Airman wrote:NW. #Hama: #Israel|i airstrikes hit last night a Scientific Research Base near #Masyaf, despite presence of nearby Russian air defense.
"Article" ......if someone can call this way the authenticate mountain of garbage coming from this low level clearly pro-jihadist twitter private page......from 7 September, widely debated and debunked, moreover employing the very old phantasious ,as naive, pro-israely/western/jihadist Psy-Op narrative.
I responded in another thread to the same "news".........usually saying much more about the poster linking it than the reality of the events on the ground. https://www.russiadefence.net/t7006p950-s-300-400-500-news-russian-strategic-air-defense-2
"About the few and skirmish level scale IAF strikes of the last five years; it is always the same story : israely information operatives invent literally from nothing in each of those strike the presence of the most advanced air defences supposedly availaable to the other side (sometime ever hinting that batteries of S-300 or Buk was targeted and destroyed Laughing Laughing Laughing), anyone can recall the ridiculous phantasy soap on the presence of Pantsyr-S1 in the operation Orchard
That is done to maintain in the public opinion an image of strenght and capability of its air force very different from what the reality of those operations would suggest if revealed.
Reality of those operations is much more simpler and far less exciting : Israely HUMINT - incluing obviously "collaborative" syrian armed forces operatives - continously monitorize, for what possible, activities in proximity of potential targets in Syria with particular attention to possible presence of advanced mobile air defences and their pattern of coverage of the area.
If even only a remote possibility exist that some of the few batteries of the most advanced SAM systems would be present in the potential area of attack the operation do not receive the let-go from Israely command, because the repercussion for the failure of such an operation would be simply devastating for the image of IAF.
Only when those chances are next to zero the "placet" for the attack is conceded ,with the operation usually executed ,delivering from outside Syrian airspace, by part very few aircraft -often not more than two- capable to hide themselves among those daily present in "friendly" nation's airspace.
In substance IAF do (rightfully i can add) what it and, more in general, western Air Forces have done 99% of times in the latest 50 years : attack enemy assets defended by AD systems 25-30 years ,on average, older than the aircraft employed in those operations.
The unique time when IAF was forced to confront very few batteries of an export version of a relatively up-to-date ,for the time, SAM system , nominally 2К12Е Квадрат in the Yom Kippur war, IAF was massacrated and Israely command retain a precise memory of that."