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    Russian military intervention and aid to Syria #10

    crod
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    Russian military intervention and aid to Syria #10 - Page 31 Empty Re: Russian military intervention and aid to Syria #10

    Post  crod on Wed Nov 30, 2016 7:44 pm

    Militarov wrote:
    KoTeMoRe wrote:
    Militarov wrote:Russian military intervention and aid to Syria #10 - Page 31 CyTDEc0VQAEik86

    EDIT: November 26th Aleppo allegedly

    Southeastern Aleppo.

    Is it me btw or that barrel looks abit... roasted?

    Not sure if it's the background horizon but it looks slightly curved - suspect it's a trick of the eye. Damn thing will ruin some bearded scumbag's breakfast all the same! Looks Aleppo is curtains now for them. early xmas present for one and all attack sniper thumbsup
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    Russian military intervention and aid to Syria #10 - Page 31 Empty Re: Russian military intervention and aid to Syria #10

    Post  KiloGolf on Wed Nov 30, 2016 7:48 pm

    Militarov wrote:
    KoTeMoRe wrote:
    Militarov wrote:Russian military intervention and aid to Syria #10 - Page 31 CyTDEc0VQAEik86

    EDIT: November 26th Aleppo allegedly

    Southeastern Aleppo.

    Is it me btw or that barrel looks abit... roasted?

    toasted and chipotle southwest russia
    KoTeMoRe
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    Russian military intervention and aid to Syria #10 - Page 31 Empty Re: Russian military intervention and aid to Syria #10

    Post  KoTeMoRe on Thu Dec 01, 2016 8:13 am

    Militarov wrote:
    KoTeMoRe wrote:
    Militarov wrote:Russian military intervention and aid to Syria #10 - Page 31 CyTDEc0VQAEik86

    EDIT: November 26th Aleppo allegedly

    Southeastern Aleppo.

    Is it me btw or that barrel looks abit... roasted?

    Yes it's done. They've pretty much fired over 2000 rounds in half a month from Nayrab to Sheikh Lutfi (Russians really nailed that one well), them rats fought like crazy for Syriatel heights then found out that the real push was at Hanano and Owija.

    avatar
    Guest
    Guest

    Russian military intervention and aid to Syria #10 - Page 31 Empty Re: Russian military intervention and aid to Syria #10

    Post  Guest on Thu Dec 01, 2016 9:40 am

    KoTeMoRe wrote:
    Militarov wrote:
    KoTeMoRe wrote:
    Militarov wrote:Russian military intervention and aid to Syria #10 - Page 31 CyTDEc0VQAEik86

    EDIT: November 26th Aleppo allegedly

    Southeastern Aleppo.

    Is it me btw or that barrel looks abit... roasted?

    Yes it's done. They've pretty much fired over 2000 rounds in half  a month from Nayrab to Sheikh Lutfi (Russians really nailed that one well), them rats fought like crazy for Syriatel heights then found out that the real push was at Hanano and Owija.


    Havent seen barrel in such a bad shape since...well... 1999. when guys fired 6000 20mm shells though M55 for one night:

    Russian military intervention and aid to Syria #10 - Page 31 2mq4yes
    magnumcromagnon
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    Russian military intervention and aid to Syria #10 - Page 31 Empty Re: Russian military intervention and aid to Syria #10

    Post  magnumcromagnon on Thu Dec 01, 2016 10:56 am

    Militarov wrote:
    KoTeMoRe wrote:
    Militarov wrote:
    KoTeMoRe wrote:
    Militarov wrote:Russian military intervention and aid to Syria #10 - Page 31 CyTDEc0VQAEik86

    EDIT: November 26th Aleppo allegedly

    Southeastern Aleppo.

    Is it me btw or that barrel looks abit... roasted?

    Yes it's done. They've pretty much fired over 2000 rounds in half  a month from Nayrab to Sheikh Lutfi (Russians really nailed that one well), them rats fought like crazy for Syriatel heights then found out that the real push was at Hanano and Owija.


    Havent seen barrel in such a bad shape since...well... 1999. when guys fired 6000 20mm shells though M55 for one night:

    Russian military intervention and aid to Syria #10 - Page 31 2mq4yes

    Barrel replacement would be pretty simple wouldn't it? They can always meltdown, recast, and recycle the old barrel.
    avatar
    Guest
    Guest

    Russian military intervention and aid to Syria #10 - Page 31 Empty Re: Russian military intervention and aid to Syria #10

    Post  Guest on Thu Dec 01, 2016 11:06 am

    magnumcromagnon wrote:
    Militarov wrote:
    KoTeMoRe wrote:
    Militarov wrote:
    KoTeMoRe wrote:
    Militarov wrote:EDIT: November 26th Aleppo allegedly

    Southeastern Aleppo.

    Is it me btw or that barrel looks abit... roasted?

    Yes it's done. They've pretty much fired over 2000 rounds in half  a month from Nayrab to Sheikh Lutfi (Russians really nailed that one well), them rats fought like crazy for Syriatel heights then found out that the real push was at Hanano and Owija.

    Havent seen barrel in such a bad shape since...well... 1999. when guys fired 6000 20mm shells though M55 for one night:

    Barrel replacement would be pretty simple wouldn't it? They can always meltdown, recast, and recycle the old barrel.

    Fairly simple yes. However its not that common to wear out howtizer barrel at least not today, back in WW1 and WW2 it was more likely. So spare barrels are not produced on wide scale.

    Melting down and recasting is not very plausible, such recycled materials are used for other purposes as it will never be of the same quality as it was originally.
    calm
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    Russian military intervention and aid to Syria #10 - Page 31 Empty Re: Russian military intervention and aid to Syria #10

    Post  calm on Fri Dec 02, 2016 10:11 am

    +

    On the same day, one year apart, Russia gets its revenge and stops Turkey at the gates of al-Bab.
    https://elijahjm.wordpress.com/2016/11/27/on-the-same-day-one-year-apart-russia-gets-its-revenge-and-stops-turkey-at-the-gates-of-al-bab/

    On the 24th of November 2015, Turkey shot down a Russian Sokhoi Su-24 over the Turkish-Syrian border causing the death of one of the two parachuted pilots while trying to hit the ground. On the same day, a year later, a Syrian Air Force jet hits a Turkish military convoy two kilometres from the northern Syrian city of al-Bab, killing three Turkish soldiers. The Turkish aggressive move toward Russia had come after the destruction of hundreds of oil tankers used by the “Islamic State” (ISIS) to transport oil from Syria and Iraq to Turkey.

    The Syrian Air Force (SyAF) activity is directly linked, coordinated and ordered by a common military operations room, headed by a Russian General, so as to avoid friendly fire or incidents. Russia coordinates most of the air traffic with the US-led coalition activities over Syria for the same purposes. The Russian command needs to assure the safeguard of its military naval and ground force with artillery and air protection since it is operating in various locations and cities over the Syrian geography. Therefore, every air strike, reconnaissance or drone sorties must be agreed and approved before anything takes off. Faisal al-Miqdad, the Syrian deputy Foreign Minister clearly said: “This event took place on Syrian land. Turkey should only blame itself”.

    But why the Syrian city of al-Bab?

    When Turkey shot down the Russian jet, the aim was to humiliate Russia and push it out of its comfort zone, knowing that Moscow would think carefully before stepping up a full military escalation against Ankara. On the same day, Turkish President Recep Tayyib Erdogan ran to NATO for protection and refuge. The Russian President Vladimir Putin limited his reaction to hitting Turkey proxies in Syria hard, followed by economic sanctions and much more aggressive support to the Syrian President Bashar al-Assad. He agreed to help the Syrian Army retake Aleppo and decided to stand and face the United States of America at all costs in Bilad al-Sham. Putin considered the Turkish action not an Erdogan miscalculated adventure but rather a coordinated act of war with the US. Two main strong elements stand out:

    Russia coordinates air traffic control with the US, informing the military command of its schedule and presence over specific areas.
    It took 17 seconds for the Turkish Air Force to see the Russian Su-24 on its border, ask for orders from the military chain of command and from then via the highest political leadership for the anti-air missile to be launched. This is not a record by military means but impossible to achieve unless previous orders were in place given way ahead.
    Nevertheless, the night of the coup-d’Etat against Erdogan allowed Russia to return the hit to the US by informing Erdogan – via Iran – of the plan to kill him. The premises he was spending some holidays in were supposed to be bombed. But the thirty minutes warning were enough to save Erdogan’s life, and, in consequences, caused the failure of the coup that should have been ignited from the Incirlic military Air base, where US officers are established. The Turkish President accused the US administration indirectly, who in turn strongly contested the Turkish reaction in jailing most officers “friendly of the US”.

    This event warmed up the Turkish-Russian relationship which had dramatically cooled. In Putin’s eyes, the US, not Erdogan, paid the price (even if not fully) of its involvement in the Su-24 incident.

    Turkey responded to the Russian favour by recalling thousands of fighters from Aleppo to the borders to start a military campaign aiming to dismantle the US plan to divide Syria and create a Kurdish state from the Syrian north east, Al-Hasaka, to the Syrian north west, Afrin.

    Dismantling the US plan was convenient for:

    Turkey by preventing a Kurdish state along its borders. This state, apart form the long-lasting Turkish struggle with the Kurds, would also foil the Turkish dream to annexe part of Syria or impose its agenda on Damascus at the end of the war.
    Russia wanted to hit back at the US for the Su-24. The Russian plan is to establish a long-lasting presence in Syria without having to share the territory with its old US enemy. Therefore, the unity of Syria has become valuable for Putin.
    Damascus was happy to teach the Kurds a lesson following al-Hasaka events. The government of Syria and the Kurds were always on good terms, supporting Syrian cities under siege, i.e. Aleppo, Nubl and Zahra’. Nevertheless, the US pressure on the Kurds was greater than the long-standing relationship with Damascus. Nevertheless, the Kurds, as a minority, have dream “since forever” about having a Federation for themselves.
    All of the above created a convenient environment for many players in favour of the Turkish advance toward Jarablus and disturbing the US plans in the north of Syria. Nevertheless, the Turkish President was not content with contering the Kurdish plan but wanted to expand further, even without Russia closing its eyes to what he was doing.

    Turkey allowed regional countries to generously finance and supply Qaidat al-Jihad and Syrian rebels with weapons to initiate major attacks against the Syrian Army and keep it busy within a limited geographical sector, mainly around Aleppo. As soon as Russia and its allies pushed forces toward ISIS occupied territories at al-Tabqa, the jihadists and rebels attacked rural Homs and south Aleppo, forcing Damascus to recall all forces engaged on that front to defend positions under attack.

    Recently, jihadists and rebels carried out two major attacks on Aleppo under the banner of “breaking the siege” of the eastern surrounded part of the city. The “Aleppo Epic Battle” and the “Abu Omar Saraqeb” second battle caused months of full engagement for over 25.000 members of the Syrian Army, and around 8500 of all of their allies ground forces (Iraqi militia, Iranian advisors and their Afghan and Pakistani militia). Additionally, the Lebanese Hezbollah decided to inject 2500 of its elite Ridwan force in Aleppo and leave these in the city. The two attacks failed to achieve their objective in that part of Syria but succeeded in giving enough time for Turkey to advance toward al-Bab city and make the Syrian Army less keen to distribute forces around multiple fronts.

    Damascus didn’t officially agree with the Russian-Turkish understanding over Jarablus because Syria mistrusted the Turkish leader and wanted to maintain a good relationship with the Kurds. Moscow never agreed with Ankara to expand its military presence for controlling the triangle Jarablus-Manbij-al-Bab or even to go to Raqqah.

    The presence of Turkish forces at the door of al-Bab represented a strategic menace to the Syrian Army based in Aleppo from its eastern gate. The presence of Turkish forces and their proxies at 2 km from al-Bab triggered an understanding where ISIS would pull forces from the city without a fight, as was the case in Jarablus. Ankara is trying to insinuate that the intention of its forces to enter al-Bab aim is to stop the Kurdish federation.

    But neither Damascus not Russia will tolerate the Turkish control of al-Bab. The Russians delivered a squad of Su-24M2, deployed the anti-air missiles S-300 and S-400 and encouraged the Syrian President to impose new rules of engagement (ROE) and red lines on Turkey for the first time since the creation of the two states.

    A squadron of the Syrian Air Force, followed by a protection escort, raided a Turkish military convoy at the door of al-Bab on the morning of the 24th of November, killing 3 Turkish soldiers. Russia was on alert, ready to launch its missiles in case of any Turkish reaction. That was the second Syrian-Turkish confrontation since the last month. The first took place over the Syrian-Turkish borders when two F-16s violated Syrian air space. These were confronted by four MIGs who locked their missiles on the Turkish jets. The F-16 scan radar informed the F-16 pilots who received instructions to return to base. Syria imposed it sovereignty over its air space for the first time. Russia won’t tolerate any further violation and Ankara’s F-16 are no longer permitted in the sky over Syria.

    This is exactly what the newly elected US President Donald Trump meant when he declared he has no intention to fight Assad, because this means confronting Putin who is determine to keep Syria united and defend the Syrian regime.

    When hitting Turkish soldiers on Syrian territory, Damascus is not provoking Ankara because it had never given the permission to send that army onto Syrian soil. In consequences, the idea of Turkey pushing forces even toward Raqqah is no longer a pushover, because Damascus and Moscow have not said their last word to Turkey and the US.

    Since Trump said he has no intention of triggering a nuclear war or a third World War, the partition of the north of Syria is no longer as easily imposed compared with during Obama administration. Therefore, the future of Syria depends on how Trump-Putin understanding is imposed on all parties. Either that, or the war will proceed even more violently.

    Erdogan is weaker than ever in relation to Iraq and Syria: he failed to impose his will regarding participation in the attack against the capital of the caliphate, Mosul, or even the smaller city of Talafar. And today he can’t materialise his dream to annex Aleppo, and his forces are stopped at the gates of al-Bab. If he continues toward Raqqah there is a huge risk: he will have to face a superpower: Russia.
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    par far

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    Russian military intervention and aid to Syria #10 - Page 31 Empty Re: Russian military intervention and aid to Syria #10

    Post  par far on Fri Dec 02, 2016 12:00 pm

    calm wrote:+

    On the same day, one year apart, Russia gets its revenge and stops Turkey at the gates of al-Bab.
    https://elijahjm.wordpress.com/2016/11/27/on-the-same-day-one-year-apart-russia-gets-its-revenge-and-stops-turkey-at-the-gates-of-al-bab/

    On the 24th of November 2015, Turkey shot down a Russian Sokhoi Su-24 over the Turkish-Syrian border causing the death of one of the two parachuted pilots while trying to hit the ground. On the same day, a year later, a Syrian Air Force jet hits a Turkish military convoy two kilometres from the northern Syrian city of al-Bab, killing three Turkish soldiers. The Turkish aggressive move toward Russia had come after the destruction of hundreds of oil tankers used by the “Islamic State” (ISIS) to transport oil from Syria and Iraq to Turkey.

    The Syrian Air Force (SyAF) activity is directly linked, coordinated and ordered by a common military operations room, headed by a Russian General, so as to avoid friendly fire or incidents. Russia coordinates most of the air traffic with the US-led coalition activities over Syria for the same purposes. The Russian command needs to assure the safeguard of its military naval and ground force with artillery and air protection since it is operating in various locations and cities over the Syrian geography. Therefore, every air strike, reconnaissance or drone sorties must be agreed and approved before anything takes off. Faisal al-Miqdad, the Syrian deputy Foreign Minister clearly said: “This event took place on Syrian land. Turkey should only blame itself”.

    But why the Syrian city of al-Bab?

    When Turkey shot down the Russian jet, the aim was to humiliate Russia and push it out of its comfort zone, knowing that Moscow would think carefully before stepping up a full military escalation against Ankara. On the same day, Turkish President Recep Tayyib Erdogan ran to NATO for protection and refuge. The Russian President Vladimir Putin limited his reaction to hitting Turkey proxies in Syria hard, followed by economic sanctions and much more aggressive support to the Syrian President Bashar al-Assad. He agreed to help the Syrian Army retake Aleppo and decided to stand and face the United States of America at all costs in Bilad al-Sham. Putin considered the Turkish action not an Erdogan miscalculated adventure but rather a coordinated act of war with the US. Two main strong elements stand out:

    Russia coordinates air traffic control with the US, informing the military command of its schedule and presence over specific areas.
    It took 17 seconds for the Turkish Air Force to see the Russian Su-24 on its border, ask for orders from the military chain of command and from then via the highest political leadership for the anti-air missile to be launched. This is not a record by military means but impossible to achieve unless previous orders were in place given way ahead.
    Nevertheless, the night of the coup-d’Etat against Erdogan allowed Russia to return the hit to the US by informing Erdogan – via Iran – of the plan to kill him. The premises he was spending some holidays in were supposed to be bombed. But the thirty minutes warning were enough to save Erdogan’s life, and, in consequences, caused the failure of the coup that should have been ignited from the Incirlic military Air base, where US officers are established. The Turkish President accused the US administration indirectly, who in turn strongly contested the Turkish reaction in jailing most officers “friendly of the US”.

    This event warmed up the Turkish-Russian relationship which had dramatically cooled. In Putin’s eyes, the US, not Erdogan, paid the price (even if not fully) of its involvement in the Su-24 incident.

    Turkey responded to the Russian favour by recalling thousands of fighters from Aleppo to the borders to start a military campaign aiming to dismantle the US plan to divide Syria and create a Kurdish state from the Syrian north east, Al-Hasaka, to the Syrian north west, Afrin.

    Dismantling the US plan was convenient for:

    Turkey by preventing a Kurdish state along its borders. This state, apart form the long-lasting Turkish struggle with the Kurds, would also foil the Turkish dream to annexe part of Syria or impose its agenda on Damascus at the end of the war.
    Russia wanted to hit back at the US for the Su-24. The Russian plan is to establish a long-lasting presence in Syria without having to share the territory with its old US enemy. Therefore, the unity of Syria has become valuable for Putin.
    Damascus was happy to teach the Kurds a lesson following al-Hasaka events. The government of Syria and the Kurds were always on good terms, supporting Syrian cities under siege, i.e. Aleppo, Nubl and Zahra’. Nevertheless, the US pressure on the Kurds was greater than the long-standing relationship with Damascus. Nevertheless, the Kurds, as a minority, have dream “since forever” about having a Federation for themselves.
    All of the above created a convenient environment for many players in favour of the Turkish advance toward Jarablus and disturbing the US plans in the north of Syria. Nevertheless, the Turkish President was not content with contering the Kurdish plan but wanted to expand further, even without Russia closing its eyes to what he was doing.

    Turkey allowed regional countries to generously finance and supply Qaidat al-Jihad and Syrian rebels with weapons to initiate major attacks against the Syrian Army and keep it busy within a limited geographical sector, mainly around Aleppo. As soon as Russia and its allies pushed forces toward ISIS occupied territories at al-Tabqa, the jihadists and rebels attacked rural Homs and south Aleppo, forcing Damascus to recall all forces engaged on that front to defend positions under attack.

    Recently, jihadists and rebels carried out two major attacks on Aleppo under the banner of “breaking the siege” of the eastern surrounded part of the city. The “Aleppo Epic Battle” and the “Abu Omar Saraqeb” second battle caused months of full engagement for over 25.000 members of the Syrian Army, and around 8500 of all of their allies ground forces (Iraqi militia, Iranian advisors and their Afghan and Pakistani militia). Additionally, the Lebanese Hezbollah decided to inject 2500 of its elite Ridwan force in Aleppo and leave these in the city. The two attacks failed to achieve their objective in that part of Syria but succeeded in giving enough time for Turkey to advance toward al-Bab city and make the Syrian Army less keen to distribute forces around multiple fronts.

    Damascus didn’t officially agree with the Russian-Turkish understanding over Jarablus because Syria mistrusted the Turkish leader and wanted to maintain a good relationship with the Kurds. Moscow never agreed with Ankara to expand its military presence for controlling the triangle Jarablus-Manbij-al-Bab or even to go to Raqqah.

    The presence of Turkish forces at the door of al-Bab represented a strategic menace to the Syrian Army based in Aleppo from its eastern gate. The presence of Turkish forces and their proxies at 2 km from al-Bab triggered an understanding where ISIS would pull forces from the city without a fight, as was the case in Jarablus. Ankara is trying to insinuate that the intention of its forces to enter al-Bab aim is to stop the Kurdish federation.

    But neither Damascus not Russia will tolerate the Turkish control of al-Bab. The Russians delivered a squad of Su-24M2, deployed the anti-air missiles S-300 and S-400 and encouraged the Syrian President to impose new rules of engagement (ROE) and red lines on Turkey for the first time since the creation of the two states.

    A squadron of the Syrian Air Force, followed by a protection escort, raided a Turkish military convoy at the door of al-Bab on the morning of the 24th of November, killing 3 Turkish soldiers. Russia was on alert, ready to launch its missiles in case of any Turkish reaction. That was the second Syrian-Turkish confrontation since the last month. The first took place over the Syrian-Turkish borders when two F-16s violated Syrian air space. These were confronted by four MIGs who locked their missiles on the Turkish jets. The F-16 scan radar informed the F-16 pilots who received instructions to return to base. Syria imposed it sovereignty over its air space for the first time. Russia won’t tolerate any further violation and Ankara’s F-16 are no longer permitted in the sky over Syria.

    This is exactly what the newly elected US President Donald Trump meant when he declared he has no intention to fight Assad, because this means confronting Putin who is determine to keep Syria united and defend the Syrian regime.

    When hitting Turkish soldiers on Syrian territory, Damascus is not provoking Ankara because it had never given the permission to send that army onto Syrian soil. In consequences, the idea of Turkey pushing forces even toward Raqqah is no longer a pushover, because Damascus and Moscow have not said their last word to Turkey and the US.

    Since Trump said he has no intention of triggering a nuclear war or a third World War, the partition of the north of Syria is no longer as easily imposed compared with during Obama administration. Therefore, the future of Syria depends on how Trump-Putin understanding is imposed on all parties. Either that, or the war will proceed even more violently.

    Erdogan is weaker than ever in relation to Iraq and Syria: he failed to impose his will regarding participation in the attack against the capital of the caliphate, Mosul, or even the smaller city of Talafar. And today he can’t materialise his dream to annex Aleppo, and his forces are stopped at the gates of al-Bab. If he continues toward Raqqah there is a huge risk: he will have to face a superpower: Russia.


    Great article and a lot of details in it, some things that I did not even know.
    Godric
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    Russian military intervention and aid to Syria #10 - Page 31 Empty Re: Russian military intervention and aid to Syria #10

    Post  Godric on Fri Dec 02, 2016 12:35 pm

    par far wrote:
    calm wrote:+

    On the same day, one year apart, Russia gets its revenge and stops Turkey at the gates of al-Bab.
    https://elijahjm.wordpress.com/2016/11/27/on-the-same-day-one-year-apart-russia-gets-its-revenge-and-stops-turkey-at-the-gates-of-al-bab/

    On the 24th of November 2015, Turkey shot down a Russian Sokhoi Su-24 over the Turkish-Syrian border causing the death of one of the two parachuted pilots while trying to hit the ground. On the same day, a year later, a Syrian Air Force jet hits a Turkish military convoy two kilometres from the northern Syrian city of al-Bab, killing three Turkish soldiers. The Turkish aggressive move toward Russia had come after the destruction of hundreds of oil tankers used by the “Islamic State” (ISIS) to transport oil from Syria and Iraq to Turkey.

    The Syrian Air Force (SyAF) activity is directly linked, coordinated and ordered by a common military operations room, headed by a Russian General, so as to avoid friendly fire or incidents. Russia coordinates most of the air traffic with the US-led coalition activities over Syria for the same purposes. The Russian command needs to assure the safeguard of its military naval and ground force with artillery and air protection since it is operating in various locations and cities over the Syrian geography. Therefore, every air strike, reconnaissance or drone sorties must be agreed and approved before anything takes off. Faisal al-Miqdad, the Syrian deputy Foreign Minister clearly said: “This event took place on Syrian land. Turkey should only blame itself”.

    But why the Syrian city of al-Bab?

    When Turkey shot down the Russian jet, the aim was to humiliate Russia and push it out of its comfort zone, knowing that Moscow would think carefully before stepping up a full military escalation against Ankara. On the same day, Turkish President Recep Tayyib Erdogan ran to NATO for protection and refuge. The Russian President Vladimir Putin limited his reaction to hitting Turkey proxies in Syria hard, followed by economic sanctions and much more aggressive support to the Syrian President Bashar al-Assad. He agreed to help the Syrian Army retake Aleppo and decided to stand and face the United States of America at all costs in Bilad al-Sham. Putin considered the Turkish action not an Erdogan miscalculated adventure but rather a coordinated act of war with the US. Two main strong elements stand out:

    Russia coordinates air traffic control with the US, informing the military command of its schedule and presence over specific areas.
    It took 17 seconds for the Turkish Air Force to see the Russian Su-24 on its border, ask for orders from the military chain of command and from then via the highest political leadership for the anti-air missile to be launched. This is not a record by military means but impossible to achieve unless previous orders were in place given way ahead.
    Nevertheless, the night of the coup-d’Etat against Erdogan allowed Russia to return the hit to the US by informing Erdogan – via Iran – of the plan to kill him. The premises he was spending some holidays in were supposed to be bombed. But the thirty minutes warning were enough to save Erdogan’s life, and, in consequences, caused the failure of the coup that should have been ignited from the Incirlic military Air base, where US officers are established. The Turkish President accused the US administration indirectly, who in turn strongly contested the Turkish reaction in jailing most officers “friendly of the US”.

    This event warmed up the Turkish-Russian relationship which had dramatically cooled. In Putin’s eyes, the US, not Erdogan, paid the price (even if not fully) of its involvement in the Su-24 incident.

    Turkey responded to the Russian favour by recalling thousands of fighters from Aleppo to the borders to start a military campaign aiming to dismantle the US plan to divide Syria and create a Kurdish state from the Syrian north east, Al-Hasaka, to the Syrian north west, Afrin.

    Dismantling the US plan was convenient for:

    Turkey by preventing a Kurdish state along its borders. This state, apart form the long-lasting Turkish struggle with the Kurds, would also foil the Turkish dream to annexe part of Syria or impose its agenda on Damascus at the end of the war.
    Russia wanted to hit back at the US for the Su-24. The Russian plan is to establish a long-lasting presence in Syria without having to share the territory with its old US enemy. Therefore, the unity of Syria has become valuable for Putin.
    Damascus was happy to teach the Kurds a lesson following al-Hasaka events. The government of Syria and the Kurds were always on good terms, supporting Syrian cities under siege, i.e. Aleppo, Nubl and Zahra’. Nevertheless, the US pressure on the Kurds was greater than the long-standing relationship with Damascus. Nevertheless, the Kurds, as a minority, have dream “since forever” about having a Federation for themselves.
    All of the above created a convenient environment for many players in favour of the Turkish advance toward Jarablus and disturbing the US plans in the north of Syria. Nevertheless, the Turkish President was not content with contering the Kurdish plan but wanted to expand further, even without Russia closing its eyes to what he was doing.

    Turkey allowed regional countries to generously finance and supply Qaidat al-Jihad and Syrian rebels with weapons to initiate major attacks against the Syrian Army and keep it busy within a limited geographical sector, mainly around Aleppo. As soon as Russia and its allies pushed forces toward ISIS occupied territories at al-Tabqa, the jihadists and rebels attacked rural Homs and south Aleppo, forcing Damascus to recall all forces engaged on that front to defend positions under attack.

    Recently, jihadists and rebels carried out two major attacks on Aleppo under the banner of “breaking the siege” of the eastern surrounded part of the city. The “Aleppo Epic Battle” and the “Abu Omar Saraqeb” second battle caused months of full engagement for over 25.000 members of the Syrian Army, and around 8500 of all of their allies ground forces (Iraqi militia, Iranian advisors and their Afghan and Pakistani militia). Additionally, the Lebanese Hezbollah decided to inject 2500 of its elite Ridwan force in Aleppo and leave these in the city. The two attacks failed to achieve their objective in that part of Syria but succeeded in giving enough time for Turkey to advance toward al-Bab city and make the Syrian Army less keen to distribute forces around multiple fronts.

    Damascus didn’t officially agree with the Russian-Turkish understanding over Jarablus because Syria mistrusted the Turkish leader and wanted to maintain a good relationship with the Kurds. Moscow never agreed with Ankara to expand its military presence for controlling the triangle Jarablus-Manbij-al-Bab or even to go to Raqqah.

    The presence of Turkish forces at the door of al-Bab represented a strategic menace to the Syrian Army based in Aleppo from its eastern gate. The presence of Turkish forces and their proxies at 2 km from al-Bab triggered an understanding where ISIS would pull forces from the city without a fight, as was the case in Jarablus. Ankara is trying to insinuate that the intention of its forces to enter al-Bab aim is to stop the Kurdish federation.

    But neither Damascus not Russia will tolerate the Turkish control of al-Bab. The Russians delivered a squad of Su-24M2, deployed the anti-air missiles S-300 and S-400 and encouraged the Syrian President to impose new rules of engagement (ROE) and red lines on Turkey for the first time since the creation of the two states.

    A squadron of the Syrian Air Force, followed by a protection escort, raided a Turkish military convoy at the door of al-Bab on the morning of the 24th of November, killing 3 Turkish soldiers. Russia was on alert, ready to launch its missiles in case of any Turkish reaction. That was the second Syrian-Turkish confrontation since the last month. The first took place over the Syrian-Turkish borders when two F-16s violated Syrian air space. These were confronted by four MIGs who locked their missiles on the Turkish jets. The F-16 scan radar informed the F-16 pilots who received instructions to return to base. Syria imposed it sovereignty over its air space for the first time. Russia won’t tolerate any further violation and Ankara’s F-16 are no longer permitted in the sky over Syria.

    This is exactly what the newly elected US President Donald Trump meant when he declared he has no intention to fight Assad, because this means confronting Putin who is determine to keep Syria united and defend the Syrian regime.

    When hitting Turkish soldiers on Syrian territory, Damascus is not provoking Ankara because it had never given the permission to send that army onto Syrian soil. In consequences, the idea of Turkey pushing forces even toward Raqqah is no longer a pushover, because Damascus and Moscow have not said their last word to Turkey and the US.

    Since Trump said he has no intention of triggering a nuclear war or a third World War, the partition of the north of Syria is no longer as easily imposed compared with during Obama administration. Therefore, the future of Syria depends on how Trump-Putin understanding is imposed on all parties. Either that, or the war will proceed even more violently.

    Erdogan is weaker than ever in relation to Iraq and Syria: he failed to impose his will regarding participation in the attack against the capital of the caliphate, Mosul, or even the smaller city of Talafar. And today he can’t materialise his dream to annex Aleppo, and his forces are stopped at the gates of al-Bab. If he continues toward Raqqah there is a huge risk: he will have to face a superpower: Russia.


    Great article and a lot of details in it, some things that I did not even know.

    and Erdogan can't go running to America or Nato after his disparaging comments about the USA and Nato over the failed coup and his comments towards Nato he is a leader with very few friends
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    Russian military intervention and aid to Syria #10 - Page 31 Empty Re: Russian military intervention and aid to Syria #10

    Post  par far on Fri Dec 02, 2016 12:52 pm

    Godric wrote:
    par far wrote:
    calm wrote:+

    On the same day, one year apart, Russia gets its revenge and stops Turkey at the gates of al-Bab.
    https://elijahjm.wordpress.com/2016/11/27/on-the-same-day-one-year-apart-russia-gets-its-revenge-and-stops-turkey-at-the-gates-of-al-bab/

    On the 24th of November 2015, Turkey shot down a Russian Sokhoi Su-24 over the Turkish-Syrian border causing the death of one of the two parachuted pilots while trying to hit the ground. On the same day, a year later, a Syrian Air Force jet hits a Turkish military convoy two kilometres from the northern Syrian city of al-Bab, killing three Turkish soldiers. The Turkish aggressive move toward Russia had come after the destruction of hundreds of oil tankers used by the “Islamic State” (ISIS) to transport oil from Syria and Iraq to Turkey.

    The Syrian Air Force (SyAF) activity is directly linked, coordinated and ordered by a common military operations room, headed by a Russian General, so as to avoid friendly fire or incidents. Russia coordinates most of the air traffic with the US-led coalition activities over Syria for the same purposes. The Russian command needs to assure the safeguard of its military naval and ground force with artillery and air protection since it is operating in various locations and cities over the Syrian geography. Therefore, every air strike, reconnaissance or drone sorties must be agreed and approved before anything takes off. Faisal al-Miqdad, the Syrian deputy Foreign Minister clearly said: “This event took place on Syrian land. Turkey should only blame itself”.

    But why the Syrian city of al-Bab?

    When Turkey shot down the Russian jet, the aim was to humiliate Russia and push it out of its comfort zone, knowing that Moscow would think carefully before stepping up a full military escalation against Ankara. On the same day, Turkish President Recep Tayyib Erdogan ran to NATO for protection and refuge. The Russian President Vladimir Putin limited his reaction to hitting Turkey proxies in Syria hard, followed by economic sanctions and much more aggressive support to the Syrian President Bashar al-Assad. He agreed to help the Syrian Army retake Aleppo and decided to stand and face the United States of America at all costs in Bilad al-Sham. Putin considered the Turkish action not an Erdogan miscalculated adventure but rather a coordinated act of war with the US. Two main strong elements stand out:

    Russia coordinates air traffic control with the US, informing the military command of its schedule and presence over specific areas.
    It took 17 seconds for the Turkish Air Force to see the Russian Su-24 on its border, ask for orders from the military chain of command and from then via the highest political leadership for the anti-air missile to be launched. This is not a record by military means but impossible to achieve unless previous orders were in place given way ahead.
    Nevertheless, the night of the coup-d’Etat against Erdogan allowed Russia to return the hit to the US by informing Erdogan – via Iran – of the plan to kill him. The premises he was spending some holidays in were supposed to be bombed. But the thirty minutes warning were enough to save Erdogan’s life, and, in consequences, caused the failure of the coup that should have been ignited from the Incirlic military Air base, where US officers are established. The Turkish President accused the US administration indirectly, who in turn strongly contested the Turkish reaction in jailing most officers “friendly of the US”.

    This event warmed up the Turkish-Russian relationship which had dramatically cooled. In Putin’s eyes, the US, not Erdogan, paid the price (even if not fully) of its involvement in the Su-24 incident.

    Turkey responded to the Russian favour by recalling thousands of fighters from Aleppo to the borders to start a military campaign aiming to dismantle the US plan to divide Syria and create a Kurdish state from the Syrian north east, Al-Hasaka, to the Syrian north west, Afrin.

    Dismantling the US plan was convenient for:

    Turkey by preventing a Kurdish state along its borders. This state, apart form the long-lasting Turkish struggle with the Kurds, would also foil the Turkish dream to annexe part of Syria or impose its agenda on Damascus at the end of the war.
    Russia wanted to hit back at the US for the Su-24. The Russian plan is to establish a long-lasting presence in Syria without having to share the territory with its old US enemy. Therefore, the unity of Syria has become valuable for Putin.
    Damascus was happy to teach the Kurds a lesson following al-Hasaka events. The government of Syria and the Kurds were always on good terms, supporting Syrian cities under siege, i.e. Aleppo, Nubl and Zahra’. Nevertheless, the US pressure on the Kurds was greater than the long-standing relationship with Damascus. Nevertheless, the Kurds, as a minority, have dream “since forever” about having a Federation for themselves.
    All of the above created a convenient environment for many players in favour of the Turkish advance toward Jarablus and disturbing the US plans in the north of Syria. Nevertheless, the Turkish President was not content with contering the Kurdish plan but wanted to expand further, even without Russia closing its eyes to what he was doing.

    Turkey allowed regional countries to generously finance and supply Qaidat al-Jihad and Syrian rebels with weapons to initiate major attacks against the Syrian Army and keep it busy within a limited geographical sector, mainly around Aleppo. As soon as Russia and its allies pushed forces toward ISIS occupied territories at al-Tabqa, the jihadists and rebels attacked rural Homs and south Aleppo, forcing Damascus to recall all forces engaged on that front to defend positions under attack.

    Recently, jihadists and rebels carried out two major attacks on Aleppo under the banner of “breaking the siege” of the eastern surrounded part of the city. The “Aleppo Epic Battle” and the “Abu Omar Saraqeb” second battle caused months of full engagement for over 25.000 members of the Syrian Army, and around 8500 of all of their allies ground forces (Iraqi militia, Iranian advisors and their Afghan and Pakistani militia). Additionally, the Lebanese Hezbollah decided to inject 2500 of its elite Ridwan force in Aleppo and leave these in the city. The two attacks failed to achieve their objective in that part of Syria but succeeded in giving enough time for Turkey to advance toward al-Bab city and make the Syrian Army less keen to distribute forces around multiple fronts.

    Damascus didn’t officially agree with the Russian-Turkish understanding over Jarablus because Syria mistrusted the Turkish leader and wanted to maintain a good relationship with the Kurds. Moscow never agreed with Ankara to expand its military presence for controlling the triangle Jarablus-Manbij-al-Bab or even to go to Raqqah.

    The presence of Turkish forces at the door of al-Bab represented a strategic menace to the Syrian Army based in Aleppo from its eastern gate. The presence of Turkish forces and their proxies at 2 km from al-Bab triggered an understanding where ISIS would pull forces from the city without a fight, as was the case in Jarablus. Ankara is trying to insinuate that the intention of its forces to enter al-Bab aim is to stop the Kurdish federation.

    But neither Damascus not Russia will tolerate the Turkish control of al-Bab. The Russians delivered a squad of Su-24M2, deployed the anti-air missiles S-300 and S-400 and encouraged the Syrian President to impose new rules of engagement (ROE) and red lines on Turkey for the first time since the creation of the two states.

    A squadron of the Syrian Air Force, followed by a protection escort, raided a Turkish military convoy at the door of al-Bab on the morning of the 24th of November, killing 3 Turkish soldiers. Russia was on alert, ready to launch its missiles in case of any Turkish reaction. That was the second Syrian-Turkish confrontation since the last month. The first took place over the Syrian-Turkish borders when two F-16s violated Syrian air space. These were confronted by four MIGs who locked their missiles on the Turkish jets. The F-16 scan radar informed the F-16 pilots who received instructions to return to base. Syria imposed it sovereignty over its air space for the first time. Russia won’t tolerate any further violation and Ankara’s F-16 are no longer permitted in the sky over Syria.

    This is exactly what the newly elected US President Donald Trump meant when he declared he has no intention to fight Assad, because this means confronting Putin who is determine to keep Syria united and defend the Syrian regime.

    When hitting Turkish soldiers on Syrian territory, Damascus is not provoking Ankara because it had never given the permission to send that army onto Syrian soil. In consequences, the idea of Turkey pushing forces even toward Raqqah is no longer a pushover, because Damascus and Moscow have not said their last word to Turkey and the US.

    Since Trump said he has no intention of triggering a nuclear war or a third World War, the partition of the north of Syria is no longer as easily imposed compared with during Obama administration. Therefore, the future of Syria depends on how Trump-Putin understanding is imposed on all parties. Either that, or the war will proceed even more violently.

    Erdogan is weaker than ever in relation to Iraq and Syria: he failed to impose his will regarding participation in the attack against the capital of the caliphate, Mosul, or even the smaller city of Talafar. And today he can’t materialise his dream to annex Aleppo, and his forces are stopped at the gates of al-Bab. If he continues toward Raqqah there is a huge risk: he will have to face a superpower: Russia.


    Great article and a lot of details in it, some things that I did not even know.

    and Erdogan can't go running to America or Nato after his disparaging comments about the USA and Nato over the failed coup and his comments towards Nato he is a leader with very few friends


    Very true, Erdogan was an idiot for trying to remove Assad. Assad never did anything to Turkey and Assad kept the Kurds away from Turkey and Syria had good relationship with Turkey for so long(there were minor things but for Turkey, Assad was better than the Kurds or the deceiving Zionists).

    Erdogan was tricked by the AngloZionists to help them destroy Syria and Iraq and Ahmet Davutoğlu knew this(Ahmet Davutoğlu wanted friendly relationships with Turkey's neighbours, Russia, Iran and China(Erdogan destroyed good relations with China by doing the dirty work of US and by targeting the Uyghurs in China) while having Turkish influence on them) and this was the reason that Ahmet Davutoğlu resigned.
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    Russian military intervention and aid to Syria #10 - Page 31 Empty Re: Russian military intervention and aid to Syria #10

    Post  PapaDragon on Fri Dec 02, 2016 7:54 pm

    airstrike
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    Post  airstrike on Sat Dec 03, 2016 2:17 pm

    Russian sappers return to Syria

    http://defense-watch.com/2016/12/03/russian-sappers-return-syria/
    eehnie
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    Russian military intervention and aid to Syria #10 - Page 31 Empty Re: Russian military intervention and aid to Syria #10

    Post  eehnie on Sun Dec 04, 2016 1:45 am

    calm wrote:ZU-23-2 23mm autocannon with  Ammunition in Hmeymim AB ready to airdrop for SAA garrison in Deir-Ezzor.
    Russian military intervention and aid to Syria #10 - Page 31 Cyb6IWnXUAADhv7Russian military intervention and aid to Syria #10 - Page 31 Cyb6KBzXAAAjRlO


    Putin Orders Sending Mobile Hospitals to Assist Residents of Syria's Aleppo

    Read more: https://sputniknews.com/middleeast/201611291047967338-russia-syria-aleppo-field/


    Russian President Vladimir Putin has ordered sending mobile field hospitals to Aleppo in order to provide immediate medical assistance, Kremlin spokesman Dmitry Peskov said Tuesday.

    Russian President Vladimir Putin has ordered sending mobile field hospitals to provide immediate medical assistance to residents of Syria's embattled city of Aleppo and its neighborhoods, Kremlin spokesman Dmitry Peskov said Tuesday. "The president has ordered the Defense ministry and the Emergencies Ministry to send mobile hospitals to provide medical assistance to residents of Aleppo and nearby settlements," Peskov told reporters. According to Peskov, the Defense Ministry will send a special medical unit equipped with a multipurpose hospital for 100 patients, which has a children ward, while the Emergencies Ministry will send a mobile field hospital for 50 patients, which can also provide ambulatory treatment for some 200 people per day.

    Very interesting news. The ZU-23-2 and the 2B9 Vasilek are likely to be finished in Russia by this war, and maybe in Novorussia too.
    d_taddei2
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    Russian military intervention and aid to Syria #10 - Page 31 Empty reply

    Post  d_taddei2 on Sun Dec 04, 2016 9:20 am

    eehnie wrote:
    calm wrote:ZU-23-2 23mm autocannon with  Ammunition in Hmeymim AB ready to airdrop for SAA garrison in Deir-Ezzor.
    Russian military intervention and aid to Syria #10 - Page 31 Cyb6IWnXUAADhv7Russian military intervention and aid to Syria #10 - Page 31 Cyb6KBzXAAAjRlO


    Putin Orders Sending Mobile Hospitals to Assist Residents of Syria's Aleppo

    Read more: https://sputniknews.com/middleeast/201611291047967338-russia-syria-aleppo-field/


    Russian President Vladimir Putin has ordered sending mobile field hospitals to Aleppo in order to provide immediate medical assistance, Kremlin spokesman Dmitry Peskov said Tuesday.

    Russian President Vladimir Putin has ordered sending mobile field hospitals to provide immediate medical assistance to residents of Syria's embattled city of Aleppo and its neighborhoods, Kremlin spokesman Dmitry Peskov said Tuesday. "The president has ordered the Defense ministry and the Emergencies Ministry to send mobile hospitals to provide medical assistance to residents of Aleppo and nearby settlements," Peskov told reporters. According to Peskov, the Defense Ministry will send a special medical unit equipped with a multipurpose hospital for 100 patients, which has a children ward, while the Emergencies Ministry will send a mobile field hospital for 50 patients, which can also provide ambulatory treatment for some 200 people per day.

    Very interesting news. The ZU-23-2 and the 2B9 Vasilek are likely to be finished in Russia by this war, and maybe in Novorussia too.

    the ZU-23-2 will be around for long while its very useful and no replacement planned and its still being produced and Vasilek is very unique design so might hang around longer than you think and we have to ask how many is actually left in storage on both items
    eehnie
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    Russian military intervention and aid to Syria #10 - Page 31 Empty Re: Russian military intervention and aid to Syria #10

    Post  eehnie on Sun Dec 04, 2016 10:14 am

    d_taddei2 wrote:
    eehnie wrote:
    calm wrote:ZU-23-2 23mm autocannon with  Ammunition in Hmeymim AB ready to airdrop for SAA garrison in Deir-Ezzor.
    Russian military intervention and aid to Syria #10 - Page 31 Cyb6IWnXUAADhv7Russian military intervention and aid to Syria #10 - Page 31 Cyb6KBzXAAAjRlO


    Putin Orders Sending Mobile Hospitals to Assist Residents of Syria's Aleppo

    Read more: https://sputniknews.com/middleeast/201611291047967338-russia-syria-aleppo-field/


    Russian President Vladimir Putin has ordered sending mobile field hospitals to Aleppo in order to provide immediate medical assistance, Kremlin spokesman Dmitry Peskov said Tuesday.

    Russian President Vladimir Putin has ordered sending mobile field hospitals to provide immediate medical assistance to residents of Syria's embattled city of Aleppo and its neighborhoods, Kremlin spokesman Dmitry Peskov said Tuesday. "The president has ordered the Defense ministry and the Emergencies Ministry to send mobile hospitals to provide medical assistance to residents of Aleppo and nearby settlements," Peskov told reporters. According to Peskov, the Defense Ministry will send a special medical unit equipped with a multipurpose hospital for 100 patients, which has a children ward, while the Emergencies Ministry will send a mobile field hospital for 50 patients, which can also provide ambulatory treatment for some 200 people per day.

    Very interesting news. The ZU-23-2 and the 2B9 Vasilek are likely to be finished in Russia by this war, and maybe in Novorussia too.

    the ZU-23-2 will be around for long while its very useful and no replacement planned and its still being produced and Vasilek is very unique design so might hang around longer than you think and we have to ask how many is actually left in storage on both items

    If the production of the ZU-23-2 continues is not for internal procurement. It is more for export.

    Russia has lots of self propelled "successors" of the ZU-23-2. All them more powerful than the ZU-23-2. The ZSU-23-4 can be considered the first "successor" (technologically) of the ZU-23-2.

    Neither Russia or Novorrussia need today to mount ZU-23-2 on trucks to cover the role of this weapon in the war of Syria.

    I tend to think that even South Ossetia and Abkhazia will send their oldest weapons to Syria, including this one.

    And for the 2B9 Vasilek of 82mm, its high weight makes them significantly more difficult to move than the current bench of lighter portable/man-portable mortars of 82mm (2B14, 2B24 and 2B25) and 120mm (2B11 2S12 Sani and 2B23). Again no reason to keep them having better options and with a need of procurement for Syria. Do you know when its production stopped? Late 1970s, early 1980s? I'm not sure.



    Last edited by eehnie on Sun Dec 04, 2016 12:36 pm; edited 2 times in total
    d_taddei2
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    Russian military intervention and aid to Syria #10 - Page 31 Empty reply

    Post  d_taddei2 on Sun Dec 04, 2016 12:09 pm

    eehnie wrote:
    d_taddei2 wrote:
    eehnie wrote:
    calm wrote:ZU-23-2 23mm autocannon with  Ammunition in Hmeymim AB ready to airdrop for SAA garrison in Deir-Ezzor.
    Russian military intervention and aid to Syria #10 - Page 31 Cyb6IWnXUAADhv7Russian military intervention and aid to Syria #10 - Page 31 Cyb6KBzXAAAjRlO


    Putin Orders Sending Mobile Hospitals to Assist Residents of Syria's Aleppo

    Read more: https://sputniknews.com/middleeast/201611291047967338-russia-syria-aleppo-field/


    Russian President Vladimir Putin has ordered sending mobile field hospitals to Aleppo in order to provide immediate medical assistance, Kremlin spokesman Dmitry Peskov said Tuesday.

    Russian President Vladimir Putin has ordered sending mobile field hospitals to provide immediate medical assistance to residents of Syria's embattled city of Aleppo and its neighborhoods, Kremlin spokesman Dmitry Peskov said Tuesday. "The president has ordered the Defense ministry and the Emergencies Ministry to send mobile hospitals to provide medical assistance to residents of Aleppo and nearby settlements," Peskov told reporters. According to Peskov, the Defense Ministry will send a special medical unit equipped with a multipurpose hospital for 100 patients, which has a children ward, while the Emergencies Ministry will send a mobile field hospital for 50 patients, which can also provide ambulatory treatment for some 200 people per day.

    Very interesting news. The ZU-23-2 and the 2B9 Vasilek are likely to be finished in Russia by this war, and maybe in Novorussia too.

    the ZU-23-2 will be around for long while its very useful and no replacement planned and its still being produced and Vasilek is very unique design so might hang around longer than you think and we have to ask how many is actually left in storage on both items

    If the production of the ZU-23-2 continues is not for internal procurement. It is more for export.

    Russia has lots of self propelled "successors" of the ZU-23-2. All them more powerful than the ZU-23-2. The ZSU-23-4 can be considered the first "successor" (technologically) of the ZU-23-2.

    Neither Russia or Novorrussia need today to mount ZU-23-2 on trucks to cover the role of this weapon in the war of Syria.

    I tend to think that even South Ossetia and Abkhazia will send their oldest weapons to Syria, including this one.

    And for the 2B9 Vasilek, its high weight makes them significantly more difficult to move than the current bench of portable/man-portable mortars of calibers until 120mm (like the 2B12 or the 2B23) while the 2B9 is of 82mm. Again no reason to keep them having better options and with a need of procurement for Syria. Do you know when its production stopped? Late 1970s, early 1980s?

    not sure when the 2B9 stopped production but i do know it operates differently to a standard due to the fact its automatic and fires clips of 4x82mm which has its own advantages and when mounted on MT-LB the weight doesn't become an issue, Airborne forces still use it. As for the ZU-23-2 this is still popular due to recent upgrades such as ZU-23/ZOM1 and its various versionsthis makes for reasonable air defence that can be towed by small truck or 4x4, or even mounted on some other vehicle, it can be air dropped from small aircraft, where we actually see the reduction of the ZSU-23-4 in service, as the 23-4 is mounted on an older chassis of T-55/54 which makes it heavy, greater operating cost, it won't be air dropped, and the turrets protection is a problem, and the chassis is no longer prodcued, so if a country wants ZSU-23-4 it will be old stock were they can buy new 23-2 and mount it on what ever they want, its more versatile. Also the 23-2 is also mounted on the BTR-D which currently is still in use. Also Russia must have 1,000's of them as well as ammo for them. As for South Ossetia and Abkhazia they are not in a position to be giving anything away yet they need everything they have in till Russia starts donating or they are fully absorbed into Russia (officially part of Russia) then they will get better equipment. But anyway i think this is going off topic now, dont get me wrong i love talking about older equipment and future upgrades and uses as you well know from other topics i have posted.
    eehnie
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    Russian military intervention and aid to Syria #10 - Page 31 Empty Re: Russian military intervention and aid to Syria #10

    Post  eehnie on Sun Dec 04, 2016 12:49 pm

    d_taddei2 wrote:
    eehnie wrote:
    d_taddei2 wrote:
    eehnie wrote:
    calm wrote:ZU-23-2 23mm autocannon with  Ammunition in Hmeymim AB ready to airdrop for SAA garrison in Deir-Ezzor.
    Russian military intervention and aid to Syria #10 - Page 31 Cyb6IWnXUAADhv7Russian military intervention and aid to Syria #10 - Page 31 Cyb6KBzXAAAjRlO


    Putin Orders Sending Mobile Hospitals to Assist Residents of Syria's Aleppo

    Read more: https://sputniknews.com/middleeast/201611291047967338-russia-syria-aleppo-field/


    Russian President Vladimir Putin has ordered sending mobile field hospitals to Aleppo in order to provide immediate medical assistance, Kremlin spokesman Dmitry Peskov said Tuesday.

    Russian President Vladimir Putin has ordered sending mobile field hospitals to provide immediate medical assistance to residents of Syria's embattled city of Aleppo and its neighborhoods, Kremlin spokesman Dmitry Peskov said Tuesday. "The president has ordered the Defense ministry and the Emergencies Ministry to send mobile hospitals to provide medical assistance to residents of Aleppo and nearby settlements," Peskov told reporters. According to Peskov, the Defense Ministry will send a special medical unit equipped with a multipurpose hospital for 100 patients, which has a children ward, while the Emergencies Ministry will send a mobile field hospital for 50 patients, which can also provide ambulatory treatment for some 200 people per day.

    Very interesting news. The ZU-23-2 and the 2B9 Vasilek are likely to be finished in Russia by this war, and maybe in Novorussia too.

    the ZU-23-2 will be around for long while its very useful and no replacement planned and its still being produced and Vasilek is very unique design so might hang around longer than you think and we have to ask how many is actually left in storage on both items

    If the production of the ZU-23-2 continues is not for internal procurement. It is more for export.

    Russia has lots of self propelled "successors" of the ZU-23-2. All them more powerful than the ZU-23-2. The ZSU-23-4 can be considered the first "successor" (technologically) of the ZU-23-2.

    Neither Russia or Novorrussia need today to mount ZU-23-2 on trucks to cover the role of this weapon in the war of Syria.

    I tend to think that even South Ossetia and Abkhazia will send their oldest weapons to Syria, including this one.

    And for the 2B9 Vasilek, its high weight makes them significantly more difficult to move than the current bench of portable/man-portable mortars of calibers until 120mm (like the 2B12 or the 2B23) while the 2B9 is of 82mm. Again no reason to keep them having better options and with a need of procurement for Syria. Do you know when its production stopped? Late 1970s, early 1980s?

    not sure when the 2B9 stopped production but i do know it operates differently to a standard due to the fact its automatic and fires clips of 4x82mm which has its own advantages and when mounted on MT-LB the weight doesn't become an issue, Airborne forces still use it. As for the ZU-23-2 this is still popular due to recent upgrades such as ZU-23/ZOM1 and its various versionsthis makes for reasonable air defence that can be towed by small truck or 4x4, or even mounted on some other vehicle, it can be air dropped from small aircraft, where we actually see the reduction of the ZSU-23-4 in service, as the 23-4 is mounted on an older chassis of T-55/54 which makes it heavy, greater operating cost, it won't be air dropped, and the turrets protection is a problem, and the chassis is no longer prodcued, so if a country wants ZSU-23-4 it will be old stock were they can buy new 23-2 and mount it on what ever they want, its more versatile. Also the 23-2 is also mounted on the BTR-D which currently is still in use. Also Russia must have 1,000's of them as well as ammo for them. As for South Ossetia and Abkhazia they are not in a position to be giving anything away yet they need everything they have in till Russia starts donating or they are fully absorbed into Russia (officially part of Russia) then they will get better equipment. But anyway i think this is going off topic now, dont get me wrong i love talking about older equipment and future upgrades and uses as you well know from other topics i have posted.

    Of course the ZU-23-2 and the 2B9 Vasilek are good weapons, they remained long for some reason. I'm not of those that despise old warfare, as you know (I like too these topics). It is necessary to read my comments in relative terms, comparing these weapons with the rest of heavy warfare present in the Russian armed forces.

    As example, while I like the MT-LB more than other veteran platforms, like the old BMD platform, surely between the MT-LB with 120mm 2B11 mounted, a 2S9 also of 120mm and a MT-LB with a 82mm 2B9 mounted, the last would be the weakest option. The clip also is interesting compared to light mortars, but every self propelled piece would be over this level and would be of heavier caliber.

    Today the ZU-23-2 and the 2B9 Vasilek are the 2 weakest heavy weapons which use by the Russian armed forces has been documented since the begin of 2014. Then the procurement of the ZU-23-2 and the 2B9 to Syria, and its replacement in Russia by stronger weapons, is a natural step for Russia. The presence and use of older artillery pieces like the M-30, D-20, D-1, M-46,... has not been documented since earlier, and also the procurement of these pieces to Syria would be a natural step if they are available still in Russia, something that I doubt.
    JohninMK
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    Russian military intervention and aid to Syria #10 - Page 31 Empty Re: Russian military intervention and aid to Syria #10

    Post  JohninMK on Sun Dec 04, 2016 5:07 pm

    eehnie wrote:
    Today the ZU-23-2 and the 2B9 Vasilek are the 2 weakest heavy weapons which use by the Russian armed forces has been documented since the begin of 2014. Then the procurement of the ZU-23-2 and the 2B9 to Syria, and its replacement in Russia by stronger weapons, is a natural step for Russia. The presence and use of older artillery pieces like the M-30, D-20, D-1, M-46,... has not been documented since earlier, and also the procurement of these pieces to Syria would be a natural step if they are available still in Russia, something that I doubt.
    John's advanced English lesson number 17.

    I realise that you are not a native English speaker so could I respectively suggest that the use of 'procurement' in the above para is wrong. Procurement is a posh word for purchasing, in this context the words 'supply' or 'sale' would be more appropriate.
    d_taddei2
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    Russian military intervention and aid to Syria #10 - Page 31 Empty re

    Post  d_taddei2 on Sun Dec 04, 2016 5:33 pm

    eehnie wrote:
    d_taddei2 wrote:
    eehnie wrote:
    d_taddei2 wrote:
    eehnie wrote:
    calm wrote:ZU-23-2 23mm autocannon with  Ammunition in Hmeymim AB ready to airdrop for SAA garrison in Deir-Ezzor.
    Russian military intervention and aid to Syria #10 - Page 31 Cyb6IWnXUAADhv7Russian military intervention and aid to Syria #10 - Page 31 Cyb6KBzXAAAjRlO


    Putin Orders Sending Mobile Hospitals to Assist Residents of Syria's Aleppo

    Read more: https://sputniknews.com/middleeast/201611291047967338-russia-syria-aleppo-field/


    Russian President Vladimir Putin has ordered sending mobile field hospitals to Aleppo in order to provide immediate medical assistance, Kremlin spokesman Dmitry Peskov said Tuesday.

    Russian President Vladimir Putin has ordered sending mobile field hospitals to provide immediate medical assistance to residents of Syria's embattled city of Aleppo and its neighborhoods, Kremlin spokesman Dmitry Peskov said Tuesday. "The president has ordered the Defense ministry and the Emergencies Ministry to send mobile hospitals to provide medical assistance to residents of Aleppo and nearby settlements," Peskov told reporters. According to Peskov, the Defense Ministry will send a special medical unit equipped with a multipurpose hospital for 100 patients, which has a children ward, while the Emergencies Ministry will send a mobile field hospital for 50 patients, which can also provide ambulatory treatment for some 200 people per day.

    Very interesting news. The ZU-23-2 and the 2B9 Vasilek are likely to be finished in Russia by this war, and maybe in Novorussia too.

    the ZU-23-2 will be around for long while its very useful and no replacement planned and its still being produced and Vasilek is very unique design so might hang around longer than you think and we have to ask how many is actually left in storage on both items

    If the production of the ZU-23-2 continues is not for internal procurement. It is more for export.

    Russia has lots of self propelled "successors" of the ZU-23-2. All them more powerful than the ZU-23-2. The ZSU-23-4 can be considered the first "successor" (technologically) of the ZU-23-2.

    Neither Russia or Novorrussia need today to mount ZU-23-2 on trucks to cover the role of this weapon in the war of Syria.

    I tend to think that even South Ossetia and Abkhazia will send their oldest weapons to Syria, including this one.

    And for the 2B9 Vasilek, its high weight makes them significantly more difficult to move than the current bench of portable/man-portable mortars of calibers until 120mm (like the 2B12 or the 2B23) while the 2B9 is of 82mm. Again no reason to keep them having better options and with a need of procurement for Syria. Do you know when its production stopped? Late 1970s, early 1980s?

    not sure when the 2B9 stopped production but i do know it operates differently to a standard due to the fact its automatic and fires clips of 4x82mm which has its own advantages and when mounted on MT-LB the weight doesn't become an issue, Airborne forces still use it. As for the ZU-23-2 this is still popular due to recent upgrades such as ZU-23/ZOM1 and its various versionsthis makes for reasonable air defence that can be towed by small truck or 4x4, or even mounted on some other vehicle, it can be air dropped from small aircraft, where we actually see the reduction of the ZSU-23-4 in service, as the 23-4 is mounted on an older chassis of T-55/54 which makes it heavy, greater operating cost, it won't be air dropped, and the turrets protection is a problem, and the chassis is no longer prodcued, so if a country wants ZSU-23-4 it will be old stock were they can buy new 23-2 and mount it on what ever they want, its more versatile. Also the 23-2 is also mounted on the BTR-D which currently is still in use. Also Russia must have 1,000's of them as well as ammo for them. As for South Ossetia and Abkhazia they are not in a position to be giving anything away yet they need everything they have in till Russia starts donating or they are fully absorbed into Russia (officially part of Russia) then they will get better equipment. But anyway i think this is going off topic now, dont get me wrong i love talking about older equipment and future upgrades and uses as you well know from other topics i have posted.

    Of course the ZU-23-2 and the 2B9 Vasilek are good weapons, they remained long for some reason. I'm not of those that despise old warfare, as you know (I like too these topics). It is necessary to read my comments in relative terms, comparing these weapons with the rest of heavy warfare present in the Russian armed forces.

    As example, while I like the MT-LB more than other veteran platforms, like the old BMD platform, surely between the MT-LB with 120mm 2B11 mounted, a 2S9 also of 120mm and a MT-LB with a 82mm 2B9 mounted, the last would be the weakest option. The clip also is interesting compared to light mortars, but every self propelled piece would be over this level and would be of heavier caliber.

    Today the ZU-23-2 and the 2B9 Vasilek are the 2 weakest heavy weapons which use by the Russian armed forces has been documented since the begin of 2014. Then the procurement of the ZU-23-2 and the 2B9 to Syria, and its replacement in Russia by stronger weapons, is a natural step for Russia. The presence and use of older artillery pieces like the M-30, D-20, D-1, M-46,... has not been documented since earlier, and also the procurement of these pieces to Syria would be a natural step if they are available still in Russia, something that I doubt.

    well if your talking about power etc then we could say why not get rid of 120mm and have the 160mm and 240mm as both are in Russian storage/inventory?? certain rounds/shells are useful for certain types of warfare, and we have to remember the 82mm mortar round is still being used within the army, being used with the 2B14 Podnos which i believe is still in production (if Russia or any customer wants it). The advantage of the 2B9 is the fact you can fire off 4 rounds in about 2 seconds and the 2B9 has both indirect and direct fire capability which the 2B14 and other stand alone mortars don't have, hence there is an anti armour round available for it. There is a good article telling you about the use of artillery in Afghan, called "Artillery and Counterinsurgency: The Soviet Experience in Afghanistan"
    http://fmso.leavenworth.army.mil/documents/arty/arty.htm

    also video of 2B9 in eastern Ukraine which i am sure you might have seen already.
    https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=LwyFCWmpiUk

    and in syria
    https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=IZrTovgWqEc

    and training video

    https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=geGtS0157_0

    eehnie
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    Russian military intervention and aid to Syria #10 - Page 31 Empty Re: Russian military intervention and aid to Syria #10

    Post  eehnie on Sun Dec 04, 2016 6:46 pm

    d_taddei2 wrote:
    eehnie wrote:
    d_taddei2 wrote:
    eehnie wrote:
    d_taddei2 wrote:
    eehnie wrote:
    calm wrote:ZU-23-2 23mm autocannon with  Ammunition in Hmeymim AB ready to airdrop for SAA garrison in Deir-Ezzor.
    Russian military intervention and aid to Syria #10 - Page 31 Cyb6IWnXUAADhv7Russian military intervention and aid to Syria #10 - Page 31 Cyb6KBzXAAAjRlO


    Putin Orders Sending Mobile Hospitals to Assist Residents of Syria's Aleppo

    Read more: https://sputniknews.com/middleeast/201611291047967338-russia-syria-aleppo-field/


    Russian President Vladimir Putin has ordered sending mobile field hospitals to Aleppo in order to provide immediate medical assistance, Kremlin spokesman Dmitry Peskov said Tuesday.

    Russian President Vladimir Putin has ordered sending mobile field hospitals to provide immediate medical assistance to residents of Syria's embattled city of Aleppo and its neighborhoods, Kremlin spokesman Dmitry Peskov said Tuesday. "The president has ordered the Defense ministry and the Emergencies Ministry to send mobile hospitals to provide medical assistance to residents of Aleppo and nearby settlements," Peskov told reporters. According to Peskov, the Defense Ministry will send a special medical unit equipped with a multipurpose hospital for 100 patients, which has a children ward, while the Emergencies Ministry will send a mobile field hospital for 50 patients, which can also provide ambulatory treatment for some 200 people per day.

    Very interesting news. The ZU-23-2 and the 2B9 Vasilek are likely to be finished in Russia by this war, and maybe in Novorussia too.

    the ZU-23-2 will be around for long while its very useful and no replacement planned and its still being produced and Vasilek is very unique design so might hang around longer than you think and we have to ask how many is actually left in storage on both items

    If the production of the ZU-23-2 continues is not for internal procurement. It is more for export.

    Russia has lots of self propelled "successors" of the ZU-23-2. All them more powerful than the ZU-23-2. The ZSU-23-4 can be considered the first "successor" (technologically) of the ZU-23-2.

    Neither Russia or Novorrussia need today to mount ZU-23-2 on trucks to cover the role of this weapon in the war of Syria.

    I tend to think that even South Ossetia and Abkhazia will send their oldest weapons to Syria, including this one.

    And for the 2B9 Vasilek, its high weight makes them significantly more difficult to move than the current bench of portable/man-portable mortars of calibers until 120mm (like the 2B12 or the 2B23) while the 2B9 is of 82mm. Again no reason to keep them having better options and with a need of procurement for Syria. Do you know when its production stopped? Late 1970s, early 1980s?

    not sure when the 2B9 stopped production but i do know it operates differently to a standard due to the fact its automatic and fires clips of 4x82mm which has its own advantages and when mounted on MT-LB the weight doesn't become an issue, Airborne forces still use it. As for the ZU-23-2 this is still popular due to recent upgrades such as ZU-23/ZOM1 and its various versionsthis makes for reasonable air defence that can be towed by small truck or 4x4, or even mounted on some other vehicle, it can be air dropped from small aircraft, where we actually see the reduction of the ZSU-23-4 in service, as the 23-4 is mounted on an older chassis of T-55/54 which makes it heavy, greater operating cost, it won't be air dropped, and the turrets protection is a problem, and the chassis is no longer prodcued, so if a country wants ZSU-23-4 it will be old stock were they can buy new 23-2 and mount it on what ever they want, its more versatile. Also the 23-2 is also mounted on the BTR-D which currently is still in use. Also Russia must have 1,000's of them as well as ammo for them. As for South Ossetia and Abkhazia they are not in a position to be giving anything away yet they need everything they have in till Russia starts donating or they are fully absorbed into Russia (officially part of Russia) then they will get better equipment. But anyway i think this is going off topic now, dont get me wrong i love talking about older equipment and future upgrades and uses as you well know from other topics i have posted.

    Of course the ZU-23-2 and the 2B9 Vasilek are good weapons, they remained long for some reason. I'm not of those that despise old warfare, as you know (I like too these topics). It is necessary to read my comments in relative terms, comparing these weapons with the rest of heavy warfare present in the Russian armed forces.

    As example, while I like the MT-LB more than other veteran platforms, like the old BMD platform, surely between the MT-LB with 120mm 2B11 mounted, a 2S9 also of 120mm and a MT-LB with a 82mm 2B9 mounted, the last would be the weakest option. The clip also is interesting compared to light mortars, but every self propelled piece would be over this level and would be of heavier caliber.

    Today the ZU-23-2 and the 2B9 Vasilek are the 2 weakest heavy weapons which use by the Russian armed forces has been documented since the begin of 2014. Then the procurement of the ZU-23-2 and the 2B9 to Syria, and its replacement in Russia by stronger weapons, is a natural step for Russia. The presence and use of older artillery pieces like the M-30, D-20, D-1, M-46,... has not been documented since earlier, and also the procurement of these pieces to Syria would be a natural step if they are available still in Russia, something that I doubt.

    well if your talking about power etc then we could say why not get rid of 120mm and have the 160mm and 240mm as both are in Russian storage/inventory?? certain rounds/shells are useful for certain types of warfare, and we have to remember the 82mm mortar round is still being used within the army, being used with the 2B14 Podnos which i believe is still in production (if Russia or any customer wants it). The advantage of the 2B9 is the fact you can fire off 4 rounds in about 2 seconds and the 2B9 has both indirect and direct fire capability which the 2B14 and other stand alone mortars don't have, hence there is an anti armour round available for it. There is a good article telling you about the use of artillery in Afghan, called "Artillery and Counterinsurgency: The Soviet Experience in Afghanistan"
    http://fmso.leavenworth.army.mil/documents/arty/arty.htm

    also video of 2B9 in eastern Ukraine which i am sure you might have seen already.
    https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=LwyFCWmpiUk

    and in syria
    https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=IZrTovgWqEc

    and training video

    https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=geGtS0157_0


    This is not the point, while sometimes can be coincident I'm not talking about firepower, I'm talking more about power or weakess in terms of design. It is an overall view about every type of warfare mentioned.

    The process of adding new modern warfare and eliminating the weakest/less modern warfare is a natural process, is part of the continuous process of improvement.

    Doing the exercice of indentifying which are the weakest designs of warfare over portable/man-portable size, present today in the Russian armed forces, I come to the conclussion that are the ZU-23-2 and the 2B9 Vasilek. Their weaknesses compared to other warfare are basically:

    - A weight that makes them towed weapons, which means to have not own mobility and to be not portable/man-portable. To move them you need weapon+vehicle.
    - A lack of protection for their crews while are used.
    - A lower fire power compared to the weapons of (at least) their weight+role.

    If you try to see which are the weakest heavy weapons present in the Russian Armed Forces maybe you can reach to the same conclussion.

    If you reach not the same conclussion, it would be interesting to know which would be the heavy weight combat warfare in the Russian Armed Forces, that you see weaker than the ZU-23-2 and the 2B9 (including not the non-combat vehicles for transport). Note that as commented, I do not think warfare like the M-30, D-20, D-1, M-46, M-160, ML-20, B-4M or the S-60 are at this point present if the Russian Armed Forces (if you say them we would agree).


    Last edited by eehnie on Sun Dec 04, 2016 8:12 pm; edited 5 times in total
    zorobabel
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    Russian military intervention and aid to Syria #10 - Page 31 Empty Re: Russian military intervention and aid to Syria #10

    Post  zorobabel on Sun Dec 04, 2016 7:01 pm

    Aleppo, yesterday and today:

    Russian military intervention and aid to Syria #10 - Page 31 Cy20kmqXcAAj_UT
    Russian military intervention and aid to Syria #10 - Page 31 Cy20lusWEAEoB5C
    Russian military intervention and aid to Syria #10 - Page 31 Cy3BpJlXAAEgOdc
    GarryB
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    Post  GarryB on Mon Dec 05, 2016 4:27 am

    The ZU-23-2 and the 2B9 Vasilek are likely to be finished in Russia by this war, and maybe in Novorussia too.

    Really don't understand what you have against such weapons... both can still do the jobs they were designed to do...

    Russia has lots of self propelled "successors" of the ZU-23-2. All them more powerful than the ZU-23-2. The ZSU-23-4 can be considered the first "successor" (technologically) of the ZU-23-2.

    Wrong.

    The ZSU-23-4 are not even related to ZU-23-2. They entered service only a couple of years apart.... the ZSU-23-4 replaced the ZSU-57-2.

    The ZU-23-2 cannot be replaced with a ZSU-23-4 just like a Sprut can't be replaced by a T-90.

    And for the 2B9 Vasilek of 82mm, its high weight makes them significantly more difficult to move than the current bench of lighter portable/man-portable mortars of 82mm (2B14, 2B24 and 2B25) and 120mm (2B11 2S12 Sani and 2B23).

    The Vasilek has wheels and can move as quickly as the vehicle towing it... which is much faster than a man portable 82mm mortar...

    Then the procurement of the ZU-23-2 and the 2B9 to Syria, and its replacement in Russia by stronger weapons, is a natural step for Russia.

    To actually replace those two systems you would need a comparable system... ie for the ZU-23-2 the only replacement system I have ever seen would be the trailer mount for a single twin barrel 2A38M 30mm cannon that had four laser beam riding SOSNA-R missiles mounted on it.

    For the Vasilek the only viable replacement would be the new 57mm grenade launcher that has not yet entered service AFAIK.


    - A weight that makes them towed weapons, which means to have not own mobility and to be not portable/man-portable. To move them you need weapon+vehicle.

    The Russian military is fully mechanised... towing vehicles would not be a problem.

    - A lack of protection for their crews while are used.

    You are thinking of the ZU-23-2 as a weaker version of the ZSU-23-4. It is actually a rather more powerful HMG. That is how it is used these days.

    Most light mortars are crew served weapons that are small and light and portable in terms of protection the Vasilek is no less well protected than any western 82mm equivalents... but has enormous advantages in fire power.

    - A lower fire power compared to the weapons of (at least) their weight+role.

    Wrong. The western equivalent of the ZU-23 is a 50 cal HMG or a 40mm grenade launcher which are not more mobile than the ZU-23 and have rather less power and range.

    In terms of the Vasilek a Russian team can arrive to a firing position, set up and fire 32 rounds and leave before a western 82mm mortar has even gotten into position...

    The only comparable western system would be a 60mm french Brandt auto mortar mount.... and how often do you see those?

    The simple fact is that some weapons are useful for all sorts of purposes and some age quickly.

    A case in point is the anti tank rifle and towed light anti tank gun... the soviets had 14.5mm rifles and 45mm towed guns. Well after they were ineffective against enemy armour they continued in widespread use because for some targets a powerful high velocity round was useful. With the 45mm gun HE shells made them even more useful.

    The ZU-23-2 is just such a weapon... useful gate guard or for directing streams of heavy shells at a target that is being difficult. Recoilless Rifles can perform a similar role but the devastating effect of high velocity 23mm cannon shells coming through the front of your truck or light APC is not the same as anything else... remember the ZU-23 fires 23 x 152mm shells with high velocity and heavy projectiles for its calibre.

    where we actually see the reduction of the ZSU-23-4 in service, as the 23-4 is mounted on an older chassis of T-55/54 which makes it heavy, greater o

    The ZSU-57-2 had the T-55 chassis... the chassis for the ZSU-23-4 was based on the the same chassis the PT-76 was made from... a GM class chassis similar to the chassis for the 2S3 and Tunguska, and TOR...
    eehnie
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    Russian military intervention and aid to Syria #10 - Page 31 Empty Re: Russian military intervention and aid to Syria #10

    Post  eehnie on Mon Dec 05, 2016 6:35 am

    When someone fails to see the technological relation between the ZU-23-2 and the ZSU-23-4 and how a weapon and its selfpropelled variant can afford the same adversaries, we have the previous comment.

    Well even wikipedia explains very easily the technological relation between both, and why I used the word successor between "":

    https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/ZU-23-2 wrote:The ZU-23-2 was developed in the late 1950s. It was designed to engage low-flying targets at a range of 2.5 km as well as armoured vehicles at a range of two kilometres (km) and for direct defense of troops and strategic locations against air assault usually conducted by helicopters and low-flying airplanes.[2] In 1955, KBP presented the single-barrel ZU-1 and the twin-barrel ZU-14. While the former was eventually dropped, the ZU-14 was selected and, after some modifications, entered series production.

    In the Soviet Union, some 140,000 units were produced. The ZU-23 has also been produced under license by Bulgaria,[3] Poland, Egypt[4] and the People's Republic of China.[5]

    Development of this weapon into a self-propelled anti-aircraft gun (SPAAG) led to the ZSU-23-4 Shilka.

    Both fire exactly the same ammunition, and you say the ZSU-23-4 is weaker than the ZU-23-2, well let me laugh, please.

    Another important mistake of the previous comment:

    GarryB wrote:The Vasilek has wheels and can move as quickly as the vehicle towing it... which is much faster than a man portable 82mm mortar...

    This is not right. If fact the reality is just the contrary. The man-portable mortar reachs the same speed of the vehicle where the mortar and the man travel. Towed weapons affect strongly to the speed of the vehicle that carry them, and impose to the tractor vehicle their own (lower) speed limit. And not only affect to the speed, also affect strongly to the maneuverability.

    Finally a little comment:

    GarryB wrote:Wrong. The western equivalent of the ZU-23 is a 50 cal HMG or a 40mm grenade launcher which are not more mobile than the ZU-23 and have rather less power and range.

    In terms of the Vasilek a Russian team can arrive to a firing position, set up and fire 32 rounds and leave before a western 82mm mortar has even gotten into position...

    The only comparable western system would be a 60mm french Brandt auto mortar mount.... and how often do you see those?

    My comment was refered to the Russian warfare present in the Russian Armed Forces. Not wrong.

    Note that your last quote is not mine. I do not know if you are trying to intoxicate or what.


    Last edited by eehnie on Mon Dec 05, 2016 12:39 pm; edited 1 time in total
    AK-Rex
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    Russian military intervention and aid to Syria #10 - Page 31 Empty Re: Russian military intervention and aid to Syria #10

    Post  AK-Rex on Mon Dec 05, 2016 7:31 am

    Russian Su-33 crashed in the Mediterranean while attempting to land on Kuznetsov aircraft carrier

    Less than three weeks after losing a MiG-29, it looks like the Russian Navy has lost another aircraft during Admiral Kuznetsov operations: a Su-33 Flanker.

    Military sources close to The Aviationist report that a Russian Navy Su-33 Flanker carrier-based multirole aircraft has crashed during flight operations from Admiral Kuznetsov on Saturday, Dec. 3.

    According to the report, the combat plane crashed at its second attempt to land on the aircraft carrier in good weather conditions (visibility +10 kilometers, Sea State 4, wind at 12 knots): it seems that it missed the wires and failed to go around falling short of the bow of the warship.

    The pilot successfully ejected and was picked up by a Russian Navy search and rescue helicopter.

    Considered that on Nov. 14 a MiG-29K crashed while recovering to the aircraft carrier, if confirmed this would be the second loss for the air wing embarked on Admiral Kuznetsov in less than three weeks and a significant blow for the Russian Naval Aviation during its combat deployment off Syria.

    https://theaviationist.com/2016/12/05/russian-su-33-crashed-in-the-mediterranean-while-attempting-to-land-on-kuznetsov-aircraft-carrier/
    calm
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    Post  calm on Mon Dec 05, 2016 9:47 am

    Russian military hospital set up 4 civilians from E #Aleppo attacked this morning. 1 Russian doc killed 2 nurses injured. due 2 open 2moro
    https://twitter.com/LizziePhelan/status/805750051200843776?ref_src=twsrc%5Etfw
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