Russian Nuclear Submarine Force: Discussion

It will not build any new SSBNs. The 955A from Bulava will remain in service for the next 40 years.

It will not build any new SSBNs. The 955A from Bulava will remain in service for the next 40 years.

Highly unlikely considering that the Borei and Bulava were built under treaty limitations that no longer apply and in the Bulava's case it was built with older technology that has since been surpassed, namely its engines not being detonation engines.

Considering that there will be a need to increase warhead numbers as much as possible and that fielding 50 of the anemic Boreis is just not practical, bigger submarines with heavier missiles are very likely.

In ICBM and SLBM propulsion technologies, detonation engines have not yet been developed. Anyway, this is only a developed technology and it is not known whether it will be used in SLBM missiles.
I don't know why Borey has to be anemic. It is currently the most modern SSBN in the world. So is Bulava. It does not carry a large load, but it also has a much flatter trajectory and a faster boost phase.

I had the idea in that detonation engines could be used to increase the payload to 20 warheads on a heavy SLBM and give it better acceleration.

Just for example, Russia (USSR) put the following SSN/SSGN nuclear submarines into service only from 1980 to 1991, when the USSR collapsed;

* 19 submarines of project 671 RTM and RTM(K) Schchuka,
* 8 of project 971 Schchuka-B,
* 8 pf project 949A Antey,
* two of project 949 Granit,
* two 945 Barracuda,
* two 945A Kondor,
* two 705 Lira,
* and one of project 685 Plavnik.
* In total; 44 nuclear submarines and ONLY 22 non-nuclear submarines of project 877.

The construction of project 636.3 is a forced solution because Sevmash is working on 3 different nuclear submarine projects, although the strength and quality of Russian shipbuilding is in nuclear submarines - it always has been.
The Soviet Union viewed non-nuclear submarines as secondary submarines in closed seas, the Baltic Sea and the Black Sea - that's all.

Yasen or nothing - everything else is less important in Russian shipbuilding.
Borei-A, Yes, but it is a submarine with a completely different purpose.

Podlodka77 wrote:, when the USSR collapsed;

There might be some connection for these two facts, bro

The problem is less of a problem given that hypersonics have made it impossible for surface navies to operate within strike aircraft range of Russian coasts. And no air cover means that your own air power can scour the depths for submarines and sink them without any trouble.

To Lancelot
I have listed in detail only the submarines that reached active service in the period from 1980 to 1991. You must add to that that several more submarines of project 971 and 949A were launched in 1990 and 1991, but entered active service in the following years. Therefore, the Russians gave primacy to SSN/SSGN even though nuclear submarines are more than twice as expensive and immeasurably more efficient in terms of their capabilities compared to non-nuclear submarines. So Yasen is a beast and with 636.3 and 677 submarines you will DEFINITELY not catch Virginia submarines or Astute. That is why I write that the construction of submarines is ineffective until the construction of Yasen-M submarines is accelerated again. Yes, hypersonic missiles are great but good luck with 636.3 or 677 against Virginia or Astute.

Garry, you mention testing again as you did in another section. Then explain to us where you see the efficiency in the fact that none of the project 971M and 949AM submarines have yet reached active service? Everything is clear about the slow construction of the Yasen-M submarines, and it is likely that the already desperately slow modernization of the inherited submarines will be further delayed due to the SMO. Gentlemen, you cannot hunt Virginia and Astute in the Arctic Ocean and the Pacific with project 636.3 and 677 submarines - hypersonic weapons will not help you there. Come on, be a little realistic

Garry, the biggest disadvantage of the 636.3 submarine is the low speed in underwater navigation, as well as the impossibility of staying under the surface of the water for a long time. Add to that that Virginia certainly has a better hydroacoustic complex than 636.3 submarines. For the Northern and Pacific fleets, those submarines are not a solution. Is there a chance that the 636.3 submarine sinks the Virginia? Yes, probably, if it's well hidden. However, these submarines do not have sufficient range, cannot stay underwater for long, nor do they have sufficient diving depth, underwater navigation speed or hydroacoustic complex as on Yasen-M. The only BIG advantage could be in striking NATO surface warships.

For Lada submarines, it remains to mature as a project and for their production to start at the desired speed at the Admiralty. As long as the Russians are working this much on the submarine B-586 Kronshtadt, it means that this submarine has many new technologies, which is good.

Indian Kilo class won against a US Los Angeles class 20 years ago.

An upgraded kilo can destroy a Virginia.

Diesel subs are way more stealthy than nuclear ones. They run on batteries with electric engines that have just the rotor that moves.

Nuclear subs have tens of different pomps working 24/7 in the reactor creating noise.

Diesel subs can't hunt because of their speed but once you are in their engagement range you are dead.

The fact that Kilo defeated Los Angeles was probably announced by the Indians, who are unable to produce domestic tanks, planes or ships. Indians just know how to fart too much. Then why is your France still building non-nuclear submarines for its navy if those non-nuclear submarines are better? That story was forced with the German Type-212 submarines, which are certainly good, but not as modern SSN/SSGN submarines. Since you yourself wrote that SSKs are not designed for "hunting", it is clear that the only real solution for the Arctic and Pacific is the construction of SSN/SSGN submarines.

Yes, if you are going to hunt anyone.

Podlodka77 wrote:The fact that Kilo defeated Los Angeles was probably announced by the Indians, who are unable to produce domestic tanks, planes or ships. Indians just know how to fart too much. Then why is your France still building non-nuclear submarines for its navy if those non-nuclear submarines are better? That story was forced with the German Type-212 submarines, which are certainly good, but not as modern SSN/SSGN submarines. Since you yourself wrote that SSKs are not designed for "hunting", it is clear that the only real solution for the Arctic and Pacific is the construction of SSN/SSGN submarines.

SSN allow to patrol far away and work in a task force with surface ships. SSK couldn't follow.

The SSN have too many advantages so when you decide btw having SSN or SSK you go for SSN. But that comes at a certain costs.

SSK have their own advantages and usefulness. In WW2 they destroyed plenty of ships even if their speed was the same as today and the ship's speed was also the same as today.

There is also a huge market for SSK while there isn't any for SSN. France produces SSK for export and has decided to buy only SSN because it needs a submarine that can quickly go in French off shore territories and protect the blue water surface ships but they also want to keep a limited amount of 6 submarines because they don't have money for a huge navy like the chinese or US.

Isos, it is also possible that in a few years France will go "crazy" like Poland and buy hundreds and hundreds of tanks, American HIMARS, and maybe even F-35.
The same applies to the fact that in the foreseeable future the number of "Suffren" (Barracuda) submarines may increase from the planned 6 to a larger number - perhaps 8 or even 10.

It will cost money, of course, but the whole West is blindly following the US and I wouldn't be surprised anymore.
I cant wait to finish construction for the 955A Borei-A submarines (6 active and one launched) plus almost certain that K-XXX "Emperor Alexander III" will also be launched this year
Thus, the production of SSGN submarines would become an absolute priority for Sevmash - unless the crazy Russians give Sevmash some crazy task like building an aircraft carrier.
And I don't understand why the Russians are in such a hurry with the 955A "Borei-A" project since the US has a fairly old Ohio class whose SLBMs are also quite old, especially since the SLBMs for the 677BDRM "Delfin" are also relatively new.


Project 677 submarines are an enigma, and it is certain that the B-586 "Kronshtadt" submarine has a lot of new equipment, as long as the tests last this long. The submarines of that project should mature and serial production in the Admiralty should be increased - which also provides money in case of export (which you mentioned) of those submarines.

Navykorabel.ru...
15.05.2023

Nuclear underwater confrontation 2.0




Thirty-odd years ago, the first large-scale confrontation between the nuclear submarine forces of the two powers - the USSR and the USA - ended in naval history, which we won on points. According to a very time-consuming study conducted by the author of the blog, on 12/26/1991 (the day of the collapse of the Soviet Union), the Russian Navy included 143 submarines (6 TRPKSN pr. 941, 7 SSBNs pr. 667BDRM, 14 pr. 667BDR, 4 pr. pr. 667B, 8 pr. 667A/AU, 6 APCRRK pr. 949A, 2 pr. , 7 PLAK Project 971, 1 Project 945A, 2 Project 945, 1 Project 705K, 4 Project 671RTMK, 21 Project 671RTM, 7 Project 671RT, 11 Project 671(B), 3 Project 667AT) with a total surface displacement of 1,135,000 tons (more than all today's Russian submarines and surface ships of the main classes).
In turn, the US Navy had 125 boats (12 Ohio SSBNs, 12 Lafayette III (Benjamin Franklin), 8 Lafayette II (James Madison), 2 Lafayette I, 8 Los Angeles III (San Juan), 8 Los Angeles II (Providence), 31 Los Angeles I, 1 Narwhal, 9 Sturgeon II" ("Archerfish"), 27 "Sturgeon I" type, 6 "Thresher" ("Permit") type and 1 "Ethan Allen" type converted from SSBNs) with a total Dboost of 849,500 tons.

Our victory, of course, was not unambiguous. In terms of SSBNs, it is beyond doubt - we had more boats (by 68% - 57 versus 34), which carried more missiles (by 35% - 864 versus 640). However, the R-27 and R-27U SLBMs with a launch range of 2500 and 3000 km, which were in service with 8 SSBNs pr. 667A and 667AU, did not belong to the category of intercontinental. Therefore, the real superiority was somewhat smaller - 44% for boats (49/34) and 15% for missiles (736/640). In addition, it is easy to see that one American SSBN had 18.8 missiles, and one Soviet - only 15.0.One fifth (29 units) of the nuclear submarine forces of the USSR belonged to the subclasses of the APKRRK and SSGN, i.e., it was their anti-aircraft component, the main weapon of which was anti-ship cruise missiles. The US Navy, due to the complete superiority in NK (including AB) over the Soviet Navy, did not need such boats, so they focused their attention on the construction of multi-purpose submarines and were very successful in this - on 12/26/1991 their numerical advantage here was more than one and a half times ( 91/57=1.6). In general, at that time, the situation was close to parity.

Knowing about the orgy of destruction of the Russian submarine fleet (and the fleet in general) in the 1990s, it may seem strange, but both states were actively involved in the disposal of their submarines in a proportion of about 3/2 (Russia - 119, USA - 79). However, the slanderous Americans remained true to themselves here. Having written off the 26-year-old Lafayettes, Sturgeons and Permits, which have exhausted their resources, they promptly replaced them with much more modern Ohios and Los Angeles and began to build even more modern Seawolfs and Virginias .At the same time, they made every effort to break up our defense industry (in particular, through the efforts of advisers who promoted methods of economic transformation that were most beneficial to them and disadvantageous to us). As a result, the Russian Navy turned into a pale shadow of its former self, and the US Navy began to unconditionally and solely rule the seas. Suffice it to say that today only 16 of ours are opposed to 50 US multi-purpose submarines, of which only 6 can be considered conditionally ready to perform tasks as intended.

However, nothing lasts forever, especially the disgustingly self-satisfied hegemony of a teenage state (by the standards of world history), won by someone else's (our) hands during the Second World War and supported by bandit and cheat-dependent methods without any respect for the neighbors on the planet ( no one denies the significant contribution of the United States to the development of human civilization, but this cannot justify what they are doing). The end of Pax Americana will begin with the collapse of the Bretton Woods system and the de-dollarization of the global economy. As Tucker Carlson said, "If the dollar ceases to be the world's reserve currency, our country [USA] will be destitute overnight."
The process has already begun, and it began with the freezing of Russian gold and foreign exchange reserves after the start of the SMO (there is a suspicion that the early withdrawal of $ 300 billion from the risk zone was not done out of naivety or negligence, but purposefully - so that the world would understand what kind of harmful currency it is dealing with ). Following the collapse of the dollar (not tomorrow, but not far off), Fed bonds will no longer be bought, and in America, which has long been living in debt, a budget crisis will inevitably break out, followed by the collapse of the American military industry.

Meanwhile, in spite of everything, the highest ranks of the US Navy continue to dream of building up a multi-purpose submarine force to 66 units within the concept of a fleet of 355 pennants, although there are serious problems even with 50 existing SSNs: 1) the cumulative construction rate of Virginia-class submarines at both US boatyards Newport News and Electric Boat, working in cooperation with division and rotation of work, is 1.2 boats per year with the prospect of increasing to two in five years, which is far from obvious given their encumbrance with Columbia-class SSBNs; 2) the low productivity of shipyards is exacerbated by plans to sell up to 5 Virginias to Australia in the context of the AUKUS pact and the need to withdraw age-old Los Angeles-type submarines with an average service life of 31 years from the fleet; 3) only 20-30% of maintenance work on combatant Virginias is completed on time - delays are associated with flaws in planning and the lack of spare parts, which often have to be removed from other submarines (reference 3); 4) low rates of construction and lengthy repairs of new boats make it necessary to extend the service life of old ones (link 4), the repair of which takes up to 6 years (link 5 - from 09/01/2017, link 6 - from 10/16/2017).

As a result, according to a recent sensational publication by Newsweek, based on classified documents at the disposal of the editors and information received from competent sources (link 7, original - link , only a quarter of full-time American submarines can be deployed at a time in strategically important areas of the World ocean. This thesis is especially clearly illustrated by the table given in the original material (given at the end of the entry), from which it follows that in 2022 (that is, at the time of a sharp aggravation of relations with Russia and China, when the maximum tension of the forces of the imperial submarine fleet was required) the average monthly the number of deployed submarines (Deployed SSN) was 12.6 - thus 25% of the 50, which are clearly stated in the text. The reasons for this state of affairs are the above-mentioned 20-30% of scheduled repairs and maintenance (with clarification: "over the past decade"), a chronic lag behind the construction schedule for new boats, as well as the presence of only one crew for each multi-purpose submarine (unlike from two for SSBNs),which naturally reduces their time at sea even with longer deployments.

Thus, the US Navy is able to simultaneously deploy 6 multi-purpose submarines in the Atlantic Ocean and 6 in the Pacific (with a hypothetical increase in the number of SSNs to 66, the named number increases to 2x8). What can Russia oppose to the naval hegemon in the foreseeable future? Firstly, unlike the US shipyards, Sevmash has already reached the rate of two boats a year (three were commissioned in 2021), and after the 955A and PLASN programs with Poseidons are soon completed, it will be able to completely switch to 885M / 545.
Secondly, the State Navy and 51 ship repair institutes (51 TsKTIS) are actively improving the methodology for maintaining submarines and ships - repair and technical documentation (RTD) and standard service maintenance sheets (TVSO) (link 9) are being developed and implemented, designed to simplify and speed up all types of factory repairs and maintenance (in particular, it is known that TVSOs for submarines pr. 636.3 and 677 are already ready - link 11). Thirdly, our multi-purpose anti-ship missiles have two crews each (link 12). With the immutable parity of NSNF (say, 12 SSBNs each) and superiority in PLASN with nuclear torpedoes, the above will allow us to have two divisions each in the Northern Fleet and Pacific Fleet (2x6 each) APKR 885M / 545, half of which will be able to simultaneously be in combat service, thereby ensuring parity and multi-purpose submarine forces without militarizing the economy, even with 66 SSN (plus 2x2 boats in the sea will definitely not make the weather).

https://navy-korabel.livejournal.com/289853.html

And while this man writes that Sevmash delivers two nuclear submarines every year (I will add that 3 were delivered in 2021), which was true until last year, I don't see anywhere that he mentioned the K-564 Arkhangelsk and B-XXX Khabarovsk.
But he and I agree on one thing - SSGN submarines must have primacy in the Russian Navy. The SSN index is obsolete because today all multipurpose nuclear submarines are SSGN class and have guided missiles.