran, and seeks to enlist Armenian support to apply “maximum pressure” in order to “squeeze Iran,” as Bolton openly admitted.
Bolton also informed the Armenian government that the Trump administration intends to enforce tightened sanctions “very vigorously,” adding a warning that the Armenian border with Iran will be “a significant issue.” ..it is now clear that the past practice of the United States “looking the other way” as Armenia deepened its ties and trade with Iran is over. This is despite the fact that Armenia has consistently conformed to previous sanctions and only saw Iran as an essential alternative to depending too much on Russia.
But there were two other rather strange twists to Bolton’s visit to Armenia. First, in a rather vague and abrupt reference that would be a substantial shift in US policy, Bolton announced that Washington would “look at” potential arms sales to Armenia, despite the American position as a key mediator of the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict with Azerbaijan. And with Russia as the primary arms supplier to both sides in that conflict, such an off-hand statement is certain to trigger Russian unease.
The second twist was even more bizarre, as President Trump’s “private lawyer” Rudolph Giuliani arrived in Armenia just days before Bolton, on a “private visit” to attend a conference devoted to the Russian-led Eurasian Economic Union, and during which he hailed Armenia’s potential role as a “bridge” between the Eurasian Union and the EU. While Giuliani’s optimism for such cooperation with the West was perhaps designed to offset Bolton’s tougher talk in Moscow days earlier, like everything else in the Trump Administration, the outlook for US policy and the real implications for Armenia remain as unpredictable as ever.

..the notion that Yerevan would orient its relations toward Azerbaijan – which it regards as an existential threat – around the U.S.'s policy of isolating Iran fell flat among Armenians.
“John Bolton, or anyone for that matter, cannot speak on my behalf,” Armenian Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan told a news conference following Bolton's visit. “They are moving forward with the logic that they have some kind of ownership of the Karabakh issue, and now they are attempting to sell it to me, without asking my opinion.” ..the combined effect of the Mills and Bolton statements added to a sense in Yerevan that the new Pashinyan government's tentative steps toward the West are being repaid by a conspicuous lack of sympathy toward Yerevan's position. On top of that, the Trump administration has evinced little interest in the Caucasus – even by the low standards of the U.S. – and little indication that Washington has anything to offer Armenia in exchange for the dramatic moves Bolton proposed. ..The Kremlin, naturally, did not take kindly to Bolton's attempts to drive a wedge between Armenia and Russia; Yerevan is Moscow's closest ally in the Caucasus and Armenia depends heavily on subsidized Russian weaponry. ..“Incidentally, not all of John Bolton’s statements in Yerevan deserve to be criticized. In his October 25 interview to Radio Liberty, he made a wonderful comment: 'I think that’s really fundamental to Armenia exercising its full sovereignty and not being dependent on or subject to excessive foreign influence.' It would be good if John Bolton thinks over the meaning of his own words.”

It is possible that for Azerbaijan the problem of Nagorno-Karabakh is still being pushed into the background because of the unpredictable development of events around Iran. At the same time, Yerevan has already stated that it will use the right of veto if the issue of accepting Baku in the CSTO arises, recalling that, like in the EAEU, all decisions are made on the basis of consensus. That's the way it is. But we still do not know what conditions are spelled out in the status of an observer at the Organization and whether consensus is needed. This is the first. The second. There is Russia's desire to bring together the positions of Azerbaijan and Armenia and minimize the threat of renewed hostilities between them. The start has already been given. On September 28, on the margins of the CIS summit in Dushanbe, the conversation between the President of Azerbaijan was held with the mediation of Russian President Vladimir PutinIlham Aliyev and Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan . The sides then expressed their commitment to the negotiations on the settlement of the Karabakh conflict, the strengthening of the cease-fire regime to prevent incidents on the contact line of troops in the conflict zone and on the border between Armenia and Azerbaijan. And we do not exclude that the dialogue between Putin and Pashinyan in this direction will continue in Astana. ..It is not by chance that Iran expressed a desire to obtain observer status in the CSTO, realizing that clouds are gathering over the region. Against this background, Moscow would not like to throw Azerbaijan into a geopolitical whirlpool, therefore, so far, the problem of the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict and the hostility between Baku and Yerevan has been out of the question. ..
As for Russia, it cannot be a geopolitical hostage of Armenia; it is important for Moscow to maintain good relations with both Yerevan and Baku. Therefore, Russia will look for options to reconcile the conflicting parties, and the further course of events for many may be unexpected.
https://regnum.ru/news/polit/2514001.html

..the Iranians could do with a few factories to licence produce old simple model Su-30s in large numbers to replace their F-14s.

To reach Iran from Georgia they would have to fly over Russian airspace to get to the Caspian, or over Armenia or Azerbaijan, or over Turkey...

magnumcromagnon wrote:You guys seem to forget that the only reason why Tbilisi wasn't taken in the 8/8/08 war was because of VVP's and VDV's restraint.

Tsavo Lion wrote:

magnumcromagnon wrote:You guys seem to forget that the only reason why Tbilisi wasn't taken in the 8/8/08 war was because of VVP's and VDV's restraint.

But holding it or installing a puppet ruler wasn't sustainable as it would trigger a guerrilla Chechen/Afghan style war. The same with Kiev in 2014.

China could also supply them J-10/-11s, & for le$$.

They could fly low over borders & also use stealth helos to deliver/extract SF/pilots.
But mostly the base will be used for logistics & training once a civil war starts in Iran.

But holding it or installing a puppet ruler wasn't sustainable as it would trigger a guerrilla Chechen/Afghan style war. The same with Kiev in 2014.

The point now isn't for them to install a puppet, but to make them realize they can't keep a missile base safe (or the secrets that they contain in them) from sabotage, which in turn makes the Georgians negotiate, and the Yanks yell sanctions. It makes it also clear that a eagle feather sweater can't keep them warm, which is a strong message to other allies.

They could get together with Sukhoi and adapt the design a little to suit their own specific needs... the way the Su-30MKI was adapted for India etc.

miketheterrible wrote:I would figure maybe allowing them to have shells with the prospects of adding their own avionics may be best solution.  Or outright assembly as said.  Su-27SKM's or Su-30SM variant would be best option and give Iran a solid multipurpose fighter jet.

Iran has lots of money, there is no doubt about that.  They shell out money when they can if the options are available.  It would have been interesting to see then shell out that kind of money on domestic development instead of going the slow route which lead them to nothing but a copy of F-5.